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

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EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES IN POLITICAL GROUPS: THE CASE OF THE McCARTHY PHENOMENON*

STEVEN R. BROWN AND JOHN D. ELLITHORP
Kent State University

In many ways the study of political groups from a theoretical point of view can be said not to have progressed much beyond the conceptions of Arthur F. Bentley.[1] There have been countless studies of political groups, to be sure, but it seems most have been little more than the collection and presentation of *ad hoc* facts obtained from the testing of *ad hoc* hypotheses, the concepts of "group" and of "group behavior" having been little altered in the process.

Much of the difficulty no doubt stems from Bentley's strict empiricism and the interpretation given his position by most social scientists who have aspired to translate him. When Bentley said that we know nothing of ideas and feelings but only of activity, he was merely reminding the social scientist to remain close to the operations of the phenomena he was studying. Activity, or behavior, can be worked with and studied directly, but it is questionable whether or not the same can be said of ideas and feelings. Scientific progress, Bentley would say, can be made only if one deals with what is visible and replicable. Critics as well as followers of Bentley, however, have interpreted him to mean that such matters as subjectivity are outside the pale of science, since subjectivity is presumed to be private, idiosyncratic, and nonreplicable.

Although Bentley was no friend to subjectivist psychology, all he really required was that there be operations of some kind for one's concepts. If the concept was a subjective one but there were at the same time verifiable operations for it, Bentley would have asked for no more. But when he denied the scientific validity of nonoperational-subjectivist notions, social scientists assumed him to be opposed to subjectivity *per se. The Process of Government* preceded the development of the operational philosophy in science, but Bentley's thinking was in this tradition.[2] To him, the question was not whether the data were public or private in origin, but whether or not they could be expressed in terms of verifiable operations. Only the operations needed to be public and replicable.

However, most social scientists have missed this distinction and have therefore proceeded emphasizing only the public, manifest aspects of group life, leaving to the psychoanalysts to speculate, in ways quite unacceptable to Bentley, about the equally important emotional aspects. Contemporary group theorists usually acknowledge an emotional ingredient in group life, but few attempts are made to study these aspects for themselves, largely because such matters are so intangible. Typically, studies are designed with the assumption, erroneous according to Greenstein,[3] that these effects can be regarded as random, i.e., as having cancelled out one another so as not to have influenced the results. Despite disclaimers to the contrary, political and social scientists—apart from a handful, such as Robert Lane and Harold Lasswell—remain basically disinclined to take subjectivity seriously.

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* An earlier version of this paper was read at the meeting of the Ohio Association of Economists and Political Scientists, Columbus, March, 1969.

[1] Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908).

[2] P. W. Bridgman is generally regarded as the father of the operational philosophy, and his intellectual indebtedness to Bentley is reflected in Bridgman, "Error, Quantum Theory, and the Observer," in Richard W. Taylor (ed.), *Life, Language, Law: Essays in Honor of Arthur F. Bentley* (Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1957), pp. 125–131.

[3] Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1969), pp. 35–36.

I. BION'S THEORY OF GROUP EMOTIONALITY

It has been suggested by some theorists that individual behavior is phenomenally different from group behavior, but in his study of neurotic psychotherapeutic groups, Bion[4] contends that the psychoanalytic (individual) and group approaches are merely two different facets of the same phenomenon. This is because group behavior is dual in nature: there is the manifest *work* function for which the group ostensibly is constituted, and there is the *emotional* behavior of the group which co-exists (co-behaves) alongside the work group, following its own independent laws and occasionally interacting with the sophisticated work group.

The work function in group context is analogous to the ego in individual psychology: the sophisticated work group, through its members, is in contact with reality and makes decisions which take reality into consideration; therefore, the work group is interested in learning and development, and in its essentials provides the basis for science. The emotional group, as is the case with the nonrational components of individual psychology, is interested in satisfaction rather than development.

On the emotional plane, individuals wish to contribute anonymously to the group, and if the group has so structured itself as to allow such contributions, it has provided a means for individual evasion and denial of personal responsibility. The *group mentality* is the pool into which these anonymous contributions are made and through which desires and impulses implicit in these contributions are gratified. Thus does one have the individual and his desires on the one hand, and the group mentality on the other in what Kantor calls an interbehavioral field.[5]

The group places requirements and restrictions on the individual, thereby frustrating him. The behavior which results from the interplay between individual needs and group mentality is called *group culture*. Man is a group animal, but this aspect of his psychology frequently is not apparent until he is observed in a group situation—just as the transference phenomena is not obvious until analyst and analyzed are together, although the analyzed always has the capacity for transference. However, in order to produce certain aspects of group phenomena it is not necessary to place individuals physically in a group. In fact, as Bion says, ". . . no individual, however isolated in time and space, should be regarded as outside a group or lacking in active manifestations of group psychology."[6] An actual group merely brings into prominence certain behavioral phenomena not readily obvious in the absence of the group. Of group cultures, Bion says there are three basically different kinds, each culture distinguished from the others according to the basic assumption which appears to govern it.

The Basic Assumption of Dependence. The first basic assumption Bion discusses is that of dependence in which group members on an emotional level depend on someone (e.g., the leader) or something (e.g., tradition, the group bible, etc.). The group's behavior is made more understandable if it is assumed "that the group is met in order to be sustained by a leader on whom it depends for nourishment, material and spiritual, and protection."[7]

This is a rather immature emotional situation, similar to the infant's egocentric relationship to the parent,[8] resulting in great inefficiency in group relationships. The leader-follower relationship is direct and personal as far as the follower is concerned, with little gratification obtained from group relations. Each individual desires the leader's complete attention (just as the child wishes to dominate parental attention) and all members of the group combined therefore tend to frustrate any given member. Such a situation is frequently accompanied by resentment at being placed in a dependent position; by guilt about having been greedy; by insecurity, frustration, and a consequent desire to avoid the group situation itself; and by anger and jealousy. In his hospital groups of this type, Bion observed that one individual is typically elevated to the position of leader, and if left to its own devices the group, in search of someone congruent with the basic assumption of dependence, will select from its midst its most psychologically-ill member, the "psychiatric winner." This phenomenon occurs in this type of group because that individual who wishes to be depended upon is most apt to find his needs complemented by a group with members who in turn are looking for someone upon whom to depend. That person with greatest need to be sustained and nourished by the group (i.e., who depends on the group) typically is not the group's strongest member; indeed, from a characterological standpoint, he is frequently its weakest.

---

[4] W. R. Bion, *Experiences in Groups* (London: Tavistock, 1961). Essays in this volume previously were published in the following locations: *Human Relations,* 1 (1948), 314–320; *ibid.,* 487–496; *ibid.,* 2 (1949), 13–22; *ibid.,* 295–304; *ibid.,* 3 (1950), 3–14; *ibid.,* 395–402; *ibid.,* 4 (1951), 221–228; *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis,* 33 (1952), 235–247. A summary of Bion's theoretical position can be found in Marshall Edelson, *Ego Psychology, Group Dynamics, and the Therapeutic Community* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1964), pp. 31–40.

[5] J. R. Kantor, "Feelings and Emotions as Scientific Events," *Psychological Record,* 16 (October, 1966), 377–404.

[6] Bion, *op. cit.,* p. 169.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 147.

[8] "Egocentric," that is, in the sense in which it is used by Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York: Free Press, 1965), to refer to that stage in which the child unilaterally defers to the generalized Elder. Under certain conditions, this respect for parents is transferred to other authority figures, such as political leaders, as has been described by D. Wilfred Abse and Lucie Jessner, "The Psychodynamic Aspects of Leadership," in Stephen R. Graubard and Gerald Holton (eds.), *Excellence and Leadership in a Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 76–93.

Devereux has suggested that such dynamics operate in political groups as well:

> . . . power, infantilism and dependency always occur together. Some charismatic leaders were infantile and dependent long before they rose to eminence, and were actually elevated to social leadership because their behavior fitted the childish expectations of their potential followers. In other instances initially reasonably normal persons gradually become infantile and dependent as a result of having had power foisted on them.[9]

Under these conditions, Lord Acton's principle can be rephrased to read: power infantilizes, and absolute power infantilizes absolutely.

In this dependent group, all interaction is leader-member oriented: member-member interactions are minimized for there is a feeling on the part of the individual that the group can be of little help to him; all reliance is placed on the leader. It is this kind of leadership which typically is described by the psychoanalyst turned political analyst, largely as a function of the kinds of persons and groups with which the analyst is accustomed to dealing.

The Basic Assumptions of Pairing. The psychoanalytic social theorists, in emphasizing dependency, have tended to overlook other group-leadership possibilities, but Bion has described a second basic assumption group, which he calls the pairing group, wherein the group's behavior can be best understood if it is assumed that the group comes together in order to break down into smaller groups, i.e., to pair off. While in the dependent group the leader is typically visible and very real, a characteristic of the pairing group is that the leader—who is looked upon as a hero, genius, or Messiah—is unborn, i.e., is not physically present. Accompanying the pairing group, in which paired subgroups virtually ignore the larger group, is a feeling of hopeful expectation and optimistic anticipation, usually expressed in statements to the effect that conditions will improve or problems will be solved with the coming of some future event—a change in the season, a new group, a new leader, a new idea, etc. Pairing has overtones of sexuality, and the spirit of messianic hope is both a part of sexuality and a precursor of it.

Bion indicates that the optimism serves as a rationalization for guilt which derives from pleasantries characteristic of pairing behavior; however, such pleasantries are tolerated because of the importance of the ultimate goal, whatever it may be. Unlike the dependent leader, the leader of the pairing group cannot present himself and must always remain unfulfilled; otherwise, the hope characteristic of this group could not be sustained and feelings of hatred, destructiveness, and despair avoided. Optimism is therefore a defense against despair, on the one hand, and hostility, on the other (i.e., a group defense against individual tension), which points up the dynamic relationships among the various basic assumption groups.[10] Since the leader of the pairing group is absent, all interaction in the group is member-member oriented.

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[9] George Devereux, "Charismatic Leadership and Crisis," *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences,* 4 (1955), 150–151. This group search for a suitable leader is a matter of elite recruitment, and whereas the political scientist is more accustomed to thinking of an elite controlling and manipulating the mass, roles are reversed in this case: the leader is manipulated by the group, being forced in a sense to play the lead role in the common group fantasy. See Bion, *op. cit.,* p. 149.

[10] Bion, *op. cit.,* p. 151. Optimism as a rationalization is an attempt to effect a time displacement,

The Basic Assumption of Fight-Flight: The third basic assumption group delineated by Bion is that of fight-flight in which the group, almost indifferently, gathers together either to fight a common enemy or to run away from one. The leader is that individual who facilitates aggression (hostility) or evasion (avoidance, withdrawal, irrelevancy, etc.), depending on the occasion. Under these conditions, group members regard methods of dealing with a problem other than by fighting or fleeing as either nonexistent or contrary to the best interests of the group. Bion observes that the group dominated by the fight assumption typically will select for its leader that member with most marked paranoid tendencies since if members of the group cannot see the enemy, the next best thing is to choose as leader someone who apparently can.

Group members need not necessarily manifest their aggression or evasion in physical acts. Should a problem present itself, a group governed by the flight assumption, for example, might flee from the problem by denying its existence (denial), underplaying its importance (rationalization), or over-emphasizing reason in dealing with the problem (intellectualization). Lapsing into silence and refusing to talk is a way of avoiding a problem, changing the subject is another, and not showing up to meetings of the group is still another evasive technique.[11] All such are examples of individual efforts to flee from the problem at hand, to avoid a confrontation. Suicide, of course, is the ultimate in flight behavior.

Intragroup and Intergroup Dynamics. It is important to note that these three emotional group cultures are not necessarily opposed to one another: cultures can alternate within the same group of people, sometimes rapidly and sometimes very slowly. Frequently different emotional strategies are used unknowingly by group members to protect the group. As an example, a group may be operating initially according to the dependent assumption. If the leader, however, attempts to democratize the group—e.g., by dispersing power and decision-making—and if group members do not wish to take on responsibilities for their own futures (preferring instead to leave this to the leader), then the group may switch to a flight stance in order to protect itself—e.g., by "pretending" not to understand the leader and what he is trying to do. Bion found patients in some groups so unwilling to be cured as to band together in silence as if to deprive him of the information necessary to effect their cures—an example of a group fighting a common enemy, the therapist, who was the shared source of individual anxiety.

Alternatively, a group may take evasive pairing action in order to isolate a threat—e.g., by talking amongst themselves and ignoring the leader. The group, as an organic whole, in this sense is capable of strategically changing the basic assumption upon which the membership has operated in order to adjust to changing circumstances. It is not unusual to see members of a group isolate a stranger in their midst, particularly if he is threatening, by suddenly turning their backs on him, even if only symbolically, and talking amongst themselves. In this way the group protects the purity of its membership by adopting the pairing assumption. (It was this tendency to maintain the "purity of its membership" which led Bion to suggest an aristocratic bias in the pairing group.)

What has been described thus far is strictly the emotional side of the coin. Groups have their sophisticated, or work, functions which are reality oriented and which can therefore, from an analytic point of view, be treated quite separately from the emotional behavior, although the two kinds of behavior are dynamically related and have analogous components. For example, work groups stress *cooperation* which is characteristically voluntary, rational, and dependent to a certain degree on the mental and motor development and experience of the individual, involved. The equivalent basic-assumption term is *valency*, a term Bion borrowed from physics "to express a capacity for instantaneous involuntary combination of one individual with another for sharing and acting on a basic assumption."[12] So while cooperation is voluntary, rational, and learned, valency is involun-

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the rationalization thereby producing a futuristic outlook. The rationalization, however, is a defense against a present (not future) threat. Any immediate behavior, therefore, must contain what Ezriel calls a "because clause": a person adopts one course of futuristic behavior and avoids another *because* he fears the consequences of the latter, and not because he is genuinely interested in the possibilities of the former. See Henry Ezriel, "Notes on Psychoanalytic Group Therapy: II. Interpretation and Research," *Psychiatry*, 15 (1952), 119–126.

[11] Absence as flight behavior is illustrated in Eléonore L. Herbert and E. L. Trist, "The Institution of an Absent Leader by a Students' Discussion Group," *Human Relations*, 6 (1953), 215–248.

[12] Bion *op. cit.*, p. **153**.

tary, inevitable, and purely automatic, an expression of the gregariousness in man's personality and the prime determinant of the extent of an individual's interaction on the basic assumption level. Just as individuals differ with regard to the amount of cooperation which they are willing to contribute to a task situation, so individuals differ in the amount and kind of valency which they are capable of expressing in particular basic assumptions situations. The emotional group leader frequently holds his position by virtue of his valency; i.e., because he is the personification of the group's basic assumption.[13]

Bion suggests that certain groups are set aside for specialized functions in a society, each group demanding and functioning best with a certain kind of leadership congruent with the basic assumption of the group: the church places a premium on dependency valency, and members can combine with one another almost instantaneously to form a dependency structure on an emotional level; the aristocracy, Bion presumes, is endowed with pairing valency, able to protect the purity of its strain and to obtain gratification from the sexual symbolization of the pairing group; and the military, of course, draws a disproportionate number of individuals prepared to augment the fight assumption.

Again, two kinds of behavior are progressing simultaneously within the same group of individuals and operating according to quite different laws of behavior: the work group follows one set of reality-bound laws and is devoted to development through time; the emotional group follows another set of laws unrelated to reality or time—more properly, bounded by its own sense of reality and time. Bion's methodology can be compared to the different ways of looking at this cube: looked at one way corner AB is closest, while looked at another way CD is closest. Similarly, as Bion notes "in a group, the total of what is taking place remains the same, but a change of perspective can bring out quite different phenomena."[14]



It may seem like a big jump from the small therapy groups with which Bion dealt to the large-scale groups with which political scientists are expected to deal, but Bion's contention is that all groups—indeed, whole cultures—will behave according to one of these three basic assumptions. He suggests, for example, that the Egypt of the Pharaohs exemplified an entire civilization geared to implement the basic assumption of dependency, with all human energy devoted to obedience toward, and the coddling of, a central figure. The childishness of the Roman Emperor Caligula might also be pointed to as the pattern of behavior consistent with that which might be expected under conditions of dependency. More recently, wartime Germany would seem to illustrate a society dominated primarily by the fight assumption, and Adolph Hitler's oft-mentioned paranoia coincides with that expected to characterize the leader under these conditions.

Accepting Bion's theory as tentative—and Bion recognizes this tentativeness—we should be able to find some evidence supportive of his contentions with any group whatever, political or otherwise. In principle, it should not matter whether the group under immediate scrutiny is a political party, pressure group, street-corner gang, professional gathering of Ph.Ds, or whatever—i.e., since the theory presumably applies to the emotional behavior of groups, we should be able to select any group irrespective of its rational task so long as it is structured in such a way as to permit emotional expression. Modern political science has been prone to study the work functions of various groups, and much of the technological development associated with the behavioral persuasion has been in support of this important but limited interest. However, Bion warns that "since work-group functions are always pervaded by basic-assumption phenomena it is clear that techniques that ignore

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[13] Cecil A. Gibb ("The Principles and Traits of Leadership," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* 2 (July, 1947), 267–284) earlier pointed to the relationship between an individual's being a leader and his ability to embody many of the qualities of his followers.

[14] Bion, *op. cit.,* p. 87. One might also make an analogy to the focussing of a camera lens: if one focusses on the foreground, the background becomes blurred; if, on the other hand, one focusses far away, objects close by will become blurred. This does not mean that the objects close by do not exist, only that attention has been directed elsewhere. Similarly, the study of emotional group behavior does not deny the existence of task-oriented behavior.

Main Effects	Levels			N	df
A. Basic assumption	(a) Dependence	(b) Pairing	(c) Fight	3	2
B. Expressive valence	(d) Positive	(e) Negative		2	1

$m = 10$ statements per combination, $mAB = (10)(3)(2) = 60$ items

FIG. 1. Factorial Design of Bion's Theory

the latter will give misleading impressions of the former."[15]

The following is an illustration of how Bion's theory might be applied to political groups, in this instance involving the followers of Senator Eugene McCarthy during his 1968 bid for the Democratic party's nomination for President.

II. DESIGN OF THE STUDY

For instrumental purposes, Bion's theory can be reduced in its essentials to a completely randomized design with two main effects in factorial arrangement,[16] as indicated in Figure 1. In this instance, there are $3 \times 2 = 6$ combinations of the two main effects: *ad* Dependency, *ae* Counterdependency, *bd* Pairing, *be* Counterpairing, *cd* Flight, and *ce* Flight.

In early autumn, 1968, members of a graduate seminar in political behavior sought out and interviewed in depth supporters and former supporters of Senator McCarthy. The statements of opinion by the respondents—along with statements from another source[17] rewritten specifically for this study, as well as some items which were invented by the authors—provided us with a population of approximately 250 statements covering the McCarthy phenomenon domain, including statements about group experiences. From this population were sampled 60 statements, 10 theoretically representing each of the six combinations in Figure 1. The following are illustrative:

I think that a man like McCarthy, even though he had failed, would have made the country proud. He was a man I could follow. (*ad* Dependency)

I did not like McCarthy as a person, but I liked his ideas. (*ae* Counterdependency)

The McCarthy phenomenon has allowed me to hope that changes will be made. I am confident that by 1972 someone will emerge to provide the leadership we need. (*bd* Pairing)

I didn't have much time for those who were interested in McCarthy because it was "the thing" to do. It wasn't supposed to be fun. (*be* Counterpairing)

Maybe we weren't defeated after all. Maybe McCarthy did his job: He got rid of L.B.J. didn't he? Besides, it's not over yet by any means. (*cd* Fight)

I don't think about McCarthy anymore. I was shocked by the result of the convention, and now I have no intention of participating further. (*ce* Flight)

For purposes of this study, the items and the factorial design they represent are theoretical matters. The design is used to aid in the generation of what Brunswik calls a representative stimulus situation: by following the structure represented in the design, we insure situational comprehensiveness on theoretical grounds.[18] Rather than scale scores, which are the raw data of scaling methodology, our basic datum is what the respondent does with the items, i.e., we are interested in the subjects' operations as they manipulate the statements. Any meanings or significances to be attributed to these behavioral operations come after the respondent has behaved rather than before.

The operations are provided in the context of *Q* technique, a modified ranking procedure described by Stephenson.[19] The 60 statements are randomly numbered, typed on cards, and presented to the respondent who is asked to provide his viewpoint. To facilitate this task, he is presented with an opinion-continuum from +5 (most agree) to −5 (most disagree), with 0 (neutral, ambiguous, etc.) in the center, as follows:

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

[16] See Roger E. Kirk. *Experimental Design: Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences* (Belmont, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1968), pp. 171–229.

[17] Dorothy Stock and Herbert A. Thelen, *Emotional Dynamics and Group Culture* (New York: New York University Press, 1958). The statements, the factorial combinations they represent, and their factor scores (to be discussed subsequently) can be obtained from the authors.

[18] Egon Brunswik, *Perception and the Representative Design of Psychological Experiments* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956). More appropriate for the methodology employed here, see Steven R. Brown, "On the Use of Variance Designs in *Q* Methodology," *Psychological Record*, in press; and S. R. Brown and Thomas D. Ungs, "'Representativeness' in the Study of Political Behavior," forthcoming.

[19] William Stephenson, *The Study of Behavior: Q-technique and Its Methodology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). A guide to literature on this technique is to be found in S. R. Brown,

	(most disagree)									(most agree)	
Score	−5	−4	−3	−2	−1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
Frequency	4	5	5	6	6	8	6	6	5	5	4

Rather than responding to each item singly, as in a questionnaire, respondents individually display all items along the continuum with a given number being required to be placed beneath each category to implement comparability of response.

The respondents themselves were obtained in a manner similar to the way in which statements were obtained, i.e., by design, as in Figure 2. It was presumed that McCarthy activists would have had differing group experiences compared to those who wore McCarthy buttons only; similarly, it was expected that women might have reacted to McCarthy differently from men.[20] All respondents therefore were McCarthy supporters, but an activist was the kind of person who contributed heavily of his time: Most had attended the Democratic National Convention or traveled to the various state primaries. The sample was small—$N = 34$ respondents—but quite sufficient for exploratory purposes, as will be indicated.

Data-gathering took place during a period of time just prior to the November, 1968, general election. Each respondent in the study provided his ranking of the statements (from "most agree" to "most disagree") and all 34 *Q* sorts were intercorrelated, providing a 34 × 34 matrix, and the correlation matrix was factor analyzed. Five principal axis factors resulted and were rotated to a position in simple structure, as shown in Table 1. This means that of the 34 separate *Q* sorts provided by the respondents, the statements were distributed in only five basically different ways. At this point it is possible to identify those individuals who cluster together—i.e., those who organized the statements in a similar fashion and therefore, frim Bion's perspective, demonstrate common valency—and construct one *Q* sort from a weighted average of all their separate *Q* sorts. This then reduces the data to five *Q* sorts, representing five different points of view about the McCarthy experience, and these can be looked at separately and comparatively for any implications that might be derived in terms of Bion's theory.[21]

III. THE FACTORS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

Factor 1—Dependence. The first factor is composed of respondents 1–6 (Table 1) and

Main Effects	Levels		N	df
A. Degree of involvement	(a) Activist	(b) "Button-wearer"	2	1
B. Sex	(c) Male	(d) Female	2	1

FIG. 2. Person-Set for McCarthy *R*s

"Bibliography on *Q* Technique and Its Methodology," *Perceptual and Motor Skills*, 26 (April, 1968), 587–613. The *Q*-sorting session in this instance becomes an experimental situation (similar to the psychoanalytic session described by Ezriel, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-123), which allows the respondent to enter into the object relationships in a dynamic way as they are represented in the *Q*-sample structure. If Bion's theory is correct, some respondents will resonate to some items, will become defensive toward others, and so forth, and in a systematic way.

[20] The importance of sex differences in political orientations has not been stressed often enough. Men and women are reared under different sets of contingencies, and as a consequence each sex develops a prior readiness to perceive certain events to which the other is oblivious, as subsequent results indicate. See Irving E. Sigel, "Rationale for Separate Analyses of Male and Female Samples on Cognitive Tasks," *Psychological Record*, 15 (July, 1965), 369–376.

[21] Most factor work proceeds by correlating tests across a sample of persons. Inverted factor work, of which this study is an example, proceeds by correlating persons across a sample of tests, where "tests" in this case are *Q* statements. Correlation under these conditions indicates the extent that respondents did or did not rank the statements in essentially the same pattern, providing us with

TABLE 1.—FACTOR MATRIX FOR MCCARTHY STUDY

	Characteristics				Factor Loadings				
R	Sex	Age	A/BW*	Education	1	2	3	4	5
1	F	24	BW	19 years	68	02	−10	18	30
2	F	28	BW	18 years	67	12	19	09	07
3	F	23	BW	M.A.	60	10	19	23	17
4	M	24	BW	15 years	58	08	17	−10	15
5	F	39	A	M.S.	57	15	14	36	20
6	M	20	BW	13 years	46	−18	24	27	07
7	F	21	A	15 years	10	77	−05	11	14
8	M	22	BW	M.A.	37	55	38	27	16
9	M	28	A	M.A.	09	44	19	23	21
10	F	22	BW	15 years	37	24	18	07	16
11	M	40	A	Ph.D.	33	11	55	03	34
12	M	21	BW	14 years	36	15	48	01	24
13	M	17	A	13 years	22	13	46	−10	07
14	M	50	BW	Ph.D.	26	26	43	24	01
15	M	21	BW	15 years	03	−22	41	21	03
16	M	23	BW	M.A.	−10	28	−14	70	27
17	F	38	BW	16 years	10	−04	02	63	−07
18	M	29	BW	M.A.	02	12	16	55	−10
19	M	30	A	Ph.D.	27	31	36	55	12
20	M	27	BW	18 years	13	13	38	47	37
21	M	32	A	Ph.D.	34	10	21	−06	72
22	F	22	BW	16 years	28	−01	10	10	63
23	M	26	BW	14 years	32	24	07	−10	60
24	F	21	BW	16 years	−01	29	08	27	40
25	F	26	BW	16 years	61	18	45	−10	31
26	F	21	BW	16 years	58	60	08	07	10
27	M	29	BW	16 years	56	18	51	08	31
28	M	25	BW	M.A.	45	23	65	−03	26
29	F	21	BW	– – – –	43	36	52	−18	21
30	F	21	A	15 years	05	51	55	18	07
31	F	23	BW	M.A.	39	42	26	61	−10
32	F	18	A	12 years	11	07	53	44	38
33	M	23	BW	M.A.	17	−04	−18	22	−14
34	M	25	BW	15 years	32	29	25	15	33

* A = Activist BW = "Button-wearer"
Decimals have been omitted. Respondents' saturations exceeding ±40 are significant (p <.01).

can be best described as dependent in nature, not just because it gives some of the dependent statements high marks, but because the marks given other statements as well betray what is called here a dependent stance. The factor is proud of the leader, Senator McCarthy, and

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an indication as to how the audience was segmented relative to the phenomenon. Factors now represent clusters of likeminded persons, not clusters of traits. (See Stephenson, *loc. cit.*, for the differences between *Q* and *R* factor analysis.) Further, the factors in this study are inductive, such that individual membership in a factor is nonarbitrary: Respondents 1–6 in Table 1 are members of factor 1 because they organized the statements in essentially the same way. The factor array is simply their six *Q* sorts, which are already similar, averaged together. The factors then are nonarbitrary types, or classes (operants), in Skinnerian terminology. (See B. F. Skinner, *Contin-*

defends him, as indicated by the scores given the statements which follow:[22]

8. I did not like McCarthy as a person, but I liked his ideas. (—5)
16. I think that a man like McCarthy, even though he had failed, would have made the country proud. He was a man I could follow. (+5)
35. McCarthy was too stubborn, too idealistic. He should have compromised more. (—5)
42. Until McCarthy announced, I was getting kind of unsure of the future. I must say, I really felt relieved to have someone like him stand up for what I believed. (+4)
53. McCarthy was not a serious candidate because he was never emotionally involved in the race. Had I been in his place, I would have been more aggressive. (—5)

Characteristic of the dependent group, as described by Bion, is the orientation of the member to the leader and the relative dissociation of the member from other group members. It is not surprising therefore to find factor 1 disavowing any pleasures were derived from group activity:

2. I found I could always speak intimately with other McCarthy people. In fact, the whole movement was intimate. (—3)
6 .Although I supported McCarthy as a candidate, I didn't bother to take the time to become deeply involved with other McCarthyites. (+4)
13. As I look back on it, the best times were when we would campaign in groups of two or three—door-to-door, over coffee, at social gatherings. (—2)

Instead, factor 1 stresses the impersonal, intellectual, and philosophical aspects of the movement:

27. I was oriented more toward the McCarthy movement as a whole than toward particular individuals in it. (+4)
50. During the primaries, I always preferred to discuss the issues in intellectual rather than personal terms. (+4)
55. I was primarily interested in the philosophical implications behind the McCarthy movement. (+5)

Such behavior would suggest that flight behavior was employed to protect a basically dependent orientation, and there is good evidence the factor withdrew from threatening or competitive situations:

3. Frankly, I'm tired of the whole mess—Republicans, Democrats, even McCarthy and politics in general. When these things come up, I would just as soon change the subject. (+3)
4. I have strong views, and whenever I got together with other McCarthy people, I always contributed my 2-cents worth. (—3)
20. I really feel as though I played an active, influential role in the McCarthy movement—at least as far as one individual could. (—5)
28. During the primaries, if I heard anyone say anything against McCarthy, I was immediately prepared to debate. (—4)

Although the factor declares an interest in the intellectual aspects (nos. 50, 55), elsewhere it seems to betray a wish that the entire situation would vanish (no. 3)—hardly an intellectual posture. Indeed, there is evidence the factor is unwilling to face the realities of the leader's defeat, a characteristic of the dependent syndrome mentioned by Bion and substantiated by reaction to this statement:[23]

29. When McCarthy lost the nomination, I felt as though I had lost, too. After him, I felt there was no one left I could look up to. (0) [Factors 2, 3, 4, and 5 scored this item +3, +3, —5, and +4, respectively.]

Only factor 1 fails to react strongly to this statement, one way or the other, indicating only factor 1 has failed to come to grips with what is implied.

In light of these observations, it is of considerable interest to find in Table 1 that the largest number of persons associated with factor 1 are women: female respondents, 1, 2, 3, and 5 are

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gencies of Reinforcement (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 127–132.) Much typological work, on the other hand, is arbitrary with respondents assigned to a type or not as a function of operations performed by the investigator: For example, whether a person is typed as a moron, nincompoop, or genius depends on the magnitude of his IQ relative to the arbitrary cut-off point imposed by the test-giver. In the present study, however, respondents classify themselves by behaving or not behaving alike as manifested in the intercorrelations based on their independent card sortings.

[22] Scores for statements in each factor range from +5 (most agree) to —5 (most disagree) with the same frequency as in the forced distribution above. Each factor at this point can be regarded as an operant possibility, i.e., in principle an individual exists who would provide this arrangement of the statements to represent his own viewpoint. When factors are referred to as if they were persons, therefore, reference is to the operant possibility of which those loaded on a factor are approximations.

[23] Bion, *op. cit.*, pp. 120–121. In Bion's psychoanalytic framework, the failure of the dependent type to react to such a statement would reflect an unwillingness to accept the symbolic death of the leader.

all pure for the factor. Women as a class do not typically become involved in direct political action, and upon becoming active some might therefore be expected initially to experience a feeling of incompetence, perhaps followed by withdrawal and a façade of pseudo-intellectuality. Further, women more than men tend to be socialized into being submissive to authority figures (fathers, husbands, bosses, etc.), and political novices finding no other criteria upon which to rely for the evaluation of an immediate and complicated political phenomenon might easily regress to earlier internalized infantile reaction patterns.[24] When in a situation of conflict, individuals select that framework for dealing with the situation which they have relied upon before. If the nearest framework happens to be that which was learned early in one's life space, lacking other alternatives it will just have to suffice.

Factor 2—Pairing. This factor comes closest to following the behavior described by Bion as pairing, as indicated by the scores assigned the following statements:

9. I was sometimes reluctant to go to rallies and work meetings. I didn't like to get all worked up emotionally, even about McCarthy. I was for him, and that was enough. (—2)
11. I suppose I was fairly unresponsive to friendly gestures from other persons in the McCarthy group, but I was generally too involved with the "cause" to waste time socializing. (—4)
19. I had a tendency to remain somewhat detached from the rest of the McCarthy people—they always impressed me as being rather cliquish. (—3)
21. I didn't have much time for those who were interested in McCarthy because it was "the thing" to do. It wasn't supposed to be fun. (—4)
26. McCarthy was an intellectual. The average person did not understand him. To understand him you have to be educated—above average. (+3)
44. Even at the Democratic convention, right up through the voting of the states, I hoped and prayed that McCarthy would get the nomination. (+5)
48. The McCarthy phenomenon has allowed me to hope that changes will be made. I am confident that by 1972 someone will emerge to provide the leadership we need. (+5)
52. The McCarthy movement could have attracted more support if its members hadn't of acted like they were part of an exclusive club. (—5)

The aristocratic bias of the pairing viewpoint, as suggested previously, is emphasized at least indirectly by such statements as no. 26 (which implies that the respondent is above average), while the accusation that the movement was in fact exclusive (no. 52) is strongly denied. Highly characteristic and distinguishing for this factor is the feeling of hope which Bion said would be associated with the pairing attitude as defense against despair. Statements 44 and 48 are particularly indicative of this messianic posture. Bion also postulated a kind of sexuality to accompany pairing, and although the factor 2 type may tend to display a kind of exclusiveness toward out-group members, statements such as nos. 9, 11, 19 and 21 would indicate a feeling of intimacy, affection, and playfulness toward those inside the group. As an aside, it is interesting (and theoretically comforting) that the female respondent with the highest saturation on this factor was not only the vice president of a local group supporting McCarthy, but also the steady girlfriend of the president of the same organization.

Despite its natural tendency to display warmth, the pairing factor also has the capacity to become aggressive:

28. During the primaries, if I heard anyone say anything against McCarthy, I was immediately prepared to debate. (+4)
46. Whenever McCarthy or his followers were attacked, I tended to defend them. (+4)

This acceptance of fight behavior on the part of the pairing group was also found by Stock and Thelen,[25] and while it appears incongruent with the friendliness presumably characteristic of this factor, apparently no one is more surprised at this than is factor 2 itself, as witnessed by the following response:

45. During the McCarthy days, I was sometimes surprised at my own willingness to get involved in intense arguments. (+4) [Factors 1, 3, 4, and 5 scored this item —1, —4, +3, and +2, respectively.]

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[24] See footnote 20. Wiebe found the same phenomenon in the reaction of women to Senator Joseph McCarthy during the televized Army-McCarthy hearings of the 1950s. See G. D. Wiebe, "The Army-McCarthy Hearings and the Public Conscience," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 22 (Winter 1958–1959), 490–502; Wiebe, "Social Values and Ego Ideal: Recollections of the Army-McCarthy Hearings," *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, 5 (1958), 164–186. The 1968 McCarthy phenomenon lended itself to emotional expression since a large number of his followers were novices who brought with them no previous political experiences upon which to draw. The mass character of the movement is illustrated in William P. McDonald and Jerry G. Smoke, *The Peasants' Revolt: McCarthy 1968* (Mt. Vernon, Ohio: Noe-Bixby, 1969).

[25] Stock and Thelen, *op. cit.*, pp. 43–44.

As can be seen from differential scores assigned this statement, being surprised at one's own aggressiveness is not characteristic of factor 3, to which we now turn.

Factor 3—Fight. This factor is geared for the expression of aggression, and while the dependent factor 1 was primarily female in membership, factor 3 is masculine: no female has a pure saturation on this factor. (See Table 1.) The fight posture is indicated by the following statements and their accompanying factor scores:

12. McCarthy not only talked as others did, but came out and demonstrated. He knew it was difficult to go against the Johnson Machine, but he was not afraid to try. (+4)
18. McCarthy himself was not really that important. "The Movement" was looking for him and accepted him, but it also preceded him. (+4)
25. Maybe we weren't defeated after all. Maybe McCarthy did his job: He got rid of L.B.J. didn't he? Besides, it's not over yet by any means. (+5)
31. I was glad McCarthy didn't endorse anyone at the convention. I figured, if he was going to buck the system, he should go all the way. (+5)
41. I supported McCarthy because he bucked the political system. He knew the strength of the Johnson Machine, but chose to go ahead regardless of the consequences. (+5)
60. I liked McCarthy's attitude after the convention. Humphrey acted like it was a kid's game where everyone shakes hands after it's over. McCarthy realized it wasn't a game, that the issues still existed. (+5)

The kind of person who would give the factor 3 statement ranking as his own would be a person prepared for political battle. The main enemy for factor 3 is President Johnson, and Senator McCarthy is admired and supported for opposing the President. Any suggestion of withdrawal or retreat—in short, of *flight*—is incongruent with the prevailing basic assumption and therefore is rejected:

3. Frankly, I'm tired of the whole mess—Republicans, Democrats, even McCarthy and politics in general. When these things come up, I would just as soon change the subject. (—5)
17. When McCarthy endorsed Humphrey, it was his recognition that you can't beat the system. I don't blame him I think he's probably right. (—4)
22. I don't think about McCarthy anymore. I was shocked by the result of the convention, and now I have no intention of participating further. (—5)

Bion's concept of valency is well illustrated in the case of the fight-oriented factor 3, particularly when compared, as in Table 2, with the other factors thus far considered in the scores assigned statement 58. Factor 3 to some extent recognizes in itself an aggressive tendency and, following Bion, is cognizant of the fact that the McCarthy movement was probably more catalytic than causal as far as the expression of this aggression is concerned; the score assigned statement 18 (*supra*) also supports this. Bion therefore seems to be on the right lines: ". . .the accepted leader of a group in this [fight-flight] state is one whose demands on the group are felt to afford opportunity for flight or aggression and if he makes demands that do not do so, he is ignored."[26] McCarthy's continued opposition to Hubert Humphrey, even after the Democratic party had made its convention decision, was perhaps an attempt to retain the loyalty of the factor 3 type, i.e., implicit recognition by McCarthy that if he did not afford the opportunity for opposition that he might indeed be ignored by a large and effective segment of his following.[27]

TABLE 2.—VALENCY IN THE FIGHT FACTOR

Statement no. 58	Factor Scores Dependence	 Pairing	 Fight
I tend to be impulsive in expressing my feelings about "the system," the War—the whole bit. And I think the McCarthy movement brought this out in me more than ever.	−3	−4	+2

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[26] Bion, *op. cit*, p. 152. The fight orientation, as is the case with the other basic assumptions, can have a persistent quality. In a speech before a 1969 graduating class, McCarthy reportedly received his biggest ovation for the following statement: "You may be called upon to cross the Red Sea knowing it will close on you—and, having made the passage, realize that you may be called upon to make the passage again." See Susan Brownmiller, "Eleven Months After Chicago: Gene McCarthy Is Waiting for a Sign," *New York Times Magazine,* July 20, 1969, p. 25. Upon the same occasion, a McCarthy supporter is also reported to have said, "Really like old times. Even the Boston Globe said he was welcomed like a returning hero. . . . A lot of us are prepared to go the route with him again." It would be difficult to find a clearer expression of the leader-follower relationship in the fight context.

[27] McCarthy's implicit recognition of his followers' wants frequently borders on the explicit. As he was again reported to have said (in Brownmiller, *ibid.*, p. 18), "Last year I was more outspoken than anybody. I fought the fight where it should have been fought. What is it that people

TABLE 3.—STATEMENTS DISTINGUISHING FACTOR 4

Statements	Factor Scores 1	2	3	4	5
4. I have strong views, and whenever I got together with other McCarthy people, I always contributed my 2-cents worth.	−3	3	−1	5	3
15. Although I was part of the McCarthy movement, I wasn't always in agreement with McCarthy himself, and I often said so.	2	1	2	5	0
29. When McCarthy lost the nomination, I felt as though I had lost, too. After him, I felt there was no one left I could look up to.	0	3	3	−5	4
33. It's hard for me to express what it was about McCarthy that attracted me, but as far as I'm concerned, he would have been the difference between *the* President and *my* President.	2	5	−1	−3	2
37. Most of McCarthy's followers will probably disagree with me, but I didn't think he was as graceful in defeat as he was in victory.	−1	1	−5	5	−2
57. While McCarthy was still in the running, I was deeply interested in this year's race, but when he didn't make it, I didn't much care who won.	1	−1	−1	−5	2

Factors 4 and 5. These two factors are of interest because they appear to be specific to this particular political phenomenon: they probably would not have emerged had the data been collected prior to the Democratic Convention. Factor 4 in a sense represents the other side of the emotional coin to the dependent factor 1 and may be characterized as "counterdependent." This is not to say factor 4 was opposed to McCarthy for all respondents in this study were or had been McCarthy supporters. Factor 4 was just not as much taken by the movement, appears a bit disgusted with Senator McCarthy's intransigence, looks at matters in a more emotionally-detached manner compared to the other factors, and in its present stage comes closest to Bion's concept of the work group, as indicated by the scores assigned the statements in Table 3. Factor 4 persons appear not as committed to McCarthy *per se* but, in contrast to the other factors, more goal-oriented. These were probably the loyal Democrats who made up factor 4, and when McCarthy lost the nomination, they were prepared to move in behind the winner.

Stock and Thelen mention that counterdependency is characterized by high work orientation, rejection of hostility, and rejection of flight of the irrelevancy type,[28] and factor 4 appears to fit this description. The factor appears willing to discuss the political issues on a rational, but not on an emotional, level. Useless hostility (fight) is rejected as is an attitude of "dropping out," i.e., irrelevant flight. It is worthy of note that this factor, as was the case with factor 3, is primarily male in composition and in its attitude toward the group leader is most opposite to the supportive attitude expressed by factor 1, which was primarily female.

Factor 5 also appears to be an attitude existing as a function of events surrounding the Democratic Convention. Respondents from this factor probably would have been associated with the bitter-enders of factor 3 prior to the Convention, but while factor 3 continues an uncompromising fight stance, factor 5 has surrendered and might therefore, as a first approximation, be labeled "defeatist." The statements in Table 4 would tend to indicate factor 5 was highly committed to McCarthy on a personal basis, but in the face of defeat is prepared to give up, when compared to the readiness of the other factors, at least to give up on the political system as it presently exists. Factor 5 wanted only McCarthy and when he lost, the loss was personal and total.[29] Factor 5 sees the course of

TABLE 4.—STATEMENTS DISTINGUISHING FACTOR 5

Statements	Factor Scores 1	2	3	4	5
17. When McCarthy endorsed Humphrey, it was his recognition that you can't beat the system. I don't blame him—I think he's probably right.	−4	−2	−4	−2	1
18. McCarthy himself was not really that important. "The Movement" was looking for him and accepted him, but it also preceded him.	2	4	4	3	−1
22. I don't think about McCarthy anymore. I was shocked by the result of the convention, and now I have no intention of participating further.	−4	−2	−5	−5	1
25. Maybe we weren't defeated after all. Maybe McCarthy did his job: He got rid of L.B.J. didn't he? Besides, it's not over yet by any means.	−1	−1	5	0	−3
40. A minority of people felt the way McCarthy did and they knew he would lose, but what endeared him to his supporters was that he would be glorious in defeat.	1	2	0	1	−4
48. The McCarthy phenomenon has allowed me to hope that changes will be made. I am confident that by 1972 someone will emerge to provide the leadership we need.	3	5	4	2	−4

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would have me do now? . . . What is it that people want from me?"

[28] Stock and Thelen, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[29] For example, respondent 21, with the highest factor loading on factor 5 (Table 1), attended the Convention and reported being so angered at McCarthy's loss that he refused to return to

events as being immediately crucial: the McCarthy defeat indicates the system cannot be beaten (nos. 17, 48), at least from within. And while factors 1, 2, 3, and 4 intend to continue participating, factor 5 is uncertain (no. 22) and generally appears to be in the process of withdrawal.

This factor comes closest to flight behavior, but not enough to be so labeled at this point. One might speculate that genuine flight would have occurred had the leader publicly lead at least a symbolic retreat—e.g., by urging his followers to become apathetic and to withdraw from participation. If such had occurred there is little doubt that factors 3 and 5, who were most involved in the attack, would have been disproportionately represented in the retreat. Such polar behavior is to be expected from the fight-flight syndrome.

IV. GROUP EMOTIONALITY AND ANXIETY

Despite the fact that the respondents tended to segment into five relatively independent points of view regarding their experiences in the McCarthy movement, there are certain matters about which there was consensus. One such revolves around the function played by McCarthy's entrance into national politics, and the factor scores for statement 42 (Table 5) would seem to indicate all factors experienced a positive feeling of relief that a person of his stature and who shared their beliefs was willing to speak out. Bion, following Freud, hypothesizes anxiety as an important aspect of group formation and behavior. This isolated observation, of course, does not prove Bion's theory in any sense; however, it does support it.

TABLE 5.—RELIEF FROM UNCERTAINTY AS CONSENSUS

Statement no. 42	Factor Scores* 1	2	3	4	5
Until McCarthy announced, I was getting kind of unsure of the future. I must say, I really felt relieved to have someone like him stand up for what I believed.	1.05 +4	0.65 +2	1.08 +3	0.78 +2	1.27 +4

* Normalized factor scores are also shown to help make finer distinctions than are obvious with the rounded scores.

One must be careful however not to assume that just because individuals are agreeing or disagreeing with some manifestly specific point of view that they are doing so for the same reasons. Bion provides a warning on this point:

> Emotions associated with basic assumptions may be described by the usual terms, anxiety, fear, hate, love, and the like. But the emotions common to any basic assumption are subtly affected by each other as if they were held in a combination peculiar to the active basic assumption. That is to say, anxiety in the dependent group has a different quality from anxiety evident in the pairing group, and so on with other feelings.[30]

Feelings and emotions are qualitatively modified according to the kind of "cement," in Bion's terms, which holds them together. Anxiety in the dependent group takes on a peculiar coloration because of the guilt and depression dominant in that emotional group; anxiety in the pairing group is influenced by the predominance of messianic hope; and anxiety in the fight-flight group is modified by feelings of anger, hate, and fearfulness which characterize that group. It is an interesting but not so revealing fact that all five factors expressed a feeling of relief at McCarthy's political appearance. The real explanation of the phenomena underlying the existence of these factors however goes beyond any manifest evidence of anxiety into the sources and dynamics of these various anxieties. While anxiety may be a verifiable fact for each of the emotionality groups, the primary problem of explanation, as Sartre would say, is not to treat the mere fact, but to suggest its *signification*.[31]

Bion states that anxieties underlie the various basic assumptions of dependence, pairing, and fight-flight. In the pairing group, to provide an illustration, anxiety on the part of an individual may compel him to seek allies—ally-seeking as a

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the floor of the Convention even to listen to the acceptance speech of the Democratic vice-presidential candidate, Senator Edmund Muskie, and refused to vote for any presidential candidate in the general election. Bion has suggested (personal communication) that factor 5 may represent an attitude of hatred toward thoughtful observation itself, a kind of fight-flight behavior. If so, he speculates the depression characteristic of the factor could have two contradictory roots: Failure of the liberal-scientific attitude to prevail *and* failure to destroy the liberal-scientific attitude. Such duality has been expressed as well in pure science in what Beveridge, interestingly enough, has chosen to call the "attack-escape" reaction to new ideas. The premature ridicule heaped on new ideas in science is the very antithesis of the scientific attitude, and although the scientific attitude, as a consequence, does not prevail, neither is it destroyed. See W. I. B. Beveridge, *The Art of Scientific Investigation* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1951), pp. 105–106.

[30] Bion, *op. cit.*, pp. 154–155.

[31] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, trans. by P. Mairet (London: Methuen, 1962), pp. 26–27.

defense against anxiety—which manifests itself in the form of pairing behavior. When questioned about his overt behavior however, the individual may provide statements with the kind of sexually-symbolic content noticed by Bion and given a certain degree of confirmation in this study. But Bion suggests that such "sexual explanations" of pairing behavior may be only *rationalizations*—i.e., the anxiety exists and creates a drive which is relieved through a strategy of ally-seeking (pairing), and while the individual gives a plausible accounting for his immediate behavior, the real reason for the behavior lies elsewhere. As Ezriel was able to see (footnote 10), immediate behavior may be used deceptively—including self-deception—to avoid confronting reality.

How similar these dynamics are to those described by Lasswell in his developmental formula for political man,[32] namely, *Political Man* $= p \} d \} r$, where p represents the private motive (the source of anxiety), d represents the displacement of affect into the public arena (through projection), and r represents the rationalization of the resulting behavior in terms of a broader interest (e.g., the future well-being of the country, returning the Democratic party to "the people," making the Presidency more respectable, etc.). $\}$ means "transformed into." So long as the respondent keeps the conversation focussed on whatever is represented by r, there will be no examination of the less-defensible p. This is not a conscious deception, however, as indicated by d.

The function expressed by Lasswell's d in Bion's schema is based on a concept discussed in an earlier paper by Melanie Klein[33] wherein the leader is incorporated into the group to the extent that he is seen to be compatible with the group's basic assumption. The leader does not create the group through manipulation of his special organization skills; he is the recipient of individually-projected desires and characteristics with which the follower in turn identifies in a subtle process of *projective identification.*

Under different titles, the Kleinian concept of projective identification has been noticed in various realms of human endeavor. In theology, for example, Feuerbach made note of the uniquely human capacity for putting oneself in another's place, and he therefore was able to account for the image of the Deity as a projection of the individual's highest feelings of self: "God, as he is an object of religious sentiment, is nothing else than a product of the imagination."[34] Such projections appear to obtain an independent status, and the individual identifies with his projections as if they were separate from him, providing the essentials for alienation. The varying projections are dependent upon the human condition which in turn depends on the existing social relationships, as Marx intimated. For Feuerbach, the sublimity of the religious vision was in inverse relation to the hopelessness of the human situation: The more abject the situation, the more glorious the vision.[35]

Other patterns of behavior discussed elsewhere in the social sciences are also related to this dynamic. In the present study, for example, McCarthy can be regarded in psycho-linguistic terms as a *key symbol,* the presence of which provides a cue for those whose perspectives were similarly standardized during the formative stages of individual development.[36] For example, those persons reared under the influence of contingencies supportive of dependency behavior will develop similar perspectives; therefore, McCarthy becomes a unifying experience for them since what he symbolizes is common to all their experiences.

But going further, McCarthy's symbolic comprehensiveness was apparently sufficient for him to serve as key symbol for persons with differing patterned preferences and, as such, he fell into the category of what Edelman calls a *condensation symbol*—the recipient of diverse and simultaneous projections.[37] At this point the phenomenon becomes truly multiplex as persons with diverse perspectives resonate to the same stimulus object (McCarthy), but for different reasons as developed through different experiences. The ambiguity of the object, coupled with its remoteness, provides a target for what Blumer has chosen to call *convergent selectivity*,[38] a process by which members of a mass converge on a common object because of an idiosyncratic attraction by each of them to selected characteristics of the object. Their common convergence produces the impression of homogeneous mass behavior—previously mistaken for a herd instinct—with the further, but erroneous, assumption of homogeneous motivation.

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[32] Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics,* Compass Books (New York: Viking Press, 1960), pp. 75–76.

[33] Melanie Klein, "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms," in Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann, Susan Isaacs, and Joan Riviere (eds.), *Developments in Psycho-Analysis* (London: Hogarth Press, 1952), pp. 292–320. (Originally published: *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis,* 27 (1946), 99–110.)

[34] Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity.,* trans. by George Eliot (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), p. 317.

[35] See J. L. Talmon, *Political Messianism* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 209. As a propositional matter, Klein (*op. cit.,* pp. 303–304) postulates just the reverse, i.e., that there is a direct rather than inverse relationship between the projection and the individual's situation: "For instance, the projection of a predominantly hostile inner world which is ruled by persecutory fears leads to the introjection—a taking back—of a hostile external world; and *vice versa,* the introjection of a distorted and hostile external world reinforces the projection of a hostile inner world." The relationship of such dynamics to alienation are discussed in a symposium, "Alienation and the Search for Identity," *American Journal of Psychoanalysis,* 21 (1961), entire issue.

[36] Harold D. Lasswell, "Key Symbols, Signs and Icons," in Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, R. M. MacIver, and Richard McKeon (eds.), *Symbols and Values: An Initial Study,* 13th Symposium, Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 200.

What is suggested here, however, is that the homogeneous flocking to McCarthy really had its roots in enduring but heterogeneous motivations, and that the link between the motivations and common overt behavior is bridged by Klein's notion of projective identification. The physical remoteness of McCarthy from most of his followers provided a gap which was spanned by individual projection onto him of characteristics the individual wanted or needed to find in a leader, wants and needs being contingent on previous interpersonal relations.[39]

But if all five factors in this study have a tendency to express relief at McCarthy's having entered the political race, factor 2 (pairing) seems least inclined from an examination of the normalized factor scores for statement 42 (Table 5). While this relative lack of anxiety is not statistically significant, it is still in keeping with findings reported elsewhere. According to Josephine Klein, for example, the emotional group cultures are in a kind of hierarchy based on progressive security, with the dependent group least secure and the work group most secure. Somewhere between the two extremes is the pairing group. Being more secure than the other two major emotional groups, members of the pairing group are more opposed to withdrawal (flight), a phenomenon observed as well by Stock and Thelen.[40] All of this suggests a developing sense of self-efficacy on the part of the pairing individual, and although his gregarious and social orientation toward the McCarthy movement might be considered superficial by the more "serious" and dedicated of the McCarthy followers, still it is only factor 2 apparently who emerges from the political fray with a strong positive self-regard and a feeling of having accomplished something. (See Table 6.)

Experiences during the campaign differed, of course: The noncompromising attitudes of fac-

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[37] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, Illini Books (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967), pp. 6–7.

[38] Herbert Blumer, "The Crowd, the Public, and the Mass," in Wilbur Schramm (ed.), *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954), pp. 363–379.

[39] As a symbol, McCarthy represented something or somebody many of his followers had experienced before in their separate life spaces. As Laing states, "behavior is a function of experience; and both experience and behavior are always in relation to someone or something other than self." See R. D. Laing, *The Politics of Experience* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), pp. 9–10. The concept of projective identification has been used retrospectively to account for the facts, and this is apt to bother some investigators concerned with confirmation. The concept need not remain this inferential, however, but can be put to test. In the context of the present study, for example, statements could be obtained relative to presumed characteristics of McCarthy's character: (1) a kind person; (2) warm and friendly; (3) dependable and conscientious; (4) wary of other politicians; (5) distrustful of our present policies and policy-makers; (6) cautious of attempts to trick or ensnare him; and so forth. A sample of, say, 40-some attribute-statements could be presented to respondents, such as those in the above study, who would then be asked to rank the items from "most like what I think McCarthy is like" to "most unlike what I think McCarthy is like." If, as Bion suspects, the dependent person seeks out a father-figure type of leader, then factor-1 persons will give high scores to items like 1–3 above, reflecting their *projection* onto McCarthy of father-figure characteristics (kind, warm, dependable, and so on). The important matter, of course, is that McCarthy objectively might be none of these. The private motives of the fight-oriented individual leads to a need for a leader with paranoid tendencies and a consequent projection onto McCarthy of these kinds of traits. This is reflected instrumentally by the giving of high scores to statements like 4–6 above, indicating McCarthy to be wary, distrustful, cautious, etc. The differential rankings could then be correlated and factored as before, different factors indicating differing perceptions of the same stimulus object. The concept of projective identification then can be held constant for steady inspection in terms of factor loadings and factor scores, all subject to standard error formulae and statistical evaluation.

[40] Josephine Klein, *The Study of Groups* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), p. 184; Stock and Thelen, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

TABLE 6.—PERCEPTION OF INFLUENCE IN THE MOVEMENT

Statement no. 20	Factor Scores 1	2	3	4	5
I really feel as though I played an active, influential role in the McCarthy movement—at least as far as one individual could.	−5	4	−3	1	−3

tors 3 and 5, however, almost precluded a psychological win except under conditions of total victory. And one must keep in mind the tendency on the part of the pairing factor 2 to rationalize for the pleasantries of the pairing attitude, which might help account for the high score given by this factor to statement 20. But aside from these possibilities, by their own report factors 3 (fight) and 5 (despair) fare very poorly as far as feelings of influence are concerned; dependent factor 1 feels least influential of all; pairing factor 2 feels very influential. Counterdependent factor 4 never placed its self-esteem on the line in the first place and so had nothing to lose.

V. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

What has been illustrated manifestly is that the McCarthy movement of 1968 was not homogeneous and that the perceptions of those involved differed. This much is factual as expressed in factor-analytic terms.[41] Explanation of these differing perceptions reach into human subjectivities which are shown systematically to follow themes of group behavior suggested by Bion. Underlying all experiences is an assumption of individual tension manifested in common group action; the link between individual and group is explained in terms of projective identification, a concept encountered under various labels in psychoanalysis, linguistics, political science, theology, and sociology.

The pressures of modern society lead to various degrees of individual frustration and anxiety. Individuals, if they have anxieties, develop certain reactions to, as well as strategies for, dealing with those anxieties. And, as theory goes, individuals leave neither their anxieties nor their reaction patterns nor their strategies behind when they join groups, but bring these to the group situation. These reactions produce certain needs which the individual in concert with others in group context tries to satisfy. Bion has observed these individual-group interactions in small therapy sessions and has found them to vary about three major themes: dependency, pairing, and fight-flight. Our investigation of a political movement indicates these themes to be of more general applicability, as Bion intimated, with dynamics summarized as follows:

Dependence (factor 1). The reaction to anxiety is one of depression, and the need which develops is one for reassurance and sympathetic attention. The individual's strategy is to manipulate the group situation so as to produce a nurturant relationship. The group leader necessary for these purposes is a father-figure type, a person with an image of strength, stability, and capability for providing the needed reassurance. In a situation, as in this study, in which the leader is remote, the desired leadership traits are projected onto him.

Pairing (factor 2). The reaction to anxiety is one of a displacement in time, to a future time when the source of anxiety is in the past, and the need which develops is one for optimism and affiliation with other optimists to prevent a return in time. The leader is not present, his arrival representing that future event about which the group expresses its optimism and hopefulness. The leader is a conversation piece, and the group's hopeful anticipation makes it necessary that the leader be endowed (again through projection) with extraordinary characteristics, as if he were a genius or messiah. The greatness of the group leader and the selective affiliation of the group members provides an aristocratic aura to the group.

Fight (factor 3). The reaction to anxiety is one of anger and hate, and the need which develops is one for the expression of aggression and, consequently, a need for a suitable target for that aggression. The individual's strategy is to manipulate the group into an aggressive force, and the most appropriate leader is one who sees the enemy most clearly, usually an individual with paranoid tendencies. McCarthy, being remote, has such tendencies projected onto him by individuals managing tension in this fashion.

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[41] The genuineness of the phenomenon in a technical sense is supported by a replication study by Professor Brij B. Khare (California State College, San Bernardino) who with only 14 respondents and the same McCarthy *Q* sample has shown some of the same responses (factors) emerge again. This tends to substantiate this small-sample approach, and we are grateful to Professor Khare for his assistance. No claim, of course, can be made on the basis of a study like this regarding the percentage of this or that factor type, but the inclusion of another 1000 respondents will do little more than fill up the factor space and, perhaps, add another factor or two. However, additional factors would in no way detract from the ones we have found. This study was designed to illustrate the different ways in which the McCarthy audience was segmented, and this can be done without recourse to large numbers of cases. See S. R. Brown, *Small-Sample Behavioral Research: Procedures for Employing Q Technique in Political Science* (Kent, Thio: Institute for Government Research and Service, Kent State University, 1970), in press.

Two minor themes also emerged in this study:

Counterdependence (factor 4). Members of this factor-type are not in conflict with the McCarthy phenomenon for they have at the time of this study rejected McCarthy. Being closest, by our interpretation, to Bion's work group, this factor reacts rationally, its needs are goal-determined, and as a consequence it identifies with a leader who is a *realist.* McCarthy is abandoned because he is perceived as being unrealistic.

Defeatist (factor 5). This factor is frustrated by events surrounding the 1968 Democratic Convention and is characterized by both depression (as in dependency) and anger (as in fight). This leads to both uncertainty and aggressiveness, and these cross-pressures lead to an apparent withdrawal.

The one theme suggested by Bion which did not emerge clearly was the basic assumption of flight. The following explanation would account for this absence: the flight-oriented individual's reaction to anxiety is fearfulness which leads to a need for escape. The leader-type facilitating such behavior would be epitomized by the alarmist, the person who would see at every turn a threat from which to flee—a worried paranoid as opposed to an angry one. McCarthy's calm exterior did not lend itself readily to these kinds of projections.

The results of this study justify closer attention to Bion's theory and speculation as to its broader implications. As Bion notes, it is important to understand emotional behavior for it can influence a group's attempt to accomplish a rational task. When group members actually try to act on a basic assumption—thereby allowing the nonrational to obtrude and influence reality-based behavior—unwanted effects may result. Pairing behavior on an emotional level, for example, may be the most appropriate strategy for dealing with individual stress at a particular point in time; however, if the hallucinatory gratifications of pairing are allowed to govern reality-bound behavior, the work group may split apart. Pairing on an emotional level, if allowed to operate openly, may appear as schismatic behavior on the work level.

An actual example is provided by Ezriel who discusses an incident in therapy in which group members colluded on an emotional level to create a situation all deplored: patient X needed to be the group's *central figure* at a time the group needed a leader whom it could attack; therefore, X satisfied his needs by offering himself as leader, and this satisfied the group's need for a target to attack. The emotional group then proceeded to render ineffectual the work group: members found themselves driven, by forces beyond their rational control, into wasting the entire therapeutic session.[42] This not only illustrates how under certain conditions a person will offer himself as leader at the expense of unpopularity, but also how he may succeed in attaining that position despite sufficient opposition to defeat him.

One need not go far in politics to find examples of unconscious collusion. Beradt, for example, shows that many of those subjugated in Nazi Germany voluntarily indulged in behavior which placed them under greater subjugation—i.e., they colluded with their oppressors in their own oppression, the reverse of their rational intentions.[43] Much of the liberal-conservative debate might be looked at in the same way: *the right adheres to tradition* (the group bible) and opposes developmental change, whereas the left supports the new idea but, in the process, becomes so exacting in its demands as to cease recruiting itself. Therefore, schism and clash on an emotional level provide the illusion of group differences, whereas Bion suggests both groups may be colluding to avoid the painful synthesizing of old and new which is the essence of developmental conflict.[44]

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[42] Ezriel, *op. cit.,* p. 125. The idea of a central figure was first put forward by Fritz Redl, "Group Emotions and Leadership," *Psychiatry,* 5 (1942), 573–596. (Reprinted: Robert Endleman (ed.), *Personality and Social Life* (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 527–537.)

[43] Charlotte Beradt, *The Third Reich of Dreams,* trans. by Adriane Gottwald (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966). See also the discussion of "transpersonal system of collusion" by R. D. Laing, *The Politics of the Family* (Toronto: CBC Publications, 1969), p. 29.

[44] Bion, *op. cit.,* p. 159. Since absence of developmental process is a characteristic of the basic-assumption mentality, much interesting research could proceed by assuming from the outset that both left and right, despite what they say, are committed to no change, and then looking for the subtle ways in which this is accomplished. It is not infrequently the case that on the eve of victory, radicals make new demands which render impossible a settlement or perform acts which cause them to lose the very support necessary for the legitimate majority for which they verbally appeal.

Bion's observation that groups can switch emotional strategies as a defense against threat also has implications. Insanity used to be regarded as a kind of meaningless behavior indulged in by persons who had "gone over the edge." More recently, it has been recognized that "insanity" is a lawful and systematic game played by persons who have not been able to win by sticking to the rules of "normality," a kind of purposive behavior whereby a person plays at being insane in order to avoid (flight) having his actions judged by rational criteria. One wonders somberly if some of the more extreme forms of "socio-political insanity" we witness daily are not also playful, in this sense, and governed by motivations analogous to the desire to avoid evaluation by rational criteria. This is not a criticism of the lunatic, for there may be good reasons for his acting crazy. But that his insanity is a kind of game, under the joint control of the actor and certain environmental contingencies, and not a mental illness in any physiological sense, is becoming clearer. Likewise, recognition of the nonrational basis of rioting, burning, and other "socio-political insanities" is not to be mistaken for criticism, for economic and social conditions may make such behavior patterns inevitable.[45] However, the political scientist, as is the case with the psychiatrist, must exercise care when dealing with the actors he is studying, for since they are members of both a work and emotional group, it is not always obvious whether their verbalizations are an accurate description of the phenomenon or merely another manifestation of it.

So in conclusion, we would again emphasize the importance of subjectivity in a complete theory of political action. Rogow recently has suggested that the relationship between psychiatry and political science is like one "of those long engagements that somehow never eventuate in marriage."[46] Although the two disciplines are no closer to marriage now than they ever were, they still have an active interest in one another. No one has ever seriously denied the importance to political theory of the emotional ingredient in which the psychiatrists have always been interested. In the past, such matters have been neglected largely for lack of developed theory (which tells us where to look) and lack of techniques able to capture the dynamic aspects which inevitably accompany emotional behavior. As a consequence, most such available theories, such as Bion's, are nonpolitical and most techniques are insensitive to subjective behavior. The study reported here admittedly is a long way from untangling the vexing problems of political-group emotionality, but we hope that it has served to indicate how one might go about beginning an investigation of such matters.

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[45] See Thomas S. Szasz, *The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961). Even lunatics begin to quit acting insane, apparently of their own volition, when given the power and respect denied them in the game of reality. Playing normal is therefore to some extent contingent upon power and respect which reinforce a particular behavior pattern. Evidence of this is to be found in Robert Rubenstein and Harold D. Lasswell, *The Sharing of Power in a Psychiatric Hospital* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), and Rubenstein, "The Study of Political Processes in Psychiatric Illness and Treatment," in Arnold A. Rogow (ed.), *Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century: Essays in Honor of Harold D. Lasswell* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 147–154.

[46] Arnold A. Rogow, "Psychiatry, History, and Political Science: Notes on an Emergent Synthesis," in Judd Marmor (ed.), *Modern Psychoanalysis* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 663. See also, Fred I. Greenstein, "Private Disorder and the Public Order: A Proposal for Collaboration Between Psychoanalysts and Political Scientists," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 32 (1968), 261–281.

THE MEANINGS OF BLACK POWER: A COMPARISON OF WHITE AND BLACK INTERPRETATIONS OF A POLITICAL SLOGAN*

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I. INTRODUCTION

Angry protests against racial discrimination were a prominent part of American public life during the 1960's. The decade opened with the sit-ins and freedom rides, continued through Birmingham, Selma, and the March on Washington, and closed with protests in hundreds of American cities, often punctuated by rioting and violence. During this troubled decade the rhetoric of protest became increasingly demanding, blanket charges of pervasive white racism and hostility were more common, and some blacks began to actively discourage whites from participating either in protest demonstrations or civil rights organizations. Nothing better symbolized the changing mood and style of black protest in America than recent changes in the movement's dominant symbols. Demonstrators who once shouted "freedom" as their rallying cry now were shouting "black power"—a much more provocative, challenging slogan.

The larger and more diverse a political movement's constituency, the more vague and imprecise its unifying symbols and rallying cries are likely to be. A slogan like black power has no sharply defined meaning; it may excite many different emotions and may motivate individuals to express their loyalty or take action for almost contradictory reasons. As soon as Adam Clayton Powell and Stokely Carmichael began to use the phrase in 1966 it set off an acrimonious debate among black leaders over its true meaning. Initially it was a blunt and threatening battle cry meant to symbolize a break with the past tactics of the civil rights movement. As Stokely Carmichael put it in one of his early speeches:

> The only way we gonna stop the white men from whippin' us is to take over. . . . We've been saying freedom for six years and we ain't got nothing'. What we gonna start saying now is black power, . . . from now on when they ask you what you want, you know to tell them: black power, black power, black power![1]

Speeches of this kind not only were a challenge to the white community; they also were attacks on the currently established black civil rights leaders, especially those who had employed more accommodating appeals or had used conventional political and legal channels to carry on their struggle. Carmichael's speeches brought a swift, negative response from Roy Wilkins:

> No matter how endlessly they try to explain it, the term black power means anti-white power. . . . It has to mean going it alone. It has to mean separatism. Now separatism . . . offers a disadvantaged minority little except a chance to shrivel and die. . . . It is a reverse Mississippi, a reverse Hitler, a reverse Ku Klux Klan. . . . We of the NAACP will have none of this. We have fought it too long.[2]

Although not so adamant and uncompromising as Wilkins, Martin Luther King expressed the doubts of many moderate leaders when he said:

> It's absolutely necessary for the Negro to gain power, but the term "black power" is unfortunate because it tends to give the impression of black nationalism. . . . We must never seek power exclusively for the Negro, but the sharing of power with the white people. Any other course is exchanging one form of tyranny for another. Black supremacy would be equally evil as white supremacy. My problem with SNCC is not their militancy. I think you can be militantly nonviolent. It's what I see as a pattern of violence emerging and their use of the cry "black power," which whether they mean it or not, falls on the ear as racism in reverse.[3]

This disagreement over the implications of the black power slogan was caused partly by a clash

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[1] William J. Brink and Louis Harris, *Black and White* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 50.

[2] *New York Times*, July 6, 1966, p. 14.

[3] *Ibid*, July 6, 1966, p. 15, and July 9, 1966, p. 8.

of personalities and ambitions, but it was also the result of fundamental differences over the proper rôle of a black minority in a society dominated by white men. Should the ultimate goal be complete assimilation and the development of an essentially "color blind" society, or should blacks strive to build a cohesive, autonomous community, unified along racial lines, which would be in a stronger position to demand concessions and basic social changes from the whites? For American Negroes, who bear the brutal legacy of slavery and are cut off from their African heritage, this is a terribly difficult choice. As James Baldwin said when he compared himself with the lonely, poverty-stricken African students he met in Paris: "The African . . . has endured privation, injustice, medieval cruelty; but the African has not yet endured the utter alienation of himself from his people and his past. His mother did not sing 'Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child,' and he has not, all his life long, ached for acceptance in a culture which pronounced straight hair and white skin the only acceptable beauty."[4] The slogan black power raises all the agonizing dilemmas of personal and national identity which have plagued black Americans since the end of slavery; the current dispute over its meaning is echoed in the speeches of Frederick Douglass, Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. DuBois, and Marcus Garvey.

Those, like Harold Cruse,[5] interested in a comprehensive social theory to guide black development in the United States are not particularly impressed with the term black power because:

> it is open to just as many diverse and conflicting interpretations [as the former abstractions Justice and Liberation]. While it tries to give more clarity to what forms Freedom will assume in America as the end-product of a new program, the Black Power dialogue does not close the conceptual gap between shadow and substance any more than it plots a course for the program dynamic.[6]

Cruse hopes for the development of a synthetic political ideology in the classic sense which brings together economic, cultural and political factors; black power, at this point in time, is a label for a series of ideas which fall far short of this goal.

Whatever interpretation may be given it, black power is a provocative slogan which causes excitement and elicits strong responses from people. Even though, as Charles Hamilton says, "in this highly charged atmosphere it is virtually impossible to come up with a single definition satisfactory to all,"[7] the definition an individual selects may tell us a great deal about how he defines himself politically in a society torn by racial strife. His definition is a way for him to bring together his views on leaders and events in the environment. If he agrees with Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, he sees black power as "a call for black people in this country to unite, to recognize their heritage, to build a sense of community."[8] He may also see it as a call for anything from "premeditated acts of violence to destroy the political and economic institutions of this country" to "the use of pressure-group tactics in the accepted tradition of the American political process."[9]

We know that community leaders have strong reactions to the black power slogan, but little is known of its impact on ordinary citizens, both black and white. As we shall demonstrate, for the white citizen the slogan usually provokes images of black domination or contemporary unrest which he cannot understand or tolerate. For the black citizen, it is more likely to raise subtle issues of tactics and emphasis in the racial struggle. In this essay we will examine how blacks and whites in a large urban center define black power, why they define it as they do, and whether their view of the slogan is part of a coherent set of interpretations and evaluations, a racial ideology, which they used to define the role of blacks as political and social actors in our society.

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[4] James Baldwin *Notes of a Native Son* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), p. 122.

[5] Cruse, for example, in his provocative series of essays, *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual* (New York: William Morrow, 1967), p. 557, says that "the radical wing of the Negro movement in America sorely needs a social theory based on the living ingredients of Afro-American history. Without such a theory all talk of Black Power is meaningless."

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 545.

[7] Charles Hamilton, "An Advocate of Black Power Defines It," *New York Times Magazine*, April 14, 1968, pp. 22–23, 79–83, reprinted in full in Robert L. Scott and Wayne Brockriede, eds., *The Rhetoric of Black Power* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 178–194. This statement is found on p. 179.

[8] Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 44.

[9] Hamilton, *op. cit.*, p. 179. For a view of the concept from a broader perspective see, Locksley Edmondson, "The Internationalization of Black Power: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives," *Mawazo* (December, 1968), pp. 16–30.

II. THE DATA

Our analysis is based on data gathered in a survey of Detroit, Michigan, completed in the fall of 1967. A total of 855 respondents were interviewed (394 whites and 461 blacks). In all cases whites were interviewed by whites, blacks by blacks. The total N came from a community random sample of 539 (344 whites and 195 blacks) and a special random supplement of 316 (50 whites and 266 blacks) drawn from the areas where rioting took place in July, 1967.[10] Since there are few meaningful differences between the distributions or the relationships of interest in the random and riot-supplement samples, we have employed the total N in the analysis so that a larger number of cases are available when controls are instituted.

III. A PROFILE OF COMMUNITY OPINION

Since there is such confusion and uncertainty over the meaning of black power among the writers, spokesmen and political leaders of both races, we might wonder if the slogan has had any impact at all on average citizens. The first questions we must ask are simply: do our respondents recognize the term, have they formed an elaborate reaction to it, and if so, what meaning do they give it?

Because of the lack of consensus among community leaders about the precise meaning of black power or even agreement on a common framework for discussing the slogan, we were reluctant to use a close-ended question to capture our respondents' interpretations of the term. In order to avoid the danger of biasing responses or eliciting a random choice we used a simple, open-ended question: "What do the words 'black power' mean to you?" This has the advantage of permitting people to speak with a minimum of clues, but it also has disadvantages which we recognized. Respondents may not have given the term a great deal of thought and their answers may be unreliable indicators of their opinion (or lack of opinion). Use of the vernacular at times inhibited interpretation of the answers.[11] It was sometimes difficult to judge whether a respondent was sympathetic or unsympathetic to black power as he interpreted it. For example, a small number of Negro respondents (N = 3) could only define black power as "rebellion." We can guess their feelings about this word from the context of the interview, but this carries us a step away from their answers.

Fortunately, the answers were generally quite comprehensible and when we asked the same open-ended question of a subsample of the original respondents one year later (1968) we received answers consistent with their first response from a majority of the people.[12] In addition, in 1968 we supplemented the question on the meaning of black power with a close-ended item: "Do you approve or disapprove of 'black power'?" This provided a means of checking the criteria we developed in 1967 from the open-ended question for deciding whether respondents had a favorable or unfavorable view of the black power slogan. The correlation between our scoring as favorable or unfavorable of the 1968 respondents' interpretations of black power on the open-ended question and their own assessment, on the close-ended question, of their position was (Gamma) .99 for blacks and .97 for whites.[13]

Table 1 presents a simple profile of Detroit community responses to our question on black power. As noted above, since there were no appreciable differences for either race in the interpretations given by respondents in the riot or non-riot areas, we have included all our respondents in the analysis.[14]

Interpretations indicating a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward black power are

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[10] Riot areas were defined by a location map of fires considered riot-related by the Detroit Fire Department.

[11] See our discussion below of "nothing" as a response.

[12] The correlation between interpretations of black power on the open-ended question in 1967 and interpretations in 1968 is (Gamma) .54 for blacks and .78 for whites. We will be gathering data from the same respondents once again in September, 1970, and will report our findings in detail after the third round is completed.

[13] We will present our codings below. A more conservative coefficient for demonstrating the relationship between interpretations of black power on the open-ended question and approval or disapproval on the close-ended question would be Kendall's tau-beta. See Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classification," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* (December, 1954). The tau-beta correlations are .86 for blacks and .60 for whites. The lower coefficient in the white case reflects the relatively large percentage of whites who give favorable interpretations of black power but disapprove of the slogan. This will be discussed in more detail in the text.

[14] For the blacks, the riot area respondents gave a greater emphasis to black unity as opposed to fair share interpretations of black power, but the differences are not great. Non-riot area respondents actually were slightly more favorable to black power if we consider unity and fair share responses as indicators of positive feelings.

TABLE 1.—BLACK POWER INTERPRETATIONS, BY RACE

(Question: What do the words "black power" mean to you?)

Interpretation	Blacks	Whites
Unfavorable		
Blacks Rule Whites	8.5%	38.6%
Racism	3.9	7.3
Trouble, Rioting, Civil Disorder	4.1	11.9
"Nothing"	22.3	5.3
Negative Imprecise Comments (ridicule, obscenity, abhorrence)	6.5	11.7
Other*	4.3	5.9
	49.6	80.7
Favorable		
Fair Share for Black People	19.6	5.1
Racial (Black) Unity	22.6	5.6
	42.2	10.7
Don't Know, Can't Say	8.2	8.6
	100% (N=461)	100% (N=394)

* "Other" responses were scattered and inconsistent, although generally negative. They include references to black power as communism, radicalism, a return to segregation and a sophisticated failure to define the concept because of a perception that it has contradictory meanings. The latter answer was given by one black and five white respondents.

marked off for the convenience of the reader. As we go through the various categories the reasons for our designations will be explained in detail.

Almost 40 percent of the whites believe black power means black rule over whites, while only 9 percent of the black respondents hold this view. This attitude of the whites is clearly *not* a function of a rational projection that the increasing black population in the city of Detroit (now about 40 percent) will soon elect a black mayor, but is an almost hysterical response to the symbolism of the slogan. White people in this category usually refer to blacks taking over the entire country or even the world:[15]

(white, male, 47, 12 grades) Nasty word! That the blacks won't be satisfied until they get complete control of our country by force if necessary.

(white, male, 24, 12 grades plus) Black takeover—Take over the world because that is what they want to do and they will. There's no doubt about it. Why should they care? I'm working and supporting their kids. In time they'll take over—look at how many there are in Congress. It's there—when they get to voting age, we'll be discriminated upon.

(white, female, 28, 12 grades plus) The colored are going to take over and be our leaders and we're to be their servants. Yes, that's exactly what it means.

(white, female, 28, 12 grades) They want the situation reversed. They want to rule everything.

(white, male, 32, 11 grades) The Negro wants to enslave the white man like he was enslaved 100 years ago. They want to take everything away from us. There will be no middle class, no advancement. He is saying, "If I can't have it neither can you." Everything will be taken away from us. We'll all be poor.

(white, female, 40, 12 grades) I don't like the sound of it. Sounds like something coming to take you over.

Most of our black respondents *do not* interpret black power in this way. Blacks who were coded in this category were usually also hostile to black power. For example:

(black, male, 28, 12 grades plus) It means dominating black rule—to dominate, to rule over like Hitlerism.

(black, female, 38, 11 grades plus) It means something I don't like. It means like white power is now—taking over completely.

(black, male, 29, no answer on education) It means to me that Negroes are trying to take over and don't know how.

A few others gave this answer because they have very vague ideas about the concept:

(black, female, 50, 9 grades) Sounds like they want to take over control.

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[15] The quotes presented here are typical examples of black power definitions coded in each category. Respondents are identified by race, sex, age and educational attainment for the benefit of the reader. In cases where the respondent has some specialized training, he is coded with a "plus" after his grade level.

There were only seven people in this group of 37 blacks who saw black domination over whites as the definition of black power and whose answers could possibly be interpreted as approval of this goal.

A small number of whites and blacks simply defined black power as racism or race hatred. The comments of blacks holding this view were especially scathing:

(black, female, 57, 11 grades) It's like the Ku Klux Klan and I don't like it.

(black, female, 38, 12 grades) It means something very detrimental to the race as a whole. This is the same tactic the whites use in discriminating.

The black power definitions of about 12 percent of the white population and 4 percent of the blacks sampled were directly influenced by the violence of the 1967 Detroit disorders. Terms like "trouble" and "rioting" were commonly used by these individuals, especially blacks in the riot areas and whites outside of it. Clearly, however, the vast majority of black people sampled do not see black power as a synonym for violence and destruction, racism or even black rule over whites, while 57.2 percent of the whites do.

Two views of black power predominate among our black respondents. One represents a poorly articulated negativism or opposition to the term and the other a positive or approving interpretation of the concept and its meaning. Roughly 23 percent of the black respondents indicated that the term meant "nothing" to them. This category was coded separately from the "Don't Know," "Can't Say," and "No Answer" responses because the word "nothing" is generally used as a term of derision, especially in the black community. Some examples of extended responses give the proper flavor:

(black female, 39, 10 grades) Nothing! (Interviewer probe) Not a damn thing. (further probe) Well, it's just a word used by people from the hate school so it don't mean nothing to me.

(black, male, 52, 12 grades plus) It means nothing! (probe) A word coined by some nut. (further probe) There is only one power and that is God.

(black, female, 60, 5 grades) It doesn't mean nothing. (probe) Biggest joke in the 20th century.

It is, of course, possible that some people use "nothing" as a synonym for "I don't know." We have two major pieces of evidence which indicate that this is not so for the major proportion of blacks giving the response: (1) while direct expressions of ignorance ("don't know," "can't say," etc.) are a function of educational level, "nothing" is used in the same proportion by blacks no matter what their academic accomplishments; (2) blacks use the expression more than four times as often as whites (22 percent to 5 percent) in trying to express what black power means to them; and (3) almost 90 percent of the respondents who interpreted black power in this way in 1968 also expressed disapproval of the term on our close-ended question.[16]

There are other individuals who give less ambiguous, clearly negative interpretations of the term. A small proportion of our respondents (1.3 percent of the blacks and 0.7 percent of the whites) found profanity indispensable as the sole expression of their definition. Others (5.2 percent of the blacks and 11.0 percent of the whites) were slightly more articulate in their condemnation, although their definitions were still imprecise. Often, especially for the whites, they reflect a general abhorrence of power in any form:

(white, female, 52, 12 grades) I hate the expression because I don't like power. It's very domineering and possessive and (they) have only themselves in mind.

(white, male, 54, 4 grades) No more than the words white power mean. They should cut that word out.

(black. female, 37, 9 grades) Black power and white power means the same to me which is no good. Man should be treated as a man.

(white, female, 55, 12 grades) Disaster! You know what you can do with your black power.

(white, female, 53, 12 grades) Scare! Why should there be black power any more than white power? Don't the blacks agree that all races are equal?

The last remaining major category of answers clearly distinguishes the black from the white community in its views of black power. In their statements 42.2 percent of our black respondents as compared to 10.7 percent of the whites emphasized a "fair share for black people" or "black unity." We coded all those answers which stressed blacks getting their share of the honors and fruits of production in society, exercising equal rights, bettering their living conditions or gaining greater political power into our "fair share" categories. Definitions stressing black unity or racial pride were coded separately.[17] Since only 7 blacks and 2 whites mentioned racial pride specifically, we will refer in the text to "black unity" or "racial unity" only. We felt that a definition of black power in terms of black people gaining political power in areas where blacks are in the majority fell under our fair share concept, but there were only two statements of this type. This definition may be implicit in the statements made (or in some of our black unity interpretations), but virtually all references are to justice and equity rather than exclusive control of a geographical area.

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[16] All of the few whites who interpreted black power as "nothing" in 1968 were negative about the slogan.

Fair share answers were given by almost twenty percent of our black respondents. People whose responses fall into this category see the black power slogan as another statement of traditional Negro goals of freedom, equality and opportunity. Respondents often take pains to reject notions of blacks taking advantage of others:

> (black female, 47, 12 grades plus) That we should have blacks represent us in government—not take over, but represent us.
>
> (black, male, 40, 9 grades plus) Negroes getting the same opportunities as whites when qualified.
>
> (black, male, 24, 12 grades) Negroes should get more power to do the same things which whites do.
>
> (black, female, 52, 12 grades plus) Give us an equal chance.
>
> (black, male, 41, 0 grades) To me it means an open door into integration.
>
> (black male, 39, 12 grades) Equal rights to any human being.
>
> (black, female, 54, 7 grades) That America is going to have a new power structure so black people can have a share.
>
> (black, male, 23, 10 grades) Getting in possession of something—like jobs and security.
>
> (black, male, 55, 12 grades) It means equal opportunities for both races. What's good for one is good for the other.

About 23 percent of our black respondents gave "black unity" responses.[18] These were more militant in tone than the fair share definitions, sometimes extremely nationalistic, but always (as in the fair share answers) concerned with bettering the situation of the black man and not putting down the white man. In fact, the data suggest to us that blacks who are most favorably disposed towards black power simply do not see the political world as one where blacks can gain something only at the expense of whites and vice versa. As we have seen, however, large numbers of whites do see things this way. For them one group or the other must tend to "take over."

The major difference between the "fair share" and "black unity" groups is that the former places heavy stress on blacks as equal participants in the total society, while the latter emphasizes black togetherness and achievement without the same attention to the traditional symbols of Negro advancement. We know from extended answers to our black power question and others that individuals giving black unity responses want equality and a just share of America's goods, but "thinking black" and speaking militantly and with pride are given primacy when talking about black power.[19] It is not that they are against white people; they are simply *for* black people and deeply committed to the idea of black people working together:

> (black, male, 35, 9 grades) People getting together to accomplish things for the group.
>
> (black, male, 36, 12 grades plus) Negroes have never been together on anything. Now with the new movement we gain strength.
>
> (black male, 24, 12 grades) We people getting together, agreeing on issues and attempting to reach a common goal.
>
> (black, male, 28, 12 grades) Sounds frightening, but really is what whites, Jews, Arabs and people the world over do—divided we fall united we stand.
>
> (black, female, 41, 12 grades plus) Togetherness among Negroes; but it means you can get along with others.

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[17] In a few cases (N = 20) respondents stressed black unity in order to achieve a fair share. We are considering first mentions here and in our analysis, but will probe this in detail when we have more time.

[18] We will combine black unity definitions with the few racial pride references for purposes of analysis.

[19] See footnote 17. About 20 percent of the black respondents mentioning racial unity saw it as a means of achieving equality. For example:

> (black, male, 42, 12 grades) Negroes getting together and forcing whites to realize our importance—our worth to the United States. Gaining respect and equality.

The more articulate members of the black unity group are concerned with ends as well as means. See Carmichael and Hamilton, *op. cit.*, pp. 46–47.

(black, female, 37, 10 grades) It means being true to yourself and recognize yourself as a black American who can accomplish good things in life.

(black, female, 57, 10 grades) The white man separated us when he brought us here and we been that way ever since. We are just trying to do what everybody else has—stick together.

As we have noted, the number of whites giving either the fair share or black unity response is small—just over 10 percent of the white sample. To most whites, even those who think of themselves as liberals, the concept of black power is forbidding. The 1967 riot is certainly one factor that might account for this, but we found little evidence of it. Only 5 whites in the entire sample (one percent) gave answers like the following:

(white, female, 23 college) It's gotten (away) from the original meaning. Means violence to me now.

In addition, as we shall see, even whites who have very sympathetic views about the causes of the disturbances can hardly be described as favorable to black power. The negative presentations of black power in the mass media may be responsible, but Detroit Negroes are also attentive to the same media and their views are quite different. The evidence presented in Table 1 points strongly towards a simple conclusion—the overwhelming majority of whites are frightened and bewildered by the words black power. Some of this seems rooted in abhorrence of stark words like power, but the term *black* power is obviously intolerable. The words conjure up racial stereotypes and suspicions deeply ingrained in the minds of white Americans. The slogan presents an unmistakable challenge to the country's prevailing racial customs and social norms; for precisely this reason it seems exciting and attractive to many blacks.

In summary, the vast majority of white people are hostile to the notion of black power. The most common interpretation is that it symbolizes a black desire to take over the country, or somehow deprive the white man. Blacks, on the other hand, are almost evenly divided in their interpretations with 42.2 percent clearly favorable to black power and 49.6 percent defining it in an unfavorable way. Those blacks who are favorable to black power see it as another call for a fair share for blacks or as a rallying cry for black unity, while those who are negatively inclined tend to see it as empty and meaningless (our "nothing" category, for example). Blacks certainly do not interpret the term the way the whites do. They do not see it as meaning racism, a general black takeover, or violence, and those few blacks who do define the term in this way are negative about such meanings. It is evident that "black power" is a potent slogan which arouses contradictory feelings in large numbers of people. Interpretations of the term may differ, but the slogan clearly stimulates intense feelings and may be exciting enough to move men to purposeful action.

Although these data invite many different forms of analysis, we have decided that an attempt to understand the sources of favorable reactions to the black power slogan is of primary importance. We have, accordingly, conducted a detailed investigation of factors which predispose an individual to give a "fair share" or "black unity" response to our question on the meaning of black power. In the case of blacks, we are confident that all such definitions indicate a favorable attitude and for whites we know that they usually represent a positive attitude and always indicate at least a grudging respect or admiration. Certainly, as indicated above, we will miss a few black people who are favorable to black power if we follow this procedure, but the number is very small. In most cases, in order to keep the tables and text from becoming inordinately complex, we will combine the fair share and black unity categories and speak of individuals favorably interpreting black power, but where differences between respondents giving these two answers are of great importance we will consider them separately.

IV. THE APPEAL OF BLACK POWER: SOCIAL CHANGE, SOCIALIZATION AND DEPRIVATION

Many social scientists in recent years have been struggling to understand the increasing militancy within the black community and the concurrent rise in popularity of slogans like black power. To date, most systematic social science research in this area has centered on the "conventional militancy" of the early 1960's[20] or the backgrounds and attitudes of rioters and those who sympathize with them.[21] The civil disturbances of the mid-1960's were clearly watersheds in American racial history, but most scholars concentrating on the riots would agree that there is more to the current upheaval in the black community—symbolized by the slogan black power—than violence. Recent calls for racial pride, black unity and black self-esteem, and programs to promote these ends, are meant to reach members of the community and help them to become a constructive force in their own behalf.

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[20] The best example of work in this area is Gary T. Marx, *Protest and Prejudice: A Study of Belief in the Black Community* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967). Marx defined "conventional militancy" by the standards of civil rights activists and organizations at the time of his study (1964). All were (pp. 40–41) "urgently aware of the extensiveness of discrimination faced by the American black man. All called for an end to discrimination and segregation and demanded the admission of the Negro to the economic and political mainstream of American life. And they wanted these changes quickly—'Freedom Now.' In pursuit of this end, participation in peaceful demonstrations was encouraged."

This section is devoted to a discussion of the factors which predispose an individual to interpret black power favorably. The major emphasis in our analysis will be on our black respondents, but at times we will compare them to whites in order to highlight certain points. The relative lack of support for black power among white respondents prevents a more elaborate analysis of their views in this section stressing favorable versus unfavorable interpretations of the term.

It is probably best to begin by laying to rest the so-called "riffraff" theory, which has been the favorite target of many riot researchers, as a possible explanation for the appeal of the black power slogan. The riffraff theory, drawn from the report of the McCone Commission on the Watts riots of 1964,[22] holds that urban unrest is a product of a deprived underclass of recent unassimilated migrants to the cities. We will discuss the issue of migration below, but neither education (Gamma = $-.02$)[23] nor income (Gamma = $-.06$) nor occupation (Gamma = .00) is a very potent predictor of favorable interpretations of black power for blacks. For whites, on the other hand, education (Gamma = .32), income (Gamma = .23) and occupation (Gamma = .48) are associated with positive views of black power, but here it is the upper status elements who interpret the slogan favorably.[24] It is clear that any notion that black power appeals strictly to the less privileged in the black community is without foundation.

Some scholars, and many journalists and politicians, have adopted the clash between generations as a principal explanation of the growing popularity of the black power slogan.[25] The riots in Detroit and Los Angeles are seen as only one manifestation of a worldwide revolt of youth against the established order. The young are said to be more impatient and less willing to accept marginal gains than their elders.

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[21] Riot research is widespread. See, especially, David O. Sears and John B. McConahay, "Riot Participation," and Raymond J. Murphy and James M. Watson, "The Structure of Discontent: Grievance and Support for the Los Angeles Riot," *Los Angeles Riot Study* (Los Angeles: Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of California, 1967); Nathan S. Caplan and Jeferey M. Paige, "A Study of Ghetto Rioters," *Scientific American* (August, 1968), pp. 15–21, also reported in the *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (The U. S. Riot Commission Report)*. Washington: United States Goernment Printing Office, 1968); *Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), especially Angus Campbell and Howard Schuman, *Racial Attitudes in Fifteen American Cities*, Chapters 5–6 and Robert M. Fogelson and Robert B. Hill, *Who Riots: A Study of Participation in the 1967 Riots;* and Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen, eds., *Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1968). Studies which emphasize aggregate data can be found in Ted R. Gurr and Hugh D. Davis, eds., *The History of Violence in America* (New York: Bantam Press, 1969).

[22] *Violence in the City—An End or a Beginning? A Report by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots* (Los Angeles: McCone Commission Report, 1965).

[23] In the calculations which follow, unless otherwise noted, the black power variable is dichotomized with a favorable interpretation ("fair share" or "racial unity") scored *one* and unfavorable interpretations scored *zero*. Respondents with "don't know" or "no answer" responses were not used in the analysis. In this association, for example, those with low educational achievement were slightly less likely to approve of black power (give the "fair share" or "racial unity" interpretations) than those with substantial educational achievement.

[24] We do not think that this is simply because their higher level of education makes them more aware of the content of the actual debate over black power. Relative youth, education, and support of integration are all intertwined and each of these factors is related to a favorable interpretation of black power.

[25] See Jerome H. Skolnick, *The Politics of Protest* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 162, and *The U. S. Riot Commission Report, op. cit.*, especially p. 93 where "a new mood among Negroes, particularly among the young" is described. "Self-esteem and enhanced racial pride are replacing apathy and submission to 'the system.' Moreover, Negro youth, who make up over half of the ghetto population, share the growing sense of alienation felt by many white youth in our country. Thus, their role in recent civil disorders reflects not only a shared sense of deprivation and victimization by white society but

When we divided our respondents according to age, however, we did not find great differences over the interpretation of black power within either racial group, although age was a better predictor for whites (Gamma = −.26) than for blacks (Gamma = −.11). Among blacks, 51 percent of those in their twenties gave the racial unity or fair share interpretations, but almost the same percentage of thirty, forty and fifty-year-olds gave similar responses. Approval of black power drops off among sixty and seventy-year-old blacks, but they constitute a small percentage of our sample. As noted above, age is a better predictor for whites with individuals forty and older somewhat less likely to offer an approving interpretation of black power than those under forty.

A. Social Change and Socialization: Breaking the Traditional Mold

One might assume after examining this relationship that the much discussed "generation gap" is not very wide, especially in the black community. But that conclusion would be unwarranted. Differences among blacks exist, not between youth and age, but between those who grew up in Michigan and those who were born and grew up in the South. Blacks who were born in Michigan are much more likely to give the racial unity or fair share interpretation of black power than those born in the South (Gamma = .33).[26] When we related age and attitudes toward black power with regional background controlled (Table 2), we found that the background factors clearly predominated. Those in our sample who were born in Michigan are much younger, on the average, than the rest of our respondents (78 percent are under 40 years old and 98 percent are under 50), but definitions of black power are almost invariable for this group between age categories. There is also very little variance between age categories for those who were born in the South and came to Michigan after they were 21 years old, although, of course, there is much less approval for black power in this group. In both cases, it is regional background and not age which is the most powerful explanatory factor. Further confirmation of this conclusion comes when we examine those respondents who were born in the South, but arrived in Michigan before they were 21.

TABLE 2.—PERCENTAGES OF BLACK RESPONDENTS FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER* ACCORDING TO THEIR AGES AND REGIONS OF BIRTH

Present Age (In Ten's)	Southern Born (Arrived in Michigan after age 21)	Southern Born (Arrived in Michigan before age 21)	Born in Michigan
10's	**	33%(6)	67%(12)
20's	39%(13)	46%(26)	59%(41)
30's	21%(19)	44%(45)	58%(24)
40's	52%(25)	64%(31)	55%(20)
50's	35%(20)	63%(19)	**
60's	17%(12)	33%(12)	**
70's	33%(12)	**	**
	(Gamma = −.02)	(Gamma =.15)	(Gamma = −.12)

* For economy of presentation and because of the complexity of our black power code, we display only the percentages of respondents favorably interpreting black power, that is, those who gave fair share or black unity interpretations of black power.

** Percentages are not displayed if N is less than 5.

Within this group we find that the percentage of those voicing approval of black power actually *increases* along with age from the teens to the fifties, and then decreases again for the small number who are in their sixties.

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also the rising incidence of disruptive conduct by a segment of American youth throughout the society."

[26] We have defined the South as the 11 states of the Confederacy (N = 255) and the border states of Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, and West Virginia (N = 49). Blacks born in border states were actually less likely to interpret black power in fair share or black unity terms than those born in the former states of the Confederacy, although the differences are small. One hundred and seven of our black respondents were born in Michigan (coded *one*). This accounts for only 412 respondents. Of those remaining, 43 were born in the United States, but outside of Michigan and the South, 1 in Canada, 1 in the West Indies and 1 in Puerto Rico. We lack information on 3 individuals. The 43 respondents born in the U.S., but not in Michigan or in the South, come from a wide variety of places. They are more favorably disposed toward black power than the Southerners but less so than the Michigan-born.

It might be thought that regional differences mask a more fundamental difference between blacks who were born in cities and those raised in rural areas. This is not the case. Thirty-nine percent of Southern-born Negroes who grew up on farms and in small towns favored black power; the percentage giving fair share or black unity interpretations is only 4.3 percent higher (43.3 percent) for respondents raised in the large Southern towns and cities (Gamma = .03).

This evidence leads us to conclude that, for all but the very old, it is primarily the experience of life in Michigan and not the respondent's age which helps determine his reaction to black power.[27] A great migration began during World War II which brought thousands of black workers to the auto plants and foundries of Detroit. Their children are coming of age in the 1960's. It is not their youth, however, which leads them to see black power as a call for racial unity or a fair share for their race; it is their experience with the culture of the urban North. It seems that the further one is from life in the South, and the sooner one experiences life in a city like Detroit, the more likely one is to approve of black power.

Life in the Northern city brings to bear on a black person forces which lead him to reject the traditional, subservient attitudes of Southern Negroes, particularly if these forces represent his major socializing experience. Away from the parochial, oppressive atmosphere of the South, he is born into or slowly appropriates the more cosmopolitan, secularized culture of the North. The new life in the promised lands of Detroit, New York and Chicago is exciting and disillusioning at the same time. It brings new hopes and the promise of a better life, and disappointments when achievements do not live up to expectations.

The Southern migrant arrived in the "promised land" to find bigotry, filth, and a more sophisticated form of degradation. With time, he grasps sufficient information about the urban paradise. Traditional attitudes of deference and political passivity fade as a militant social and political stance gains approval in the community.[28] This is the atmosphere for the emerging popularity of fair share and racial unity interpretations of slogans like black power.

TABLE 3.—PERCENTAGES OF BLACK RESPONDENTS FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER BY CHURCH AFFILIATION WITH BIRTHPLACE CONTROLLED

Affiliation	Place of Birth	
	South	Michigan
Church Member	33%(143)	39%(58)
Non-Member	48%(107)	67%(33)
	(Gamma = −.32)	(Gamma = −.52)

Just as the trip North represented an attempt to find deliverance, so the Negro church was another traditional avenue of entry into the "promised land." Most blacks who break with the church are more likely to define black power in fair share or unity terms.[29] This relationship holds even with region controlled (Table 3). In fact, membership and place of birth exert an independent effect. Michigan-born church members are about mid-way between Southern-born church members and Southern non-members in their approval of black power. Retention of a church affiliation acts as a brake on the effects of being raised in the Northern urban environment. It represents a strong tie to the traditional Negro culture.[30]

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[27] Other bodies of data and our own show that almost all riot participants are young and that age does have an impact on favorable attitudes toward violence, especially for young men. This is not surprising in light of the physical attributes helpful to a participant in a disturbance and the bravado of the young. However, age is unrelated to more general notions of whether riots helped or hurt the black cause (Murphy and Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 82) as well as to attitudes toward black power. It is clear that age is an important variable in the study of our recent strife, but by itself it does not explain contemporary militancy or even sympathy for those who participate in civil disturbances.

[28] See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 280–283 for a discussion of the potential for "political radicalism" of second generation slumdwellers. Claude Brown makes the same points in the graphic Foreword to his autobiography, *Manchild in the Promised Land* (New York: Macmillan, 1965). We will make some distinctions between the effects of dissatisfaction on lower and upper status groups in the section on deprivation below.

[29] The sample was divided into church (coded *one*), non-members (coded *zero*) and members of groups, usually action groups, connected with a church (not included in the analysis). People in the latter category (N = 25) chose to emphasize their group above their church affiliation in answering our open-ended question on membership in "church or church-connected groups." They were about as likely as the non-members to approve of black power and should be the subject of intensive study because of their pivotal position in the black community.

For a detailed discussion of the similar influence of religion on conventional militancy among blacks, including consideration of denomination and religiosity, see: Gary T. Marx, "Religion: Opiate or Inspiration of Civil Rights Militancy Among Negroes," *American Sociological Review* (1967), pp. 64–72.

Another aspect of traditional Negro culture is the unique measure of esteem granted the federal government and its personnel. Through the years the federal government, for all its shortcomings, has been the black man's special friend in an otherwise hostile environment. It won him his freedom, gave him the best treatment he received in his worst days in the South, provided relief in the Depression and in the difficult periods which have followed, and has done the most to secure his rights and protect him during his struggle for equality.[31] In addition, it has been the symbol of his intense identification with and "faith in the American Dream."[32] Evaluation of local government in the North has been less positive, but still higher than evaluation of local government in the South.

Systematic research on political trust is rather recent, but what does exist indicates that blacks have always had at least the same distribution as whites on answers to political trust questions focused on the federal government.[33] In fact, when one takes into account the extraordinary amount of interpersonal distrust present in the black community,[34] the level of trust in the federal government has always been remarkable. Our data indicate that this pattern is now breaking down, at least in cities like Detroit. Using the Standard University of Michigan Survey Research Center political trust questions, we found blacks less trusting of both the federal and Detroit governments than whites.[35] These differences in levels of political trust are not a function of education, income or other non-racial status discrepancies.

Let us assume that the black power slogan strikes a most responsive chord in the minds of black people who want to break their traditional ties with paternalistic friends and allies. For them, expressing distrust of government, especially the federal government, is in fact a rejection of dependency—an assertion of self-worth and non-utopian thinking about the realities in the United States.[36] As we can see in Table 4, expressions of political trust and approval of black power are indeed inversely related. The higher a person's score on the various trust indices, the less likely he is to favorably interpret black power. This relationship is especially strong for trust in the federal government which has traditionally been granted unique esteem in the black community.

When we consider all three indicators of traditionalism together—place of socialization, church affiliation and level of political trust—we see that each is important in its own right (Table 5). The combined explanatory power of these variables is substantial. Only 20 percent of the Southern-born church members who exhibit high levels of trust give approving interpretations of black power compared to 77 percent of the Northern-born non-members who are distrustful of government. Michigan-born church members are a particularly interesting group for further study in that church membership significantly depresses the effects of political trust. Our future research will emphasize the impact of socialization into the secular polit-

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[30] The impact of region as a variable will surely diminish over time as the effects of national black leadership and the messages of the media and relatives are diffused throughout the nation. However, church affiliation is likely to remain important.

[31] For example, see William Brink and Louis Harris, *The Negro Revolution in America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), pp. 131 and 232–233 on black attitudes towards various political institutions and figures.

[32] See Louis E. Lomax, *The Negro Revolt* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 250, and also Gunnar Mydral, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper and Row, 1944), pp. 3–5, 880 and 1007 on blacks as "exaggerated Americans."

[33] Donald E. Stokes, "Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment," in Harlan Cleveland and Harold D. Lasswell, (eds.), *Ethics and Bigness* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 61–73 and Joel D. Aberbach, *Alienation and Race* (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1967), pp. 119–126.

[34] Lee Rainwater's "Crucible of Identity—The Negro Lower-Class Family" in *DAEDALUS* (1966), especially pp. 204–205 and 215 is very insightful on this point, but this distrust is not confined to lower class ghetto dwellers. See Aberbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 104–114 for a detailed discussion.

[35] For a detailed discussion of our findings and a critique of the existing literature on Political Trust see Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," a paper delivered at the 1969 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, especially pp. 2–7. A revised version will appear in this REVIEW (December, 1970).

[36] Political trust has complex roots. See *ibid.*, pp. 7–13 for an analysis of its origins.

TABLE 4.—GAMMA CORRELATIONS FOR BLACKS BETWEEN MEASURES OF POLITICAL TRUST AND FAVORABLE INTERPRETATIONS OF BLACK POWER

	Trust Detroit Government**	Trust Federal Government***	General (Combined) Measure of Political Trust****
Black power interpretation*	−.22	−.52	−.39

* A negative coefficient indicates that the higher a person's score on the various trust indices (high score equals high trust), the less likely he is to favorably interpret black power.

** The Trust Detroit Government measure is a simple additive index of answers to the following questions:

1. How much do you think we can trust the government in Detroit to do what is right: just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or almost never?
2. How much do you feel having elections makes the government in Detroit pay attention to what the people think: a good deal, some, or not very much?

*** The Trust Federal Government measure is a simple additive index of answers to the following questions:

1. How much do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right: just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or almost never?
2. Would you say that the government in Washington is pretty much run for the benefit of a few big interests or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?
3. How much do you feel that having elections makes the government in Washington pay attention to what the people think: a good deal, some, or not very much?

**** The General Political Trust Measure runs from 0 to 4 and equally weights the Trust Detroit Government and Trust Washington Government answers.

ical culture of the Northern black communities, with special attention to the development of more refined indicators which will help us to understand better this acculturation process.

B. Deprivation: Dissatisfaction and Discrimination

We asked our respondents to tell us about "the life you would most like to lead, the most perfect life as you see it." Once they had described this kind of life they were shown a picture of a ladder with ten rungs and asked to imagine that their ideal lives were at the top of the ladder, on rung number ten. They were then asked to rank, in comparison with their ideal, their present lives, their lives five years ago, and what they expected their lives to be five years in the future.[37] Answers are therefore based on standards meaningful to the individual, with no simple objective indicator of achievement such as education, income or occupation serving as a substitute for his subjectively defined goals.[38]

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[37] This is the famous Cantril Self-Anchoring Scale which indicates the discrepancy between an individual's definition of the "best possible life" for him and his past, present, or future situation. See Hadley C. Cantril, *The Pattern of Human Concerns* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965). Our respondents were given the following set of questions:

> Now could you briefly tell me what would be the best possible life for you? In other words, how would you describe the life you would most like to lead, the most perfect life as you see it? (Show R card with a Ladder)
> Now suppose that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you, the one you just described, and the bottom represents the worst possible life for you.
>
> "Present Life" A. Where on the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time?
> "Past Life" B. Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago?
> "Future Life" C. Where on the ladder do you think you will be five years from now?

[38] In the black community sample, for example, level of education is correlated (Gamma) .06 with scores on the past life ladder, .09 with the present life ladder and .29 with the future life ladder. Education is, therefore, only important as a predictor of assessments of future prospects and even here other factors are obviously at work. Income and occupation work much the same way. It is

TABLE 5.—PERCENTAGES OF BLACK RESPONDENTS FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER ACCORDING TO CHURCH AFFILIATION, PLACE OF BIRTH, AND LEVELS OF TRUST IN GOVERNMENT

Level of Trust in Government*	Place of Birth:	South		Michigan	
	Church Membership:	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member
High (2–4)		20% (76)	29% (65)	38% (16)	58% (26)
Low (0–1)		55% (40)	66% (73)	44% (16)	77% (31)

* The General Political Trust measure was employed in this table.

This question revealed a great deal of current dissatisfaction in the black community, but also substantial optimism about the future. When asked to rank their lives five years ago only 13 percent of our black respondents put themselves in the top four categories (7, 8, 9 and 10); when asked to rank their present lives 23 percent place themselves within the top four ranks; but 64 percent chose the top four categories to describe their lives as they expected them to be five years in the future.

As Table 6 indicates, both current dissatisfaction and, to a greater extent, pessimism about the future are strongly related to approval of black power in the zero-order case. When we control for level of education, however, the relationship only holds for the lower education group. The same general trend holds true for reports of experiences of discrimination. However, the differences are less pronounced. Experience of discrimination is a more powerful predictor of fair share or racial unity interpretations of black power for the lower than the upper education group, but it still has a noticeable effect for the upper education group.[39]

These data fit a general pattern which we have discussed in detail elsewhere.[40] For lower education blacks, approval of black power is strongly influenced by dissatisfaction with one's current lot and pessimism about the future as well as by reported experiences of discrimination. For blacks with higher levels of educational attainment, however, personal dissatisfaction with present achievements or prospects for the future do not help us to understand favorable interpretations of black power. Even reported personal experiences of discrimination are only moderately related to approval of the slogan. The views on black power of this higher education group are more strongly influenced by their identification with others in the community—their feelings for the group.

Upper status blacks who have broken free from traditional moorings become a part of a *black political community* which includes persons from all social classes. The responses of these upper status blacks to questions about the interpretation of significant events and the evaluation of leaders are most strongly affected by their sense of empathy and identification with their racial community than by their feelings of achievement or even their personal expectations about the future. They share a set of beliefs and a mood of protest about racial issues with those lower status segments of the black community who have also assimilated the secular culture typical of the urban North.[41] The major difference between the two groups is that dissatisfaction with one's current lot and prospects for the future interact with church membership, region of socialization and political trust in determining interpretations of black power for the lower education group, but not for the upper education group.

TABLE 6.—CORRELATIONS (GAMMA) FOR BLACKS BETWEEN LADDER POSITIONS ON THE SELF-ANCHORING SCALES, EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION, AND APPROVAL OF BLACK POWER, BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION

Scales	Zero-Order	Low Education*	High Education*
Present Life**	−.27	−.34	.06
Future Life**	−.40	−.47	−.05
Reported Experiences of Discrimination***	.30	.34	.20

* Respondents in the low education group (N =322) include all those who have completed high school (but had no additional training), while those in the high education group (N =122) have, at minimum gone beyond high school to either specialized training or college. We chose education as a status indicator and dichotomized the sample so as to preserve the maximum number of cases for the analysis.

** The ladders were trichotomized as follows: 1–3 =0; 4–7 =1; 8–10 =2. Therefore, a negative coefficient means that the higher a person's score on the ladder the *less* likely he is to give a fair share or racial unity interpretation of black power.

*** This is a simple additive index of reports of personal experiences of discrimination in Detroit in obtaining housing, in the schools, from a landlord, or in obtaining, holding or advancing on a job.

V. THE BLACK POWER IDEOLOGY

So far our attention has been concentrated on the demographic and attitudinal correlates of approval of black power. Some scholars have ar-

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clear that people's evaluations of their achievements vary more within than between objectively defined status groupings.

[39] Reported experiences of discrimination are unrelated to education (Gamma = .01).

[40] Aberbach and Walker, *op. cit.*, (1969), especially pp. 11–16.

[41] The correlations (Gamma) between church membership, place of birth and approval of black power are actually slightly higher in the upper education than in the lower education group:

Black Power by	*Low Education*	*High Education*
Church Membership	—.38	—.42
Place of Birth	.31	.34
Political Trust	—.39	—.37

gued that interpretations of this kind of slogan stem from a more comprehensive belief system, a "riot ideology," which is said to be developing within the black community.[42] We found that knowledge of the black power slogan has diffused widely through the black community of Detroit. There are many different interpretations of the slogan, but only about 8 percent of the population were unable to respond when asked about its meaning. The question remains whether an individual's reaction to black power, be it positive or negative, is related in any logical way to his attitudes about other issues of racial policy, his interpretation of significant events, and his choice of leaders or representatives. In order to investigate this question, we turned to our data in search of evidence of a coherent or constrained belief system on racial matters within Detroit's black community; something we might justifiably call a racial ideology.

Anyone acquainted with recent research on public opinion might doubt the existence of a set of ideas resembling a racial ideology among any but a small activist fringe in the black community. Public attitudes about political leaders or questions of public policy are usually fragmentary and contradictory. Citizens readily express opinions about public issues, but these beliefs seldom hang together in a coherent system; knowing an individual's position on one issue does not allow one to predict his positions on other, related issues. The classical liberal or conservative ideologies may often be employed by political activists or leaders as a guide to policy making, but most citizens seem to use as a guide some form of group identification or other considerations of self interest when formulating their attitudes toward political questions.[43]

Converse argues that the degree of constraint in a belief system is determined most directly by the amount of information the individual has acquired about the issues involved. Levels of information, in turn, are usually affected by the relative centrality or importance of the issues to the individual. The more deeply concerned the individual becomes about a subject, the more likely he is to seek information about it, and, as time passes, to form consistent or comprehensive beliefs about the issues involved. Converse, of course, has dealt most often with liberalism and conservatism in their American incarnations. Comprehensive belief systems of this sort generally "rest upon the kinds of broad or abstract contextual information about currents of ideas, people, or society that educated people come to take for granted as initial ingredients of thought."[44] This form of contextual or background information is usually accumulated after extensive, formal education, a factor which seems to be a prerequisite to ideological thinking, in most cases. Since only a small minority of the public possesses this important educational prerequisite, ideological thinking is said to be rare.

Since our respondents share the educational limitations of average Americans, and do not have any special access to political information, we would not expect them to be capable of broadly ideological thinking. As Converse suggests at several points, however, it would be unwarranted to infer from this fact that average citizens are incapable of consistent thinking about all areas of public affairs. Even without a grasp of classical liberalism or conservatism and with a minimum of formal education, respondents might have consistent belief systems concerning subjects which they found to be of inescapable personal importance, and which also involved the social groupings with which they most strongly identify.

Bearing in mind the possibility that considerable structure might be uncovered in the social and political thought of our respondents if the proper issues could be identified, we asked open-ended questions at several points in our interview about topics we thought might be salient for our respondents. Using these methods we discovered clear indications that a coherent belief system dealing with racial matters has developed within Detroit's black community. This belief system seems well organized and serves as a guide for most of our respondents in formulating their answers to our questions about racial problems. The high degree of constraint existing among the elements of this belief system is displayed in Table 7 where we present a matrix of

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[42] T. M. Tomlinson, "The Development of a Riot Ideology Among Urban Negroes," *American Behavioral Scientist* (1968), pp. 27–31.

[43] The best single statement is Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–262. For a brief review of this literature see: Lester W. Mibrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); and Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this REVIEW (1964), 361–382. For some reecnt work see: Robert Axelrod, "The Structure of Public Opinion on Policy Issues," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1967), 49–60; and Norman R. Luttbeg, "The Structure of Beliefs Among Leaders and the Public," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1968), 398–410.

[44] Converse, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

TABLE 7.—CORRELATIONS (GAMMA) AMONG RESPONSES TO RACIAL ISSUES BY BLACK RESPONDENTS, BY EDUCATION*

		High Education (N = 122)				
		1. Approval of Black Power	2. Word to Describe Riot	3. Sympathy for the Rioters	4. Reasons for the Riot	5. Leader Who Represents You
Low Education (N = 322)	1. Approval of Black Power**	X	.34	.46	.32	.29
	2. Word to Describe Riot**	.36	X	.40	.58	.22
	3. Sympathy for the Rioters**	.45	.30	X	.62	.49
	4. Reasons for the Riot**	.64	.37	.48	X	.41
	5. Leader Who Represents You**	.41	.29	.32	.35	X

* Respondents in the low education group include all individuals who have completed high school (but had no additional training), while those in the high education group have, at minimum, gone beyond high school. Correlations for the high education group are recorded above the diagonal, and those for the low education group are below the diagonal.

** The following items make up this table:

1. What do the words "black power" mean to you? For this table only the signs on the black power code are reversed so that all coefficients are positive.
2. What would you call the events that occurred in Detroit between July 23 and July 28? What word would you use? Open-end question coded as follows: 1) Insurrection; 2) Riot; 3) Disturbance; 4) Lawlessness.
3. Do you sympathize with the people who took part in the (Respondent's term for the event)?: 1) yes; 2) somewhat; 3) no.
4. Which of the following comes closest to explaining why the (Respondent's term for the event) took place?: 1) people were being treated badly; 2) criminals did it; 3) people wanted to take things.
5. What single national or local leader best expresses your views on relations between the races? Open-ended question coded as follows: 1) Militant Black Leaders; 2) Other Black Leaders, excluding Martin Luther King; 3) Martin Luther King; 4) White Leaders, excluding Robert F. Kennedy.

   A militant is defined here as someone who unequivocally endorsed black power before the time of our interviewing (September, 1967). Persons identifying Robert F. Kennedy were not considered in the calculation of coefficients for this question because of the special nature of his partisans. See below (footnotes to Table 11) for a discussion of this.

correlations of answers by our black respondents to five questions concerning racial issues.[45] The coefficients appearing below the diagonal are for all those with a high school education, or less, while above the diagonal are findings for those who have, at minimum, progressed beyond high school to either specialized training or college. The relatively high correlations in this table make us feel justified in referring to this set of opinions as a racial ideology.

One of the most significant aspects of Table 7 is the attitudinal consistency existing among those with lower educational achievements. A careful examination of the table shows that the two educational groups display almost the same levels of constraint. Associations among the upper education group are slightly higher, as earlier research on ideology might lead one to expect, but only by .02, on the average. Further, as we shall establish, respondents in our sample are not only capable of consistency, but display, as well, an impressive amount of knowledge about these questions, and demonstrate the capacity to make several subtle distinctions among leaders and political symbols.

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[45] To judge the relative strength of these relationships, see a similar matrix for a national cross-section sample in Converse, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

The results of Table 7 are even more significant in view of the fact that three of the five items in the matrix were completely open-ended questions. We have already discussed our open question on the meaning of black power and the way in which we constructed our code and identified favorable and unfavorable responses. The question on the word used by the respondents to describe the riot was also open-ended. At the beginning of each interview respondents were asked what word they would use to describe the events "that occurred in Detroit between July 23rd and July 28th" of 1967, and that word was used by the interviewers throughout the interview. Although some responses were quite unorthodox (one young woman called it a "steal-in" and an older woman called it "God's vengeance on man"), we found it possible to code most of the answers into four categories: revolt, riot, disturbance, and lawlessness, which roughly form a dimension from an understanding of the events as an expression of political demands, to a belief that they were an anomic, lawless outburst. We also asked our respondents, without supplying any cues, to name "the single national or local leader who best expresses your views on relations between the races." The list of leaders mentioned were then arranged according to their publicly stated views on black power. This arrangement was made on the basis of our knowledge of these leaders and their public statements.[46]

Open questions require respondents to formulate their own answers, a formidable challenge to those with limited powers of expression. Some error may be introduced by interviewers when recording answers to open questions, and once they have been recorded, they must be coded. It is extremely difficult, both to construct comprehensive codes for responses of this kind, and to complete the coding process without introducing even further error. In view of all these difficulties, the relatively strong associations we have found among the items in Table 7 are strong evidence of the existence of a racial ideology. We believe that the success of these techniques and the high degree of consistency in our respondents' opinions was due to their intense interest and concern with racial issues. It would seem that the relative salience of an issue for an individual, or his interest in a subject, is more important than his educational level or his ability to manipulate abstractions in determining the coherence of his beliefs.[47] Our findings confirm the proposition that where issues of sufficient personal importance are concerned, even the poorly educated are capable of developing relatively sophisticated, inter-related, ideological belief systems.

A. Black Power Ideology and Integration

Some of our respondents may not have an advanced understanding of the justifications for their views, but we are certain that the questions in our matrix require a choice among legitimate alternatives; they are not being translated by our black respondents into simple tests of racial loyalty. An inspection of our questions will show that we are not asking merely if they are sympathetic or unsympathetic toward the aspirations of blacks in America. Our respondents are being called upon to identify and evaluate political leaders as representatives, interpret the causes of the Detroit riot, and define the meaning of a controversial political slogan. One can be closely identified with his racial group and greatly concerned for its welfare, and yet be either *positive* or passionately *negative* about black power, the riot, or many black political leaders. Our black respondents are prevented from employing some simple form of racial chauvinism as a guide for answering our questions because of the necessity of choosing sides in fundamental disputes over the role of blacks in American society which have traditionally divided their racial community.

Some symbols and ideas, of course, seem to be accepted by virtually all members of the black community. Had questions concerning these topics been included in our matrix we would not have such strong evidence of a racial ideology, because our responses could then be interpreted as mere expressions of support for the black community. This would have been true, for example, of any questions dealing directly with racial integration. In order to find how both racial groups felt about this issue, each of our respondents was asked whether he favored "racial integration, total separation of the races, or something in between." In response to this question, 27 percent of our white respondents endorsed integration, 17 percent favored total separation, and 54 percent chose "something in between." Even the most sympathetic whites overwhelmingly disapprove of black power, but as we can see in Table 8, approving interpretations of black power came most often from those whites who endorsed integration. The relationship was matched by a separate finding that whites who reported having friends among blacks were somewhat more approving of black power, although blacks who reported having white friends did not differ appreciably from others in their interpretation of the slogan. All of the aversion of whites toward black power cannot be attributed to an aversion toward blacks; some of it grows out of a fear and dislike of the general use of power to achieve social ends, and an unease and resentment of all forms of protest. Nevertheless, it is our impression that when most whites are asked about symbols like black power and integration, they are less likely to respond directly to the complicated issues being raised, but are tempted to translate the questions into the much simpler issue of whether they are favorable or unfavorable toward black people.[48]

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[46] The two remaining questions in the matrix were close-ended and provided respondents with a set of alternative answers from which to choose. See the footnotes of Table 7 for their exact wording.

[47] See Converse, *op. cit.;* and Roy T. Bowles and James T. Richardson, "Sources of Consistency of Political Opinion," *American Journal of Sociology* (1969), who argue on p. 683, that "interest in politics is a more powerful predictor of both ideological conceptualization and consistency of opinion than is ability to use abstract ideas."

When our black respondents were asked the same question about racial integration, 86 percent endorsed integration, while only 1 percent chose separation. Years of struggle against institutionalized segregation and great efforts by opinion leaders in both racial communities for almost a century have made integration a potent, positive symbol for blacks. Asking for an endorsement of this idea is almost akin to asking for an expression of loyalty to the black community. Since we recognized the emotional connotation of these terms we substituted the word "separation" for "segregation" in our questions, but even in this form the positive attraction of integration proved overwhelming. The consensus on the desirability of integration includes most black writers and intellectual leaders as well as the average citizens. Debate over the idea has remained sharp and vigorous, but it has primarily concerned the question of whether integration ultimately should result in virtual assimilation, or in some form of social pluralism.[49]

TABLE 8.—PERCENTAGES OF RESPONDENTS FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER, BY RACE, ACCORDING TO ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION

Form of Race Relations Preferred	Percent Favorably Interpreting Black Power	
	Whites	Blacks
Integration	25%(96)	46%(364)
Something in Between	8%(197)	46%(54)
Separation	5%(65)	*
	Gamma = −.57	Gamma =.01

* N is less than 5.

In view of the special status of integration as a symbol within the black community, it is not surprising that we should find conclusive evidence that approval for black power among blacks *does not* imply approval of racial separation. In Table 8 there are no appreciable differences in approval for black power between black respondents who endorse integration and those who do not.

The racial ideology we have identified, even though not merely an expression of racial loyalty, may still have social rather than purely in-

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[48] The issue of the nature of racial ideology among whites will be explored in Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, *Race and the Urban Political Community* (Boston: Little, Brown, forthcoming).

[49] Strong advocates of black power are almost uniformly in favor of social pluralism and reject cultural assimilation as resting on the demeaning "assumption that there is nothing of value in the black community." (Carmichael and Hamilton, *op. cit.*, p. 53). However, they do not endorse separatism holding that black power is "ultimately not separatist or isolationist." (Hamilton, *op. cit.*, p. 193). The basic idea is that after the black man develops "a sense of pride and self-respect . . . if integration comes, it will deal with people who are psychologically and mentally healthy, with people who have a sense of their history and of themselves as whole human beings." (Hamilton, *op. cit.*, p. 182) Detailed discussion on the meanings of assimilation can be found in Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

TABLE 9.—PERCENTAGES OF BLACK RESPONDENTS FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER ACCORDING TO WHEN THEY BELIEVE INTEGRATION WILL OCCUR

Time for Integration	Favorable Interpretations of Black Power		
	Fair Share	+Black Unity	=Total
Near Future	18%	16%	34%(140)
Distant Future	22%	33%	55%(206)

tellectual origins. An individual's status or the role he plays in the economy may prompt him to adopt the beliefs of the leaders of his social group because he is convinced that this is a way to advance his own interests. This form of intellectual emulation would be most likely among those, like many of our respondents, who have little education or experience with abstract thinking, and also have a strong sense of group identification. Several beliefs may be appropriated by an individual under these circumstances which may appear to him as natural collections of interdependent ideas, even if he does not have the intellectual capacity to make a similar synthesis of his own. In other words, he may know that several different elements of his belief system naturally go together, and he may also know that certain kinds of responses are considered appropriate for certain kinds of questions, without having any notion of why.[50]

Our respondents' racial ideologies may have originated through this process of social diffusion and group mobilization, but we find enough subtlety in the responses to conclude that many individuals have developed a surprisingly elaborate understanding of the applicability and meaning of the beliefs they hold. For example, although virtual unanimity exists within the black community about the desirability of integration as an ultimate goal, there is considerable disagreement over how soon it might occur. As we can see in Table 9, those who believe that realization of the goal is in the distant future are more likely to approve of black power than those who believe it will soon appear. In analyzing our data we have found that the perception of obstacles to racial progress, or the actual experience of some form of discrimination, is related to approval of black power. Table 9 demonstrates that the more pessimistic respondents are also more likely to interpret black power as an appeal for racial unity rather than a call for a fair share or an equal opportunity. There is evidence in this table, and in others we shall present, that the capacity for subtle shifts of emphasis and interpretation is not merely confined to the community's activist minority, but instead is widely diffused among a large segment of Detroit's black population.

B. Black Power Ideology and the Detroit Riot

The Detroit riot of July, 1967 caused fear and anxiety among almost all the citizens of the city, both black and white. Immediate reactions to the event ranged from those who believed it was a sign that the Negro citizens of the city were

TABLE 10.—PERCENTAGES OF RESPONDENTS FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER, BY RACE, ACCORDING TO WORD THEY USE TO DESCRIBE THE RIOT

a. *Total Sample*

Word Used to Describe Riot	Percent Favorably Interpreting Black Power	
	Whites	Blacks
Revolt	32%(28)	62%(51)
Riot	10%(212)	50%(194)
Disturbance	0%(19)	33%(42)
Lawlessness	8%(25)	27%(33)

b. *Black Respondents Only*

Word Used to Describe Riot	Interpretation of Black Power		
	Fair Share	+ Racial Unity	= Total
Revolt	25%	37%	62%(51)
Riot	23%	27%	50%(194)
Disturbance	19%	14%	33%(42)
Lawlessness	21%	6%	27%(33)

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[50] Converse discusses this possibility in a section called "Social Sources of Constraint." Converse, *op. cit.*, pp. 211–213. For other treatments of the origins of ideology, see William H. Form and Joan Rytina, "Ideological Beliefs on the Distribution of Power in the United States," *American Sociological Review* (1969), pp. 19–30; Samuel H. Barnes, "Ideology and the Organization of Conflict," *Journal of Politics* (1966), 513–530; Richard M. Merelman, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization," this REVIEW (1969), 750–767; Everett C. Ladd, Jr., *Ideology in America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969). pp. 341–350; and Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 213–439.

rising up in revolt against discrimination and injustice to those who saw it as an uncivilized expression of lawlessness and hooliganism. If, as we have suggested, responses to black power are a part of an individual's basic orientation toward race relations, there should be a strong relationship between his response to this slogan and his evaluation of the causes and consequences of the riot.

In Table 10a we can see that in both races those who use the word "revolt" to describe the events were much more likely to express approval for black power. In Table 10b where the black respondents are divided according to whether they gave racial unity or fair share responses we find that racial unity interpretations clearly predominate among those who see the riot as a protest against injustice. This is another demonstration of the shift in emphasis that occurs among those who are most aware and resentful of discrimination and inequality. The more convinced our black respondents are of the existence of injustice, the more they begin to interpret black power as a call for racial solidarity.

C. Black Power Ideology and the Choice of Leaders

Our respondents were asked to name "the single national or local leader who best expresses your views on relations between the races." This question, like the one on black power, was completely open ended. Table 11 displays the relationship for Negroes between the selection of various leaders and fair share or black unity interpretations of black power.

The list of leaders is arranged so that the percentage totals of respondents favoring black power are in descending order. The table seems to us to indicate the validity of our measure since respondents identifying with militant black leaders are the most favorably disposed towards black power while those choosing white leaders are least positive. In addition, the assumptions we made earlier about the meaning of the "black take-over" and "nothing" responses also seem warranted as individuals who identify with the least militant leaders most often give responses of this kind.

There are some more subtle differences revealed in this table. Negroes who felt best represented by black leaders other than the late Martin Luther King favored racial unity over fair share definitions of black power by a ratio of two to one. Dr. King's partisans, however, heavily emphasized fair share definitions. In addition, the likelihood of a favorable definition of black power is a direct function of the type of black leader selected. As a general rule, the more militant the leader who represents the respondent, the greater the chance of a positive orientation toward black power.

TABLE 11.—PERCENTAGE OF BLACK RESPONDENTS FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER ACCORDING TO THEIR SELECTION OF A LEADER BEST REPRESENTING THEIR VIEWS ON RACE RELATIONS

Leader Best Representing Respondent*	Black Power Interpretation		
	Fair Share	+ Racial Unity	=Total
Militant Black Leaders (N =59)	26%	50%	76%
Robert F. Kennedy (N =17)	12%	47%	59%
Other Black Leaders, excluding Martin Luther King (N =107)	17%	34%	51%
"No One" (N =20)	10%	30%	40%
Martin Luther King (N =150)	28%	10%	38%
White leaders, excluding Robert F. Kennedy (N =30)	11%	13%	24%

* Question: What single national or local leader best expresses your views on relations between the races?

N's in parentheses are the bases for the calculation of percentages, i.e., persons giving don't know or no answer responses to the black power question were not used in the table.

Total N's for the categories on leadership are given in the explanations of the leader classifications below:

A militant black leader (N =61) is defined here as someone who unequivocally endorsed black power before the time of our interviewing (September, 1967). They include: Muhammed Ali (N =3); H. Rap Brown (N =9); Stokely Carmichael (N =15); State Senator James Del Rio (N =13); Dick Gregory (N =6); Floyd McKissick (N =3); Adam Clayton Powell (N =8); and Rev. Albert Cleage (N =4). Del Rio and Cleage are local figures.

Robert F. Kennedy (N =21).

Other black leaders, excluding Martin Luther King (N =111) mentioned were: Senator Edward Brooke (N =16); Ralph Bunche (N =3); U. S. Representative John Conyers (N =31); U. S. Representative Charles Diggs (N =17); Detroit Common Councilman Nicholas Hood (N =10); Detroit Urban League Head Francis Kornegay (N =1); Judge Thurgood Marshall (N =4); Carl Rowan (N =1); Roy Wilkins (N =17); State Senator Coleman Young (N =1); Whitney Young (N =5). Hood, Kornegay and C. Young are local figures.

"No One" (N =21).

Martin Luther King (N =165).

White Leaders, excluding Robert F. Kennedy (N =33), mentioned were: Senator Dirksen (N =1); President Eisenhower (N =1); TV Commentator Lou Gordon (N =1); Vice President Humphrey (N =1); President Johnson (N =14); President Kennedy (N =9); Walter Reuther (N =3); Governor Romney (N =3). Gordon is a local figure.

The total N =412. Of the remaining 49 individuals in our black sample, 27 could not answer the question and 22 mentioned their minister (no name given), coach or assorted persons (including themselves) we could not categorize with confidence on a leadership spectrum.

Over seventy-five percent of our Negro respondents chose a black leader who best represented their views, but there were white leaders selected as well and instances where the interviewee could make no selection. The number of respondents who could not name a leader is small and we have divided them into two groups. "No one" is a category for individuals who decisively stated that they had no representative. This tiny group was often cynical about black power (and everything else) with over one-third saying that black power meant "nothing" to them. When they did define the slogan, however, black unity was the dominant theme. Another small group (N = 25) simply could not think of any person who represented them and they were also unlikely to answer the question about black power (i.e., they were coded in the don't know or no answer category on black power). These individuals were not visibly cynical about racial leaders or approaches; they were simply uninformed.

Thirty-one respondents identified with white leaders other than the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy. They were generally negative about black power, showing no meaningful preference for either positive interpretation. Over fifty percent of the black respondents who selected Senator Kennedy, however, gave favorable definitions of black power and they were disposed towards racial unity definitions of the term by a ratio of four to one. While the number of people who named Senator Kennedy is small, his importance as a link with the more militant elements in the black community should not be underestimated. The severing of this connection between the white and black worlds is a major tragedy. In the next phase of our research we will explore the impact of the deaths of both Kennedy and King on the beliefs of their followers.

D. Black Power Ideology: An Overview

Black power has no direct, generally accepted meaning, but the slogan still provokes strong responses from both blacks and whites. The power of all effective political slogans lies in "the emotional charges or valences they carry, the very elements that make cognitions dissonant or consonant," and in "their associative meanings, the very ambiguities that permit them, like Rorschach ink blots, to suggest to each person just what he wants to see in them."[51] In their efforts to shape a meaning for black power, our black respondents have fallen back upon fundamental sets of beliefs which have spread throughout all sectors of their racial community. Many of those who share these beliefs may be unaware of their most profound implications, but the beliefs are consistently organized in the minds of our respondents primarily because they are securely focused on the issue of racial injustice in America, a problem faced by most blacks in one form or another virtually every day of their lives.

When Converse speaks of ideological thinking, of course, he usually refers to "belief systems that have relatively wide ranges and that allow some centrality to political objects."[52] The racial ideology we have identified has a much narrower range. Given the limitations of our data, we cannot be sure that individuals holding a consistent racial ideology would also have consistent opinions about federal aid to education, or governmental measures deisgned to ensure full employment. Those with a racial ideology might be able to think in coherent ways only about questions of public policy which bear some relationship to the status of blacks in American society, but not about the general relationship between government and private business, or about America's relations with foreign countries.

The ideology of black power is not a wide ranging, highly elaborated, political world view. Nevertheless, the tone and quality of American political life in the latter 1960's was profoundly altered by the development of this belief system and its exceptionally wide diffusion among black Americans. In its radical form, as it is developing among our more disillusioned black respondents, the belief system includes doubts about the possibilities of realizing the goal of integration in the near future, sympathetic explanations of the July, 1967 disturbances in Detroit and a revolutionary label for them, selection of a militant leader as a spokesman, skepticism about improvements in the quality of life in the future, and a definition of black power which stresses the need for greater racial solidarity. This system of beliefs does not arm many of our respondents with concrete programs of social and economic reform, but in spite of its limited scope, its existence is of great potential significance. Its impressively wide diffusion is a striking indication of the growing mobilization and increasing sense of group identification within the black community.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Black power is a potent, meaningful slogan for most of our respondents. Some react with fear, others with cynicism, many with warm approval or strong disapproval, but in most cases reactions are intense and interpretations of the idea's meaning are related to an individual's basic orientation toward social and political problems. Whites have an overwhelmingly negative reaction to black power. The slogan is seen by most whites as an illegitimate, revengeful challenge. Among blacks, however, about forty-two percent of our sample see the term either as a call for equal treatment and a fair share for Negroes, or as an appeal for racial solidarity in the struggle against discrimination.

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[51] Robert E. Lane, *Political Thinking and Consciousness* (Chicago: Markham, 1969), p. 316.

[52] Converse, *op. cit.*, pp. 208–209.

The partisans of black power among Negroes are somethat younger than the rest of the black community, but neither their age nor other standard demographic factors, such as income, occupation, and education, are very helpful in explaining the distributions we have found. Sharp divisions exist within the Detroit black community, but they are not merely the result of a clash between young and old; instead, they represent a clash between those who have appropriated the cosmopolitan, secularized culture typical of the North and those whose social outlook and political attitudes are rooted in the paternalistic culture of the South. Approval for black power, as our analysis has shown, comes most often from those who were born or grew up in Detroit, are not members of churches, and have begun to doubt the trustworthiness of government in both Detroit and Washington.

Black power is the rallying cry of a generation of blacks whose fathers fled from the South to seek a new life in the "promised lands" of Detroit, New York, or Chicago. The move from the grinding poverty and overt oppression of the South to the cities of the North was seen as a great step forward by the original pioneers. But most of their children cannot be satisfied by these changes. In the words of Claude Brown:

> The children of these disillusioned colored pioneers inherited the total lot of their parents—the disappointments, the anger. To add to their misery, they had little hope of deliverance. For where does one run to when he's already in the promised land?[53]

This modern generation finds little compensation or hope in the evangelical, "old time religion" of their parents, nor do they share the traditional faith of Southern Negroes in the ultimate benevolence of white men. Many are distrustful of government, unimpressed with most of the civic notables and established political leaders of both the black and white communities, and increasingly pessimistic about their chances to achieve a satisfactory life in this country. They have not surrendered the ultimate aim of social equality and racial integration, but they have begun to doubt that the goal will be reached in the foreseeable future.

We encountered few racist, anti-white interpretations of black power among our black respondents and most of those came from respondents who were *not* sympathetic to black power. There was chauvinism and some glorification of blackness, especially among those who interpret black power as a call for racial unity or solidarity, but most were pro-black rather than anti-white. Black unity definitions of black power are not disguised appeals for separation from American society; at least, not at the present moment. If insufficient progress toward racial accommodation is made in the future and tensions continue to mount, separationist sentiments might begin to spread within the black community. Today, we find, instead, a deep concern with the rights of and desires for respect within the American black community. These feelings are most eloquently expressed in the interpretation of black power given by one of our young respondents:

> (black, male, 19, 12 grades) It means mostly equality. You know, to have power to go up to a person, you know, no matter what his skin color is and be accepted on the same level, you know, and it doesn't necessarily have to mean that you gotta take over everything and be a revolutionary and all this; just as long as people are going to respect you, you know, for what you are as a person and not, you know, what you skin color has to do with the thing.

Restraining ties with the traditional culture of the South are being steadily eroded as the percentage of blacks who were born and grew up in the North increases, the influence of the church wanes, and faith in the benevolence of paternalistic friends and allies weakens. The children born in Detroit since World War Two are coming of age politically in the midst of a social revolution. Events as diverse as the Detroit riot, the dominance of black athletes in every major American spectator sport, the collapse of colonial empires in Asia and Africa, the total integration of the American armed forces, and the murders of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy are all accelerating the break with traditional modes of thought and accommodation. The reservoir of potential supporters for black power is bound to grow.

The social revolution now in progress has resulted in a more unified, more highly mobilized black political community. Franklin Frazier's accommodating, apolitical "black bourgeoisie"[54] is rapidly disappearing as the sense of empathy and racial identification among the black middle class grows stronger. This developing racial community is profoundly restless and is searching for new forms of political expression and participation. The result of this search is likely

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[53] Claude Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[54] E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (New York: Free Press, 1957).

TABLE 12.—PERCENTAGES OF BLACK RESPONDENTS FAVORABLY INTERPRETING BLACK POWER ACCORDING TO THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE PART IN A RIOT

Would You Riot*	Percent Favorably Interpreting Black Power
No:	35%(262)
Yes:	57%(60)
Maybe:	69%(93)

* Question: Can you imagine any situation in which you would take part in a ________ (respondent's term for the events of July, 1967)?

to be increased activity of all kinds, both conventional and unconventional. Our data indicate a willingness to participate in political campaigns and elections on the part of even the most militant advocates of black power. Their involvement in this activity, however, would not preclude their taking part in other, more flamboyant, forms of protest.

No single, dominant tactical stance is likely to evolve among blacks; questions about the feasibility and utility of tactics are major sources of disagreement within the black community. Most of our black respondents, for example, believe the Detroit riots of 1967 were an understandable reaction to social injustice, and there is some sympathy for the individuals who actually did the rioting, but there is almost no approval of the sniping and fire bombing that took place. Extreme violence of this kind is presently thought of as a legitimate or useful expression of grievances by only a tiny minority of blacks in Detroit, but many others express considerable ambivalence about the utility of violent protests. For example, when we asked our black respondents, "Can you imagine any situation in which you would take part in a ________ (respondent's term for the events of July, 1967)?" a majority said no, but, as we can see in Table 12, respondents who expressed ambivalence were even more supportive of black power than those who said they definitely would participate. This undecided group is a substantial proportion of our sample, they have made the sharpest break with traditional forms of social thought, they are the most sympathetic toward the black power ideology, and they are wavering.

The outcome of this search by blacks for acceptable modes of political expression will depend primarily on the behavior of whites, both those who control all the public and private institutions that matter, and the average citizens who must adjust to changes in prevailing customs. If Detroit's future is to be peaceful, ways must be found to pull down the barriers to equal opportunity which now exist, and there must be radical improvement in the prospects for personal advancement of the city's black population. Although success in these efforts depends, in large measure, on the flexibility and compassion of the whites, it also depends on the capacity of many public and private governmental institutions to mobilize the resources necessary to create a decent, livable, urban environment.

Some of the most important decisions about Detroit's future will not be made in the city, but in Washington, in surburban city halls, or in the state capitol in Lansing; the policies adopted by labor unions, businesses and manufacturers in the city will probably be more important than anything done by the officials of city government. This complex, decentralized system of social choice, with its elaborate checks and balances and its many barriers to radical change, will be faced during the next decade with an insistent challenge from a new generation of black Americans. To successfully meet their demands large efforts will have to be made toward the creation of a truly inter-racial society. Depending on the extent and success of these efforts, this new black generation could either become a persuasive and creative new influence within the democratic system, or a force bent on the violent disrupton of American urban life.

DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ALIENATION*

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In recent years there has emerged in this country a radical questioning and rejection of established political institutions unparalleled since the Civil War in its intensity and scope. One objective indicator of this trend since World War II is the marked rise in voluntary renunciation of American citizenship, an act which represents the formal and final estrangement of the individual from his former political ties.[1] Available evidence suggests that estrangement from the polity is also widespread in countries throughout the world as fundamental questions are being raised about the legitimacy of political institutions and political leadership.

Attitudes toward the political system have long been a concern of political scientists. Major orienting theories of the political system suggest that citizen support plays a crucial role in determining the structure and processes of political systems. Almond and Verba, for example, use the concept "civic culture" to refer to a complex mix of attitudes and behaviors considered to be conducive to democratic government.[2] Easton underscores the fundamental importance of attitudes for system stability, focusing especially on "diffuse support" as a prerequisite for the integration of political systems. He suggests that "(w)here the input of support falls below [a certain] minimum, the persistence of any kind of system will be endangered. A system will finally succumb unless it adopts measures to cope with the stress."[3]

The conversion of these general theoretical ideas into systematic empirical theory requires further rigorous and comprehensive analyses of types of citizen support and the development of empirical indicators for this domain.[4] The concept of alienation, which may be conceived as one end of a continuum whose opposite extreme is defined by the concepts of support or integration, offers a useful vantage point from which to pursue this goal. The long history of intellectual concern with alienation has resulted in a literature rich in concepts and suggestive hypotheses which may provide a valuable perspective from which to develop an empirical theory relating citizen attitudes to the structures and processes of the political system.

I. DIMENSIONALIZING POLITICAL ALIENATION

There have been a number of recent theoretical and empirical efforts to explicate and clarify the concept of alienation.[5] The most fruitful of these involve attempts to specify particular *modes* of alienation by identifying the essential meanings of this attitudinal orientation.[6] This approach seeks to decompose a global concept into its component parts and thus may be referred to as one of *dimensionalization* of the concept. The research reported here utilizes this approach in developing concepts and measures of *political* alienation. In this respect it differs from most past efforts in that its focus is on attitudes which refer specifically to the institutions of government and the political process. Even when concerned with the specification of the mode of alienation, much previous research has been non-specific regarding the particular social institutions toward which such attitudes are directed. Since it has not been established, however, that alienation is normally an attitude which is either generalized over several modes *or* over a number of different social institutions, it would seem most useful to specify both the *mode* of alienation and the particular institutional *referent* in the operationalization of the concept. In this way, the actual extent of generalization, both as to mode and referent, can be determined by empirical investigation. In a sense, the present research "holds constant" the institutional referent of alienation by dealing only with attitudes toward aspects of the political system; the goal is to specify major modes of alienation directed toward this particular institutional sector.

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[1] While the motivations involved are unknown, renunciation of nationality appears to have strong content validity as a "hard" indicator of political estrangement. Formally recorded renunciations of nationality have increased consistently over the last two decades, from 149 in 1950 to 679 in 1968. (See *Annual Reports*, Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Department of Justice.) This represents almost a quadrupling of the rate, from .15 per 100,000 voting age population in 1950 to .57 per 100,000 voting age population in 1968.

[2] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[3] David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley, 1965), p. 220.

[4] For an example of Easton's own concern with the operationalization of "support," see David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," this REVIEW, LXI (March, 1967), 25–38. References to other empirical studies of support and alienation will be found in the footnotes to the present article; an extensive list of earlier studies is found in f. 4 of Easton and Dennis, *op. cit.*

[5] See, for example, Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (December, 1959), 783–791; Dwight Dean, "Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (1961), 753–758; Lewis S. Feuer, "What Is Alienation:

It is useful to distinguish at least four different ways in which alienation toward the polity may be expressed.[7]

1) "Political powerlessness" may be defined as an individual's feeling that he cannot affect the actions of the government, that the "authoritative allocation of values for the society," which is at the heart of the political process, is not subject to his influence. Political decisions, which determine to a great extent the conditions under which the individual lives, may appear to be *happening to* individuals who feel powerless, independent of or in spite of their own judgment or wishes. This mode of alienation is closely related (inversely) to the concept of "political efficacy," which has achieved such prominence in studies of voting behavior.[8]

2) "Political meaninglessness" may be said to exist to the extent that political decisions are perceived as being unpredictable. A perceived random pattern of decision making would, of course, prevent an understanding of the political system. This mode of alienation is distinguished from the first in that in the case of powerlessness decisions may be clear and predictable, but are simply not subject to the influence of the individual; in the case of meaninglessness, however, the individual perceives no discernible pattern. This feeling is illustrated by an individual's inability to distinguish any meaningful political choices, and the sense that political choices are themselves meaningless, because one cannot predict their probable outcomes nor, consequently, use them to change social conditions.

3) Following Durkheim's use of "anomie," which denotes a devitalization of social norms regulating individual behavior, "perceived political normlessness" is defined as the individual's perception that the norms or rules intended to

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The Career of a Concept," *New Politics,* 1 (Spring, 1962), 116–134; Arthur G. Neal and Salomon Rettig, "Dimensions of Alienation among Manual and Non-Manual Workers," *American Sociological Review,* 28 (August, 1963), 599–608; Kenneth Keniston, *The Uncommitted* (New York: Dell, 1965), esp. pp. 449–476; and Charles J. Browning, *et al.,* "On the Meaning of Alienation," *American Sociological Review,* 26 (1961), 780–781.

[6] See, especially, Seeman, *op. cit.,* and Neal and Rettig, *op. cit.* In his stimulating discussion, Keniston uses the term "mode" to express whether alienation is manifest as an attempt to change society (alloplastic) or is, rather, directed inwardly toward change in the individual himself (autoplastic). Keniston, *op. cit.* Although the behavioral expression of alienation is of obvious relevance to a theory of political alienation, it seems to me that it does not need to be made part of the definition of the concept itself but might be treated as a separate variable whose relation to the *attitude* of alienation is conditioned by other variables such as the opportunities for social change present in the system, or certain psychological characteristics of the individual.

[7] The concepts of "powerlessness," "meaninglessness," and "isolation," used here are based on Seeman's discussion of their generic types; the present discussion specifies how these modes of alienation relate to *political* institutions. The concept of "normlessness" developed here departs from the meaning attached to this term by Seeman. In addition to these four types, Seeman also discusses a type of alienation identified as "self-estrangement." The sense in which this type of alienation can be said to have an institutional referent is unclear.

[8] See especially the work emanating from the University of Michigan studies, most notably Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960).

govern political relations have broken down, and that departures from prescribed behavior are common. A belief that officials violate legal procedures in dealing with the public or in arriving at policy decisions exemplifies this mode of alienation.

4) "Political isolation" refers to a rejection of political norms and goals that are widely held and shared by other members of a society. It differs from perceived normlessness in which there is implicit *acceptance* of some set of norms from which *others* are perceived to be deviating. Political isolation can be illustrated by a belief that voting or other socially defined political obligations are merely conformist formalities, or, indeed, that public participation is inappropriate in the formulation of public policy. This type of alienation is consistent with Lane's description of alienated individuals as feeling that "the rules of the game are unfair, loaded, illegitimate; the Constitution is, in some sense, fradulent."[9] To the extent that social norms are dynamic, however, a state of isolation at one point in time may entail a different attitude set than isolation at another time. Similarly, to the extent that social norms differ from culture to culture, alienation in this mode can only be understood with reference to the prevailing normative patterns of particular societies.

Conceptual dimensionalization of an attitudinal domain implies a set of hypotheses about the relationships among empirical measures of the various dimensions. Although some previous work on alienation has demonstrated separate dimensions empirically,[10] studies using measures with direct *political* relevance frequently *assume* the existence of separate attitudinal dimensions without actually providing evidence to substantiate this assumption.[11] The present study pursues this line of inquiry further by exploring the dimensionality of attitudes toward the political system. If the hypothesis that distinct modes of political alienation exist can be substantiated, then it would seem imperative that future discussions of attitudinal support for political systems specify the sense in which "support" or "alienation" is being used, and consider the likelihood that different modes of support or alienation may be differentially related to other theoretically important variables.

II. CONSTRUCTION OF MEASURES

The data used in this study are derived from interviews collected from a nation-wide probability sample in the United States in early 1960. A description of sampling procedures has been published elsewhere.[12] Twenty-six questions, whose manifest content was judged related to the political alienation domain, were examined to determine their dimensionality. These items, arranged according to their final allocation to two scales of political alienation, are presented in Table 1.

The matrix of intercorrelations among these questions, arranged in a linked-simplex structure in which the largest correlations appear along the main diagonal, is presented as Table 2. This method of displaying the data has the advantage that "the factorial structure of a matrix may be anticipated quite directly by looking at the arrangement of correlations of variables."[13]

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[9] Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 162.

[10] See Neal and Rettig, *op. cit.;* the same authors' "On the Multidimensionality of Alienation," *American Sociological Review,* 32 (February, 1967), 54–64; and Elmer L. Struening and Arthur H. Richardson, "A Factor Analytic Exploration of the Alienation. Anomie and Authoritarianism Domain," *American Sociological Review,* 30 (1965), 768–776.

[11] See for example, Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein, and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," *Journal of Politics,* 23 (August, 1961), and Kenneth Janda, "A Comparative Study of Political Alienation and Voting Behavior in Three Suburban Communities," in *Studies in History and the Social Sciences* (Normal: Illinois State University, 1965), pp. 53–68. However, in a recent publication, Aberbach reports that factor analysis confirmed the dimensionality of several different measures of alienation, including two measures of political alienation. He does not report the factor loadings, although he describes them as "strong." His data support the utility of considering specific types of political alienation separately. See Joel Aberbach, "Alienation and Political Behavior," this REVIEW, LXIII (March, 1969), 86–99. Two recent articles dealing with support for particular political institutions also use factor analytic techniques to dimensionalize attitudes. See Jack Dennis, "Support for the Party System by the Mass Public," this REVIEW, LX (September, 1966), 600–615 and G. R. Boynton, S.C. Patterson and R. D. Hedlund, "The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* XII (May, 1968), 163–180.

[12] See Almond and Verba, *op. cit.,* pp. 519–523. The data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Neither Professors Almond nor Verba nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

[13] Edgar F. Borgatta, "On Analyzing Correlation

TABLE 1. QUESTIONS USED AS MEASURES OF POLITICAL ALIENATION[*]

Component I: "Political Powerlessness"

13a. If you wanted to discuss political and governmental affairs, are there some people you definitely wouldn't turn to—that is, people with whom you feel it is better not to discuss such topics? About how many people would you say there are with whom you would avoid discussing politics? (*discuss with no one*)

14. Some people say that politics and government are so complicated that the average man cannot really understand what is going on. In general, do you *agree* or disagree with that?

15. How do you feel about this? Thinking of the important national and international issues facing the country, how well do you think you can understand these issues? (*not at all*)

16. How about local issues in this town or part of the country? How well do you understand them? (*not at all*)

23. If you made an effort to change this regulation, how likely is it that you would succeed? (hypothetical local regulation considered to be "very unjust or harmful") (*not at all likely*)

24. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you would actually try to do something about it? (local regulation) (*not at all likely*)

27. If you made an effort to change this law, how likely is it that you would succeed? (hypothetical national law considered to be "very unjust or harmful") (*not at all likely*)

28. If such a case arose, how likely is it you would actually try to do something about it? (national law) (*not at all likely*)

31a. Thinking now about the national government in Washington, about how much effect do you think its activities, the laws passed and so on, have on your day-to-day life? Do they have a great effect, some effect, or *none*?

32a. Now take the local government: about how much effect do you think its activities have on your day-to-day life? Do they have a great effect, some effect, or *none*?

72f. People like me don't have any say about what the government does. (*Agree*-Disagree)

Component II: "Perceived Political Normlessness"

18a. One sometimes hears that some people or groups have so much influence over the way the government is run that the interests of the majority are ignored. Do you *agree* or disagree that there are such groups?

31b. On the whole, do the activities of the national government tend to improve conditions in this country, or would we be *better off without them*?

32b. On the whole, do the activities of the local government tend to improve conditions in this area, or would we be *better off without them*?

34. Suppose there were some question that you had to take to a government office—for example, a tax question or housing regulation. Do you think you would be given equal treatment? I mean, would you be treated as well as anyone else? (*No*)

35. If you explained your point of view to the officials, what effect do you think it would have? Would they give your point of view serious consideration, would they pay only a little attention, or would they *ignore* what you had to say?

37a. If you had some trouble with the police—a traffic violation, maybe, or being accused of a minor offense—do you think you would be given equal treatment? That is, would you be treated as well as anyone else? (*No*)

37b. If you explained your point of view to the police, what effect do you think it would have? Would they give your point of view serious consideration, would they pay only a little attention, or would they *ignore* what you had to say?

51. The Republican party now controls the administration in Washington. Do you think that its policies and activities would ever seriously endanger the country's welfare? Do you think that this *probably would happen*, that it might happen, or that it probably wouldn't happen?

52. If the Democratic party were to take control of the government, how likely is it that it would seri-

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[*] Question numbers refer to the original interview schedule as reported in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), Appendix B. Code categories were arranged to represent assumed ascending degrees of political alienation, the highest point of which is underlined for each question.

TABLE 1 (*Continued*)

ously endanger the country's welfare? Do you think that this *would probably happen,* that it might happen, or that it probably wouldn't happen?

72d. All candidates sound good in their speeches, but you can never tell what they will do after they are elected. (*Agree*—Disagree)

Items Omitted

45. Some people feel that campaigning is needed so the public can judge candidates and issues. Others say that it causes so much bitterness and is so unreliable that we'd be better off without it. What do you think? Is it needed or would we be *better off without it?*

46. Do you ever get angry at some of the things that go on in election campaigns? Do you *often* get angry, do you sometimes get angry, or do you never get angry?

47. Do you ever find election campaigns to be pleasant and enjoyable? Do you often, do you sometimes, or do you *never* find them pleasant and enjoyable?

48. Do you ever find election campaigns silly or ridiculous? Do you *often,* sometimes, or never find them silly or ridiculous?

72a.The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country. (Agree—*Disagree*)

The scales used in this research resulted from an interplay between factor and item analysis techniques which are described here in summary fashion. The matrix of correlation coefficients among alienation measures was analyzed by the principal components method.[14] Eight components with eigenvalues above 1.0 were extracted. The simplex arrangement of the matrix suggested two distinct dimensions.[15] However, in order to allow for the possible emergence of a third component of items with unclear relations to the two dominant clusters, the first three components extracted were retained for rotation by the Varimax criterion. The initial three-component solution was judged to be unacceptable for its poor approximation to simple structure.[16] The pattern of loadings suggested that rotation to two components might yield a clearer solution. This was indeed the case. These results, combined with the item analysis data, isolated five items which were of questionable relation to these dominant components, and they were eliminated.[17] A second principal-components analysis was performed on the remaining twenty-one items. Seven components with eigenvalues above 1.0 were found; the first two were clearly dominant (4.3 and 2.0) while the remaining values dropped rapidly (1.4, 1.3, 1.2, and 1.0). Because of their clarity and strength, the first two components were retained for rotation, resulting in the pattern displayed in Table 3. This solution was accepted as a satisfactory approximation to simple structure. All of the items are clearly associated with one of the two major components.

The manifest content of the eleven items constituting the first component strongly suggests the "powerlessness" dimension of alienation described above. As stipulated in the *a*

Matrices: Some New Emphases," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* XXII (Winter, 1958–59), p. 523.

[14] For a comparison of the components and factor models see Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), Chapter 8.

[15] Questions 24, 28, 27, 23, 15, 16, 72f and 14 compose one strong cluster, each having a correlation of .3 or higher with at least one other variable in the cluster, and Questions 37b, 35, 34, 37a, 32b, 31b, 51, and 52 form a weaker but identifiable second cluster.

[16] See L. L. Thurstone, *Multiple Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 335, and J. P. Guilford, *Psychometric Methods* (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), p. 508.

[17] Specifically, the results of the two-component, twenty-six item solution demonstrated that (a) Qs. 45 and 72a had weak loadings on *both* components, and (b) Q. 46 loaded *negatively* on its dominant component. To investigate further the structure of the items, Qs. 46 and 72a were eliminated, and two scales were formed using a cluster scoring procedure. Item analyses (based on response choice-total scale biserial correlations) indicated that Qs. 46, 47, and 48 were only weakly related to the dominant content of their scales. Since all three of these questions concerned attitudes toward election campaigns (as did Q. 45, which was eliminated because of its weak loadings), it seemed reasonable to conclude that the domain tapped by these questions was essentially different from that of the other items and all were eliminated.

TABLE 2.—ARRANGED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR 26 ALIENATION ITEMS[a]

Q.No.	24	28	27	23	15	16	72f	14	72d	18a	37b	35	34	37a	32b	31b	51	52	47	45	31a	32a	46	48	13a
28	53																								
27	33	49																							
23	47	36	49																						
15	34	42	34	29																					
16	31	30	19	20	46																				
72f	24	27	32	29	29	22																			
14	13	15	16	13	37	21	26																		
72d	09	13	13	05	19	13	21	22																	
18a	−07	−08	−01	−02	−02	−01	09	13	19																
37b	16	12	11	21	14	15	19	17	12	18															
35	14	16	20	20	17	11	23	12	11	11	39														
34	12	09	10	14	10	07	16	08	11	11	27	36													
37a	11	09	05	11	11	14	17	09	07	10	38	19	38												
32b	15	11	13	15	17	14	18	11	08	02	24	19	14	16											
31b	16	13	12	15	18	13	18	14	10	03	18	19	16	15	39										
51	05	09	14	10	09	04	16	07	15	05	13	16	14	14	08	15									
52	06	07	07	05	06	04	15	05	10	06	08	14	07	10	08	09	47								
47	17	20	18	18	19	17	17	12	14	02	10	13	05	06	11	09	05	08							
45	11	08	10	11	14	07	19	11	12	03	13	13	04	06	17	14	09	02	26						
31a	23	24	21	19	29	18	24	14	10	−08	07	13	08	00	11	08	−01	−02	10	14					
32a	16	16	19	16	23	20	16	14	06	−05	07	08	00	−01	18	11	−04	−01	11	12	45				
46	−20	−20	−13	−14	−18	−19	−08	00	−01	18	−01	01	02	−04	00	−03	00	04	−14	−08	−21	−11			
48	01	−05	−06	00	−05	00	−05	06	04	09	11	06	05	07	10	08	03	00	08	12	−09	−05	18		
13a	14	13	10	13	25	21	19	13	10	−01	08	07	03	08	11	07	06	05	07	10	20	09	−09	−07	
72a	03	−01	00	03	−09	03	02	00	−03	−01	06	03	00	03	08	05	−02	−04	03	01	−01	05	05	09	−03

[a] Decimals have been omitted. N = 970. Correlations of .06 are significant at the .05 level; correlations of .08 are significant at the .01 level. Missing data were coded as the mean of continua or the mode of dichotomies.

priori description of this dimension, the defining items (15, 23, 24, 27, and 28) refer to the individual's ability to understand important national and international issues facing the country, his propensity to do something about either a local regulation or a national law that he thinks unjust, and his subjective assessment of the efficacy of such efforts. Other items (14, 16, and 72f) share similar content, relating to the individual's ability to understand and affect the political process. Two of the items (31a and 32a) tap the respondent's understanding of the multifarious effects of government on the lives of citizens. Question 13a measures a fear or shunning of political discussion, which indicates a feeling of low ability to cope with the political environment. These interpretations support the identification of the first component as "political powerlessness."

TABLE 3.—ROTATED COMPONENT STRUCTURE OF TWENTY-ONE ALIENATION ITEMS

Question	Content	Component I	Component II
28	Likelihood of action to change unjust national law	.69	.06
15	Understanding of national and international issues	.68	.13
24	Likelihood of action to change unjust local regulation	.66	.08
27	Perceived efficacy of efforts to change national law	.62	.11
23	Perceived efficacy of efforts to change local regulation	.60	.16
31a	Effect of national government on daily life	.56	−.07
16	Understanding of local issues	.54	.11
32a	Effect of local government on daily life	.49	−.09
72f	People like me have no say about government activities	.47	.34
14	Politics and government are too complicated for average man	.35	.24
13a	Extent of avoidance of political discussions	.34	.08
37b	Consideration to point of view by police	.14	.62
37a	Treatment by police	.03	.59
34	Treatment in government office	.05	.59
35	Consideration of point of view by officials	.18	.57
51	Prudence of Republican party policies	.02	.49
52	Prudence of Democratic party policies	−.01	.42
31b	Benefit deriving from national government activities	.22	.40
18a	Elite vs. majority rule	−.16	.39
32b	Benefit deriving from local government activities	.24	.38
72d	Reliability of candidates for public office	.19	.31

The defining items of the second component are 34, 35, 37a, and 37b. These questions refer to the treatment expected by the individual from two different governmental agencies. These questions appear to assume a norm of equal and considerate treatment of citizens by government officials, and may be considered to refer ultimately to the legal norm represented by the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.[18] Lack of congruence between this norm and actual behavior may be considered as an indication of deterioration in the normative structure. Accordingly, the *subjective* assessment of the existence of this state can be interpreted as a condition of "perceived normlessness." That is, the individual who thinks that he would receive unequal treatment is making this judgment with reference to a state of affairs that he thinks *should* exist because it is affirmed by the political culture.

Another pair of questions (51 and 52) that load highly on this second component ask for the respondent's judgment as to the likelihood that the policies of either of the major political parties would endanger the country's welfare when that party is in control of the government. These questions refer to a set of norms about the role of political parties. This role includes the expectation that the parties will act with a degree of patriotism, judgment, and knowledge that will ensure the country's security and well-being. Failure to comply with these expectations would likely be perceived as a normative violation of great magnitude. Similar reasoning may be applied to items 31b and 32b. If the effects of governmental actions are such that the public would be better off without them, norms specifying that such activity be in the national welfare will be perceived as having been violated. The remaining two items of the second component (18a and 72d), which concern the influence of people and groups on government actions and the reliability and trustworthiness of elected officials, can also be taken as measures of cynical feelings regarding compliance with certain widely held ideals and norms of the political culture.

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[18] Consistent with this interpretation, Almond and Verba report that these questions were intended to measure the "qualities our respondents imputed to the executive side of government." *Op. cit.*, p. 106. At a different point in their analysis, however (see especially Chapter 8), they use these questions as measures of "administrative competence," which might be construed as a subtype of *powerlessness.* There is clearly some conceptual overlap here. Although a sense of departure from community norms is being used in the present study to define "perceived normlessness," it is obvious that, when the particular norm in question refers to the role the individual should play in his interactions with political decision-makers, assessments of norm deviations may also reflect feelings of powerlessness. That items 34, 35, 37a, and 37b have quite low loadings on the factor that is here called "powerlessness" increases confidence that their interpretation in terms of role expectations and norm deviations is more adequate than an interpretation using the powerlessness concept.

Although we do not have a direct measure of the extent to which the norms referred to here are in fact shared, some measure of their importance is indicated by Almond and Verba's finding that, when respondents were asked to mention the "things about this country that you are most proud of," 85% of Americans mentioned aspects of the political system such as the Constitution, political freedom, or democracy. These sources of pride are all strongly associated with the norms of equality, responsibility, and responsiveness which have been suggested here as providing the point of reference for answers to the questions constituting this component. In no other country studied did even as many as half of the respondents mention political characteristics as a source of pride.[19] Because the main theme shared by these questions appears to be the extent to which political leaders and government officials observe important norms of the political culture, the second component is called "perceived political normlessness." The stipulation of normlessness as "perceived" is meant to indicate that the respondent *himself* does not necessarily feel anomic, but rather that he believes that frequent deviations from accepted norms occur *in the political process*. In this sense, this concept is related to the concept of "political cynicism," since the questions used to measure cynicism all appear to have either a legal or an informal norm as an implied referent against which respondents are asked to judge the behavior of politicians.[20] It may be a more fruitful concept in that whereas "cynicism" has no apparent theoretical roots, "perceived normlessness" has theoretical ties in the alienation framework and in the Durkheim-Merton-inspired theories of anomie, in which the term is used to signify a devitalization of social norms.[21]

Each respondent was assigned a score on each of the two dimensions of alienation on the basis of his responses to the questions discussed above. A cluster scoring procedure, in which each item is assigned uniquely to the scale on which it has its highest loading, was used. The internal consistency reliability coefficients of the powerlessness and perceived normlessness scales were .77 and .62 respectively.[22] Both measures were approximately normally distributed, with a slight positive skew in the perceived normlessness scale. In the interests of greater reliability, a modification in the original sample was made consisting in the elimination of 102 cases for which there were serious data gaps.[23] All analyses which follow are based on the refined sample of 868 cases.

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[19] Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

[20] See Agger, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 479, for a list of the questions used.

[21] See especially Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (rev. ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 131–194. Another related concept inspired by Durkheim's analysis of anomie has recently been discussed by Inkeles, who develops the concept of "political anomie" along lines which are strikingly similar to those defining "perceived political normlessness." Inkeles defines political anomie as the individual's *feeling* that others are not complying with the rules of society, and operationalizes it as "the individual's *perception* of the extent to which politicians and government officials pay attention to the common man, serve the public rather than their own careers, and keep their campaign promises after the election." Alex Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries," this REVIEW, LXIII (December, 1969), p. 1125. Emphasis in original. The content of the first and third of Inkeles' defining questions is essentially the same as Qs. 18a and 72d of the perceived political normlessness scale.

[22] The Hoyt method was used. See Cyril J. Hoyt and Clayton L. Stunkard, "Estimation of Test Reliability for Unrestricted Item Scoring Methods," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 12 (1952), 756–758.

[23] Since multivariate techniques assume a constant N, some procedures had to be adopted to eliminate missing data. The entire sample of 970 was used for the component analyses reported above, with "Not Ascertained" or "Don't Know" cases coded the middle position of continuous variables or the modal position of dichotomies. Once scale composition was determined, cases were excluded from the analysis if more than one-third of the questions comprising either of the dependent variables had missing responses or if information was missing on a major socioeconomic status variable, i.e., occupation or income, since these were known to have important effects on alienation (there were no missing data for education, place of birth, or race). The two-thirds present criterion for the dependent variables was somewhat arbitrary. It seemed likely that with more than one-third of the items missing, there would be a relatively high probability of misrepresenting the respondent's true attitude. Conversely, a more stringent criterion would have eliminated a great

The examination of the meanings of each of the questions in the two scales suggests that the scales have content validity as measures of the concepts of political powerlessness and perceived political normlessness. The establishment of these two distinct measures of alienation should aid in future theoretical clarification of the concept and in the development of more specific hypotheses relating alienation to various personal characteristics and social conditions. As a step toward this goal, the relationships between these two scales of alienation and a variety of other variables are explored below. Since the two scales are only weakly related ($r = .26$, indicating only 7% shared variance), we can reasonably expect that the two dimensions of alienation will be *differentially* related to other variables. If the strength or the direction of the relationships between the measures of alienation and various social and psychological variables are significantly different, then the utility of the dimensional approach will be further substantiated.

III. CORRELATES OF TWO DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ALIENATION

The analyses reported below are directed to the question of the sources of political alienation. In previous studies many different variables have been shown to be associated with one or another type of alienation. Most studies, however, have considered only a limited number of variables and thus the literature is replete with demonstrations of bivariate relationships between measures of alienation and various personal characteristics. In the present study an attempt is made to consider a wide variety of variables simultaneously, and to evaluate their relative importance in multivariate models. In this way the development of parsimonious theory may be advanced.

Zero-order Pearson correlations among all variables are presented in Table 4.[24] For conceptual clarity, the independent variables are arranged in three groups, corresponding to the general concepts of (1) social status, which includes religion, nativity, race, sex, age, education, occupation, and income; (2) social cohesion, which includes marital status, number of children, years of residence in the community where the individual lives, frequency of church attendance, number of organizations to which the respondent belongs, whether the respondent was ever an officer in any of these organizations, an index of political participation, party identification, strength of party identification, and an index of faith in people; and (3) geo-cultural environment, including size of community and region of residence. Codes for all variables are presented in the Appendix.

The zero-order relationships between powerlessness and social status reported here are consistent with the findings of several previous studies which used different indicators of alienation.[25] In addition, the Survey Research

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many more cases. These procedures resulted in 119 exclusions, accounted for by 102 individuals. An analysis designed to ascertain the effects of excluding these 102 cases on the representativeness of the sample indicated that the revised sample generally corresponded more closely than the original to a number of census distributions. This was because missing data cases tended to have demographic characteristics similar to those which were overrepresented in the original sample. This finding and the great likelihood of unreliability in attempting to score the missing data cases were primary factors in the decision to remove these cases from the analysis. For a more detailed discussion of some problems raised by missing data and a consideration of alternative methods of handling it, as well as a detailed description of the procedures followed in the elimination of cases reported here, see Ada W. Finifter, *Dimensions of Political Alienation: A Multivariate Analysis,* Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1967, pp. 60–70.

[24] Bivariate plots between each predictor variable and each alienation scale showed no significant departures from linearity. The relationship between age and powerlessness was the only one which was very slightly curvilinear, with the youngest age group (18–25) having as high a mean powerlessness score as the 41–50 age group, but not nearly as high as that of the oldest group. This result confirms neither previous findings of a linear relationship between these variables, reported by several investigators, nor those findings indicating extreme curvilinearity, with the youngest being more alienated than any other age group. See W. E. Thompson and J. E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," *Social Forces,* 38 (March, 1960), 190–195.

[25] For example, see Agger, *et al., op. cit.,* 484–487; Russell Middleton, "Alienation, Race, and Education," *American Sociological Review,* 28 (December, 1963), 973–977; John Haer, "Social Stratification in Relation to Attitudes Toward Sources of Power," *Social Forces,* 35 (December, 1956), 137–142; and Richard Quinney, "Political Conservatism, Alienation, and Fatalism," *Sociometry,* 27 (September, 1964), 372–381. My review of previous studies intentionally omits those using Srole's

TABLE 4. CORRELATIONS AMONG DIMENSIONS OF ALIENATION, SOCIAL STATUS, SOCIAL COHESION, AND GEO-CULTURAL VARIABLES[a]

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
1 Powerlessness																								
2 Normlessness	26																							
3 Jewish	−09	−02																						
4 Catholic	01	−03	b																					
5 Protestant	02	03	b	b																				
6 Nativity	−07	10	−13	−20	26																			
7 Race	14	22	−07	−10	10	08																		
8 Sex	12	−08	−02	−01	06	03	00																	
9 Age	12	01	02	−02	02	−17	−09	−08																
10 Education	−44	−16	12	−01	−06	16	−18	07	−35															
11 Occupation	−32	−12	20	−03	−08	08	−20	−03	03	48														
12 Income	−31	−18	13	06	−09	03	−28	−06	−21	42	31													
13 Marital Status	−08	−03	05	−02	03	−07	−05	−08	−06	−00	−03	25												
14 Number of Children	07	04	−03	−04	06	02	02	02	17	−23	−15	−11	24											
15 Years Residence	03	−01	02	04	−02	−03	−01	−00	35	−16	−05	−11	−04	06										
16 Church Attendance	−17	−11	−10	17	15	08	03	10	03	06	03	01	03	04	05									
17 Organizations	−38	−13	09	01	−00	08	−08	−18	06	34	34	30	02	−07	06	21								
18 Officership	−31	−13	06	−10	09	08	−05	−02	05	27	24	20	08	−03	06	20	66							
19 Pol. Participation	−64	−10	10	−02	−03	06	−15	−23	11	38	39	30	04	−03	01	09	50	40						
20 Party ID	−07	−06	−06	−11	14	07	−07	−03	06	12	15	06	−05	−07	01	02	08	06	09					
21 ID Strength	−10	−07	−01	02	−06	−02	08	01	−19	−02	−04	01	01	09	16	08	12	13	15	−15				
22 Faith in People	−37	−37	−01	03	02	01	−22	05	−09	32	19	29	06	−05	−06	15	24	22	27	11	03			
23 Community Size	−01	05	20	17	−23	−12	04	04	−15	15	09	21	−05	−22	−08	−01	−00	−08	06	−08	11	−02		
24 Northeast	−09	−06	15	24	−28	−08	−06	−04	−01	08	05	13	−03	−05	05	04	04	−04	05	14	00	07	15	
25 South	09	08	−09	−24	28	10	14	06	−01	−15	−06	−20	02	07	−05	13	−10	01	−15	−13	02	−08	−16	b

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[a] Decimals are omitted. N =868. Correlations of .06 are significant at the .05 level; correlations of .08 are significant at the .01 level. Codes for all independent variables are given in the Appendix.

[b] These dummy variables were constructed from answers to the same item.

Center studies have found consistently that the political efficacy scale (the inverse of powerlessness) is positively related to being male, and to education, income, and occupation.[26] Within the cluster of status measures used in the present study, education is by far the single most important predictor of powerlessness, accounting for 19% of the total variance. Because of the important effects of education on job and income opportunities, it is likely that education also has important indirect effects through its influence on occupation and income, each of which is also fairly strongly related to powerlessness. However, since income level of the parental home is an important determinant of the level of education achieved by the respondent, it is difficult to reject the economic determinism hypothesis without more information on socio-economic background than is available in this study. These data do demonstrate, however, that in a contemporaneous prediction of powerlessness, education is a far more important variable than income. Nevertheless, income and occupation each independently explain about 9% of the variance in powerlessness scores. In contrast, income accounts for only about 3% and occupation for about 1% of the variance in normlessness.

Race is another measure of general social status found to be related to indicators of alienation in previous studies.[27] In each case, Negroes are more highly alienated than whites. In the present study, although race seems to be of some slight importance in predicting powerlessness ($r = .14$, $r^2 = .02$), its relationship to this form of alienation is essentially a function of education: when educational attainment is controlled, the strength of the relationship between race and powerlessness drops to less than one-fourth of its initial potency ($r = .067$, $r^2 = .004$). Given similar educational achievement, Negroes apparently feel hardly any more powerless concerning the political process than do whites. Moreover, considering that Negroes as a group are less well-educated than whites, that they generally hold lower prestige occupational positions, and that they earn less income, the zero-order correlation between race and powerlessness is perhaps smaller than one would expect.

The low correlation between powerlessness and race contrasts with the stronger effects of race in the case of normlessness. Even when income and education (the two next most powerful status predictors of normlessness) are *both* held constant, race maintains most of its original explanatory power, with the second order partial reduced only to .175. In contrast, the corresponding second order partial for race and powerlessness is an insignificant .035. This difference means that, given similar achieved status, ascriptive racial status is not important as a cause of political powerlessness, but it does remain an important cause of perceived normlessness. However, since it is obviously more difficult for Negroes to attain that same achieved status, this type of statistical controlling procedure is in danger of being misleading except as it points out possible effects of social change. That is, the implication of these findings is that if opportunities for educational and material advancement were equal, it is likely that Negroes would feel no more powerless than whites. In contrast, race *would* remain the most powerful status variable in determining the perception that public officials commonly violate community norms. Indeed, of all the independent variables considered, race is second in power only to the measure of faith in people for explaining normlessness, and even with this measure of inter-personal trust controlled, race still has a significant effect on normlessness ($r = .16$).

Another ascribed characteristic correlated with perceived normlessness is sex: men perceive norm violations somewhat more frequently than do women. This is the more interesting in view of the fact that women feel more powerless than men. The differential relationship between sex and the two dimensions of alienation indicates the contemporary persistence of the political role traditionally assigned to women. The present findings indicate that many women feel they have little capacity to affect the political system, yet they are less critical of it than are

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anomia scale as a measure of alienation. The heavy emphasis on personal life situations in the Srole scale suggests that it may largely measure personal disorganization or maladjustment rather than attitudes toward aspects of social structure. The two may be related, but this is an empirical rather than definitional question, and the indiscriminate use of the Srole scale as a *de facto* measure of "alienation" serves mainly to confuse these concepts. Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence that anomia and some measures of alienation are independent dimensions. See the articles cited in note 10.

[26] Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), pp. 190–192; Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, *op. cit.*, pp. 516–520.

[27] See, for example, Middleton, *op. cit.* and Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, *op. cit.*

men. This is an important aspect of what has been called the "subject" political orientation.[28]

Nativity, another ascribed characteristic, also has divergent effects on the two types of alienation. Whereas foreign-born respondents are likely to feel somewhat more powerless than the native-born (and the Southern European feels even more powerless than the northern European), we find that the opposite is true for perceived normlessness. That American birth is associated with lower levels of powerlessness is explicable by the higher educational attainment of native-born citizens, since education decreases feelings of powerlessness. Why then should American birth be associated with *increased* perceptions of normlessness? It will be noted that the nativity ranking orders native-born Americans highest, those born in Northern or Western Europe second, and those born in Southern Europe, or in other areas of the world, lowest.[29] This ranking clearly corresponds also to one of similarity of the political system of the country of origin and that of the United States. Similarity of these political systems is likely to be related to greater knowledge of the American system. The reason for the correlation between nativity and pereceived normlessness may then lie in the fact that those with greater knowledge of and familiarity with the American political system would be more apt to perceive the norm deviations which do, in fact, occur, than would those to whom the political structure is less familiar.[30] Another possible explanation for this finding may lie in the bases from which these judgments are made. The native-born American probably has the highest expectations regarding the behavior of public officials, rooted in an idealized orientation toward government and authority common in public schooling. Violations of this textbook image may thus evoke more negative responses (as in a frustration-aggression reaction). The political culture of the Southern European, to take the other extreme, tends to stress a more realistic and a more cynical image of the workings of government.[31] Given their lower expectations, persons socialized in this type of political culture might therefore be more tolerant of what they may perceive to be the far less frequent occurrence of norm violations in their adopted country.[32]

In summary, then, the relationships between the social status characteristics and each of the two dimensions of political alienation differ in several important respects. In particular, Negroes tend to have higher scores on the measure of perceived normlessness than do whites, while the difference between the races on the measure of powerlessness is of much less importance. Both nativity and sex have opposite effects on the two types of alienation. Women tend to feel more powerless than men but less often perceive norm violations. The native-born, in general, feel less powerless than the foreign-born, but the foreign-born are less critical of the operations of the political system.

It is clear that important differences exist also in the effects of various aspects of social cohesion on the two kinds of political alienation. Political participation has a very high negative correlation with feelings of political powerlessness ($r = -.64$), alone accounting for 41% of its variance.[33] The "faith in people" scale, designed to measure a person's "global attitude toward human nature,"[34] also has a strong inverse correlation with feelings of powerlessness ($r = -.37$). Since the faith in people scale is a measure of interpersonal trust in social relations it is understandable that it should be related to the way in which politics, a process involving considerable emphasis on interpersonal activity, is viewed. A further indicator of social cohesion which has a strong negative relation to powerlessness is the number of organizational memberships the individual reports ($r = -.38$), which is slightly more strongly related to powerlessness than is the experience of having been an officer in these organizations ($r = -.31$). Finally, frequency of church attendance is also negatively related to feelings of powerlessness ($r = -.17$). Considering the relationships *among* this set of variables, the highest correlations exist among organizational memberships, political participation, and faith in people, with church attendance somewhat less strongly related to this cluster. It is perhaps reasonable to postulate the existence of an underlying "community solidarity" factor which operates to reduce feelings of powerlessness. While these activities and attitudes tend to cluster, faith in people, political participation and church attendance have strong independent effects on this type of alienation. However, membership in general voluntary organizations alone, without participation in the political process itself, does not substantially reduce feelings of political powerlessness. The partial correlation between organizational memberships and powerlessness when political participation is controlled reduces to only $-.08$ while the corresponding partial for faith in people is $-.26$ and for church attendance, $-.15$. These results suggest important relationships between political attitudes and the broader context of social interaction.

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[28] Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, esp. Chapters 1 and 8.

[29] The ranking of ethnic prestige follows Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," *American Sociological Review,* 19 (1954), p. 407.

[30] Litt found that familiarity with Boston politics (as measured by length of residency in that city) increases political cynicism. Edgar Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," *Journal of Politics,* 25 (May 1963), 312–323.

[31] For descriptions of attitudes toward authority in different political systems see Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, esp. Chapters 4 and 14; Lawrence Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), Chapter 10; and David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 6 (1962), 229–246. Easton and Hess comment particularly on the idealization of authority encouraged in American socialization practices.

[32] Then, too, it is possible that the foreign-born may be more hesitant to make statements critical of American government to an American interviewer. Since the items in the normlessness scale tend to focus on government officials they may be more threatening in this respect than the items in the powerlessness scale, which may be perceived more in terms of the respondent's own shortcomings.

[33] Although a significant correlation between political participation and powerlessness was expected on theoretical grounds, its magnitude prompted re-examination of the scales to explore the possibility of a spurious effect caused by similarity of some of their questions. Questions 24 and 28 of the powerlessness scale asked for the likelihood that the respondent *would actually try* to do something about a national law or local regulation that he thought unjust. Questions 25 and 29, used in the participation scale, asked if the respondent had actually *ever done* anything to try to influence a national or local decision. The first set is

The participation measures are much less strongly related to perceived normlessness than to powerlessness. For example, neither organizational memberships, nor being an officer, nor political participation (each of which explains between 10% and 41% of the variance in powerlessness) can explain as much as 2% of the variance in the perceived normlessness scores. Thus, the pattern of community participation, which tends to decrease feelings of powerlessness with respect to the political process, has practically no effect on whether or not one perceives norm-violating behavior by government officials. Frequent participators appear almost as likely to perceive such behavior as apathetics. Faith in people, however, *is* equally powerful in predicting both types of political alienation. This variable is, in fact, the most powerful of all independent variables in predicting perceived normlessness, accounting for 15% of the variance.

The "social cohesion" variables present certain problems of conceptual status. They are related to each other in complex ways that must

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an almost classic operationalization of the definition of an attitude as a predisposition to behavior. Questions 25 and 29, however, ask for reports on *actual behavior.* Thus, the four questions are legitimately placed in their respective scales of *attitude* toward the political system and actual *participation* in it. Nevertheless, in order to avoid any possibility of spuriousness, the powerlessness scale was reconstructed without questions 24 and 28. The reliability of this new scale dropped from .77 to .71 because of the loss of the two items, which had been very highly correlated with the other items of the scale. However, contrary to the spuriousness hypothesis, the correlation between the participation scale and the *new* powerlessness scale dropped only to $-.60$ (from $-.64$). Since the decrease in actual prediction is less than the theoretically possible decrease due to loss of reliability alone, the diminution of the correlation is probably due solely to the decrease in reliability rather than to the omission of these two particular items. If, in contrast, the decrease in correlation had been larger than warranted by the decrease in reliability, the spuriousness hypothesis would have been more plausible. Furthermore, the correlations between these particular items of the two scales were not large enough to have caused the high correlation between the scales themselves, especially in view of the fact that they comprise only 2/7 of the participation scale and 2/11 of the powerlessness scale.

		Powerlessness Questions	
		24	28
Participation Questions	25	.36	.36
	29	.25	.33

In contrast, the correlation between items 25 and 29 of the participation scale is .47 and between items 24 and 28 of the powerlessness scale .55. This analysis demonstrated that the items contributed far more to the reliability of their respective scales than to any spurious correlation between the scales. On the basis of this evidence the original powerlessness scale was retained because of its higher reliability.

[34] Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," *American Sociological Review,* 21 (December, 1956), p. 690. The reliability of this scale in the current project was .58.

eventually be explicated if adequate causal models are to be developed. In addition, they are related to the measures of alienation more complexly than the simple independent-dependent variable model of regression analysis used here suggests. For example, participation variables have been treated in the literature as both independent and dependent with respect to political attitudes. Campbell and his associates consider political efficacy as an independent variable in predicting levels of political participation,[35] and Horton and Thompson,[36] Janda,[37] and Aberbach[38] consider the effects of political alienation on voting behavior. Agger and associates have shown that their political cynicism measure is related to frequency of political discussion,[39] a finding similar to one by Douvan relating "political effectiveness" to political discussion.[40] On the other hand, analyses by Rose and Almond and Verba are distinguished by their emphasis on organizational affiliations as *preceding* feelings of competence,[41] while competence itself is viewed as a *product* of the diffusion of group values to the members. It has also been suggested that feelings of efficacy and actual participation probably reinforce each other. Some sense of subjective competence may precede participation, but the skills and familiarity with the political process that result from participation are likely, in turn, to increase the subjective sense of ability to influence the system.[42] It seems clear that a complex feedback process exists among these variables. Development of an adequate theory of alienation will depend on the success with which these types of variables are incorporated in their dual role as both cause and effect of attitudes. Newly developing techniques for analyzing reciprocal causal models hold promise for reaching this goal.[43]

This discussion has proceeded with a separate consideration of variables on different levels of analysis. Status variables may be considered as relatively stable (indeed, some are immutable) characteristics of the individual. Community cohesion variables, on the other hand, are dynamic characteristics of the individual as he relates to others in his environment. We may also consider the effect of certain characteristics of the environment itself. Being from either the Northeastern or the Southern region of the country is related to one's level of both powerlessness and perceived normlessness, but the regional characteristics have opposite effects. As compared to Southerners, Northeasterners appear to feel more confident of their ability to understand and influence government decisions and of the normative compliance of political leaders. The correlations between community size and the two types of alienation indicate that this lesser alienation in the Northeast is not due to the higher urbanization in this area. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the correlations between community size and both forms of alienation increase positively when controlled for certain relevant variables. The relationship between region and alienation may be viewed as a reflection of the generally lower socioeconomic status of persons living in the South. When either education or income is controlled, the relationships between being from the South and both of the alienation variables are reduced. However (as in the case of the relationship between race and alienation), one may question the validity of controlling for such variables, since this procedure tends to obscure the historical factors which have made the South a distinctive region.

IV. MULTIVARIATE MODELS

A large number of variables have been considered, and an attempt has been made to identify those whose effects are most important. Obviously, however, there is an extremely large number of ways in which these variables could be combined to form prediction equations. From the enormous number of possible equations it is desirable to be able to select one model on which substantive explanations could be focused. The problem of choosing an explanatory model may be interpreted as one of striking a balance between maximizing explanatory power and minimizing the number of variables included so as to achieve theoretical parsimony. In order to find such an optimal equation, a stepwise correlation program was used.[44] The criterion adopted for termination of the equation was that the increase in R^2 resulting from the addition of a variable be statistically significant at the .05 level. This criterion increases confidence that an increment in explanatory power of a given size is unlikely to have happened because of sampling or other random error (within the usual confidence limits), and that the variable in question makes a genuine contribution to explanation.

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[35] Campbell, *et al., The American Voter, op. cit.*, pp. 479–481.

[36] John E. Horton and Wayne E. Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism: A Study of Defeated Local Referendums," *American Journal of Sociology*, 67 (1962), pp. 491–492; and W. E. Thompson and J. E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," *Social Forces*, 38 (March, 1960), 190–195.

[37] Janda, *op. cit.*

[38] Aberbach, *op. cit.*

[39] Agger, *et al., op. cit.*, pp. 495–497.

[40] Elizabeth Douvan, "The Sense of Effectiveness and Response to Public Issues," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 47 (1958), 111–126.

[41] Arnold M. Rose, "Attitudinal Correlates of Social Participation," *Social Forces*, 37 (1959), 202–206; by the same author, "Alienation and Participation: A Comparison of Group Leaders and the 'Mass'," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (December, 1962), 834–838; and Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, pp. 307–322.

[42] Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), Chapter 26.

[43] For a pioneering application of methods of analyzing reciprocal causation, see Otis Dudley Duncan, Archibald O. Haller, and Alejandro Portes, "Peer Influences on Aspirations: A Reinterpretation," *American Journal of Sociology*, 74 (September, 1968), 119–137.

Table 5 presents the regression coefficients for the two equations that meet this criterion. First, it should be noted that the full twenty-three variable equation increases explained variance in powerlessness from 50.7% to only 51.5% and in normlessness from 17.9% to only 18.9%. Thus, it seems clear that, in each case, the stepwise regression procedure has permitted the selection of a relatively small subset of variables (less than one-third of those originally available), whose power is such as to explain 98% and 95%, respectively, of the variance controlled by the full set of variables. In both cases, also, explanation of variance increases only marginally over and above the explanation possible with the one most powerful predictor alone. In the case of powerlessness, explained variance increases from 41% to 51% with the addition of six variables to political participation and for normlessness from 13% to 18% with the addition of six variables to faith in people. While beginning with different initial variables in each case would result in slight changes in these figures, the important point, *normally obscured by successive bivariate analyses,* is that the variables with which we typically work are often sufficiently inter-related so that we do not actually increase explanatory power greatly by continually increasing the number of predictor variables.[45] Thus, determination of the most powerful explanatory variables appears to be a rational and useful research strategy.

TABLE 5.—REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR FINAL EQUATIONS*

Variable	Political Powerlessness	Perceived Political Normlessness
Political Participation	−.55	—
Education	−.14	—
Age	.13	—
Jewish	−.05	—
Faith in People	−.14	−.30
Church Attendance	−.10	−.07
Community Size	.07	.07
Sex	—	−.07
Income	—	−.08
Nativity	—	.10
Race	—	.13
	$R = .712$	$R = .423$
	$R^2 = .507$	$R^2 = .179$

* Standardized coefficients are presented. Dashes indicate that the variable concerned did not have enough independent predictive power for this dependent variable to be included.

Considering the powerlessness model first, a comparison of the standardized regression coefficients indicates that political participation is by far the most important predictor. The appearance of community size may seem strange in that, of all variables, this one had the lowest zero-order correlation with the dependent variable. An examination of the stepwise calculations reveals that the major impetus to the rise in the partial correlation between population size and powerlessness was the inclusion of education. With education controlled, this correlation increases (partial $r = .06$), indicating that within educational levels, there is a weak but significant positive relationship between community size and feelings of political powerlessness. Large urban concentrations apparently do contribute to a sense of estrangement between the citizen and his government. This relationship is suppressed at the zero-order level because of the tendency of highly educated individuals to locate in larger cities and the negative relationship between education and powerlessness. The alienating effects of the urban environment do not appear to result from differential social cohesion in rural and urban areas. There are few important correlations between community size and the measures of social cohesion used in the present study and the direction of those which do exist is not consistent with the hypothesis that the reason for higher alienation in larger cities lies in lower social cohesion. If no distinct urban behavior patterns can be implicated in the positive relationship between community size and powerlessness, it is possible that type of political structure may be a useful concept in future investigations of this phenomenon.

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[44] The particular program used was "BMDO2R, Stepwise Regression." For a description of this program, see W. J. Dixon (ed.), *BMD Biomedical Computer Programs,* revised edition (Los Angeles: Health Sciences Computing Facility, Department of Preventive Medicine and School of Health, School of Medicine, UCLA, September 1, 1965), pp. 233–257.

[45] On the other hand, this very inter-relatedness may lead to difficulties in obtaining stable estimates of regression coefficients. As Farrar and Glauber suggest, the problem of multicollinearity is most usefully viewed as one of degree of severity rather than as one of categorical existence. The size of the correlation coefficients among the independent variables in the present study does not appear to constitute a serious problem. See Donald E. Farrar and Robert R. Glauber, "Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem Revisited," *Review of Economics and Statistics,* 49 (1967), 92–107.

The inclusion of age in the final regression equation also merits examination. Significant events accompanying the aging process, such as loss of spouse and enforced retirement from gainful employment, probably increase personal frustration. It may be that these feelings of frustration or helplessness are generalized to the political realm, thereby increasing the sense of political powerlessness. But such a higher level of alienation among the aged is partly obscured at the zero-order level by the *positive* correlation between age and political participation ($r = .11$). The multivariate model points up the importance of higher political participation in keeping political powerlessness among the aged at a lower level than it would otherwise reach. Indeed, as the effects of other integrating variables are held constant, the effect of age becomes increasingly strong and clear. For example, with political participation, education, and faith in people controlled, age is a more powerful predictor of powerlessness than it was at the zero-order level (partial $r = .14$).

Considering now the final equation for predicting perceived *normlessness,* there are several interesting comparisons between the set of predictor variables included here and those included in the equation for powerlessness. Most noteworthy is the absence in this equation of the single most important variable in the powerlessness equation, political participation. Cynicism about the behavior of public officials is evidently sufficiently persistent that participation, even in the political process itself, does not serve to reduce it substantially. Education, age, and being Jewish, all of which influence the degree of powerlessness, are also absent from the perceived normlessness model. Conversely, three ascribed status characteristics (sex, race, and nativity) which had less important effects on levels of powerlessness and were not included in the final equation for that variable, are relatively important among the predictors of perceived normlessness. Men are more likely to be critical of the political system, as are Negroes and those born in this country. Two separate but related explanations seem necessary to account for these findings. Men, being more attentive to politics than women, may be more aware of norm violations that occur in the political process. This is essentially the argument that was offered above to explain the positive relationship between prestige of birthplace and normlessness. However, Negroes may score higher than whites on this type of alienation precisely because they are the *objects* of the unfair treatment which is an important part of the definition of normlessness.

In contrast to the absence of measures of secular participation in the model for normlessness, religious participation (church attendance) appears in both equations. Population of place of residence is another variable which shows a small but persistent influence on both modes of alienation.

The most important variable in predicting perceived normlessness is faith in people. Since interpersonal confidence was also important for explaining powerlessness, this finding might be read to imply that political alienation is merely a derivative expression of a general personality characteristic that could be expected to have similar manifestations in other spheres. However, studies demonstrating inchoate attitudes toward politics in young children[46] suggest that the development of these attitudes does not wait on a well-formed structure of attitudes toward social relations in general, but may occur at the same time as more generalized attitudes are formed.[47] The pattern of intercorrelations among faith in people, the alienation scales, and several of the status variables suggests that fundamental attitudes of trust or cynicism with respect to the motives of other people, as well as attitudes toward particular social institutions, may be transmitted as part of class sub-cultures. The correlation between income and normlessness, for example, is higher than would be expected on the basis of a developmental sequence leading from income to faith in people to perceived normlessness (the predicted r is —.11; the observed r is —.18). On the other hand, the relationship between faith in people and perceived normlessness is far too high to be a spurious product of the correlations between income and faith in people and income and normlessness (the predicted r is —.05; the observed r is —.37). It seems likely, therefore, that attitudes toward specific social institutions and generalized attitudes toward human nature develop concurrently and in interaction with each other.

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[46] See, for example, David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 361 (September, 1965), 40–57; Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); and Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967).

[47] Verba suggests that attitudes toward specific political issues may develop *before* more coherent or inclusive ideologies. See Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 41–42.

V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In recent discussions of alienation a variety of meanings have been distinguished, such as powerlessness, normlessness, meaninglessness, and isolation. The present analysis began by considering the ways in which these modes of alienation may be useful in exploring attitudes toward the political system. Empirical measures of two of these types of political alienation were developed. The high level of prediction achieved using the powerlessness scale as a dependent variable suggests that its use in future research would be worthwhile. An important further step would be to continue the establishment of the predictive validity of the measure by studying the types of political behavior that tend to be associated with varying degrees of powerlessness. For example, some research has demonstrated that it is useful to dimensionalize political participation itself;[48] we may therefore find that varying levels of powerlessness tend to be associated with different *types* of participation, rather than merely with different *degrees* of participation considered as a global behavior. We will return to this question below. In comparison with the powerlessness results, explanation of variance in the perceived normlessness scale, while still substantial, is much lower. One reason for this may be the lower reliability of this scale which imposes a lower ceiling on predictability. Increasing the reliability of the scale, perhaps by adding more items, for example, may improve prediction.

An important consideration in improving our understanding of both types of alienation is the need for variables that simply are not measured in the present study. If alienation is at least partially a function of social experience, it is obviously imperative to consider the kinds of experiences people have with the political system and the responses they have received to their own or their peers' efforts to participate. The addition of contextual variables, such as characteristics of local political structures, to the predictive models would also be necessary in order to examine the relationship between political reality and individual attitudes. Of tremendous utility also would be the incorporation of significant political events as natural experimental variables in research programs that permit repeated measurements on the same or related study populations. In these ways an assessment of the effects of political conditions on the development of attitudes of alienation could be approached.

An important finding of this study is that there are some significant differences in the variables that are associated with each type of alienation. Individuals with high powerlessness scores are unlikely to participate in community activities, whether secular or sacred. They are likely to be older, to have less education, and to have low faith in people. Conversely, living in smaller communities or being Jewish are characteristics that tend to reduce this type of alienation. High scores on the perceived normlessness scale are most likely for individuals with low faith in people, who are native-born, Negro, male, have low income, live in large cities, or attend church infrequently. Since education and income are related, the fact that education appears in the powerlessness equation and income in the normlessness equation should not be stressed greatly unless additional research confirms this difference. Nevertheless, the difference is theoretically interesting. The sense of injustice of the poor, reflected in their higher scores on perceived normlessness, may be partially mitigated by the fact that it is not the poor *per se* who feel most powerless, but rather the poorly educated. That education and income are not completely overlapping stratification variables (i.e., that the class system is not a caste system) prevents the intensification of the sense of alienation that might otherwise exist in the lower social classes.

There is a group of characteristics, however, which tend to be associated with *both* types of alienation. These are low faith in people, infrequent church attendance, and large city size. This cluster of variables may be an appropriate indicator of the impersonality of contemporary life which so many analysts have indicted as a major source of all types of alienation. The significant *differences* in predictors of the two types of alienation involve political participation, age, sex, nativity, and race. Results obtained in this study leave little doubt that participation in the political process is far more important in reducing powerlessness than in its effect on normlessness. In fact, there is some suggestion that participation may tend to increase perceptions of normlessness. Although participation and perceived normlessness are negatively related at the zero-order level, the regression coefficient for participation in the complete twenty-three variable equation for normlessness *is* positive (and tracing this value during the stepwise procedure indicates that it is consistently positive after faith in people is controlled at the second step). This finding is suggestive only, since political participation does not contribute at a statistically significant level to the explanation of perceived normlessness. However, the fact that men and native-born citizens (both of which characteristics are significantly associated with participation) have higher normlessness scores than do women and the foreign-born (who participate less) strengthens the implication that high scores on normlessness are partially a function of knowledge and experience with the political system.[49]

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[48] See W. S. Robinson, "The Motivational Structure of Political Participation," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (1952), 151–156 and Bernard M. Finifter, "Styles of Participation in Political Life: Differential Multivariate Prediction with and without Allowance for Interaction Effects," paper presented to the Midwest Society of Multivariate Experimental Psychology, Chicago, May, 1968.

VI. ALIENATION AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Because the dimensional approach to political alienation clarifies and specifies attitudes toward the political system, it may be a useful basis for the development of more specific hypotheses regarding the effects of attitudes on political behavior. The concluding section of this paper is devoted to a brief and admittedly speculative exploration of some types of political engagement which may be associated with different combinations and levels of the dimensions of political alienation. My purpose in this discussion is to illustrate how this approach to developing concepts and measures can be useful in suggesting research hypotheses that address themselves to the larger theoretical problems of change and stability in political systems.

Alienation is commonly regarded as a threat to the survival of the political system. If we examine the relationships between alienation, political behavior, and the states of political systems more closely, however, it is reasonable to suggest that not all types of alienation need be viewed as necessarily "dysfunctional." To the extent that alienated individuals are non-participants, for example, Berelson has suggested that they serve to soften and blur crippling divisions in the body politic that may result from extreme political conflict.[50] This suggests the hypothesis of a positive relationship between political participation and debilitating system cleavages, at least above a certain critical level of participation. Thus, in Berelson's view, the contribution of apathy to a political system is to permit the maintenance of its usual decision-making patterns. However, the persistence of a political system, in the sense of a shared normative structure, is not necessarily dependent on the perpetuation of a particular set of existing political institutions. Indeed, conflicts often exist between basic normative patterns and particular political institutions. When such conflicts are recognized, political institutions may be deliberately changed to conform to the basic normative patterns. The recognition of such conflicts between basic norms and particular political institutions is an important source of political change. As Geertz points out, it is in the incongruities between cultural patterns and social organization that "we shall find some of the primary driving forces in change."[51]

Applying this culture-structure differentiation to the results of the present research, I have suggested that to those scoring high on perceived normlessness, important aspects of the political culture (such as equality of citizens and responsibility of office holders) appear to be violated by the political structure, that is, by actual behavior of office holders or aspects of the political process itself. Systemic stresses that may be created by the behavior of persons who so perceive the political system (such as protest marches, strikes, etc.) are frequently directed toward reducing the inconsistency between the

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[49] Results of an analysis of interaction effects provide some further support for the suggestion that political participation may increase perceived normlessness. The analysis identified a small but theoretically interesting sub-group ($N = 56$) of white, mobile, college-educated people with high faith in people among whom higher political participation is associated with higher alienation: Ada W. Finifter, *op. cit.*, pp. 144–151.

[50] Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 316.

[51] Clifford Geertz, "Ritual and Social Change," in N. J. Demerath, III and Richard A. Peterson (eds.), *System, Change, and Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 233.

FIG. 1 Types of Political Behavior Associated With Combinations of Two Types of Political Alienation (Hypothetical)

		Political Powerlessness	
		High	Low
Perceived Political Normlessness	High	*Extreme Disengagement* Separatist and revolutionary movements Complete withdrawal	*Reform Orientation* Protest groups working within institutional framework
	Low	*Apathy* Very low level of political involvement	*Political Integration* Conformative participation

political culture and the structures by which it is implemented. It is difficult to classify such behavior using the customary language of functionalism. Protest behavior patently does not appear to be "functional." However, insofar as protest can act as a catalyst for needed social change, it is similarly awkward to classify it as "dysfunctional." It is precisely this opposition of "functional" and "dysfunctional" which has contributed to the criticism that the functional mode of analysis has overemphasized the *status quo* and failed to provide any substantial theoretical basis for dealing with social change.[52] As a partial response to this need, it may be useful to introduce a new typological concept to describe conditions involving system disturbances that may culminate in higher levels of integration in social systems (as, for example, by narrowing gaps between cultural patterns and social organization). The concept "orthofunctional"[53] is suggested to describe such conditions. Thus, this concept might be useful to describe systemic stresses that, while initially disruptive, generate increasing system integration by the modification of conditions that violate widely-shared norms or otherwise inhibit intra-system cohesion.

Feelings of powerlessness may be considered "functional" in permitting the orderly maintenance of the *status quo;* perceptions of normlessness may be considered "orthofunctional" insofar as they may lead to demands for greater compliance with legal or cultural norms. If this interpretation of normlessness is plausible, it follows that people may perceive a condition of political normlessness precisely because of their *allegiance* to a set of ideals to which the community formally adheres, but which are commonly violated. The civil rights revolution, and the student and Vietnam war protests are based in large part on perceptions of violations of culturally accepted norms and demands on the political system for compliance and rectification. Such demands may be temporarily disruptive, but can be viewed as orthofunctional in that they may lead to adjustment and correction of system deviations from cultural norms.

The possibility that various types of alienation may have different consequences for political systems is a major reason for separately investigating their correlates, but it is also a compelling reason for studying their interrelationships. The findings of the present research indicate a substantial amount of independence between the alienation dimensions of powerlessness and perceived normlessness. This relatively weak relationship suggests a classification combining different levels of these two dimensions. Insofar as political behavior depends on modes and levels of political alienation, a provisional typology combining alienation and types of political engagement can be proposed (see Figure 1). This paradigm is highly tentative, and is intended to suggest some directions and hypotheses for future research on the relationship between alienation and political activation rather than to report on or synthesize research already accomplished.

Of the four cells, the types of political action associated with relatively low levels of perceived normlessness (i.e., the lower two quadrants) have been most extensively explored. The heavy reliance on random sampling of the general public in political behavior research has perhaps made this inevitable. These styles of participation are of the conventional "middle class" conformative type, including activities such as voting and attending to the mass media.[54] These kinds of activities tend to support existing political institutions.

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[52] See, for example, Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 15–31; and Wayne Hield, "The Study of Change in Social Science," *British Journal of Sociology* (March, 1964), 1–11.

[53] From the Greek "orthos," to straighten, correct, or make right, as in orthopsychiatry, orthopedics, etc. As an analytic concept, "orthofunctional" is not intended to increase the *explanatory* power of a functional analysis. See A. James Gregor, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis," this REVIEW, LXII (June, 1968), 425–439.

Moving to the upper two quadrants, the probability that normlessness will be orthofunctional is likely to be at its highest when perceptions of norm violations are combined with a low sense of political powerlessness. Many reform-oriented protest group activities, such as those of CORE or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and many domestic agrarian movements, such as the National Farmer's Organization, would fall in this category. The goals of these groups are directed at correcting specific social conditions that impede the integration of certain sub-groups into the system as a whole. In this sense their activities can be thought of as orthofunctional even though they may create serious temporary disturbances in system equilibrium. Individuals who participate in these types of groups feel that the system is at least potentially responsive to their efforts. Those engaging in activities suggested in the upper left quadrant, on the other hand, have probably given up hope that the political system will ever be responsive to their demands. The combination of high perceived normlessness and high levels of political powerlessness seems likely to lead to fundamental, radical rejection of established methods of accomplishing political goals.[55] Whether this rejection is manifested in total withdrawal from political activities or in revolutionary activity will likely depend on opportunities for political activation or on certain personal characteristics. For example, previous research has demonstrated a moderately strong relationship between ego strength and sense of political efficacy.[56] Since we would expect low ego strength to conduce to withdrawal rather than to revolutionary activity, the revolutionaries of the upper left quadrant may come from that small minority of individuals who feel highly powerless politically but yet maintain a strong sense of *personal* efficacy. Opportunities for political activity may further limit the behavior of those in this group. Similarly, other variables will affect the behavior suggested for other combinations of alienation, but the activities suggested may be significant trends.

The kinds of political movements suggested as possible consequences of high perceived normlessness are similar to the "value-oriented" (revolutionary) and "norm-oriented" (protest) movements distinguished by Smelser.[57] Value-oriented movements are concerned with basic changes in the nature of man and society while norm-oriented movements are based on less ambitious desires for the restoration or modification of particular social norms. Thus value-oriented movements are comprehensive in their goals while norm-oriented movements seek to make incremental or adjustive changes only. The typology posited above suggests that value-oriented movements are more likely when individuals not only perceive gross violations of political norms but also feel highly powerless to affect the political system. Where feelings of powerlessness are not so strong, it is hypothesized that norm-oriented movements will dominate attempts at political change.

That the correlation between these two dimensions of alienation is fairly low means that the coincidence of extremely high levels on both is likely to be relatively infrequent. Thus, we would expect that the type of threat to orderly system change represented by revolutionary movements will be correspondingly rare, *unless large numbers of people are drawn from the lower left and upper right quadrants into the upper left*. While the research reported here has investigated some sources of powerlessness and perceived normlessness, the conditions under which these attitudinal orientations *change* remain to be illuminated.[58] Although it appears likely that recruits to the high powerlessness, high perceived normlessness quadrant come mainly from those already highly alienated on one dimension, there may be certain conditions which draw even those normally not alienated in either way to this state of extreme disengagement. The nature of the general population sample used in this research precludes adequate representation of the type of political posture associated with the joint occurrence of high powerlessness and high perceived normlessness. Nevertheless, systematic knowledge about this type of political activity and its associated attitudinal structure is vitally needed. Although it was possible in the present study to operationalize only two of the four proposed modes of political alienation (and further research may uncover additional types as well), the great popular unrest evident throughout the world today indicates that intensive exploration of the entire alienation domain constitutes a challenge of the highest priority for empirical political theory.

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[54] See David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "Criteria for Political Apathy," in A. W. Gouldner (ed.), *Studies in Leadership* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 505–559, for this characterization of most activities used by social scientists as measures of political participation. The current "participation revolution" makes this characterization even more telling today than it was in 1950.

[55] Some substantiating evidence for this hypothesis lies in Ransford's finding that among Negroes in the Watts area, infrequent contact with whites was related to willingness to use violence under the two conditions of a high sense of powerlessness and a high dissatisfaction with treatment received as Negroes. See H. Edward Ransford, "Isolation, Powerlessness, and Violence: A Study of Attitudes and Participation in the Watts Riot," *American Journal of Sociology*, 73 (March, 1968), 581–591.

[56] Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, pp. 516–518.

[57] See Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

APPENDIX

Codes for Independent Variables

Variable	*Coding*
3. Jewish (Q. 84a)	1 = Jewish; 0 = Non-Jewish
4. Catholic (Q. 84a)	1 = Catholic; 0 = Non-Catholic
5. Protestant (Q. 84a)	1 = Protestant; 0 = Non-Protestant
6. Nativity (Q. 1a)	1 = S. Europe; 2 = N. Europe; 3 = United States
7. Race (Q. 91)	1 = Negro; 0 = White
8. Sex (Q. 90)	1 = Female; 0 = Male
9. Age (Q. 85)	Ascending Order, 1 to 7
10. Education (Q. 61)	Ascending Order, 1 to 8
11. Occupation (Q. 74)	Ascending Order of Prestige, 1 to 9
12. Income (Q. 86)	Ascending Order, 1 to 8
13. Marital Status (Q. 4a)	1 = Single, Divorced, Widowed, Separated; 2 = Married
14. Number of Children (Q. 4b)	Ascending Order, 1 to 6
15. Years Residence in Community (Q. 2)	Ascending Order, 1 to 6
16. Frequency of Church Attendance (Q. 84b)	Ascending Order, 1 to 5
17. Number of Organizations (Q. 83)	Ascending Order, 1 to 5
18. Officership (Q. 83c)	1 = Has been an officer; 0 = Has never been an officer
20. Party Identification (Q. 38)	1 = Democrat; 2 = Independent; 3 = Republican
21. Strength of Party Identification	1 = Independent; 2 = Weak; 3 = Strong
23. Population of Community (Q. 88)	Ascending Order, 1 to 6
24. Northeast (Q. 89)	1 = New England or Middle Atlantic States; 0 = Other States
25. South (Q. 89)	1 = South Atlantic and East South Central States; 0 = Other States

19. Political Participation Index*

11a. Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs?
12. What about talking about public affairs to other people?
25. Have you ever done anything to try to influence a local decision?
29. Have you ever done anything to try to influence an act of Congress?
38d. Have you ever been active in a political campaign? That is, have you ever worked for a candidate or party, contributed money, or done any other active work?
44. What about the campaigning that goes on at the time of a national election: Do you pay much attention to what goes on, just a little, or none at all?
83d. Are any of the organizations you belong to in any way concerned with governmental, political, or public affairs? For instance, do they take stands on or discuss public issues or try to influence government actions?

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[58] For some interesting ideas on the subject of change in basic political attitudes, see William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), esp. pp. 172–183.

22. Faith in People Index*
    - 7. Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?
    - 21. Speaking generally, would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves?
    - 72b. If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you. (Agree-Disagree)
    - 72e. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative. (Agree-Disagree)
    - 72h. No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it. (Agree-Disagree)

* Codes for individual questions were arranged in ascending order of the concept being measured and were summed for the total score. The Political Participation Index ranged from 0 to 13; the Faith in People Index ranged from 0 to 10.

PEASANT SOCIETY AND CLIENTELIST POLITICS*

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I. ELEMENTS OF THE PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

The basic social relations of peasant life are directly related to an environment characterized by extreme scarcity. The major factor of productive wealth in agriculture is land, to which the peasant has little or no free access. Labor—his own, and that of his family members—is available to the peasant, but this relatively unproductive factor must be applied to land in order to generate wealth. Few other outlets for productive labor employment are available to him. When the peasant is able to combine land and labor in a wealth-generating endeavor, his productivity is likely to be extremely low, due to limiting factors such as technology, capital, marketing information, and credit. All of these life aspects combine to hold down the peasant's income and preclude savings. He is, in a word, poor.

Furthermore, the peasant is powerless against many threats which abound in his environment. There are disease, accident, and death, among the natural threats. There are violence, exploitation, and injustice at the hands of the powerful, among the human threats. The peasant knows that this environmental constellation is dangerous. He also knows that there is relatively little he can do about his situation, and, accordingly, his culture often features themes of vulnerability, calamity, and misfortune.[1] As George Foster has neatly summarized if, the outlook this situation engenders in the peasant is the "Image of the Limited Good." Within this image:

> peasants view their social, economic, and natural universes—their total environment—as one in which all of the desired things in life such as land, wealth, health, friendship and love, manliness and honor, respect and status, power and influence, security and safety, *exist in finite quantity* and *are always in short supply* as far as the peasant is concerned. Not only do these and all other "good things" exist in finite and limited quantities, but in addition *there is no way directly within peasant power to increase the available quantities.*[2]

But there are basic patterns of social relations which develop in peasant societies in order to cope with these realities. They are, in general, anxiety-reduction behaviors by which the peasant attempts to build some security in the face of his perceived environmental threats, or at least to make life more tolerable within a basically threatening context.[3] These social arrangements are adaptive means for increasing the peasant's access to the "good things" in life, and, as Foster implies, they are, of necessity, indirect. One basic set of such arrangements is found in the various kinship systems—nuclear families, extended families and clan organizations.[4] An extension of such arrangements may be found in the fictive kinship relationships present in many peasant societies.[5] Finally, there are a number of typical peasant social

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[1] Consider the interesting results of Thematic Apperception Tests given to peasant respondents in Southern Italy, reported in Edward Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958), ch. 6.

[2] George Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of the Limited Good," in *Peasant Society: A Reader* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), edited by Potter, Diaz, and Foster, p. 304. This is a very useful collection of materials.

[3] On anxiety-reduction as the most powerful organizer of behavior, see Harry Stack Sullivan's *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*, as applied by Robert Presthus in *The Organizational Society* (New York: A. Knopf, 1962), esp. ch. 4.

[4] See, among others, C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1959), ch. 6.

[5] *Peasant Society, op. cit.*, contains reprints of several good articles dealing with fictive kinship systems and their effects, including Sidney Mintz and Eric Wolf, "An Analysis of Ritual Co-Parenthood (*Compadrazgo*)," pp. 174–199, and Mary Hollensteiner, "Social Structure and Power in a Philippine Municipality," pp. 200–212.

mechanisms which function to "equalize poverty" by means of individual, group, or even institutional actions—the latter, typically, through rituals of conspicuous consumption.[6]

One of these patterns of cooperative social arrangement I wish to treat in detail: *the extended patron-client relationship, or clientele system*. Such a relationship, involving an interchange of noncomparable goods and services between actors of unequal socio-economic ranks, is of profound importance when extended beyond the confines of the peasant community. An extended patron-client network, or clientele system, is important in two distinct ways: one, in its consequences for the political system in which it concretely manifests itself; and two, as an heuristic device for the understanding of a wide range of political behavior which political scientists, in the main, consider to be either pathological, deviant, or of minor import. I refer to patterns of political behavior such as nepotism, personalism, or favoritism; and political structures such as cliques, factions, machines, and patronage groups, or "followings." A fuller understanding of clientele systems, I believe, will render such phenomena more intelligible and significant.[7]

At the core of the patron-client relationship lie three basic factors which at once define and differentiate it from other power relationships which occur between individuals or groups. First, *the patron-client tie develops between two parties unequal in status, wealth and influence*; hence the most apt description by Pitt-Rivers, who called the patron-client bond a "lopsided friendship."[8] Second, *the formation and maintenance of the relationship depends on reciprocity in the exchange of goods and services*. Such mutual exchanges involve noncomparable goods and services, however. In a typical transaction, the low-status actor (client) will receive material goods and services intended to reduce or ameliorate his environmental threats; while the high-status actor (patron) receives less tangible rewards, such as personal services, indications of esteem, deference or loyalty, or services of a directly political nature such as voting. Third, *the development and maintenance of a patron-client relationship rests heavily on face-to-face contact between the two parties*; the exchanges encompassed in the relationship, being somewhat intimate and highly particularistic, depend upon such proximity. These three characteristics of the patron-client pattern—unequal status, reciprocity and proximity—hold whether the parties are individuals, which is often the case, or kinship groups, extended kinship groups, informal or formal voluntary groups, or even institutions. *It is important to note that patron-client ties clearly are different from other ties which might bind parties unequal in status and proximate in time and space, but which do not rest on the reciprocal exchange of mutually valued goods and services—such as relationships based on coercion, authority, manipulation, and so forth.* Such elements may be present in the patron-client pattern, but if they come to be dominant, the tie is no longer a patron-client relationship.[9]

Within many rural communities the patron status is highly correlated with land-ownership and the client status with poor cultivators dependent upon the patron's land for their livelihood. Here is how one anthropologist describes such a "traditional" relationship between landlord and sharecropper:

> A peasant might approach the landlord to ask a favor, perhaps a loan of money or help in some trouble with the law, or the landlord might offer his aid knowing of a problem. If the favor were granted or accepted, further favors were likely to be asked or offered at some later time. The peasant would reciprocate—at a time and in a context different from that of the acceptance of the favor, in order to de-emphasize the material self-interest of the reciprocative action—by bringing the landlord especially choice offerings from the farm produce, or by sending some member of the peasant family to perform services in the landlord's home, by refraining from cheating the landlord, or merely by speaking well of him in public and professing devotion to him.[10]

Silverman also found, in the same Italian community, that similar patron-client relationships could be established by persons who were not personally linked to a powerful figure through the agricultural system, but were merely lower-status persons who lived in the community: "The potential client would approach one of the *signori* with a request, or he might attempt to establish the relationship first by presenting him with some small gift or by making himself available to run errands or help out in various ways."[11] An important aspect of these relationships is that the needs of the client tend to be critical—for example, a peasant may need more land to farm in order to feed his growing family—while the needs of the patron, while important to him, tend to be marginal. Not only can a large landowner get along without the esteem or loyalty of an individual peasant and his family, but there are many more peasant families with needs than there are patrons with assets. The bargaining power of the patron is by definition greater than that of the client.

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[6] Foster, "Image of the Limited Good," *op. cit.*, p. 316. Also, see Eric Wolf, "Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java," pp. 230–246 in the same volume; and Mehmet Bequiraj, *Peasantry in Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell Center for International Studies, 1966).

[7] Two exceptional treatments of the phenomena in question are found in Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* Vol. 10 (July 1968), pp. 376–400; and James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," this REVIEW, LXII (December, 1969), 1142–1158.

[8] Julian Pitt-Rivers, *The People of the Sierra* (New York: Criterion Books, 1954), p. 140.

[9] For an elegant and fascinating exploration of the varieties of power relationships, see Frederick W. Frey, "Concepts of Development Administration and Strategy Implications for Behavioral Change," unpublished ms, Department of Political Science, MIT.

[10] Sydel Silverman, "The Community-Nation Mediator in Traditional Central Italy," in *Peasant Society, op. cit.*, p. 284.

Several aspects of the patron-client relationship are fixed—such as unequal status, reciprocity and proximity—and some are variable. We should take note of these variables in the relationship before proceeding to the extension of these relationships beyond the confines of the peasant community. The first variable is the origin of the initiative to establish the relationship. Either patron or client may take the initiative. This is less important in enduring relationships than in *ad hoc* or periodic patron-client ties. Duration or persistence over time, then, is a second variable. Third, the scope of the relationship may vary. A patron-client tie may cover the full range of the client's needs, if he is fortunate—from the cradle to the grave, as it were. Other relationships may be defined by the very narrow range of goods and services which are exchanged. Finally, the patron-client tie may vary in its intensity. Affect, feelings of loyalty, obligation, and satisfaction with the benefits of the relationship may be strong or weak. These variables, furthermore, tend to cluster together in distinct patterns. In a "traditional" village—isolated, with few market-network or governmental ties with the outside—patron-client relationships tend to be enduring, extensive and intense. In a more integrated, differentiated village context, patron-client relationships tend to be periodic, defined by special, narrow interests, and casual.

II. LINKAGES WITH THE LARGER SYSTEM

This brings us to a most crucial point in the analysis—the linking of the "little community" with the larger socio-economic system in which it exists. Two underlying processes are largely responsible for the establishment of these linkages: state centralization and market expansion.[12] Each involves differentiation and specialization of roles and the elaboration of networks of interdependent parts, or more simply put, transaction systems. At the boundary of the little community stands the "gatekeeper"—the landed patron.[13] As the twin processes of state and market penetration of the peasant village occur, the patron becomes transformed into a broker, mediating the impact of the larger society on peasant society.

As a result of increased attention to the interpenetration of present-day peasant cultures and national cultures over the past twenty years or so, the anthropological community has become increasingly aware of these brokers, "hinge groups," "mediators" or "buffers," as they have been portrayed in the literature. Eric Wolf's original definition of brokers will serve us nicely:

> . . . they stand guard over the critical junctures and synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole. *Their basic function is to relate community-oriented individuals who want to stabilize or improve their life chances, but who lack economic security and political connections, with nation-oriented individuals who operate primarily in terms of complex cultural forms standardized as national institutions, but whose success in these operations depends on the size and strength of their personal following.*[14]

While they vary in cultural forms, Wolf provides as examples of such brokerage systems, the *compadrazgo* system in Latin America, the Chinese *kan-ch'ing,* and the Japanese *oyabun-kobun;* to which I would add *clientela* in Italy and Sicily, the *jajmani* system in India, and the patron-client system in the Philippines.[15] I would hypothesize that such clientele systems might be encountered in any developing country in which kinship systems are unable to perform linkage functions between persons of low and high status, or between the community and the nation. Where kinship systems can perform these linkage functions at all, as in Greece (and under certain conditions in Italy), they are likely to be responsive to only a limited range of needs, leaving low-status clients to rely on non-kinship clientele systems as well.[16]

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 285.

[12] These processes are illuminated and applied with excellent effect by Charles Tilly in *The Vendée* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), especially ch. 2.

[13] "Gatekeepers," as described by Kenny, "largely dominate the paths linking the local infrastructure of the village to the superstructure of the outside urban world." See his article "Patterns of Patronage in Spain," in the *Anthropological Quarterly*, 33 (January 1960), pp. 14–23.

[14] Eric Wolf, "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico," in *Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America* (New York: Random House, 1965), edited by Dwight Heath and Richard Adams, p. 97. (Italics added)

[15] Latin America, China, and Japan cited by Wolf, *ibid.* A full treatment of *clientela* in Italy

Of great importance is the manner in which these extended clientele systems change over time. Traditional, land-owning patrons may become brokers, but additional brokers may appear to compete with them for followings on the local level. Power holders on the national level may or may not consolidate and formalize some of these clientele systems, playing off one network of brokers against another in the process. These processes of change, and their significance for political development, will be more understandable if we consider some concrete historic examples.

Sydel Silverman, in "The Community-Nation Mediator in Traditional Central Italy," focusses precisely on such changes over time.[17] According to her, prior to Italian national unification, the patron-client system was almost the exclusive domain of the great landlords, who acted in the main as direct benefactors, but also as links with the larger, Church-dominated society of central Italy. As far as commercial ties were concerned, they too were guarded by the landlords, but extended only to provincial market towns. Following unification in the 1860-1861 period, nation-community contacts grew, and landlords added to their functions as direct benefactors (loans, employment, land-access, dowry gifts, medicines) those of brokerage services. When a peasant client had dealings with bureaucracies—taxes, credits, etc.—or with the police in the area, the patron acted as broker. The role of broker, in fact, became generalized in peasant dealings with "outsiders," and the "letters of recommendation" became more highly valued in many instances than direct patronage benefits. Such letters were considered imperative when undertaking an arrangement with a distant merchant, or in seeking public employment. As outside relationships became more important over time, says Silverman, "the most valuable patron was neither the wealthiest nor the most generous, but the one with the best connections."[18]

In addition to the changes of function of the traditional patrons (the large landowners), which transformed them into brokers, other local people with "outside connections" also began to assume brokerage functions—bourgeois landowners, schoolteachers, physicians and pharmacists, priests, tax collectors and other local officials. Some of these "new" brokers had connections with the marketing system, and some with the political system, but all were intermediate in socio-economic status. They were, in other words, those whom one writer has recently characterized as the "small intellectuals" of society, whose status and role functions place them in the "strategic middle" of the social structure.[19] The Italian case clearly suggests the impact of state centralization in the little community, transforming traditional patrons into brokers, as well as creating a new pool of potential brokers (i.e., governmental agents) on the periphery of the peasant society. Similarly, the penetration of market networks, with its resultant differentiation and specialization of new roles, further enlarged the pool of potential brokers. These twin forces for change may be seen in another historic case, that of Mexico.

Eric Wolf specifically undertook a diachronic analysis of brokerage groups in rural Mexico in his seminal article, "Aspects of Group Relationships in a Complex Society: Mexico."[20] First, he traced the entry of the Spaniards into the previously autonomous Indian communities, and the establishment of landed power-holding by representatives of the Crown. This was accomplished through the *encomienda* system, and in agriculture as well as mining, enclaves of primary production were established and linked into a rudi-

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is given by Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven: Yale, 1967). For India, see Lewis and Barnouw, "Castle and the Jajmani System in a North Indian Village," in *Peasant Society, op. cit.*, pp. 110–134. The Philippine materials are presented by Carl Landé in *Leaders, Factions and Parties—The Structure of Philippine Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1965), Monograph No. 6.

[16] Ernestine Friedl, "The Role of Kinship in the Transmission of National Culture to Rural Villages in Mainland Greece," *American Anthropologist*, 61 (Feb. 1959), 30–38; and Joseph Lopreato, *Peasants No More* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967), Part Two.

[17] In *Peasant Society, op. cit.*, pp. 279–293.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 289.

[19] Belden Paulson, "The Role of the Small Intellectual as an Agent of Political Change: Brazil, Italy, and Wisconsin," paper delivered at the American Political Science annual meeting in Chicago, September, 1967.

[20] Originally published in the *American Anthropologist*, 58 (December, 1956), 1065–1078.

mentary trade system with the mother country. In addition to the landholdings producing for international trade, landed powerholders, encroaching on the communal lands of the Indians, established autonomous, self-sufficient holdings in the manorial or patrimonial style.[21] Both types of holding provided bases of manpower and wealth for a highly decentralized system of political power. In time, the struggle by Spain for the recapture of its political power and monopoly in the trading system precipitated the War of Independence by the New World landed elites. During this period of Mexican land history, the same kind of "traditional" patron behavior described for Italy by Silverman, characterized Mexican landlord-peasant relationships, exaggerated by cultural and linguistic differences.

According to Wolf, a byproduct of the trade systems established under the Crown had been a group of "marginals"—small storekeepers, middlemen, casual farmers and specialized workers located in the villages and entrepreneurial communities near mines, *haciendas*, or mills. With the destruction of the ties to Spain, the legal devices which had until that time granted a small measure of protection to the Indian communities were swept aside, and a long period of land-grabbing began. Communal property-holding dissolved into "land as a commodity," and the best remaining Indian lands were taken over by large landlords, or invaded by the upward-striving "marginals." From these processes grew the classic *hacienda* system, the epitome of autonomous, self-sufficient localism.

The Revolution of 1910 had, as one of its major consequences, the recapture of local political power by the central authorities. Violent peasant upheavals eliminated some of the local, landed powerholders, and agents of government were dispatched into the rural areas to foster the business of the "outside" authorities. As in Italy, many of the remaining landowners, more likely to be bourgeois than "aristocratic" in standing, became transformed from direct benefactors (patrons) into brokers. With the greater flow of goods and services into the rural areas which characterized post-revolutionary Mexican governments, not only did local representatives of the national government proliferate and increase in importance as brokers, but the local "small intellectuals" found increasing employment for their specific mediating skills, thereby gaining for themselves a useful channel of socio-economic mobility and influence.

III. THE CLIENTELIST STATE

Small-scale patrons, we have seen, may become transformed into brokers in the course of state and market centralization. This implies that the patron-client pattern is replicated on a higher level of organization; and indeed this is found to be the case. Thus, in discussing the Thai bureaucracy, Shor observed that:

> . . . The personal clique, based on a feudal-like system of personal obligation, provides the principle focus of bureaucratic loyalty and identification. Bonds of reciprocal obligation, reminiscent of earlier patron-client structures in the traditional social system, informally align a number of dependent subordinates with individual political and administrative leaders in more or less cohesive informal structures.[22]

And in commenting on Rustow's study of the Turkish bureaucracy, Guenther Roth points out that there exists "what is imprecisely known as 'corruption': 'connect-ions' count, favoritism prevails, and for the few there is abundant profit in real-estate dealings."[23] There are probably few countries in which such forms of behavior cannot be encountered; the important difference lying in the fact that in some—for example, contemporary South Vietnam—these forms dominate the organization of the polity. What we have then is a variation on Weber's Patrimonial State. As Guenther Roth has said of this variation, "The second type of patrimonialism is personal rulership on the basis of loyalties that do not require any belief in the ruler's unique personal qualifications, but are inextricably linked to material incentives and rewards."[24] I propose that we call this model the Clientelist State.

The utility of the clientelist notion is not limited to personalist, primitive polities. As Roth quite rightly points out, "in terms of traditional political theory, some of these new states may not be states at all but merely private governments of those powerful enough to rule" . . . but, on the other hand, ". . . personal rulership . . . is an ineradicable component of the public and private bureaucracies of highly industrialized countries."[25] I should now like to turn to the impact of clientelist politics in the national electoral process of many developing countries. The client-broker-patron network, we shall find, is of key importance as the electoral process reaches the level of the peasant village. I do not intend to disgress for the moment to analyze the historic processes by which peasant voters—usually illiterate—become enfranchised, nor the processes by which elections come to play a central role in the distribution and transfer of political authority. Let us simply acknowledge the observable fact that in many countries today, including Italy, Venezuela, India, Turkey, the Philippines, and others, peasants do vote and elections are determinative. Patron-client patterns of behavior become significant for such countries in the periodic mobilization of peasant voters. At the level of the village, we find competition among brokers and potential brokers for peasant votes which can be delivered to a particular political patron or potential patron. Such competition, which has been described as "factionalism" in village politics, is an essential ingredient in the process of aggregating clienteles into a widespread network, and linking them to vertical patronage structures in the political system.[26]

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[21] See Eric Wolf, *Peasants* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), especially "Types of Domain," pp. 50–59.

[22] Edgar Shor, "The Thai Bureaucracy," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 5 (June, 1960), pp. 70, 77, 80, as cited in Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States," *World Politics* 20 (January, 1968), p. 202.

[23] Roth, *ibid.*, p. 203.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 196. For vestiges of such behavior in complex societies, see Eric Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies," in *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies* (New York: Praeger, 1966), edited by Michael Banton, pp. 1–22. An excellent study of clientelist politics in administration is Anthony Leeds, "Brazilian Careers and Social Structures: An Evolutionary Model and Case History," reprinted in Heath & Adams, *Contemporary Cultures, op. cit.*, pp. 379–404.

National or regional political leaders recruit local political leaders from among the competing patrons and brokers. Local brokers and patrons recruit subleaders, or political workers, in turn; and these workers recruit or assemble small followings from among their kin, caste brothers, occupational colleagues, or voluntary group associates. Mayer calls such a cross-cutting electoral aggregate an "action-set," assembled for a particular action fixed in time and space (i.e., an election). In all essential details, it appears to be an aggregation of clienteles:

> These workers acted as links between the candidate and the electorate. Sometimes they did this for the advantages they calculated would accrue to them if the candidate were elected; sometimes they were acting because of party loyalty and friendships formed over the years without any thoughts of gain from the election itself; and at yet other times they were discharging specific obligations contracted at earlier times. *In the same way, there was an attempt to reach voters on the basis of a past or future benefit . . . In consequence, a great deal of the electioneering was carried out by workers, who sought to influence those with whom they had some appropriate relationship.*[27]

The exact nature of the "appropriate" relationship is a significant question. A local political worker may pull together voters on the basis of kinship ties, fictive kinship or caste ties, or through a variety of relationships, including patron-client ties. The worker who pulls such electoral bloclets together assumes the role of broker for that group with a patron group or institution, in this case a political party. Furthermore, there is some evidence which suggests that the "appropriate relationship" for pulling in peasant voters may be distinctly different from one party to another. Table 1 below is a re-arrangement of data presented by Ralph Nicholas from his study of factional politics in Govinda-

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[25] Roth, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

[26] It would be a mistake, however, to assume that inter-broker competition automatically increases the power of the client in relation to the broker or patron. Individual brokers and/or patrons tend to control different resources, not to have differential control over the same resources. Furthermore, competition may occur in terms of the number of peasant votes, but not necessarily for the votes of the same peasants. Each broker tends to mobilize the votes of the peasants over whom he has some kind of critical leverage. Indeed, inter-broker competition may lead to less bargaining power for the client, rather than more, as for example the case of a peasant who finds himself within the power domain of a landlord, a moneylender, and a storekeeper, all of whom pressure him to vote in accord with their particular preferences. In short, the degree of power asymmetry between patron and client or broker and client is a matter for empirical enquiry; and if there is no asymmetry, the relationship in question is not clientelism.

[27] Adrian Mayer, "The Significance of Quasi-Groups in the Study of Complex Societies," in *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*, *op. cit.*, p. 103. (emphasis added). Note that at this point we might break down brokers into at least three types, or specialists: one, a grass-roots mobilizer, or "ward-heeler"; two, a pure broker, of the kind found on the floor of a stock exchange; and three, a high level influence peddler. The mobilizer can turn out the bodies for any particular purpose, the influence peddler locates political patrons who desire mass political services, and the pure broker brings them together in the political market place. Note also the cross-class-cutting nature of this process. In a significant sense, it functions to integrate actors high and low in the social hierarchy, thereby serving as a potential buffer to inter-class conflict.

TABLE 1.—FACTIONAL ALIGNMENTS OF ALL POSSIBLE VOTERS IN GOVINDAPUR, WEST BENGAL

		Basis of membership support (per cent)					
Factional Leader No.	Party Affiliation of leaders	Kinship	Caste	Economic dependence	Neighbor hood Headman	Mutual enemy	Total
1 & 2	Congress	13%	7	44	17	19	100%
3 & 4	Independent	28%	33	14	25	0	100%
5–9	Communist	52%	20	7	20	1	100%

Source: Adapted from Ralph Nicholas, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis," in *Political Systems and the Distribution of Power* (New York: Praeger, 1965), edited by Gluckman and Eggan. Table 1, page 42.

pur, West Bengal, in which he analyzed the basis for membership in nine village factions, each with a leader linked to a particular political party.

The data in Table 1 lead me to the following tentative hypothesis. The exact nature of the ties to peasant voters which are activated in mobilizing an electoral turnout depends on two related factors: the particular needs of the client, and the relationship of the potential patron's political party to the government. In this Indian case, all parties tended to succeed in mobilizing followings based on neighborhood ties—the headman worked well for the Congress, the Independents, and the Communists. But the Independents and Communists were heavily dependent on utilizing kinship and caste ties to assemble their clienteles. This suggests that the brokerage functions which they performed for their clients were essentially defensive in nature—insuring that their relatives and caste brothers received equitable treatment at the hands of governmental representatives such as tax collectors, credit and extension agents, and the police. This is the other side of the coin of the functions most likely performed by the Congress party brokerage system which involved preferential treatment. This might include access to and influence in the making and administration of economic programs and policies which affected rural enterprises (and the people dependent on them); and in addition, knowledge of and influence in the judicial and police systems for the purpose of dealing with mutual enemies.

IV. CLIENTELIST POLITICS AND POLITICAL PARTIES

We need now to examine more broadly the impact of clientele politics on political parties; and further, to project our analysis into the realm of national politics. This can be economically accomplished by comparing two striking cases which have been rather fully documented and analyzed: Italy and Venezuela.[28] While many of the elements of clientelist politics—with a peasant mass base—can be encountered in the recent or current political history of India, Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, Peru, and the Philippines, and to a lesser degree in Indonesia, France, Guatemala, Spain, and Turkey, the cases of Venezuela and Italy are not only well-documented, but seem to represent the upper limits, or fullest development, of which such transaction systems are capable.

Both countries are multiparty electoral democracies in which more than one political party has competed for a peasant base of support through the elaboration of clientele systems. The degree to which the various parties depend on the peasant vote varies, of course, but it is very substantial for the Communist Party (PCI) in Italy, and for the Democratic Action (AD) and Social Christian (COPEI) parties in Venezuela. The Italian Christian Democratic Party (PDC) also receives significant support from peasant constituencies in the south. In both cases, peasant clienteles have been organized into a peasant union movement, which interpenetrates the party system at the local, regional, and national levels. In each country, there has been an extensive agrarian reform program which has provided land and a flow of governmental goods and services downward through the same clientele system which channels votes upward from the peasant base. What we have, in essence, is a transaction system with reciprocal, but unequal, flows of goods and services—votes for agrarian reform benefits. Figure 1 illustrates the Venezuelan system (which I have called the "rural problem-solving system") from the point of view of the peasant. Working through such a network is one of the few instrumental ways in which the peasant can counter his environmental threats.[29] The Italian clientele system, while somewhat more complex, functions in exactly the same manner. An important factor, obviously, is whether or not a particular party is included in a coalition government—and which portfolios or ministries it can influence. In general, the brokerage function is performed by all parties, but those parties outside the government tend to focus on the defense of peasant clients, and the government parties focus on influencing the flow of patronage for their clients. This is a strong tendency, not an absolute distinction.

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[28] See Sidney Tarrow, *op. cit.;* and John Duncan Powell, *Peasant Mobilization and Agrarian Reform in Venezuela* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

I wish to emphasize at this point the explicit argument that *peasant clientele systems are built upon, incorporate, and recapitulate the inter-personal patterns of behavior known as clientelism.* Unlike simple patron-client relations, or primitive clientele systems, the Italian and Venezuelan networks have been purposively organized from above, endure in institutionalized form, exchange a wide range of goods and services, and provide quite lengthy chains of linkages—from the peasant to the President or Prime Minister. They are, in a quite specific sense, politically representative. How did such networks come into being, and what effect have they had on national politics in these countries?

In both cases, an urban-based political elite group undertook the organization of the peasantry as a way to mobilize the political capital needed to break into a traditional, elite-dominated inner circle of power in national politics. In Italy, it was the Communist Party which succeeded in organizing the peasantry in the postwar period. In Venezuela, it was the Democratic Action Party (struggling simultaneously to establish a meaningful electoral process and to break the hold of the entrenched, traditional elites on governmental power) which began to organize the peasantry during the 1930's. The responsiveness of the peasantry in both cases rested in part on two factors: a history of bourgeois encroachments on lands formerly available for peasant use; and a recent period of prolonged, serious dislocation of commercial agriculture. In Italy the theme of land *irredenta,* according to Tarrow, originated in the massive take-over of Church and State lands by the bourgeoisie following the national unification in 1861. In Venezuela, there were twin strands of peasant land irredentism: broken promises of land for military service in the armies which fought the War of Independence and the Federal Wars of the nineteenth century; and the encroachment of the bourgeoisie on public lands during the extended, personalistic regime of the dictator, Gómez (1908-1935). The encroachments of the bourgeoisie signalled a "commoditization" of the land, and a subsequent reduction in free land use by the peasantry, often drawing them into a tenancy relationship with the new owners.[30] Dislocations in both commercial and peasant agriculture occurred during the depression in both countries, and were further exacerbated in Italy by World War II. In short, the peasants' status in the prevailing land tenure situation was precarious to begin with, and grew worse prior to their mobilization.

Both AD and the PCI, then, turned to the organization of a discontented peasantry as a way of mobilizing political capital. In the initial stages, before either was in a position to control a government patronage network, their efforts focussed on direct action at the community level, often involving the invasion of farm properties. This was especially true in the case of Italy, where the land invasions of the early 1950's were closely related to the efforts of the PCI to shape and capitalize on peasant discontent. In Venezuela, AD's opportunity to open up lands to peasant access followed its participation in the *coup d' etat* of October 1945. Dominating the subsequent Revolutionary Government, AD initiated a *de facto* agrarian reform, granting (by decree) access to governmental and private farms to peasant unions organized by the party. The ability to reward followers with land—whether by invasion, as in Italy, or by governmental action, as in Venezuela—quickly expanded the networks of peasant unions, which were actual or aspiring clienteles of the parties.

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[29] See John Duncan Powell, "Venezuela: The Peasant Union Movement," in *Latin American Peasant Movements* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), edited by Henry Landsberger, pp. 62–100.

[30] For the proposition that the degree of tenancy correlates positively—and highly—with radical or revolutionary action on the part of the peasantry, see Arthur Stinchcombe, "Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class Relations," reprinted in *Political Development and Social Change* (New York: Wiley, 1966), edited by Finkle and Gable, pp. 485–497. The same point is made by Bruce Russett in "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," in *World Politics,* 16 (April, 1964), p. 452, when tenancy is combined with a high degree of inequality in landholdings.

FIG. 1. The rural problem-solving system.


Political Environment
Multiparty System
Coalition Government
Peasant Union
FCV
Movement
Land Reform Agencies
The Campesino Population
Rural Environment
MAJOR TRANSACTIONAL FLOWS:
Inputs:
demands for goods and services
voting support
Outputs:
budget-making & programming
field projects

Within a period of two or three years, the PCI in the early 1950's, and the AD in the mid-1940's, established solid positions in the rural areas.

At this point, the parallels between Italy and Venezuela broke down. AD had established a rudimentary version of its clientele system during the three-year period from 1945-1948, when it was dislodged by a counter-revolutionary coup. When the dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez fell in 1958, and AD was successful in gaining the presidency and dominating a decade of subsequent coalition governments, then the system illustrated in Figure 1 reached fruition, with a well-financed *de jure* agrarian reform program providing a flow of goods and services into the rural areas. In response to AD's successful building of a peasant base of electoral support, the Social Christian (COPEI) party began its own program of organizing peasant unions. For six years, COPEI was included in the coalition government, providing it some direct access to agrarian reform patronage. After leaving the coalition government, the COPEI peasant unions still maintained indirect access to governmental decision-making (though less effectively than before) through their participation in the multipartisan Federation of Venezuelan Peasants.[31]

In Italy, however, the Christian Democrats, and not the Communists, were in control of the government when the *de jure* agrarian reform program was established. As a result, many of the local leaders and peasant clients organized by the PCI for the purpose of obtaining land (by invasions) were drawn into the Christian Democratic peasant-union-party structure when land and other benefits could be had through the agrarian reform program. As Tarrow describes the resulting dilemma of the Communists:

> . . . the Catholic Confederation of Direct Cultivators is really a corporate arm of the government which dispenses patronage to peasants through a complicated system of interlocking directorates with the provincial agricultural syndicates . . . The chain of causation is revealing. In leading the struggle for the land, the Communists forced the Agrarian Reform; but in the achievements of the Reform, many peasants became dependents of the Christian Democrats and of the state.[32]

With the successful establishment of a state-supported clientele system which provided land, credit, extension services, infrastructure and marketing services to peasant clients, the peasantry became "demobilized" in Tarrow's phrase. That is, land invasions and threats of violence subsided. In an important sense, however, the electoral mobilization of the peasantry was not a phenomenon which faded away, but one which was in fact stabilized and institutionalized through the same clientele system which provided the agrarian reform benefits. In short, the notion that peasants will lapse into political inactivity once they obtain a piece of land seems to be a myth. A piece of land is only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to allow the peasant to escape the world of *la miseria*. He also needs financial, technological, and marketing assistance to significantly improve his standard of living. There is a continuing need for a patron, or patronage system, which can respond to increasingly sophisticated and complex demands, and thus peasant dependency and peasant mobilization become institutionally linked.

Both the Christian Democrats in Italy and Democratic Action in Venezuela have achieved the necessary transactional equilibrium within their peasant clientele systems to stabilize a dependable base of legitimizing electoral support. From the point of view of the party leaders at the national level, a clientele system based on peasants rather than on other societal groups seems to be a sound investment. The peasant is an economical client. His range of needs tends to be narrower and more fixed than that of comparable urban clients. And in meeting the needs of peasants for more land to farm, technological and financial assistance in farm operations, public health and sanitation projects, and finally, marketing assistance, governmental decision-makers are acting in a manner not only compatible with, but prescribed by the logic of economic development. This is not the case in responding to the needs of potential urban client groups, where the costs of improving the quality of the urban environment are high, the gestation periods long, and the returns on capital investment indirect. But the support of such an electorally-legitimizing clientele system has its disadvantages as well as its advantages in the national political arena.

In analyzing the assets and liabilities of a peasant clientele system for a political party in governmental power, I would like to leave aside the Italian case, in which peasant support is relatively marginal to the position of the Christian Democrats, and consider, in addition to Venezuela, the cases of Bolivia and Mexico.[33] In the latter two cases, peasant clientele support is, or has been, of much more critical import than in the Italian case. In Bolivia and Mexico, as in the other two countries, the peasantry had lost land to an encroaching bourgeoisie. And both countries had experienced a prolonged period of economic dislocation, which was both a contributing cause and a partial effect of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the Bolivian Revolution of 1952. In neither of these two cases had a political party seeking to break into the ranks of the traditional elites originally organized a political base among the peasantry as a part of that effort. In Mexico and in Bolivia, governmental parties which grew out of the revolution incorporated embryonic peasant organizations and transformed them into a supportive clientele network as part of their consolidation of political power. As in Venezuela and Italy, an agrarian reform program was the patronage vehicle, partly consolidating and ratifying *de facto* changes brought about by peasant land invasions, and partly distributing land and other goods and services throughout the areas of peasant concentration. While the Bolivian, Mexican, and Venezuelan cases differ in detail and circumstances, one can state that governmental parties, supported by peasant clientele systems, successfully governed for extended periods of time—in Bolivia from 1952 through 1964; in Mexico, from the mid-1930's to the present; and in Venezuela from 1958 to at least 1968. There is reason to believe that the government which replaced the original sponsor of the Bolivian Revolution (the MNR) in 1964 has continued to rely on the peasant clientele system established by its predecessor.

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[31] In the December 1968 elections COPEI won the presidency and hence control over the formation of a subsequent coalition government from which AD was excluded. As of this date, therefore, access of the two parties is the reverse of the 1964–1968 situation.

[32] Tarrow, *Peasant Communism, op. cit.*, p. 364.

[33] See Peter P. Lord, "The Peasantry as an Emerging Political Factor in Mexico, Bolivia, and Venezuela," (Madison: University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, 1965), Research Paper No. 35 (mimeo.); and Charles Erasmus, "Upper Limits of Peasantry and Agrarian Reform: Bolivia, Venezuela, and Mexico Compared," in *Ethnology*, 6 (October, 1967), 349–380.

One of the salient characteristics of governments based on peasant clientele systems has been their capacity to withstand challenges from groups on both extremes of the political spectrum. In Mexico and Bolivia, where the traditional military establishments were eliminated, worker and peasant militias were used to resist the overthrow of the revolutionary governments by right-wing violence. Obregón, with the help of agrarian unions, successfully defended his government in 1923 against the attack by General de la Huerta. In Bolivia miner and peasant militias were instrumental in resisting the overthrow of the Revolutionary government until 1964. In Venezuela, where the professional armed forces were co-opted into the governmental clientele system rather than destroyed, armed peasant and labor militias were never formed, but mass peasant demonstrations were organized in Caracas on several occasions when the threat of a right-wing or dissident military *coup* seemed imminent, as in 1960. We might characterize such a capacity of resistance as stability against the recapture of political power by the traditional elites who were earlier displaced by the parties in government.

A peasant clientele base has been effective in meeting destabilizing challenges from the left, also. In Bolivia and Mexico, one-party states during the period under consideration, this amounted to resistance by the peasant branch, to a left-wing challenge from the labor branch of the party. In Mexico, in 1940, insurrection within the party by the leader of the left-wing labor sector, Lombardo Toledano, was resisted partly through the intervention of the peasant unions. In Bolivia, Juan Lechín, the leader of the miners' unions, made a similar attempt in 1964 to capture his party's presidential nomination, and was resisted by the peasant branch of the party. In Venezuela, the violent opposition of the Communists and left-wing splinter groups, and guerrilla efforts have been unsuccessful partly because of the disinclination of the peasants—who are clients of the government—to join in an attack on the source of their patronage. The characterization of all of these efforts as "left-wing" probably needs some qualification. In all three of these cases, the longer a peasant-based party has remained in governmental power, the more centrist, pragmatic, and moderate its policies have become. In other words, the drift away from earlier doctrinal positions has been toward the "right." Attacks from the "left," therefore, may also be accurately described in many cases as attacks from party loyalists who are unwilling to make compromises for the sake of maintaining governmental legitimacy among other groups in the political system.

Whatever the ideological implications of these events—and perhaps ideological references are more confusing than helpful in this context—rural-based parties have been able to withstand the destabilizing challenges of a number of urban-based, competing elites. As Samuel P. Huntington sees this phenomenon (which he describes as the result of a "ruralizing election"):

> . . . the party which was strong in the countryside normally secured control of the national government and inaugurated a regime characterized by a high degree of political stability. Where no party had a clear base of support in the countryside, some form of instability was the result. In some instances, urban revolts may overturn rural-based governments, but in general governments which are strong in the countryside are able to withstand, if not to reduce or eliminate, the continuing opposition they confront in the cities.[34]

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[34] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 437.

The use of peasant clients for purposes of political combat outside of the electoral realm has its limitations, obviously. But a clientelist base of support is also quite advantageous in political struggle and accommodation short of combat. Since the nature of the "contract" struck between the government (patron) and the peasantry (client) is concerned, really, with the flow of a rather mundane range of pay-offs—small amounts of land, credit, technological and marketing assistance—there is little or no ideological or programmatic content in the "contract" which might entangle a political elite with dissidents within or without its own party. As a result, peasant-based parties enjoy an amazing degree of flexibility in questions of policy, doctrine, and dogma. They are able to accommodate many divergent points of view within their own parties, and to deal pragmatically with opposition points of view without stirring up internal resistances. They are "pragmatic parties" *par excellence*.

But these verv advantages of clientelist bases of support suggest the limitations of such systems. First, a clientelist base of support tends to erode the ideological coherence and program content with which the leaders of these parties come to power. This is less true in a revolutionary situation, as in Bolivia and Mexico, where the parties which came to power had no ideological coherence to begin with. But Democratic Action, and to an even greater extent, the Italian Christian Democrats, did attach some importance to doctrine and ideology. The Italian case is especially striking, for both the Communists and the Christian Democrats were frustrated by the manner in which their policy and doctrinal preferences were thwarted by the clientelist mentality. The power of the peasant culture in this respect was clearly noted by Tarrow:

> . . . social groups remain chaotic, and political organization normally resides latently in the clientele ties between landholder and agricultural worker, lawyer and client, and bureaucrat and favor seeker. Local and parochial loyalties suffuse politics. Politics has very little ideological content, and popular imagery recognizes only two basic social groups: peasants and non-peasants.[35]

The result has been internally traumatic for the Italian Communist Party, which operates in a distinctly different milieu in the north. "Party leaders," notes Tarrow, "complain that southern members cluster around dominant personalities and neglect the day-to-day tasks of organization and proselytism," and "critics maintain that the evidence points to the PCI's being a typical southern party of clienteles."[36]

Ideological erosion in the southern clientelist milieu has equally dismayed the leaders of the Christian Democratic Party, despite the fact that electoral support is derived therefrom:

> Fanfani called for the *political,* and not simply the economic, development of the South. "Above all," he said, "we must create active and efficient party sections and organizations in southern Italy, if we want to create a politics of facts and ideas instead of a politics of agitation and macaroni" . . . terms that epitomized the traditional tools of southern Italian politics: the generic protest, the patronage appointment, the letter of recommendation, the sack of pasta on election day—in other words, the clientele system.[37]

In short, one of the limitations of clientelist politics is the strain it places on coherent ideologies. This may manifest itself in several important ways. Ideological parties may find it so difficult to reconcile discrepancies in ideas and reality that they will be either unable to build a clientelist base to begin with, or to maintain one if they do. Therefore, other, more pragmatic, parties may outdo them in competition for the peasant vote. Similarly, within parties, the stretching of ideology to encompass and legitimate clientelism may work in one of two ways: either the majority of the party leadership accepts the erosion of ideology, in which case the ideological purists among the leadership may leave the party; or the leadership majority may resist the erosion of ideology, in which case the peasant clients may leave or be lured away from the party. In either case, the party is weakened.

A second general limitation of clientelist politics is that it seems to be a transitional phenomenon—or, better put, appropriate and successful only under certain conditions, and then for a limited period of time. As Huntington has analyzed this situation in his book, *Political Order in Changing Societies,* political modernization involves several alternative cycles of change in urban-rural power and stability.[38] The mobilization of a peasant base of support by an urban-based political party is one form of what Huntington calls the "Green Uprising." Eventually, in the course of overall modernization, the growth of the city becomes a destabilizing phenomenon; in some cases, an urban elite group can form an alliance with the peasantry, surrounding, as it were, the unstable city with the stable countryside by bringing the two into an interdependent relationship. The resulting period of governmental stability may then be used to perform many of the necessary modernizing tasks of government in the course of development. Success, however, brings with it a decreasing relevance and effectiveness of the original peasant base of support:

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[35] Tarrow, *Peasant Communism, op. cit.,* p. 261.

[36] *Ibid.,* p. 270.

[37] *Ibid.,* pp. 308–309.

[38] Huntington, *op. cit.,* especially the first and last chapters.

> If revolution is avoided, in due course the urban middle class changes significantly; it becomes more conservative as it becomes larger. The urban working class also begins to participate in politics, but it is usually either too weak to challenge the middle class or too conservative to want to do so. Thus, as urbanization proceeds, the city comes to play a more effective role in the politics of the country, and the city itself becomes more conservative. The political system and the government come to depend more upon the support of the city than upon that of the countryside. Indeed, it now becomes the turn of the countryside to react against the prospect of domination by the city.[39]

In terms of a peasant-based clientele system, such as Venezuela's, the end of this cycle is marked by a gradual tapering off of governmental support for the agrarian reform program, as growing urban-based clientele groups exert increasing influence on internal party politics. The budgetary priorities problem may provoke splintering within the party, as brokers in the peasant clientele system find their ability to deliver the goods downward gradually eroded. These party subleaders in many cases demand a "re-radicalization" of the agrarian reform—that is, a resumption of larger flows of land and other agrarian reform benefits—and may even try to reinstate the land invasion tactic. In Venezuela and in Mexico, such internal dissension has resulted in brokerage leaders identified with the peasant branch either leaving the party for a more radical alternative, or being purged; and the occasional establishment of new peasant union splinter movements.

The general pattern, then, seems to be a cyclical one—the rise and fall of peasant-based clientelist politics. Where the political culture is a carrier of patron-client patterns of behavior, the disintegration of peasant clientelist politics does not mark the demise of the generic pattern. To the contrary, urban-based clientelist politics may proliferate. They may be more subtle and complex, but function in essentially the same manner. The agrarian reform, often begun with an initial burst of distributive activities, is slowed down, or consolidated, into a bureaucratic program of gradually receding importance. It may be succeeded by vast programs in worker's housing construction, or public works projects to improve the nature of life for the urban masses. These and other signs may indicate that the cycle described by Huntington is nearing its end.

V. CONCLUSION

It seems appropriate to conclude this discussion of clientelist politics by placing the concept in perspective: what claims are made for it as an heuristic tool, and what are its limitations? The concept, I believe, helps to illuminate the political behavior of low-status actors, particularly peasants, as they are incorporated, recruited, mobilized, or inducted into the national political process. Inasmuch as the induction of the peasantry into this process has in fact not yet occurred in many of the developing countries, an understanding of clientelist politics may be useful in a predictive sense. And while clientelist behavior may be most visible in the political cultures of Mediterranean extraction, there is much—although scattered—evidence that it can be encountered in political cultures in many parts of the world. This is not a prediction that clientele systems of the type found in Italy or Venezuela are to be anticipated elsewhere, but that clientelist patterns of interpersonal behavior may be a significant factor in the process of peasant politicization everywhere.

Clientele systems clearly differ from other forms of politically representative systems in several ways. In clientelism, there is an almost complete dependency on face-to-face relationships in the building and maintenance of the system. Impersonal communications between persons low and high in the system hierarchy are as ineffective as they are rare.[40] A low-status participant may, on occasion, personally approach a high-status participant in the same clientele system, but normally he depends on a series of linkages with intermediate brokers. This norm-dependency on personal contact—derives from the nature of the patron-client contract.

The dyadic contract between patron and client—or broker and patron—is a private, un-written, informal agreement, and highly personalistic in content. There is no public scrutiny of the terms of such agreements. There is no public entity which functions as an enforcement authority concerning such agreements. There is, in short, no process by which either partner of the agreement can go "outside" the dyadic relationship for enforcement of the contract, or to bring sanctions for noncompliance. Enforcement, compliance, and performance are bound up in, and limited to, the face-to-face relationship between the client and broker, or the broker and patron.

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[39] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[40] In my study of local peasant union leaders in Venezuela, it was found that 79.9% of all contacts between local and state leaders were in the nature of personal visits. Even contacts with national level peasant union leaders were predominantly in the nature of personal visits (33.1%), rather than through correspondence (11.9%) or other means.

This stands in sharp contrast to the relationship between citizen and representative, or even party member and party leader, in modern systems of political transactions. In essence, the patron-client pattern occurs in the realm of private accountability, the modern pattern in the realm of public accountability. In fact, such a distinction is what makes patron-client ties functional in the first place. As Eric Wolf has put it, in a slightly different context:

> The clearest gain from such a relation should therefore appear in situations where public law cannot guarantee adequate protection against breaches of non-kin contracts. This can occur where public law is weak, or where no cultural patterns of cooperation between non-kin exist to guide the required relationship. It can also occur in dealings which border on the illegal or the extra-processual.[41]

The most obvious difference that the private-public distinction makes is in the degree of power asymmetry between superior and subordinate. Superiors in a clientele system are relatively free to behave in an arbitrary and highly personalistic manner in dealing with their subordinates. Subordinates in a clientele system have relatively little recourse in such a situation. Theoretically, clients could improve their bargaining position relative to patrons through the formation of horizontal organizations, such as peasant unions. In practice, this seems difficult for at least two reasons. First, the power asymmetry between client and broker, or patron, on the local level works against the formation of such independent organizations. Organizers, potential local leaders, and prospective members are all relatively vulnerable to the negative sanctions available to the local broker or patron, who often enjoys the cooperation of other local authorities. Second, clientelist patterns of behavior frequently exist in the relationship between peasant union leader and follower.[42] For both of these reasons, peasant unions tend to be part of a clientele system organized from above, rather than a bargaining organization initiated from below.

The burden of this essay has been to explain the transformation of patron-client ties from a strictly local, landlord-peasant relationship of a traditional kind, into a complex, relatively modernized national transaction system. The main point has been that clientelist patterns of behavior persist in modern organizational form, and that an explanation of interpersonal or institutional behavior will be significantly enhanced by understanding the nature of clientelist politics. The fact that achievement criteria become more important in filling patron and brokerage roles is not inconsistent with the maintenance of traditional values embodied in the ascriptive-oriented traditional forms of clientelism. In fact, just as a relatively high power asymmetry promotes stability within clientele systems, the combination of traditional and modern value orientations in the "new" clientelism may function to perpetuate old forms in a manner quite consistent with modern organizational requirements. Seymour Martin Lipset, in discussing ways in which the Japanese have maintained particularistic and ascriptive traits while at the same time combining universalistic and achievement patterns into the elite recruitment process, illustrates how such a combination can function in a highly successful manner.[43] The example of Japanese industry, in fact, not only suggests that traditional patterns of behavior can be consistent with the requirements of modern organizational life, but may even enhance the performance of such requirements in a highly competitive environment. The implication which might flow from this would be that peasant-based transaction systems successfully perform in a competitive, modernizing political environment because of, not in spite of, the functionality of traditional practices and values.

The argument can be carried one step further.

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[41] Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies," in *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, op. cit.*, p. 10.

[42] For a concise picture of such relationships in the Brazilian Peasant Leagues, see Benno Galjart, "Class and 'Following' in Rural Brazil," *América Latina*, 7 (July-September, 1964), 3–23.

[43] Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.), *Elites in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 42–44. See also Anthony Leeds, "Brazilian Careers . . ." *op. cit.*, and Charles Wagley, "Luso-Brazilian Kinship Patterns: The Persistence of a Cultural Tradition," in *Politics of Change in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1964), edited by Maier and Weatherhead, pp. 174–189.

I would submit the proposition that certain traditional elements of the political culture, such as clientelism, become more, not less, important as modernizing changes take place in a peasant-based society. Evidence relevant to this proposition has been turned up repeatedly by social anthropologists studying the adaptation of peasant cultures to the stresses and tensions associated with socio-economic change. As Mintz and Wolf suggest in their analysis of *compadrazgo* (a fictive kinship tie) in Hispanic America:

> It is extremely noteworthy that the mechanism of *compadrazgo* has maintained itself here in the face of what appears to be progressively accelerating social change. We wonder whether the elaborations of the mechanism's forms may be part of the community's unconscious effort to answer new problems. It must increasingly face the insecurity of growing incorporation into the national structure and increasing local wage-based, cash crop competition. This may call forth an increased emphasis on techniques for maintaining and strengthening face-to-face relationships.[44]

Further evidence that change increases reliance on certain traditional practices was found by Wolf in Mexico. In his study of the changing intergroup relations of Mexican Indian communities, he took note of the "tendency of new group relationships to contribute to the preservation of traditional cultural forms."[45] Myron Weiner's findings in India were also consistent with the proposition advanced above. In *The Politics of Scarcity,* he noted the strong tendency of post-independence political change to bring about marked increases in the activities of traditional community associations of various kinds. These associations were relied on to link village interests with the emerging structures of a modern nation-state.[46]

In short, modernizing transformations in peasant societies may well make the study and analysis of clientelist politics more relevant than ever before.[47] While scholars generally acknowledge the importance of patrimonial-type behavior in traditional politics, both at the mass and at the elite levels, there may be insufficient appreciation of the fact that such behavior may survive, quite functionally, very late into the developmental process. Much of the evidence presented here has concerned the nature of such behavior in local politics, but I have also tried to demonstrate the importance of clientelist politics as an organizing principle at all levels of developing polities. Whether or not, and to what degree clientelism exists; whether it functions at the level of the village or throughout the polity; and what impact such behavior has on the course and pace of political development are significant, if not critical, empirical questions in the study of politics in peasant-based societies.

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[44] Sidney Mintz and Eric Wolf, "An Analysis of Ritual Co-Parenthood (*Compadrazgo*)," in *Peasant Society, op. cit.*, p. 194.

[45] Eric Wolf, "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico," in *Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America, op. cit.*, p. 96.

[46] Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), especially pp. 36–72.

[47] In fact, such a literature seems about to emerge. For example, Professors René Lemarchand and Keith Legg of the University of Florida presented an excellent comparative study, "Clientelism and Politics: A Preliminary Analysis," to the members of the joint Harvard-MIT faculty Seminar on Political Development in February, 1970. The paper is planned for early publication.

AN EXPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The fundamental process of politics is the aggregation of citizens' preferences into a collective—a social—choice. We develop, interpret, and explain non-technically in this expository essay the definitions, assumptions, and theorems of a mathematical model of one aggregative mechanism—the electoral process.[1] This mechanism is conceptualized here as a multidimensional model of spatial competition in which competition consists of candidates affecting turnout and the electorate's perception of each candidate's positions, and in which the social choice is a policy package which the victorious candidate advocates.

This approach, inaugurated by Downs's *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, and falling under the general rubric "spatial models of party competition," has been scrutinized, criticized, and reformulated.[2] To clarify the accomplishments of this formulation we identify and discuss in section 2 the general democratic problem of ascertaining a social preference. We review critically in section 3 the definitions and assumptions of our model. We consider in sections 4 and 5 the logic of a competitive electoral equilibrium. We assume in section 4 that the electorate's preferences can be summarized and represented by a single function; the analysis in section 5 pertains to competition between two organizational structures or two opposed ideologies (i.e., when two functions are required to summarize and represent the electorate's preference). Finally, we suggest in section 6 a conceptualization of electoral processes which facilitates extending and empirically testing our model.

II. THE DEMOCRATIC PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CHOICE

The early literature of spatial theory examines a relatively simple problem, a fundamental assumption of which is that a single dimension describes sufficiently the preferences of citizens. Assuming: (1) that candidates seek to win elections, (2) that all participants in elections (i.e., candidates and citizens) have perfect information, and (3) that the candidate can adopt any position on this single dimension; this literature seeks to ascertain the positions candidates should adopt. Finding such a position, however, requires, first, that it exists—i.e., that some position be dominant, by which

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[1] See the following: Otto A. Davis, and Melvin J. Hinich, "A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society," *Mathematical Applications in Political Science II*, J. L. Bernd, ed. (Dallas: Arnold Foundation, SMU Press, 1966); "Some Results Related to a Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society," *Mathematical Applications in Political Science III*, J. L. Bernd, ed. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1967); "On the Power and Importance of the Mean Preference in a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice," *Public Choice*, 5 (Fall, 1968), 59–72; "Some Extensions to a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice," forthcoming in *Social Choice*, B. Lieberman, ed. (New York: Gordon and Breach); Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Abstentions and Equilibrium in the Electoral Process," *Public Choice*, 7 (Fall, 1969); Social Welfare and Electoral Choice in Democratic Societies," (unpublished, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1969); Peter C. Ordeshook, "Some Extensions to a Mathematical Model of Electoral Competition, and Implications for the Theory of Responsible Parties," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, (February 1970); *Theory of the Electoral Process* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, 1969).

[2] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). For additional theoretical developments see: Gerald Garvey: "The Theory of Party Equilibrium," this REVIEW, LX (1966), 29–38; David E. Chapman, "Models of the Working of a Two-Party Electoral System," *Papers on Non-Market Decision Making III* (Fall, 1967), and *Public Choice* (Fall, 1968)

we mean that if a candidate adopts that position then he is guaranteed at least a tie in the election and a positive plurality if his opposition selects some position other than the dominant one. Unfortunately, the existence of such positions cannot be guaranteed generally and additional assumptions are required for it to exist. Consider the following *incomplete* argument purporting to support the proposition that, if all citizens vote, the median preference of the electorate is the dominant position:

> Let θ^* (see Fig. 1) represent the median position for the density of "preferences" $f(x)$; thus θ^* divides the density equally. If the first candidate selects the position $\theta_1=\theta^*$, the second candidate selects the position $\theta_2<\theta^*$, and everyone votes, the first candidate receives a positive plurality; he is preferred by all citizens to the right of θ^*, which by construction is one half of $f(x)$, and he is preferred by those citizens to the left of θ^* who are nearer to θ^* than to θ_2 (and who provide his margin of victory).

Since dominant positions exert a powerful attraction to candidates, the argument that candidates should converge to the median might appear to be trivial. However, such an argument is incomplete; it requires additional assumptions, one of the most important being that the form of each citizen's preferences is "single peaked". Specifically, the argument that all citizens to the right of θ^* prefer θ_1 with $\theta_2<\theta_1=\theta^*$, implicitly assumes the existence of a specific class of orderings of the alternatives on the horizontal axis. If preference is indicated on the vertical axis, the preference orderings in this class are represented by functions which change direction at most once from increasing to decreasing (i.e., are single peaked). If this assumption is not satisfied we may be unable to identify a dominant position so that a paradox of voting is said to exist.

The illustration of this assertion, which is a special case of Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem, is so simple that it bears repeating.[3] Consider three citizens whose preferences do not satisfy the single peakedness assumption:

Citizen	Citizen's Preference Ordering
1	A→C→B
2	C→B→A
3	B→A→C

Although each citizen has no difficulty defining a preference ordering among the alternatives—*A*, *B*, and *C*—no alternative is dominant. *B* defeats *A*, *C* defeats *B*, and *A* defeats *C*, so that the social preference ordering— $A\rightarrow C\rightarrow B\rightarrow A$ —is intransitive. Thus, if *A*, *B*, and *C* are the alternative positions for a candidate, he cannot find a strategy which guarantees him at least a tie.

The possibility that such a paradox exists poses a problem for majority decision-making. Although most standard procedures for aggregating individual preferences (e.g., voting) yield a unique social choice, if preferences are not single peaked such choices depend, for example, on the order in which the alternatives are presented.[4] Thus, if we cannot guarantee the existence of dominant positions in the context of electoral campaigns, the outcome of an election may depend on the temporal order in which candidates select their strategies.

Downs, who was perhaps the first to introduce into the contemporary political literature the problems which the paradox poses, considers only the world of one dimension. A simple example demonstrates, however, that the problems which the paradox introduces are compounded as more dimensions are considered[5]. Consider Figure 2 in which the vertical and horizontal axes index two relevant dimensions. Assume that the electorate consists of three



FIG. 1

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[3] Kenneth J. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: Cowles Commission Monograph #12, Wiley, 1951). See also: Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); and with R. A. Newing, *Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation* (London: W. Hodge, 1951). A general exposition of the paradox and its implications is given by William H. Riker, "Voting and the Summation of Preferences: An Interpretive Bibliographical Review of Selected Developments During the Last Decade," this REVIEW, LV (December, 1961), 900–911.

[4] Duncan Black, *op. cit.*, pp. 21–25.

[5] Duncan Black and R. A. Newing, *loc. cit.*



FIG. 2

voters, with their preferred positions denoted by v_1, v_2, and v_3, and that there are two candidates (who do not vote). Finally, assume that the concentric circles drawn about v_1, v_2, and v_3 represent the indifference contours of each voter's preference function. Thus, a voter is indifferent between two alternatives if they lie on the same contour, and he prefers one alternative to another if it lies on a contour closer to his preferred position—i.e., a contour of a smaller radius. Now let the first candidate adopt any strategy, say θ_1. Observe that the position θ_2 defeats θ_1 in a majority vote since it lies on indifference contours of smaller radius than θ_1 for the two voters preferring v_1 and v_2. But voters 2 and 3 prefer θ_1^* to θ_2 for similar reasons while θ_1 defeats θ_1^*, etc. Obviously this cycle continues indefinitely. No dominant position exists, and the position a candidate should adopt depends on the position selected by his opponent.

Although this result may not be inordinately surprising, it demonstrates an important distinction between the unidimensional and multidimensional cases. Consider Figure 2 again but assume that citizens cannot vote on x_1 (i.e., the value of x_1 is fixed). This is equivalent to assuming that only motions on a line parallel to the x_2 axis may be considered. Preferences on this line, by construction, are single peaked so that the value of x_2 preferred by v_2 is the dominant choice. Alternatively, if x_2 is fixed, the value of x_2 preferred by v_3 is the social choice. Thus, even though a dominant position exists for each of the dimensions taken individually, the composite of these dimensions yields an intransitive social preference.

We can easily imagine such a situation whenever citizens are permitted to vote both on the amount of some service to be provided publically *and* on the fiscal institutions for funding such a service. If the electorate is provided with the opportunity to vote only for the amount of the service to be provided (with a given fiscal institution) or only for the fiscal institution (with predetermined level of public activity) an unambiguous social choice may be revealed.[6] Such choices, as the previous illustration demonstrates, are not guaranteed with the composite of these two issues.

Since such a simple example demonstrates that dominant positions, in general, do not exist for a multi-dimensional world, one wonders whether they might exist for some reasonable set of conditions. Tullock, for example, suggests that the paradox occurs with less frequency than we might otherwise anticipate from Arrow's analysis.[7] Socialization and agreement on basic normative precepts diminish the probablities of multi-peaked preferences, and certain symmetries of preference reduce the probability of a paradox occuring in a multidimensional world. Similarly, the molasses-like variability of political parameters, and the uncertainty and imperfect measuring devices of both practitioners and academics, bring into question the relevance of such precise mathematical analyses as those of Arrow and Black. Stated differently, we do not know the frequency with which the paradox occurs in reality. That the paradox *can* occur, nevertheless, raises an ominous note for democratic theory. Specifically, it decreases the probable parsimony of acceptable models. If social choices depend on the order in which motions are brought forward for a vote, or on the number of motions, or on the number of citizens voting, then those *ceteris paribus* conditions commonly scattered through academic tracts (such as this one) can be of considerable importance. We contend, therefore, that political lore, empirical generalizations, or simple graphic arguments are not satisfactory for understanding the political process. The primitive inquires of Hotelling and Smithies, and the verbal unidimensional elaborations of

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[6] Such situations are examined closely by James M. Buchanan, *Public Finance in Democratic Process* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967).

[7] Gordon Tullock, "The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (May, 1967). Richard G. Niemi presents an excellent formal treatment and interpretation of the probability of a paradox occurring in "Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality," this REVIEW, LXIII (June, 1969), 488–497.

Downs, are inadequate. We also reject the argument that no generalization is possible, since such an assertion precludes all scientific inquiry. An adequate comprehension of political processes requires rigorous theory which specifies unambigously the relationships between relevant parameters. We seek, therefore, a model which promises to satisfy eventually our notions of an adequate thory (or which at least is conformable to such a theory). Given this objective, we now consider more rigorously the definitions and assumptions which constitute the foundation of our model.

III. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

A theory which seeks to explain how parties and candidates do act or ought to act is predicated on the citizens' responses to the candidates' strategies. And our preoccupation with the paradox of voting in section 2 suggests that such a theory is central to a spatial analysis of the electoral process. If we assume that parties and candidates waltz annually before a blind audience—that the electorate is neither attentive nor responsive to the candidates' maneuvers—then spatial analysis is not a requisite for understanding this waltz.

We conceptualize each citizen's choices and actions as the outcome of a two-stage sequential decision process. First, we assume that the citizen evaluates both candidates' (or parties') positions in terms of his own preferences; second, that he decides whether to vote or to abstain. If he votes he supports his preferred candidate. The sequential decision process is ordered in this fashion because the model postulates that the decision concerning whether to vote or to abstain depends upon the citizen's comparative evaluation of the candidates.

Every formalization, however, reveals the ambiguities associated with one's initial conceptualization of a problem. Consider, first, the central problem of ascertaining the method citizens use to compare candidates. Downs, as we note earlier, assumes that citizens compare the candidates' ideological closeness to themselves. The inadequacy of this conceptualization is that responses to campaign issues cannot be characterized as necessarily ideological.[8] Although some elections might involve a single issue, citizens' preferences cannot be ordered unambiguously on a single continuum. Opinion cleavages demonstrate that if spatial models are to retain descriptive and predictive value, they must allow for more than one dimension of conflict and taste.

This requirement first motivated our analysis. Instead of assuming that each citizen prefers one position on a common dimension, we assume that a citizen prefers a position on each of many dimensions. We represent a preferred position by a number, x, on the scale identified with each dimension. Consequently, for the ith citizen and the kth dimension the symbol x_{ik} indicates the position that a citizen, i, most prefers with respect to the dimension, k. We represent the ith citizen's preferred positions for all n dimensions by the vector,

$$(1) \qquad x_i = \begin{bmatrix} x_{i1} \\ x_{i2} \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ x_{in} \end{bmatrix}$$

This approach facilitates an analysis more nearly consonant with empirical evidence. For example, the complexity of modern society, the indeterminate implications of many policies, and the vagueness of political utterances guarantee the inability of even the most educated citizen to obtain a thorough knowledge and understanding of governmental policy and of the candidates' positions on issues. Thus, citizens employ criteria other than issues for evaluating candidates. The established fact that responses not related to issues (e.g., partisan identification, and candidate image) play significant, if not dominant, roles in determining electoral outcomes, however, does not vitiate the rationalistic perspective of voting behavior. Since our model is multi-dimensional, we can incorporate all criteria which we normally associate with a citizen's voting decision process—issues, style, partisan identification, and the like.[9] The assumption that candidates, parties, and public officials manipulate only governmental policy to win elections, therefore, is unnecessary.

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[8] V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1963), Ch. 7; Phillip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–261; "The Problem of Party Distances in Models of Voting Change," in M. Kent Jennings, and L. Harmon Zeigler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 175–207; Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," this REVIEW, LVII (June, 1963), 368–377.

[9] The relative importance of issues, compared to image and partisan bias, as causal determinants of voting behavior remains an open question. Aggregate analyses of cross-sectional survey data demonstrate clearly the predictive dominance of partisan identification. V. O. Key, however, concludes in *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

Because a multi-dimensional model permits this latitude in the specification of the electorate's criteria for evaluating candidates, Downs' assumption of rational action is rendered less objectionable. Rationality in Downs' analysis ostensibly requires that each citizen has some information about the candidates' positions on issues. This information, however, is not free, and because many regard their votes as inconsequential, they avoid this cost by voting on the basis of the candidates' images or on the basis of socially determined partisan preferences.[10] And since we interpret rational choice simply as choice which conforms to the assumptions of our model, voters are rational even though the candidates' positions on issues are disregarded.[11]

Our analysis, moreover, is not sensitive to the number of relevant dimensions, or to their labels. The number and nature of issues change from election to election and it is doubtful whether anyone can successfully predict the issues that will be important in some future contest. These are parameters which must be ascertained empirically for each election.

The mathematical exercise of evaluating campaign strategies permits some ambiguity in the empirical referents for each dimension. The specification of the mathematical properties of the x_i's, though, requires precision before rigorous analysis can proceed, and it is here that we constrain the realism of our model. First, *we assume that each dimension of taste is continuous.* This requires consideration of Stokes' observation that many dimensions are discrete and some are dichotomous (which Stokes terms "valence issues").[12] Conceptually, valence issues present no serious additional problems for the analysis of voting behavior. It is difficult, however, to mix continuous and discrete dimensions in one mathematical model, so we assume continuity simply to facilitate our analysis.

Stokes's observation, nevertheless, is pertinent. If, for example, only two spatial positions (e.g., party identification in a two-party system) are available, the candidates generally are unable to vary their positions. But the candidates may employ alternative means for influencing the electorate, such as varying the saliency of their party identification by stressing their party labels differentially. Although the analysis of strategies which have no spatial location can be conducted within the framework of our model, we focus here on the analysis of spatial strategies only.

Two additional assumptions implicit in our formulation of each citizen's preferred position must also be identified. First, *we assume that citizens act as if they estimate a preferred position for every dimension.* Thus, we ignore the possibility that citizens frequently do not or cannot evaluate alternative proposals for many issues. Second, *we assume that all citizens use the same indices to measure any given policy.* Stated differently, the indices measuring the various policies are common to all voters. Thus, we fail to consider Stokes's suggestion that "we may . . . have as many perceived spaces as there are perceiving actors."[13]

Even with these assumptions we must find a more convenient summary for our information about the electorate's preference before analyzing spatial strategies. Such a summary is obtained by observing that the vestors represented by expression (1) are not simply a collection of numbers; they also define a multidimensional coordinate system. Thus, the vector x^i, which represents the ith citizen's preferred position, identifies that citizen with some point in an n-dimensional coordinate system, where the citizen's preference on the kth dimension is measured along the kth axis of the coordinate system.

Assuming now that the preferred positions of all citizens are ascertained, we estimate the probability that a citizen, selected randomly from the electorate, prefers a particular position, say x_0, by counting citizens preferring x_0 and dividing this number by the total number of citizens. When this calculation is performed for all preferences we plot a multivariate density of preferences, $f(x)$, which characterizes the population in the sense that it represents a summary statement of the preferred positions of all

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1966) that policy counts heavily. Arthur S. Goldberg, moreover, demonstrates "that there is a rational component to party identification rooted in group norms" (p. 21) with the suggestion that these norms are related to issues, in "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification," this REVIEW, LXIII (March, 1969), 5–25.

[10] See Goldberg, *ibid.*

[11] This interpretation of rationality is equivalent to the *as if* principle of rational behavior as presented by Milton Friedman in "The Methodology of Positive Economics," *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963). See also William H. Riker, and William Zavoina, "Rational Behavior in Politics, this REVIEW, LXIV (March, 1970).

[12] *Op. cit.* For a spatial analysis of discrete dimensions see Chapman, *op. cit.*

[13] *Ibid.*

citizens. We present in Figure 3 a unidimensional example in which a citizen, selected at random from the electorate, prefers x_o with the probability $f(x_o)$.[14] Figure 4 graphs a two-dimensional example in which a citizen, selected at random from the electorate, prefers x_{o1} on the first demension and x_{o2} on the second dimension with the probability $f(x_{o1}, x_{o2})$.

The positions which a citizen prefers, however, are only a partial identification of the variables relevant for describing his calculus of voting. The act of voting implies a choice among candidates, so we require a representation of such alternatives. Additionally, since we assume that these choices involve a comparison of the alternatives and the citizen's preferred positions, we require that the representation of these alternatives conforms to expression (1). Since vectors characterize the citizen's preferences, and since a citizen's choice involves a comparison between these preferences and his perception of each candidate's position on each dimension, we assume that these positions also can be characterized by a vector. Thus, we let vector,

$$\theta_j = \begin{bmatrix} \theta_{j1} \\ \theta_{j2} \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \theta_{jn} \end{bmatrix} \tag{2}$$

represent the citizen's estimate of candidate j's position on each dimension.

Although we represent the perceived position of each candidate as a vector, we cannot assume that we know how citizens form estimates of θ_j. Downs, for example, offers several suggestions, such as estimating a candidate's strategy on the basis of past performance and probable future performance. But, like Downs, we cannot specify which suggestion is more satisfactory. Stated simply, a citizen's cognitive and evaluative processes are not sufficiently understood to permit us to identify the psychological mechanisms by which he forms estimates of θ_j.



FIG. 3



FIG. 4

But while the behavioral questions pertaining to θ_j remain unanswered, rigorous analysis can proceed only if we specify precisely the assumed mathematical properties of this vector. First, because we assume that θ_j is measured on the same dimensions as x_i, we also assume that θ_j is continuously measurable. Of greater substantive importance, however, is the additional assumption that *all citizens make identical estimates of* θ_j (thus we fail to subscript this vector with i—the citizen's index). Thus we ignore such problems as cognitive balance, imperfect information, and candidates' attempts to have different citizens believe different things about them.[15] Repeatedly, we observe citizens making "rational" decisions (i.e., decisions understandable to the observer) by their failure to perceive the disadvantages of an already preferred candidate and by failing to perceive the advantages of an already not preferred candidate. If, for instance, a voter favors the passage of strong civil rights measures and his preferred candidate does not, he may, nevertheless, believe this candidate favors such measures. The voter, furthermore, may guard against disruptive information by erecting a perceptual screen and filtering out dissonant messages. Party identification is known to bias citizens' perceptions of candidates' platforms, and highly salient issues often perform an equivalent function.

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[14] The densities illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 are represented as discrete although the scales are assumed to be continuous because electorates are finite populations. Nevertheless, our analysis is facilitated by assuming that $f(x)$ is continuous, which is not a serious distortion of any significance if the electorate is large. Hence, in all subsequent illustrations we represent $f(x)$ as a continuous density.

[15] For a discussion of the role of cognitive balance see: Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency, this REVIEW, LX (March, 1966), 19–28; Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), ch. 10; Michael J. Shapiro, "Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives," this REVIEW, LXIII (December, 1969). Cognitive balance poses a problem for our theoretical analysis, but it also reduces the validity of much cross-sectional survey research about attidudes and voting behavior. Briefly, the causal link between attitude (i.e., preference) and vote is bidirectional for many issues. Simply regressing attitude on vote does not reveal the importance of an issue for a citizen's choice—a significant

Such psychological possibilities identify an additional assumption of spatial analysis; *we assume that the candidates have perfect spatial mobility* (i.e., they can adopt any position in the relevant coordinate system). Perceptual distortion and imperfect information, however, frustrate a candidate's campaign objectives where, for example, citizens in a secure Democratic constituency favoring liberal labor legislation remain unconvinced that a Republican candidate is pro-labor—even though it is true. And in a multidimensional world candidates might find it impossible to alter their position on one issue without altering their positions on other issues.

A candidate, of course, prefers to have all citizens believe that he supports each and every preference (i.e., $\theta_j = x_i$ for all i)and if attainment of this ideal is impossible he should adopt the second best solution of approximating this ideal as closely as possible. Our assumptions, nevertheless, exclude this possibility, so the positions associated with a candidate cannot (except in a trivial instance) satisfy all citizens. Thus, to explain the choices citizens make when they regard neither candidate as perfectly satisfactory, we propose a measure of the citizen's evaluation of each candidate's position. Specifically, we provide for the loss in utility any citizen sustains when his preferred position is not supported by the candidates. We accomplish this end by introducing the concept of *individual loss functions*—functions which must satisfy several intuitively desirable properties before they are employed in the model.

First, if $x_i = \theta_j$ the loss citizen i sustains from candidate j's position, symbolically written $L_i(\theta_j)$, should be at some minimum value or zero, since the candidate's position and the citizen's preference are identical for all dimensions.[16] Consonant with this requirement, if $x_i \neq \theta_j$ (i.e., if at least one element of the vector x_i is not equal to the corresponding element in θ_j) the citizen should sustain a positive loss. Hence, we assume, *ceteris paribus*, that the greater the discrepancy between any element of x_i and the corresponding element in θ_j the greater is the loss citizen i associates with candidate j.

The mathematical formulation of these requirements is rendered difficult because: (1) the set of mathematical functions satisfying these two criteria is infinite, and; (2) the available empirical evidence fails to restrict this set sufficiently. The solution we propose for this problem is to conduct the analysis when only the general form of the loss function is assumed.

Consider the following expression as a potential specification for a citizen's loss function when the number of issues, n, equals 1.

$$a(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})^2 \qquad (3)$$

The term $(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})^2$ is the squared distance be-



FIG. 5

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regression coefficient may indicate only that the attitude has been made consistent with a predetermined preference because it is unimportant. Multiple regression analysis with many attitudinal variables, moreover, is not a satisfactory solution either. A statistically insignificant regression coefficient may indicate only that that variable is related to some other independent variable in the analysis although it may in fact be an important determinant of candidate preference. Because of such difficulties Gerald Kramer analyzes the relationship between policy preference and voting with variables which are more objectively measurable than attitudes in "An Empirical Analysis of Some Aggregative Hypotheses About U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964," (unpublished, Yale University, 1968).

[16] In some of our papers individual loss functions are symbolically represented by the function $\phi(x - \theta)$ to indicate that loss is a function of the difference between x and θ.

tween citizen i's preferred position and candidate j's position. If (3) represents a citizen's loss function and if $a > 0$, $a(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})^2$ increases as x_{i1} and θ_{j1} become more disparate. (The magnitude of a is a function of the scale used to index the issue so we ignore it presently.) Furthermore, if $x_{i1} = \theta_{j1}$, $a(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})^2 = 0$. Thus, expression (3) satisfies the two conditions which loss functions must satisfy. This function is illustrated in Figure 5.

Expression (3) however is not totally satisfactory since we must consider the possibility that $n > 1$. Suppose, therefore, that, if $n = 2$, we summed two such terms. Thus, another possible specification for the citizen's loss function is

$$(4) \qquad a_1(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})^2 + a_2(x_{i2} - \theta_{j2})^2$$

Observe now that this expression satisfies our first condition which loss functions must satisfy; if $x_{ik} = \theta_{jk}$, for $k = 1,2$, the expression reduces to zero. Thus, if this expression represents a citizen's loss function, the citizen's loss equals zero whenever $x_i = \theta_j$. This expression, moreover, satisfies our second necessary condition: if a_1, and $a_2 > 0$, $L_i(\theta_j) > 0$ whenever $\theta_j \neq x_i$. Thus, another reasonable assumption about individual loss functions is that they are represented by expression (4). Figure 6 graphs such a function.

If the election involves more than two issues we might continue adding the necessary terms to (4). But this expression ignores one possibility—that the loss a citizen derives from a candidate's position on one issue is a function of the candidate's positions on other issues. So we add the interaction term $a_{12}(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})(x_{i2} - \theta_{j2})$ to (4) to account for this possibility. Thus (4) becomes,

$$(5) \qquad a_1(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})^2 + a_2(x_{i2} - \theta_{j2})^2 + a_{12}(x_{i1} - \theta_{j1})(x_{i2} - \theta_{j2})$$

If we graph expression (5) it resembles Figure 6—the graph of (4)—except that now it is rotated either to the right or left (depending on the magnitudes of a_1, a_2, and a_{12}).



FIG. 6

For $n > 2$, expression (5) is easily generalized to,[17]

$$(6) \qquad \sum_{m=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} a_{mk}(x_{im} - \theta_{jm})(x_{ik} - \theta_{jk})$$

Thus, expression (6) represents the weighted (where the weights are the a_{km}'s) sum of squared distances (the terms for which $k = m$) plus the interaction terms between each pair of dimensions ($k \neq m$).

It remains, however, for us to interpret more precisely the weights in (6). To do so we return to the case of $n = 2$—expression (5). If a_2 and a_{12} equal zero we say that only issue 1 is salient for the citizen and expression (5) reduces to (3). Consider a second example: assume that both dimensions are measured in terms of dollars spent on a program so that θ_j reads "candidate j wishes to spend θ_{j1} dollars on the first program, and θ_{j2} dollars on the second program." Assume, furthermore, that,

$$\theta_1 = \begin{bmatrix} \$1 \\ \$1 \end{bmatrix}, \qquad \theta_2 = \begin{bmatrix} \$3 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}, \qquad a_{12} = 0$$

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[17] In matrix notation, expression (6) becomes

$$(x_i - \theta_j)' A (x_i - \theta_j)$$

where $(x_i - \theta_j)'$ is the transpose of $(x_i - \theta_j)$, i.e.,

$$(x_i - \theta_j) =' \begin{bmatrix} (x_{i1} - \theta_{j1}) \\ \vdots \\ (x_{in} - \theta_{jn}) \end{bmatrix},$$

$$(x_i - \theta_j)' = (x_{i1} - \theta_{i1}, \cdots, x_{in} - \theta_{jn})$$

and where A is the nxn matrix of weights, i.e.,

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_1 & a_{12} \cdots a_{1n} \\ a_{21} & a_2 \quad \cdot \\ \vdots & \quad \cdot \ a_n \end{bmatrix}$$

This expression is generally referred to as the quadratic form. We can guarantee that the quadratic form satisfies our requirement that it be greater than zero if $x_i \neq \theta_j$ if we assume that A is an nxn symmetric (i.e., $a_{km} = a_{mk}$) positive definite matrix. This assumption implies no substantive restrictions on our model since we simply eliminate with it citizens who do not care about any issue (i.e. $A = 0$). For a discussion of quadratic forms see George Hadley, *Linear Algebra* (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1961), 251–263.

and that citizen i prefers spending no money, i.e.,

$$x_i = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Substituting these vectors into (4) (or, equivalently, into (5) since $a_{12} = 0$), we get,

$$L_i(\theta_1) = a_1 + a_2$$
$$L_i(\theta_2) = 9a_1$$

Although the first candidate proposes to spend two dollars and the second candidate proposes to spend three dollars, the losses associated with each candidate are identical if $a_1 + a_2 = 9a_1$, or, equivalently, if $a_2 = 8a_1$. Thus, because of the unequal weighting of the issues, the losses a citizen associates with two candidates can be equal even though the candidates adopt dissimilar programs.

With this simple example we might be tempted to conclude that whenever $a_k > a_m$, issue k is "more salient" than issue m. Observe, however, that in this example we assume that the scales of both dimensions can be represented by a common measure, dollars. In general, campaign issues have no commonality of measurement and, additionally, the units of measurement for each dimension may be arbitrary. If, in the previous example, the second dimension is measured in cents, then

$$\theta_1 = \begin{bmatrix} \text{\$1} \\ 100\text{¢} \end{bmatrix} \qquad \theta_2 = \begin{bmatrix} \text{\$3} \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

and the necessary condition for equality of losses becomes $a_2 = .0008a_1$. Thus, when both dimensions are measured in dollars equal losses requires that $a_2 > a_1$, but when the second dimension is measured in cents equal losses requires that $a_2 < a_1$.

This example reveals an important property of the a's—their relative magnitudes are dependent on the scales of measurement which are applied to each dimension. And since we do not know either the scales which might measure all conceivable dimensions, the relative importance citizens attach to each dimension, or the prior identification of salient issues, the proof of our theorems should not require knowing the values of the weights.[18] Thus, we attempt to avoid the criticism that it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate these weights in any real campaign by proving theorems which are insensitive to the magnitudes of the a's.

We note, however, that in our development of a citizen's loss function, the weights are not subscripted by i; the weights are assumed to be common to all voters. This assumption, which is used in the earliest developments of our basic model, implies that the electorate is homogeneous. In other words, no restrictions are placed upon the preferred positions, so that citizens can desire widely different policies, but the assumption implies that all citizens assign the same relative weight to any dimension. Consider the issue of school desegregation. The model allows some citizens to desire segregated schools and other citizens integrated ones. The assumption that the weights are common to all citizens, however, implies that everyone assigns the same degree of importance to the issue. The model does not allow some citizens to be concerned while others do not care whether or not schools are integrated.[19]

Clearly, different citizens may not assign the same degree of importance to any issue. Yet the decision to allow individual loss functions to vary is not easily transferrable into a tractable model. Perhaps a natural method would be to assign different a's to citizens, but such a step results in a model whose complexity appears to prohibit the realization of meaningful analytical results. Accordingly, we utilize a simpler approach.

We assume that there exists some average level of concern for each issue and, if individual variations are permitted, these variations are represented as deviations from this average. *We assume, additionally, that the patterns of individual variations in level of concern do not correlate with preference.*[20] This assumption appears to conflict with the proposition that a citizen is more likely to react intensely about an issue if he prefers an extreme rather than a moderate position. If the proposi-

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[18] There exists, moreover, a linear transformation on the axes so that any quadratic of the form $(x-\theta)'A(x-\theta)$ can be reduced to $(x-\theta)'(x-\theta)$ without loss of generality (i.e., A becomes the identity matrix I). Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that

$$L_i(\theta_j) = \sum_{k=1}^{n} (x_{ik} - \theta_{jk})^2$$

so that the indifference contours for a citizen's loss function are concentric circles.

[19] The assumption of a common A matrix does not imply an interpersonal comparison of utility. It implies that, when the loss functions for citizens are ascertained independently, there exists a monotonic transformation on each loss function such that all loss functions have a common A matrix in one coordinate system.

[20] When nonvoting (which is discussed later) is caused by alienation, we must assume that variations in level of concern are *independent* of preference—a somewhat stronger assumption.

tion is correct, however, one should anticipate that relatively large and positive deviations from average concern will be associated with citizens who prefer either extreme on an issue; so there may be a zero correlation, although intensity and preference are not really independent.

If we accept expression (6) as an adequate representation of a citizen's loss function, however, we also accept the assumption of marginally increasing loss (i.e., as the citizen's preference on any dimension and a candidate's position on that dimension become more disparate, the loss which the citizen associates with this candidate increases at an increasing rate). Marginally increasing loss, however, is a hypothesis which may be disconfirmed empirically and which can be an unnecessary assumption. A more general formulation of the loss function is one which permits marginally decreasing, as well as marginally increasing, loss.[21] Such a formulation permits loss functions similar to the one illustrated in Figure 7 (and since the loss function illustrated in Figure 6 is also consistent with this assumption we employ this weaker assumption whenever possible).

Note now, from Figure 7, that this assumption allows variations in θ_j to have little impact on $L_i(\theta_j)$ for θ_j significantly different from x_i—the citizen can become indifferent between alternative positions if they are already quite far from his preferences. Citizens with such loss functions might, for example, be those who refuse to distinguish between two candidates if neither is regarded as satisfactory. Alternatively, citizens with loss functions such as the one illustrated in Figure 6 continue to discount heavily the candidate's movement as he proceeds farther and farther away from their preferences. But for neither situation is the citizen's loss permitted to *decrease* as θ_j and x_i become more disparate.



FIG. 7



FIG. 8

Thus, we come full circle to our discussion in the previous section of single peakedness and majority decision-making. Consider the following example: assume that citizens are asked to reveal their preferences for alternative tax rates. Some citizens may base their preference on the theory that "the lower the taxes the better." Others may believe that a certain amount of government activity is necessary, differing among themselves only on the amount. They prefer some intermediate tax rate. A third set of voters, however, seeks to insure the adequate financing of current programs and, consequently, favors a substantial increase in the tax rate—as opposed to an incremental increase—so that additional programs can be financed optimally. A prospective loss function for this type of citizen which fails to satisfy our assumptions is depicted in Figure 8.

From the mathematical perspective of our assumptions the occurrence of such functions offers no problem. We can satisfy our assumption about the form of the loss function if we increase the dimensionality of the analysis—by decomposing one dimension into two or more (e.g., reversing the process of factor analysis). But if loss functions on tax policy, for example, are similar to the function illustrated in Figure 8, and if our assumptions are satisfied

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[21] Mathematically, we may assume that $L_i(\theta_j)$ is a function, ϕ, of the quadratic form. Thus

$$L_i(\theta_j) = \phi\ ((x_i - \theta_j)'A(x_i - \theta_j))$$

where ϕ is any monotonically increasing function of its argument. Note that if $A = I$, the citizen's indifference contours remain concentric circles under the transformation ϕ.

by decomposition, what substantive political interpretation can be given to these new dimensions? We begin with a politically meaningful dimension—tax policy—which we assume has substantive meaning for both citizens and candidates. Can we assume further that the derived dimensions have substantive meaning? Are the candidates able to formulate policies on these dimensions?

Riker suggests a tentative answer to these questions:

> If the preference curves are single peaked, then . . . there exists a common qualitative dimension along which all preferences are ordered . . . the single peaked curves . . . reflect a cultural uniformity about the standard of judgment.[22]

If this "standard of judgment" is not uniform —if preferences are not single peaked—then the mathematical exercise of increasing the dimensionality of the analysis should discover the underlying multiple standards. And we assume, furthermore, that the candidates are able to formulate and manipulate policy on these standards. Consider again Figure 8. Our assumptions about loss functions might be satisfied if, for instance, we substitute two dimensions—efficiency in government spending, and government involvement (e.g., in welfare)—for the single dimension of tax policy. Thus we speak of the issues in the campaign as being efficiency and government involvement, but tax policy, per se, is not an issue.

We can now specify the citizens' rules for candidate preference. Generally, we assume that there are two candidates, and we denote the position of the first candidate as θ_1 and the position of the second candidate as θ_2. From the definitions of rationality and individual loss functions, a citizen prefers that candidate whose position yields him the smaller utility loss. Symbolically, the *i*th citizen prefers the first candidate if,

$$L_i(\theta_1) < L_i(\theta_2),$$

he prefers the second candidate if,

$$L_i(\theta_1) > L_i(\theta_2),$$

and he is indifferent between the candidates if,

$$L_i(\theta_1) = L_i(\theta_2).$$

We assume, moreover, that if a citizen votes, he votes for the candidate he prefers. Thus, we do not consider the possibility that citizens disguise their preferences by voting against a preferred candidate. Farquharson demonstrates that in small committees such strategic behavior can be fruitful if the paradox of voting exists or can be generated.[23] Such falsifying strategies in large electorates, however, seem worthless, since one citizen can have only an infinitesimal effect on the overall electoral preference. For large subgroups of the electorate, however, preference falsification can be rewarding, so we cannot guarantee that some citizens fail to perceive and to employ this strategy. Nevertheless, we assume that such behavior does not exist (rather than proving it does not exist or incorporating it somehow into the model).

Our assumptions concerning candidate preference and choice, however, describe only the first stage of the citizen's two stage sequential decision process. The second stage is the choice between voting for a preferred candidate or abstaining. First, some of the results reported in this essay require the assumption that all citizens vote. And for an electorate in which as many as 83 per cent of all eligible citizens vote (e.g., the 1960 Presidential election) and in which we can attribute most non-voting to habit or special circumstances, this assumption is not unduly restrictive.[24] Conversely, electoral outcomes frequently are determined by variations in turnout and other forms of participation (e.g., contributing money, ringing doorbells), and to the extent that the decision to vote or to participate otherwise is a function of the candidates' strategies, we require a theory about participation.

Presently we consider only variations in turnout, but in the final section of this essay we discuss how our analysis might be extended to include other forms of participation. The decision to vote is posited to involve a comparison of the relative expected utility from voting and not voting. Only if the expected utility of voting is greater than that of abstaining is it rational to vote. Riker and Ordeshook analyze this expected utility calculation and express the expected utility of voting hypothesis as,[25]

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[22] *Op. cit.* p. 908. See also Niemi, *loc. cit.*, and Clyde H. Coombs, *A Theory of Data* (New York: Wiley, 1964), Cps. 5–7.

[23] *Theory of Voting* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). For examples of the occurrence of paradoxes in legislatures and possible occurances of contrived paradoxes see William H. Riker, "The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments," this REVIEW, LII (1958), 349–366, and "Arrow's Theorem and Some Examples of the Paradox of Voting," in J. M. Claunch (ed.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science* (Dallas: Arnold Foundation, SMU Press, 1965).

[24] William G. Andrews, "American Voting Participation," *The Western Political Quarterly*, (December, 1966), 639–652.

$$R = PB + D - C \tag{7}$$

where:

- P is the citizen's subjectively estimated probability that his vote materially affects the outcome,
- B is the absolute value of the subjective differential loss (or utility) between the candidates,
- D is the utility a citizen derives from participating in the electoral process—termed the citizen's sense of duty,
- C is the subjectively estimated cost of voting,
- R is the expected utility of voting less the expected utility of not voting.

Thus, the citizen votes if and only if $R>0$, and he abstains from voting if and only if $R \leq 0$.

The earlier analysis of equation (7) demonstrates the necessity for inclusion of the PB term, and, specifically, how P might be calculated. Presently, this equation serves as an *indicator* of the relevant factors in a citizen's decision to vote. The equation, however, must be augmented by a specification of these factors' relationships to the candidates' strategies.

We consider two causes of abstention: (1) indifference and, (2) alienation.[26] First, a reasonable interpretation of B suggests that it is not independent of the candidates' strategies, and this relationship, termed *indifference*, can be represented by the variables employed in our model.[27] From the definition of B and of the loss functions, it follows that,

$$B_i = |L_i(\theta_1) - L_i(\theta_2)|$$

where $|\cdot|$ means "absolute value of."

Thus B and, therefore, R, the utility of voting, decrease as the losses associated with both candidates become less disparate. Additionally, if we assume that factors other than P, B, D, and C affect R, and that these factors have random effects on the citizen's expected utility calculations, then, with the present formulation of abstention from indifference, we can assume that *a citizen's probability of voting decreases as the difference between lossses which he associates with each candidate becomes less distinct.*

This assumption, however, appears to ignore the possible effects the candidates' strategies might have on the citizen's sense of civic duty, D, which appears to be largely the product of long-term socialization (e.g., learning or long-term reinforcement through non-voting). We consider the potential short-term effects on D, nevertheless, and assume that *a citizen's probability of voting decreases as the loss he acsociates with his preferred candidate increases and that his probability of voting increases as this loss decreases.*[28] Thus, if we say that a citizen's decision to vote is a function of alienation, we mean that in the short run he identifies a preferred candidate, and, if this candidate is not deemed to be satisfactory, the citizen abstains.

Both assumptions—alienation and indifference—have intuitive appeal and it is probable that both operate to some extent in all electorates. We consider each assumption separately, however, to provide ourselves with a tractable mathematical model. We do not consider, though, one potentially important effect on turnout which is represented in (7) by P, the subjective probability of affecting the outcome. We ignore P not because we consider its effects unimportant, but because it would be difficult to include it and because it does not affect many of our results. Generally, we wish to ascertain the dominant spatial positions in a campaign. Our analysis focuses primarily on perfect competition and on equilibrium states; under such conditions P is maximized, identical for all conditions, and can be ignored with some justification.

The list of assumptions which constitute the foundation of our model is now completed. We proceed to the specification of dominant campaign strategies. Note, however, that ascertaining dominant positions or dominant ranges of positions should not be interpreted as presuming that these are in fact the strategies candidates adopt in elections. Candidates obviously have neither the luxury of perfect spatial mobility nor the endowment of perfect information about citizens' preferences. Ascertaining the electorate's preference is one of the difficult objectives for candidates in campaigns. Thus, we assume only that on the average (or in the long run) candidates act in accordance with the model. Deviations from the predictions of our model are expected to occur. We hope, nevertheless, that the model describes and explains some fundamental forces operating in democratic electoral systems and, by a process of Darwinian selection, that these deviations occur around a mean which the model predicts. We turn now to a description of these forces when the electorate's preference is best described by a single multivariate density.

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[25] "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," this REVIEW, LXII (March, 1968), 25–42.

[26] Our assumptions about nonvoting conform closely to the two factors Garvey (*op. cit.*) identifies.

[27] See Ordeshook, "Some Extensions . . .," *op. cit.*

[28] See Hinich and Ordeshook, "Abstentions and Equilibrium . . .," *op. cit.*

IV. ELECTORAL STRATEGIES WITH A SINGLE DENSITY

Since dominant strategies generally do not exist in a multi-dimensional world, one objective of our analysis is to find conditions which yield dominant positions. In other words, our model should be interpreted as an attempt not only to correct the flaw of unidimensionality attributed to Downs, but also to specify conditions sufficient for majority rule. First, we consider two-candidate competition when the electorate's density of preferences is distributed unimodally. Second, the situation when the electorate's density of preferences is unknown is explored. Third, the effect of increasing the dimensionality of the election (i.e., the effect of variations in n, the number of issues) is analyzed. Finally, we consider competition when the electorate's density of preferences is bimodal.

Prior to beginning the analysis, however, we shall assume that the candidate's objective is to maximize his plurality. Although the rewards candidates seek vary (e.g., some candidates might desire idiosyncratic benefits from political activity), it is important to note that winning, at the very least, is instrumental for realizing most such goals. We assume plurality maximization, rather than vote maximization, because if winning is his criterion, a candidate must consider the votes his opponent receives as well as the votes which he receives.[29] A candidate must receive a positive plurality to win—not simply "many" votes. Even for those candidates who cannot win because of the historical prejudice of the voters of some districts (e.g., the one-party South), or those who do not seek to win (e.g., candidates who require ideological purity), the standard measure of performance is the disparity between a candidate's votes and the votes which his opponent receives. Thus, in game theoretic terms, we assume that elections are two-person zero-sum games.

It is possible to specify, with this game theoretic assumption, conditions that guarantee the dominance of a single position for *any* number of dimensions. The most prominent of these conditions is the symmetry and unimodality of the electorate's preference density. By unimodality we mean that the preference density, say $f(x)$, has a single mode (e.g., the normal density function). Symmetry implies that if, for example, the mean of $f(x)$ equals zero, the probability that a randomly selected citizen prefers the position x equals the probability that he prefers the position $-x$ (i.e., $f(x)=f(-x)$). Thus, symmetry requires that there exists for every citizen with a given preference, another citizen with a diametrically opposed preference. An example of a symmetric, unimodal density in two dimensions (Figure 9) consists of a density whose contour lines are concentric circles or ellipses.

The dominant position for these densities is μ, the vector of the means of the preferred points for each dimension. Thus, *if $f(x)$ is symmetric and unimodal, a candidate cannot be defeated if he adopts a position equal to the mean of the electorate's preference on each dimension, and this conclusion is valid if all citizens vote or if citizens abstain from voting because of alienation or indifference.*

Assuring that conditions exist in a multidimensional contest which guarantee the existence of dominant positions should not obscure the eminent restrictiveness of these conditions. It is unlikely that the electorate's preference is perfectly symmetric, even though the proof of the above theorem assumes perfect symmetry. On the other hand, symmetry and unimodality are merely sufficient conditions, and dominant positions can exist for preference densities which do not have these characteristics. Nevertheless, one should not presume the existence of dominant positions.



FIG. 9

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[29] For an analysis of electoral strategies when vote maximization is the posited goal see Hinich and Ordeshook, "Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation," this REVIEW (forthcoming, September 1970).

This latter bleak possibility can be emphasized by returning to the simplistic Downsian world of unidimensional competition. Black demonstrates that if preferences are single peaked and if all citizens vote, a dominant position exists at the median. Furthermore, this result does not require symmetry of preferences. Note, however, that if a new feature is introduced into Black's analysis—if citizens are permitted to abstain—then this feature can preclude the existence of any dominant position under conditions equivalent to those that Black examines. Specifically, if $f(x)$ is a nonsymmetric, unimodal, *and* unidimensional density, and if all citizens are assumed to vote, a dominant position will exist. On the other hand, if citizens can abstain because of indifference, then dominant positions, in general, do not exist.[30] This conclusion suggests that dominant positions are more unlikely in a multi-dimensional world, and especially one in which there is abstention, than either Arrow or Black suggest.

Let us now turn to unidimensional competition with abstention from alienation. If $f(x)$ is not symmetric, necessary and sufficient conditions for dominance are mathematically complex thus rendering difficult any substantive interpretation of the conditions. We have been unable to ascertain whether or not these conditions are satisfied for all unimodal densities of preference. These problems manifestly justify further rigorous investigation of Downs's assertion that candidates converge to a unique position when the electorate's density of preference is unimodal.

Two interesting and important observations can be culled from the conditions for dominance in unidimensional competition when $f(x)$ is unimodal and when abstention from alienation is allowed. First, if a dominant location exists, its location is, *ceteris parabus*, a function of the sensitivity of a citizen's probability of voting to variations in his preferred candidate's strategy—referred to as *the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy*. If this sensitivity is low the dominant position is near or at the median of $f(x)$, if sensitivity is high, the dominant position is near the mode, but if this sensitivity is at some intermediate value the dominant position is typically not near the median or the mode. Substantively, consider the logical situation of a citizen's probability of voting being inversely related to his cost of voting. Obviously, by selectively varying such costs the probabilities that certain citizens vote can be altered so as to change the policies candidates should adopt. Assume, however, that the cost of voting is varied *uniformly* throughout the electorate. Because a uniform variation increases every citizen's sensitivity (by definition) *electoral outcomes also are altered by uniform variations in the cost of voting*. Thus, such factors as the availability of polling stations, and *progressive* poll taxes affect the social choices which elections might produce.

A second observation concerns the strategy that a candidate should adopt if his opponent selects a non-optimal strategy. Consider three situations: (1) the opponent is near the dominant position; (2) the opponent is far from the dominant position; and (3) the opponent adopts some intermediate strategy. If $f(x)$ is unimodal and univariate, and if alienation causes abstention, a candidate who seeks to maximize his plurality adopts the following position for these three situations: (1) near the dominant position and closer to it than his opponent; (2) near the dominant position; and (3) near his opponent but closer to the dominant position than his opponent. Thus, if $f(x)$ is symmetric, and if we conceive of a situation in which the opponent shifts his strategy from the median to some extreme position, one can plot the candidate's plurality maximizing position against his opponent's position. Thus in Figure 10 the two axes measure the same unidimensional space but with one axis being reserved for one candidate and the other for his opponent so that the line (which does not represent a density) traces out the optimal position for the candidate if his opponent takes any given position.

Observe from this illustration that the candidate adopts a strategy near the dominant position (the median, which is represented here as the origin) if his opponent is either close to or far from this position. Thus, to contradict an observation made by Tullock (in reference to situations with all citizens voting) *if alienation causes abstention, the presence of an extremist opponent should not draw the candidate far from the equilibrium point*.[31] A plurality maximizing candidate has an incentive to diverge significantly from this point only if his opponent is at some "reasonable" distance from the dominant position. This suggests an intuitively appealing strategy for candidates who do not seek to win but who simply wish to create incentives for other candidates to shift their positions—adopt a moderate as opposed to an ex-

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[30] A counter example to dominance is presented in Ordeshook, "Some Extensions . . .," *op. cit.*

[31] Gordon Tullock, *Toward a Mathematics of Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), p. 52.



FIG. 10

treme position. Perhaps we have here an explanation for Goldwater's failure to influence Johnson's strategy of consensus.

Even with this interesting observation we must consider the situation in which no dominant position exists; specifically, one might desire to ascertain what bounds a rational candidate should place on his strategy (i.e., what region dominates alternative regions). Briefly, if everyone is assumed to vote and if little is known about the multivariate density of preference, $f(x)$, one can derive bounds on the relative distance from the mean a candidate can get before he insures that his opponent wins. We can show that *if θ_2 is farther than two standard deviations from the mean of $f(x)$ than is θ_1, then the first candidate is certain to win.* If a candidate's position is close to the mean of $f(x)$, then his opponent either should adopt a position which is also close to the mean or should face the consequence of losing the election with certainty. Alternatively, if his opponent adopts a platform distant from the mean, the candidate is afforded greater freedom in the positions he may adopt without insuring that his opponent wins.

The importance of the mean becomes more impressive if we imagine a situation in which the first candidate selects the mean as his strategy and his opponent adopts some other position. *If the number of dimensions required to describe the preferences of citizens increases, the proportion of the vote received by the first candidate increases; and if the number of dimensions goes to infinity, the first candidate receives all the votes.* Thus, as the number of issues increases, the strategic importance of the mean as the focal point of the candidates' strategies increases.

This result demonstrates that varying the number of relevant issues is a potentially valuable campaign strategy. Candidates in strategically advantageous positions should increase the dimensionality of the contest while candidates in disadvantageous positions should simplify the election (i.e., reduce the dimensionality) in addition to shifting to a dominant position. Note also that this result complements the intuitively satisfying notion that if a candidate is in a strategically advantageous position on a number of issues, he should attempt to increase the relative importance of these issues in the campaign.

We conclude that *as the number of issues increases, the electoral significance of candidates who advocate extreme positions decreases.* Obviously, the number of relevant issues varies from campaign to campaign. The cause of the variation is found, *inter alia,* in the exigencies of events, the candidates' focus on issues, and an increasingly pluralistic society. Perhaps as the electorate becomes more sophisticated, the number of dimensions required to represent issues increases. The civil rights "issue," for example, is no longer restricted to questions of voting and desegregation. Jobs, housing, business ownership, income distributions, and health, are now also components of this issue. Thus, assuming that responses unrelated to issues do not increase, then as a society grows more complex and the electorate more sophisticated, the chance that an extremist candidate might win is correspondingly diminished. One can also infer that the electoral fortunes of third parties are greatest when the number of issues is small, *ceteris paribus.* This inference is supported by the observation that, historically, the genesis of minor parties involves a single and dominant issue, and that any subsequent increase in the dimensionality of competition is accompanied either by a decrease in the fortunes of such parties, by their absorption by a major party, or by their replacement of a major party.

It is legitimately argued that individual voters do not perceive, and especially do not have feelings about, the entire spectrum of issues. Instead, voters are characterized as being concerned with a narrow subset of issues with the contents of the subset varying from voter to voter. Thus, farmers are supposed to care about farm price supports and those associated with the petroleum industry are supposed to be concerned with oil import quotas while the rest of us hardly even know about, and certainly are not concerned with, these issues. As the model is stated earlier, it does not include this type of phenomenon. However, with suitable assumptions, it is possible to show that our results concerning the dominanance of the mean are valid for the special case in which each voter is concerned with a single issue, but in which the issue varies from voter to voter. Specifically, if we compute the mean preference for each issue by counting only those who care about that particular issue, and if there is a symmetric preference density, then the mean vector is dominant. Also, if one candidate advocates policies which are "closer" to the vector of means than his opponent's vector, and if everyone votes, then the former candidate wins the election. Thus, our basic results obtain even if voters care only about a single issue which varies from citizen to citizen.

Thus far, however, our discussion considers competition only if $f(x)$ is either unimodal or unknown, though many electoral contests are interesting because the electorate's preference is distributed bimodally. Bimodal distributions indicate the presence of only minimal consensus, and it is competition without consensus which is of most interest for speculating about the selection of public policies by election. It is here, moreover, that we begin to uncover instances when candidates should not converge.

The results of our analysis of bimodal distributions are best expounded if we contrast these results with those achieved when preferences are distributed unimodally. In Table 1 we summarize our results.

Notice that *electoral outcomes differ between unimodal and bimodal densities only if alienation causes abstentions.* Thus, if all citizens vote or if indifference causes abstentions, the candidates should converge to the mean. One of us discusses this conclusion elsewhere within the context of the responsible parties controversy. Specifically, internal party discipline and an ability to implement programs to which the electorate has given its consent are not sufficient conditions for distinct programs.[32] This conclusion is doubtless disconcerting to proponents of a responsible two-party system. Normatively, many of us might feel that whenever preferences are bimodally distributed the two modes of opinion should be represented. Consider, as an example, a situation in which the society is governed by an omniscient and beneficent dictator faced with the task of selecting the "best" policies for his country, and where citizens' loss functions are marginally increasing (see Figure 6). The dictator should realize that in any nontrivial situation there is no possibility of satisfying everyone so he must select some scheme for evaluating the relative importance of the society's citizens—some scheme for making interpersonal comparisons of utility. Suppose that the dictator makes the judgment that such comparisons are meaningful, and decides that everyone should be weighed equally. These judgments imply that the best policies are those which minimize the total utility loss of the society. The dictator accomplishes this objective by selecting a position identical to the average desires of the population, so he selects the mean. Hence, competitive conditions which cause the two parties to converge toward the mean result in the electorial process producing the kind of result that a beneficent dictator should choose. This result, of course, although it does tend toward minimal utility losses, is quite contrary to the responsible party doctrine.

TABLE 1.—LOCATION OF DOMINANT POSITION

Distribution	All Citizens Vote	Non-Voting Because of Alienation	Non-Voting Because of Indifference
Symmetric Unimodal	Mean	Mean	Mean
Symmetric Bimodal	Mean	No General Solution	Mean*

* This result assumes that individual loss functions are quadratic, i.e., expression (6). If these loss functions are simply monotonic functions of (6), e.g., see Figure 7, then there exists no general solution. This case, however, is not yet satisfactorily analyzed.

The beneficent dictator's preference for the mean is, in fact, more pervasive than the example might suggest. Instead of weighting each citizen identically, assume that the ith voter, with the preference vector x_i, is assigned the weight $w(x_i)$. Assume also that $w(x)$ is symmetric about the mean of $f(x)$ so that $w(x) = w(-x)$ if the mean is zero. There are two general forms of the weighting function $w(x)$ which are of interest here. First, the beneficient dictator might assign more importance to those in the "middle" than to those who held extreme positions, and in this instance we say that $w(x)$ is unimodal. Second, the dictator might weight "liberals" and "conservatives" more heavily than the "moderators" and in this instance $w(x)$ is termed not unimodal. With these assumptions the dictator's preferences are presented in Table 2.

Thus, *if the citizens' loss functions are marginally increasing the dictator selects the mean for all symmetric $f(x)$ and $w(x)$.* Alternatively, if loss functions are both marginally increasing and marginally decreasing no general solution exists (unless $f(x)$ and $w(x)$ are both unimodal). The social welfare "optimality" of the mean, therefore, is sensitive to the form of the citizens' loss functions, as well as the density of citizen preferences. The point here, however, is that in a variety of situations, with a variety of ethical assumptions arbitrarily assigned, the mean appears to be a desirable point. Accordingly, contrary to the responsible parties doctrine, forces

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[32] Ordeshook, *op cit.*

TABLE 2. DICTATOR'S PREFERENCE

	Loss Functions Marginally Increasing Only		Loss Functions Marginally Increasing and Marginally Decreasing	
$f(x)$	$w(x)$ Unimodal	Otherwise	$w(x)$ Unimodal	Otherwise
Symmetric Unimodal	Mean	Mean	Mean	No General Solution
Symmetric Bimodal	Mean	Mean	No General Solution	No General Solution

which cause both party platforms to converge toward the mean, rather than recognizing differences in opinion, are not necessarily "bad" and, in the majority of the above cases, are positively "good" if one is willing to accept the assumptions.

Returning to Table 1, note that no general solution exists when $f(x)$ is bimodal and alienation causes non-voting. To specify the location of the candidates' preferred positions we must consider two additional aspects of the model. These aspects are (1) restrictions on the candidates' strategies, and (2) the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy. First, if candidates are strategically unrestricted, then even for a single dimension, no dominant position, in general, exists. By imposing restrictions, nevertheless, equilibrium may be restored so that the candidates fail to converge and adopt strategies near the modes of $f(x)$. Specifically, if the candidates are restricted so that they cannot cross each other or cross the median, dominant strategies exist, and they can be different strategies for each candidate. And since both candidates converge to the mean if all citizens vote or if indifference causes abstentions, the only explanation for divergent positions (if candidates are afforded perfect spatial mobility) is that citizens abstain because of alienation.

This situation illustrates one of the values of formal mathematical analysis. Downs offers the intuitively satisfying but mathematically unproved proposition that whenever preferences are distributed bimodally, the forces of abstention prohibit rational candidates from converging. Our analysis demonstrates, however, that this proposition generally is false—restrictions on strategies may be necessary for equilibrium. We can also give meaningful interpretations to these restrictions. First, candidates may be committed ideologically and may be unwilling or unable to adopt platforms abridging such commitments. Second, a party's nomination is commonly a requisite for winning the general election. The candidates, therefore, may find it necessary to make public commitments in conventions or in the primaries which bind them to these policies in the general election. Third, the electorate may associate traditional policies with a candidate and with his party and, therefore, strategies may be beyond the manipulative reach of the candidates except within a limited range. Finally, by crossing either the mean or his opponent's position, a candidate can alienate citizens—political activists, opinion leaders, and interest groups—whose support is vital. In electoral politics, citizens cannot be weighted in proportion to their numerical strength. If the preferences of activists differ from the preferences of the entire electorate, a candidate's optimal strategy should not be calculated from an unweighted aggregate density of preferences.

This last cause of strategy restrictions also offers an explanation of why candidates, who are afforded perfect spatial mobility, might not seek to converge when the mass electorate's preference is unimodally distributed. If the preferences of activists—citizens who are credited with disproportionately greater weights—are bimodally distributed, an electorate in which citizens are weighted in proportion to their potential contribution to a campaign, from a strategic perspective, may be equivalent to an unweighted electorate whose density of preferences is bimodal.[33] This idea is consistent with the observation that in competitive districts the legislative acts of Congressmen diverge more frequently from their constituencies' preferences than in less competitive districts.[34]

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[33] See, for example, Herbert McCosky, Paul J. Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Concensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," this REVIEW, LIV (June 1960), 406–427, and; Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), ch. 8.

[34] Warren E. Miller, "Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government," in E.

It may be that competition forces Congressmen to assign disproportionate weights to activists, thereby affecting a bimodal distribution (even when the electorate's preference density may be unimodal). Thus, if candidates diverge and if preferences are arrayed unimodally, this should not be interpreted as a refutation of spatial models, but as an indication that the components of competition are far more complex than such simple minded tests.

Earlier we note that a second important consideration in the discussion of bimodal densities is the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy. Specifically, if this sensitivity is sufficiently low, the candidates converge to the mean. Thus, we find a second important qualification for Downs's analysis of such distributions of preference. *Candidates diverge when preferences are bimodally distributed and when alienation causes abstentions only if the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy is sufficiently great. Bimodal distributions and abstentions caused by alienation, then, are not sufficient conditions for non-convergence.* "Sufficiently great" is imprecise and most likely it must remain so. The incentives for convergence or divergence are sensitive to so many parameters of $f(x)$ and of turnout that generalization appears impossible. (It is possible, nevertheless, to ascertain dominant positions in specific instances.) We can generalize only by stating that, *as the sensitivity of turnout increases, the incentives for non-convergence increase if $f(x)$ is bimodal.*

V. ELECTORAL STRATEGIES WITH TWO DENSITIES

Having sketched some theoretical results for competition between two candidates in an electorate which is characterized by a single density of preferences, we now consider electorates characterized by two densities. Specifically, assume that the sum of two symmetric unimodal densities characterizes the electorate's preferences. This permits us to consider the phenomenon of political parties. We cannot analyze, of course, the detailed quality and variety of parties. It is possible to consider in these developments only some salient characteristics. Our approach to party politics assumes that a multivariate, symmetric, unimodal density characterizes the desires of the party membership and two (possibly overlapping) densities characterize an electorate of two competing parties. Additionally, assume: (1) all citizens vote; (2) candidates are first selected in primaries; (3) in primary elections citizens can only vote in their party's primary; and (4) in the general election citizens select the candidate whose strategy yields them the smallest loss without regard to party.

The term "without regard to party" may be viewed as a most unsatisfactory assumption. Previously, we indicate that a multidimensional model is valuable because partisan identification is admissible as an additional dimension of taste. However, it is now desirable to assume that partisan identification can be ignored—although this assumption is clearly contradicted by empirical fact. A solution to this *contretemps* is available. First, since the model permits as many dimensions of taste as necessary, one might assert that a substantial basis for party identification is found in these dimensions. Thus, if a sufficient number of dimensions is provided, we can minimize the distortion afforded by ignoring party identification. Alternatively, we may retain partisan identification as a dimension, say the nth, without affecting our definition of parties. We can analyze strategies, then, on the first n-1 dimensions and take cognizance of the citizen's bias inherent in the nth dimension.

The idea now is to utilize previous results to analyze the relationship between victory in the general election and the preferences of party identifiers. Thus, if candidacies are determined by primaries, a candidate is nominated whose position is identical with the mean vector of the preferred positions of the members of his party. Symbolically,

$$\theta_1 = \mu_1; \qquad \theta_2 = \mu_2$$

where μ_1 and μ_2 are the means of the first and second parties' densities of preference respectively.

Imagine the means of the two densities being pulled apart or moved away from each other. In American politics, for example, the Democratic and Republican densities "overlap." However, as the means are moved further apart by shifting the distributions, this overlap diminishes until it vanishes. An illustrative, one-dimensional situation is set forth in Figure 11 in which no overlap exists. Obviously, since citizens select the candidate whose strategy is nearer their preferred position, at some point during the shifting all or nearly all citizens prefer the candidate of their party. In this instance the majority party always wins. The minority cannot exert an influence upon the formation of policy and is totally ignored. While

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Allardt, and Y. Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology* (Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society, 1964), 343–376.



FIG. 11

the formal proof of this argument is of the limiting variety, the argument need not be stated here in such a form. The inference derived from the theorem is that, *ceteris paribus, the greater the discrepancy between μ_1 and μ_2, the less a minority party should favor government by simple majority rule.*

Among the *ceteris paribus* conditions, however, are two important parameters of $f_1(x)$ and $f_2(x)$—their variances. Considering the usual case in which overlap exists between the two densities, and assuming that the densities are normal or multivariate normal, it is possible to obtain some mathematically rigorous results. Assume that the preferences of the second party are more dispersed (in the sense that its members represent a "wider range" of opinion) than are the preferences of the first party. Two such distributions are represented for the unidimensional case in Figure 12.

Under these circumstances a necessary condition for the second candidate to win is that it be the majority party. Thus, a "dispersed" minority party, one which encompasses a much wider range of opinion than the majority party, cannot receive a positive plurality. An obvious corollary to this theorem is that *minority parties can win elections. Their chances increase, furthermore, as the range of opinion of their membership diminishes, ceteris paribus, relative to the dispersion of the opposition.* In the situation depicted in Figure 12 the first party, assumed to be a minority, might win, since the variance of $f_1(x)$ around μ_1 is considerably less than the variance of $f_2(x)$ around μ_2. The discrepancy implies that the first party attracts more votes from the opposition than it loses from defections of its own membership. This point is intuitively satisfying and is useful for interpreting the efforts of minority parties to enforce a singleness of purpose and ideology in countries holding meaningful elections.

The preceding analysis assumes that each candidate adopts the mean vector of his party as his position in the general election. Obviously parties should not seek to constrain their nominees to strategies reflecting solely the preferences of party activists. Otherwise, movement toward the mean of the opposition party, which might increase a candidate's probability of winning, is prohibited. This reasoning suggests an interesting conflict. The minority party has the most to gain by permitting its candidates to diverge from the party's preference, but it must work hard toward retaining its singleness of purpose. The internal tension of minority parties, therefore, is the tempering of ideological purity with the necessity of nominating viable candidates. The majority party, on the other hand has less to gain by permitting its candidates to diverge from the preferences of the party, but it is less concerned with its ideological purity. The internal tension of majority parties, therefore, is the necessity for selecting among an abundance of viable candidates on the basis of some criterion other than ideology.

VI. FROM THEORY TO THE REAL WORLD

Our definition of party structure undoubtedly abstracts many interesting and important distinctions between minority and majority parties, as well as the pervasive conflicts within such organizations. This is, of course, a feature of all theories. Abstractness is not an evil nor can it be avoided in the development of any science. The relevant question is whether we have deduced an empirically valid and meaningful situation or whether we have provided only an insight into the logical equivalences of a mathematical structure which bears little relevance to actual campaigns. Political scientists should not be concerned *per se* with insights into a mathematical structure. They *should* be concerned with the relevance of such a structure to exceedingly complex processes. Hence, the correspondences between the real world and our model require identification, and it is these correspondences which should be considered.



FIG. 12

Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem is an example of the properties of an abstract analysis and its relation to the real world. In section 2 the paradox implied by this theorem is illustrated with a relatively simple situation consisting of three citizens, with unambiguously identified preference orderings over three alternatives, and a predetermined decision rule. One concludes from that illustration that the possibility of intransitive social preference is a pervasive feature of all collective decision-making situations. More importantly, Arrow's analysis consists of ascertaining the logical consequences of certain assumptions—*assumptions which do not begin to encompass the complexity of social processes.* We regard his General Impossibility Theorem as a relevant consideration in all such processes, though, because we believe that he abstracts from these processes certain fundamental characteristics. Our model, like Arrow's, should not be interpreted as a *description* of the electoral process, but as an *abstraction* of characteristics which seem fundamental and pervasive in electoral processes.

Despite such conditional statements, some scholars discount a model's value if its assumptions seem naive and unrealistic or if the opportunities for empirical analysis and further development are obscure. These conclusions about a model's assumptions, however, often are the result of two factors which, if recognized, can render the assumptions more palatable. First, there may be an unintentional resistance either to conceptualizing (perhaps diverse) empirical phenomena in terms of a model's parameters or to reinterpreting these parameters. Second, an assumption's suitability may be disputed because of a confusion between the properties of an adequate theory and the properties of a description of reality in terms of the theory.

As an example of the first factor, consider Downs's assumption that competition consists of parties presenting alternative ideological positions to the electorate. Obviously, a party is a complex and heterogeneous organization, and no single point on a scale is an adequate description of its campaign behavior. Thus, Downs abstracts from his analysis a pervasive and important feature of elections. If this assumption seems to be essential for spatial analysis, and if weakening it is a formidable task, we might reject spatial analysis. But if we represent reality as competition between candidates (individuals) and change Downs's label from "party" to "candidate" we increase somewhat the promise of his approach. A party can be interpreted then as a density of individual preferences which constrain the positions candidates adopt in the general elections.[35] Hence, a seemingly naive assumption becomes less objectionable by a simple reinterpretation of its content.

As a second example of the first factor, consider our multidimensional model. A common criticism of spatial analysis is that many citizens do not evaluate candidates on the basis of "issues", since voters' preferences are explained by partisan bias or the candidates' images. Some scholars conclude, therefore, that spatial models of competition are wholly inappropriate for understanding elections. Nevertheless, one can argue that partisan identification or candidate "image" can be conceptualized not simply as biases or new parameters but as additional preference dimensions (i.e., elements in each citizen's x vector). Thus, while additional measurement problems require consideration, we can at least reinterpret our data so that no new theoretical variables are required.

As a final example of the first factor, consider the observation that many citizens do more than simply vote in an election—many people contribute time and financial resources to one candidate or to the other. Much of a candidate's energies, moreover, are directed towards such citizens because their support is worth more than an equal number of citizens who contribute only their vote. Thus, spatial models might be construed to be inappropriate for understanding this vital aspect of elections. If we interpret voting as *only* one kind of political participation, however, and if we assume, by an appropriate redefinition of the terms in equation (7), that R is the utility a citizen derives from participating in some specified manner, we may interpret our results as the strategies candidates should adopt if they seek to maximize their plurality of any measure of participation. Thus, if we employ the assumption that variations in alternative forms of political participation can be explained by an equivalent calculus we can extend our analysis to the competition for these forms of support.

Reconceptualization also increases opportunities for testing the model. It may be difficult to measure adequately many parameters of a citizen's calculus in mass electorates; factors which we abstract out of the real world (e.g., uncertainty) may confound testability. Our sources of data, though, need not be confined to mass electorates. If we allow the generalization concerning participation, for example, we can focus on citizens who might contribute money. And if the model supplies a satisfactory explanation for such people's actions then we have some confidence that the model is useful for discussing other forms of participation. Citizens comprising this restricted data base, furthermore, should have more information concerning the candidates' strategies, and their own preferences. Some of our ideal-type assumptions thereby are renered more consonant with our view of reality.

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[35] See Peter H. Aranson and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Spatial Strategies for Sequential Elections," (forthcoming); and R. G. Niemi and H. F. Weisberg, *Probability Models in Political Science.*

Nevertheless, reconceptualization cannot account for other phenomena, such as the degree of uncertainty citizens associate with a candidate's strategy. Obviously, citizens associate some uncertainty with each element of θ_j, and candidates manipulate the stochastic properties of these elements as a strategic alternative to varying spatial location. Because we explicitly assume that θ_j is deterministic, we cannot consider such strategies presently. A fundamental variation in our assumption is necessary, then, if we wish to incorporate uncertainty into the analysis.

Reconceptualization, moreover, cannot diminish the difference in complexity between our theorems about elections and the real elections themselves. What is a candidate's optimal strategy, for example, when he and his opponent seek *both* votes and finances, when the subset of voter and financial contributors overlap, when the concerns of both subsets overlap, and when the candidates eventually hope to convert dollars into votes? If one assumes that competition occurs between candidates and not parties, as another example, what is the proper role of parties and party structures in a spatial model? Thus, even reconceptualization cannot now include many important elements of elections such as uncertainty, cognitive dissonance, misperception, and the strategies of varying uncertainty and issue saliency. Therefore, one must evaluate the adequacy of spatial models from the perspective of these omissions.

This evaluation entails clarification of a confusion which plagues political research, and which is the second factor accounting for the charge of naivete or unrealism of assumptions. Political scientists commonly confuse the desirable properties of a deductive theory with the properties of an adequate description of reality in terms of such a theory.[36] Theory construction consists of formulating general sentences about reality. The general sentences of one or more theories may be applied to particular classes of real world situations. Thus, science proposes no general "theory of falling feathers," for example, which attempts to predict every twist and turn of a feather's flight. One the other hand, one might attempt to fully explain and predict a feather's path if the environmental conditions are well specified, and if sufficient computer resources are available; and such an effort would undoubtedly utilize existing theory. Nevertheless, the fact that parsimonious propositions about falling feathers cannot be constructed is not interpreted as an inadequacy of Newtonian physics.

For identical reasons, political scientists should not expect theories from which we deduce directly all relevant or interesting aspects of reality. Instead we must differentiate between the process of constructing theories and that of applying them. This distinction necessarily entails differentiating between those facets of reality which we do not conceptualize as elements of our theory and those elements which are simple complex combinations of laws we understand theoretically.

Consider, for example, our assumption that all citizens weight the issues in an identical fashion (or our weaker assumption that these weights are distributed independently of preference). Obviously, this assumption is not satisfied generally. Hence, the critic might reject our analysis or demand that such an assumption be removed. If we remove it, however, no general sentences may be forthcoming —the situation appears to be entirely too unstructured for the construction of law-like generalizations, although our perception may or may not be correct. We can suggest, however, a strategy for empirical research about the positions which candidates are likely to adopt: (1) decompose the electorate into subgroups such that for each subgroup one reasonably might anticipate compliance with the independence assumption (e.g., Pool *et al's* categories);[37] (2) assuming that, for each subgroup, preferences are distributed symmetrically and unimodally, ascertain the mean preference vector of each such group; (3) for each candidate, ascertain those subgroups he is unlikely or unwilling to satisfy under any circumstances; (4) for each candidate, ascertain those subgroups he is likely to satisfy under any circumstance, and; (5) for the remaining (i.e., pivotal) subgroups find some strategy vector which comes closest to the aggregate mean preferences of these groups. This latter step, admittedly, is ambiguous, and it suggests employing devices such as ascertaining an optimal strategy by trial and error in simulated campaigns.

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[36] For our use of the word *theory* see Carl G. Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966). See also, Otto A. Davis, "Notes on Strategy and Methodology for a Scientific Political Science," J. Bernd (ed.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, IV* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1969).

[37] Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson, and Samuel Popkin, *Candidates, Issues, and Strategies* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964).

A second example in which we might combine productively techniques of application such as simulation with abstract theoretical principles concerns the potential conflict between the policy preferences of activists and those of voters.[38] By activists, we mean those citizens who, in addition to their vote, contribute valuable resources, such as finances or a party's nomination, to a candidate. Candidates must accord these citizens additional consideration when formulating strategies. Generally, however, the means of the preference densities of the activists and of the mass electorate do not coincide, so the candidate somehow must compromise his strategies. He might, for instance, attempt simply to assign a weight to each citizen's preference on the basis of the citizen's value, ascertain the mean preference of the weighted population, and adopt this mean. But such *ad hoc* procedures require additional justification. A citizen's value is likely to be a function of the particular resource he contributes, the amount he contributes, and the candidate's opportunities for utilizing this resource—all of which may be functions of the candidate's present strategy which, in turn, is a function of the citizen's value and the weight the candidate assigns him. Within such cyclical relationships we can suggest a few factors candidates must consider (and which we must consider when testing spatial models):

1. the resources various groups of activists can contribute,
2. the preference density of each group and of the mass electorate,
3. the patterns of issue saliency within each group and within the mass electorate,
4. the opportunities for converting each resource into votes.
5. the tradeoffs between resources necessitated by conflicting policy preferences.

This list illustrates only some of the complexity of electoral processes. A deductive approach may be suited to analyzing abstractly the opportunities for converting resources such as finances into resources such as votes and the tradeoffs between resource procurement necessitated by conflicting policy preferences.[39] Candidates, moreover, probably employ simplifying decision rules. But elections are far more complex than falling feathers, so political scientists must be cognizant of the distinction between the processes of constructing theories and those of applying them in particular instances. The important problem is determining what aspects of electoral behavior are amenable to parsimonious deductive examination and what aspects are not susceptible to the development of law-like propositions.

Definitive answers to such questions, of course, are difficult to ascertain, and the absence of adequate research about even a few of the factors we illustrate lessens the value of speculation. Nevertheless, we propose to identify some areas in which a deductive approach (theory *qua* science) might best be applied and some in which a less deductive approach might be more suitable. First, it seems reasonable to suppose that uncertainty can be introduced into the model if we let either the citizens' preference vectors, x, or the candidates' strategy vectors, θ_1 and θ_2, be random variables.[40] Thus, we might examine the strategy of varying the uncertainty associated with a candidate's position and thereby consider situations in which an incumbent's position is known (because his position is the policies he supports while in office) and his opponent's position is a matter for speculation. Similarly, we should be able to construct general propositions concerning the strategy of varying the relative saliencies of issues, and to contrast the efficacy of each strategy—varying uncertainty, saliency, and spatial location.

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[38] Some practitioners of simulation methods might object to our removing simulations from the class of deductive scientific theories. We agree with Hayward R. Alker's observation that the logical operations of computer simulations are deductive ("Computer Simulation, Conceptual Frameworks and Coalition Behavior," in S. Groennings, et. al. (eds.), *The Study of Coalition Behavior*, forthcoming). But Alker's assertion constitutes a serious confusion of the use of deduction as a method of science with the notion of a deductive theory. In the first usage a deduction is the process of inference from general statements to concrete instances. Thus, one infers that, if all α are β, then a particular α is a β. In the second usage, deduction is the process of inference from general sentence to general sentence. Thus, one infers that if all α are β and if all β are α, then α is equivalent to β. The first kind of deduction is used in fitting models to reality, and, where analysis is complex, is the proper function of stimulations; the second constitutes finding necessary and sufficient relations (i.e., cause) and is the proper domain of abstract mathematics. See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, "Realities, Assumptions, and Simulations," in William D. Coplin (ed.), *Simulation in the Study of Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1968), and Charles A. Powell's review of Coplin's book, this REVIEW, LXIII (September 1969), p. 937. Perhaps the most fruitful attempt at applying in concert simulation and the generalizations of game theory and coalition theory, and the one which comports with our understanding of the proper uses of simulation—is presented in Coplin's volume by Howard Rosenthal in "Voting and Coalition Models in Election Simulations."

[39] See Gerald Kramer, "A Decision-Theoretic Analysis of a Problem in Political Campaigning," in J. L. Bernd (ed.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science II* (Dallas: Arnold Foundation, SMU Press, 1966).

A citizen's cognitive processes, however, are undoubtedly less amenable to such aggregate analysis, and approaches similar to those which McPhee suggests may be more appropriate.[41] We might incorporate the effects of cognitive dissonance in a deductive analysis, for example, by assuming that the candidates' strategies are restricted and that these restrictions are mathematical functions of issue saliency. As with our assumption concerning a common pattern of saliency, however, an analysis of cognitive dissonance and its effects in heterogeneous electorates may not be susceptible to the development of general law-like propositions.

The inherent limitations of theories also should be kept in mind when analyzing situations in which no dominant position exists. We note previously that dominant positions do not exist for most preference densities—even for idealized situations. So we propose in section 4 a general bound on acceptable strategies for any density, and our analysis of symmetric densities suggests that strategies near or at the median are powerful attractions for candidates in less restricted circumstances. The strategies candidates really do adopt if no dominant position exists, however, are at present a function of factors which are not included in our model. It is reasonable to suppose that some of these factors, such as restrictions on spatial location and the candidates' reaction paths, can be incorporated rigorously into the model. Other factors, such as miscalculation, probably must remain external.

Obviously one can imagine many additional extensions and inherent limitations of our model. We offer these suggestions as an alternative to a banal call for further research and the observation that people develop theory slowly and incrementally. Instead, we identify some extensions which we are currently researching, and we offer some notes of caution to others who seek to develop deductive political theories. These notes of caution are relevant also to those who might attempt to test some of our conclusions or who might attempt naively to draw inferences from the model about reality. One cannot, for example, conclude that two candidates should converge whenever polls reveal that preferences are distributed unimodally. The underlying distribution of activists' preferences may be bimodal and the support of these activists may be essential. If this is the case, it would be unwise for either candidate to set his position equal to the median because to do so would be to alienate this support. Additional complications are easily imagined. Hence, those who would test and develop a theory—as well as those who would criticize it—must recognize the distinction between features of politics which are expressions of general theoretical propositions and those which are complex combinations of these propositions.

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[40] For a unidimensional spatial analysis of uncertainty see Kenneth Shepsle, "Essays on Risky Choice in Electoral Competition," (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of Rochester, 1970).

[41] William N. McPhee, *Formal Theories of Mass Behavior* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 40.

AN AXIOMATIC MODEL OF VOTING BODIES*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The act of voting in legislative and judicial bodies is one of the most widespread and valuable sources of information available to political analysts. When individuals make structured choices within some known institutional constraints, there is opportunity for the generation of data concerning how issues are collectively defined within an institution, the relative position of each actor with regard to every other actor, and the identification of blocs of actors which are more or less persistent from one issue to another over time. With proper techniques of analysis, we should be able not only to generalize about behavior within a given voting body but also to make general statements about the voting process.

Cumulative studies of voting can be undertaken, however, only on the basis of some paradigm of the voting process—that is, some consensus on how voting as an act of political commitment is to be viewed.[1] Such a paradigm not only should provide a viewpoint for the study of voting but should also suggest an orientation to the more general political phenomenon of which voting is an example—that is, actors making mutually exclusive choices in response to a series of questions, issues, candidates, etc. That such an agreed-upon viewpoint—not to mention a model that gives the viewpoint a precise focus—does not exist is obvious from the uses which have been made of voting data.[2] Despite the ubiquity of such data and the many different kinds of analyses that have been performed on them,[3] there is no model available that logically interrelates (1) systemic characteristics of voting bodies, (2) individual characteristics of their members, and (3) relational characteristics between pairs of members in such a way as to yield operational measures of voting behavior that are comparative in nature. This lack of a model seems to us the basic reason why there are so many quantitative indicators of voting behavior and so few comparable results. More often than not, the indicators used by analysts are "interesting" measures that are unrelated to a set of explicit definitions and assumptions about voting behavior and therefore incapable of rigorous

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[1] We use the term "paradigm" to indicate the generally accepted assumptions, concepts, and techniques used by members working in a particular field or on a particular problem, but not necessarily accepted by, or relevant to, all members of a discipline like political science. See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), esp. pp. 49ff.

[2] We use the term "model" to mean both (1) an *arithmetical representation* of empirical phenomena, characterized by a set of tautological or logically true statements to which we shall coordinate descriptive concepts (e.g., Agreement Level, Variance Level, etc.), and (2) a *formalization* achieved by replacing descriptive concepts with symbols that facilitate the deduction of theorems. For an explication of these different meanings of the term "model," see May Brodbeck, "Models, Meaning, and Theories," in her *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968), esp. pp. 588–597.

[3] For a useful survey of different methods that have been used to analyze roll-call data, see Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, *Legislative Roll-Call Analysis* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966). See also Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting: Methods of Statistical Analysis* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970) for a careful and sustematic review of the statistical literature relevant to roll-call analysis.

comparison with indicators used by other analysts.

In this article we hope to do more than continue the proliferation of *ad hoc* indicators of voting behavior. What we shall propose is a probabilistic model which can be applied to voting data in order to develop a set of *a posteriori* probabilities[4] that two randomly-selected members of a voting body agree on zero or more roll calls. These probabilities will allow us to calculate the expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members agree, which is the basic measure we shall use to define operationally a set of empirical indicators of (1) agreement and variance in voting for the body as a whole, and (2) relative agreement between pairs of members. Additionally, we shall define a somewhat independent probabilistic indicator for individual members that measures the extent to which a member supports the position of the majority, or other specified members, of the body.

These indicators are all comparative in the sense of being applicable to voting bodies of any size whose members take any number of different positions on a roll-call vote. Although we shall develop our indicators in terms of three different kinds of votes ("yes," "no," and "abstain"), they can easily be extended to any number of options which seem appropriate under a particular voting procedure.[5] Previous studies have been bedeviled with the problem of how to deal with more than two voting options, and all techniques so far suggested have been in our view unnecessarily arbitrary.

To begin our analysis, we shall develop a mathematical model, based on probability theory[6] and using some calculus, that conceptualizes voting as a mapping of a set of members of a voting body into a set of voting options. From this abstract representation of the voting process, we can determine the numbers of members who voted in particular ways, which will serve as the basic parameters of the model.

The next step in the process of formalizing our model is to relate these parameters, or certain quantities based on the parameters, to each other through a set of assumptions (or axioms). The purpose of this *axiomatization* is to provide a starting point, in the form of an economical and self-contained set of elements and relations, from which we can efficiently generate a rich array of theorems that lay bare the concepts we define and logical connections among them. Defining concepts and proving theorems that help us to simplify and interrelate the concepts, and discover implications of the axioms, is the final step in the *mathematization* of the model, the product of which is a *deductive system* tied directly to reality only through its parameters and axioms. It is the concepts derived from the parameters and the theorems deduced from the axioms in the system, however, that are of greatest interest to us: the concepts provide us with our different measures of voting behavior, and the theorems help us to explicate their underlying logic, with the proofs providing a check on the correctness of our reasoning. In the absence of the logical structure that the system provides, one can easily run amok on a set of ambiguous concepts and inconsistent propositions, which are some of the difficulties that have beset other studies of voting bodies.

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[4] As distinguished from *a priori* probabilities based strictly on the outcomes of a conceptual experiment. Although we shall present in the beginning an abstract model of the outcomes of a voting experiment, we wish to differentiate this kind of model, whose probabilities depend on the actual voting of members of a body, from models in which the probabilities arise from the institutional prerogatives of the members (i.e., the "voting rules" of the system). For an example of the latter kind of model, see L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this REVIEW, XLIII (1954), 787–792; for an example of the kind of model used in this article that is based on the distribution of different kinds of votes, see William H. Riker, "A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies," in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau (eds.), *Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Research and Theory* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), pp. 377–384. It should be noted that the distinction we draw between *a priori* and *a posteriori* probabilities is quite different from that made in applications of Bayes' theorem. Cf. Peter W. Zehna, *Finite Probability* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), pp. 47–50.

[5] We have chosen to develop our model in terms of three kinds of votes instead of two since abstention is a frequently chosen voting option in some bodies (e.g., UN General Assembly, whose roll calls for several sessions we are now analyzing using the indicators of the model).

[6] An excellent reference is William Feller, *An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications*, Vol. I (3d ed. rev.; New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968); at a less advanced level, see John G. Kemeny, J. Laurie Snell, and Gerald L. Thompson, *Introduction to Finite Mathematics* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), chpts. 3 and 4.

The antecedent of the mathematical model is the mathematical theory on which it is based, the parameters of the model being an *interpretation* of the primitive, or undefined, terms in the theory. We have endeavored to provide not only the primitive terms with an interpretation in the context of voting bodies but the axioms, derived concepts, and proved theorems as well. Also, we have sought to give the model a concrete *operational* meaning by showing how the various measures developed in the model can be computed for a hypothetical voting body.

Because the approach we have taken to model-building is still unorthodox in political science[7] (though its usefulness has recently been debated[8]), and because we do not want our purposes misunderstood, two points need to be stressed at the outset. First, our model, like verbal models, is an abstraction, or idealization, of reality that may or may not be regarded as fruitful in the building of empirical theory. Because it is *not* such theory, it is neither correct nor incorrect, true or false. Rather, through its assumptions the model provides a representation of the behavior of members of a voting body, just as a plane in Euclidean geometry may be used to represent any real portion of the earth's surface.[9] We can only hope at this stage that the model will give some logical coherence to the study of voting bodies and that some of the major concepts developed in the model may prove useful in the testing of hypotheses about the voting process. Toward realizing the latter aim, we shall give some examples later in the paper of testable hypotheses that incorporate concepts from the model, buttressed by some preliminary empirical results on the application of the model to both voting bodies (U.S. House of Representatives, national party conventions) and nonvoting data (wartime alliances in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).

Second, in our effort to make the exposition of the formal model as intelligible as possible, we have steered away from a heavy use of symbolism and strayed somewhat from a strict adherence to the stern canons of mathematical rigor and logical proof. We have, for example, tried to show that the parameters and axioms in our axiomatization are reasonable and useful (in general, there is more than one way to axiomatize a model), if not always "realistic," but not that they constitute an irreducible set (i.e., are logically independent). In fact, we have not even tried to enumerate all the definitions and assumptions of probability theory underpinning our axiomatization, but the mathematically inclined reader can easily fill in the gaps. We have not generalized our theorems to a voting body with more than three voting options, though in most cases the extensions are obvious. In the interest of economy, we have assumed without proof the properties of such well-known statistical measures as the mathematical expectation and variance and, in addition, have not included in this article the fairly long proofs of two theorems, though we will be glad to make these proofs available to anyone interested in them on request. Furthermore, so as not to clutter up the paper with innumerable, separately-stated "definitions," we have defined minor concepts which facilitate further description of aspects of a voting body in the statement of theorems. Thus, in building a model that might appropriately be regarded as "semi-formal," we have ignored some of the strictures of the axiomatic method and instead tried to highlight the intuitive rationale of the

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[7] Pioneering works by economists, relevant to political science, that employ the axiomatic approach include Kenneth J. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1951); Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957); Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1958); and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962). Major works by political scientists using this general approach, though with rather different specific emphases, are Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957); and William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962).

[8] See the "Symposium on Scientific Explanation in Political Science" between John G. Gunnell and Arthur S. Goldberg and A. James Gregor, this Review, LXVIII (Dec. 1969), 1233–1262.

[9] For a brief history of the axiomatization of geometry, see Herbert Hochberg, "Axiomatic Systems, Formalization, and Scientific Theories," in Llewellyn Gross (ed.), *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 419–422.

FIGURE 1

MAPPING OF MEMBERS INTO VOTING OPTIONS



FIG. 1

formalization and illustrate with concrete examples the utility of the concepts developed in the model.

II. SOME FORMAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODEL

Preliminaries. We start with the notion of a set, or voting body, containing a finite number of members. "Voting body" is a primitive term to which we can add the relational concept of a "vote on a roll call" as a mapping of members of a voting body into (but not necessarily onto) a "set of voting options" containing, for example, the members "yes," "no," and "abstain." The idea of a *mapping*, which relates the members of two different sets to each other in a particular way, is a fundamental one in mathematics, but for our purposes it is only necessary to to consider the results of the mapping (voting process). That is, on each roll-call vote the usual many-to-one correspondence established between the *domain*, or set of members of the voting body, and the *range*, or set of different voting options, partitions the domain into *preimages*, or subsets whose members voted in a particular way. Conversely, the mapping associates with each preimage a unique *image* (voting option), as shown in Figure 1.

Given three kinds of voting options in a voting body—"yes," "no," and "abstain"—the parameters (or variables) of the model for each roll-call vote are the numbers of members in each of the preimages:

$y \equiv$ numbers of members who vote "yes" on the roll call,
$n \equiv$ numbers of members who vote "no" on the roll call,
$a \equiv$ number of members who vote "abstain" on the roll call.

The total number of members present and voting on each roll call is

$$t \equiv y + n + a.$$

Interrelating these parameters through the axioms of our model will be the means by which we impose a *logical structure* on the voting of members in a voting body.

Definition 1. The probability that two *randomly-selected* members i and j agree on a roll call, $P(AG_{ij})$, is equal to the probability that both vote "yes," $P(Y_i, Y_j)$, both vote "no," $P(N_i, N_j)$, or both "abstain," $P(A_i, A_j)$:

$$P(AG_{ij}) = P(Y_i, Y_j) + P(N_i, N_j) + P(A_i, A_j). \tag{1}$$

Since the values of each of the three terms on the right-hand side of equation (1) are

$$P(Y_i, Y_j) = \frac{\binom{y}{2}}{\binom{t}{2}} = \frac{y!}{2!(y-2)!} \cdot \frac{2!(t-2)!}{t!} = \frac{y(y-1)}{t(t-1)},$$

$$P(N_i, N_j) = \frac{\binom{n}{2}}{\binom{t}{2}} = \frac{n!}{2!(n-2)!} \cdot \frac{2!(t-2)!}{t!} = \frac{n(n-1)}{t(t-1)},$$

$$P(A_i, A_j) = \frac{\binom{a}{2}}{\binom{t}{2}} = \frac{a!}{2!(a-2)!} \cdot \frac{2!(t-2)!}{t!} = \frac{a(a-1)}{t(t-1)},$$

where $\binom{m}{n}$ denotes the number of combinations that can be formed from m objects taken

n at a time, or $m!/n!(m-n)!$, equation (1) can also be written as[10]

$$P(AG_{ij}) = \frac{y(y-1)+n(n-1)+a(a-1)}{t(t-1)}.$$

Concretely, this measure may be interpreted as the ratio of the number of ways of choosing two members who voted the same way (without replacement of the first member before selection of the second) to the number of ways of choosing two members of the entire body (again without replacement). It is easy to show that $0 \leq P(AG_{ij}) \leq 1$.

Axiom 1. If $P(DG_{ij})$ is equal to the probability that two randomly-selected members i and j disagree on a roll call,

$$P(AG_{ij}) + P(DG_{ij}) = 1.$$

That is, it is a certainty that two randomly-selected members present and voting will either agree or disagree on a roll-call vote. More formally, we assume that the events "agree" and "disagree" are not only mutually exclusive (if one event occurs for a pair, then the other cannot) but exhaustive (no other event can occur).

Definition 2. $P(DG_{ij}) = 1 - P(AG_{ij})$.
The above follows immediately from Axiom 1 (i.e., $P(DG_{ij})$ is implicitly defined by Axiom 1). Alternatively, we can calculate $P(DG_{ij})$ from the formula,

$$P(DG_{ij}) = P(Y_{ij}, N_{ji}) + P(Y_{ij}, A_{ji}) + P(N_{ij}, A_{ji}), \tag{2}$$

where $P(Y_{ij}, N_{ji})$, for example, is equal to the probability that i votes "yes" and j votes "no" *or* j votes "yes" and i votes "no" (i.e., one member votes "yes" and the other votes "no," but it does not matter which one). In this case,

$$P(Y_{ij}, N_{ji}) = \frac{\binom{y}{1}\binom{n}{1}}{\binom{t}{2}} = \frac{y!n!}{(y-1)!(n-1)!} \cdot \frac{t!(t-2)!}{2!} = \frac{2yn}{t(t-1)},$$

and, after analogous calculations for the other two terms on the right-hand side of equation (2), we get[11]

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[10] Similar calculations could be made for the probability that blocs of three or more members agree on a particular roll call. For example, the probability that three randomly-selected members—p, q, and r—agree on a particular roll call is

$$P(AG_{pqr}) = \frac{y(y-1)(y-2)+n(n-1)(n-2)+a(a-1)(a-2)}{t(t-1)(t-2)}.$$

For a discussion of the probability of bloc voting under varying assumptions, see Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," this REVIEW, LVII (Dec. 1963), 906–908.

[11] The probability of paired disagreements, based on the party affiliations of members rather than their actual votes on roll calls, is what Douglas W. Rae calls the "fractionalization" of seat shares in a parliamentary body. His probability calculations are valid, however, only for a body that approaches infinite size in which, having chosen one member of the body, the probability of choosing another member of the same (or a different) party is unaltered by the fact that there is one less member of the body (and the party, if it were that made on the previous choice) from which the second choice can be made. Since we are dealing with bodies of finite size, Rae's assumption of sampling with replacement is untenable and we must instead assume sampling without replacement in calculating these probabilities. Fortunately, the practical difference between these two assumptions is small except when the fractionalization index is applied to small voting bodies, so most of Rae's empirical results on fractionalization probably remain unaffected by his erroneous calculations. See *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 62ff. We shall see later that the size of a voting body will affect the probability that two randomly-selected members agree (or disagree), which Rae did recognize in a subsequent article, "A Note on the Fractionalization of Some European Party Systems," *Comparative Political Studies*, I (Oct. 1968), 413–418. For a generalization of the fractionalization index to the study of political cleavages, see Michael Taylor and Douglas Rae, "An Analysis of Crosscutting between Political Cleavages," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (July 1969), 534–547; and Rae and Taylor, *On Political Cleavages*, forthcoming. An ingenious index, A_{ij}, developed by Duncan MacRae, Jr., for measuring agreement between two specific members of a voting body, has a probabilistic interpretation for bodies that approach infinite size in which two voting options are allowed: when two members agree, A_{ij} is equal to the probability of two randomly-selected members' taking the contrary position; when two members disagree, A_{ij} is equal to one-half the negative value of the probability of two randomly-selected members' taking different positions. These curious values have substantive implications which, as S. Sidney Ulmer has shown, are not justified by any explicit theoretical framework. See Duncan MacRae, Jr., "Indices of Pairwise Agreement Between Justices or Legislators,"

$$P(DG_{ij}) = \frac{2(yn + ya + na)}{t(t-1)},$$
$$\text{where} \quad 0 \leqq P(DG_{ij}) \leqq 1.$$

Axiom 2. The probability of agreement of two randomly-selected members on a roll call(s) is statistically independent of the probability of agreement on any other roll call(s). More formally, the number of agreements of two randomly-selected members on each roll call (0 or 1) are mutually independent random variables.[12]

This is a somewhat controversial axiom and deserves clarification. For the case when one member agrees to support another member in exchange for that member's vote at another time, it is evident that Axiom 2 is violated because the probability of agreement of the pair on one roll call is completely determined by their probability of agreement on the other roll call. It is doubtful, however, that of all possible pairs of members in a legislative or judicial body, the voting of a significant fraction of them is governed by pairwise pledges of support on most roll calls.

Variables exogeneous to the model, like party membership, may upset the independence axiom in a more serious way. In the extreme case of a legislature whose parties exercise complete discipline over the voting of their members, membership in a party is tantamount to pairwise pledges to vote with each other member of the party on all roll calls, which clearly violates Axiom 2. In fact, any forces impinging on the members of a legislature that induce a subset of members to vote consistently the same way (e.g., because they are from the same geographic region) introduces a steady bias in voting that does violence to Axiom 2. Thus, though a particular vote on one roll call does not *logically* imply a particular vote on another roll call, two voters may decide to vote together because of reciprocal pledges to each other or blanket pledges to party, region, etc. To the extent that a member's affiliations are cross-cutting (e.g., Republican party, urban black constituency), his commitment to any particular subset of members will tend to be eroded and blanket pledges of support will less certainly be translated into pairwise pledges. In fact, it seems reasonable to assume that the greater the number of cross-cutting affiliations of members of a legislature, the lower the probability that they will vote consistently with any one subset of members and, therefore, the more applicable Axiom 2 will be to the body.

Even in the extreme case where a steady voting bias prevails (e.g., because of strict party discipline) that is incompatible with Axiom 2, this does not make the definitions and theorems flowing from this axiom irrelevant or useless. In fact, the probabilities we shall give below in Theorems 1 and 1a may be strictly mythical in the sense that they do not reflect the voting of *any* pair of members. For example, if members vote strictly along party lines in a legislature containing two parties always at odds with each other, each member will agree with every other member with either probability 0 or 1 across a set of roll calls—and not some intermediate value which our calculation below will produce.[13]

The probabilities we shall give below apply to bodies whose pairs of members vote *as if* their probabilities of agreement were statistically independent across successive roll calls. What this involves is translating the deterministic fact that every voter unmistakably agreed or disagreed with all other voters on each roll call into a probabilistic statement for a hypothetical "average" pair.[14] Thus, what we are really conjuring up in this conceptual experiment are two mythical voters whose probability of agreement reflects the amount of agreement between a "typical" pair of members of the body. The behavior of actual voters will be compatible with Axiom 2 to the degree

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Midwest Journal of Political Science, X (Feb., 1966), 138–141; and S. Sidney Ulmer, "Pairwise Association of Judges and Legislators: Further Reflections," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XI (Feb. 1967), 106–115. The inattention of analysts to the theoretical justification of quantitative indices underscores our previous argument of the need for deriving indices from models with clearly-articulated assumptions about the voting process.

[12] Cf. the "axiom of local independence" in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Neil W. Henry, *Latent Structure Analysis* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968), p. 22.

[13] What we have specified are, in effect, the "limiting conditions" on the veracity of this axiom. See Herbert A. Simon, "On Judging the Plausibility of Theories," in B. van Rootselar and J. F. Staal (eds.), *Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Sciences III* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 442ff.

[14] For examples in mathematics and physics where "the determinateness of the simple single event and the probabilistic theory of the highly composite whole may seem to be equally compatible . . .," see G. Polya, *Patterns of Plausible Inference* (2d ed.; Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 194, ftn. 3.

that their voting corresponds to that of the fictitious "typical" pair.

While this "typical" pair may not exist, it is precisely this kind of construct we are searching for in order to say something about how members of a body behave "on the average," just as the actuary is interested in describing the "typical" individual's chances of surviving "on the average." As Feller put it, "Practical and *useful probability models may refer to nonobservable worlds*,"[15] which sometimes can only be built on a structure of "unrealistic" assumptions (in the mortality tables of the actuary, everyone is dead at age 100). Milton Friedman described the role assumptions play in theory-building as follows:

> Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have 'assumptions' that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions. . . . The reason is simple. A hypothesis is important if it 'explains' much by little, that is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained. . . . Its very success shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained.[16]

The natural sciences have been built on a set of idealized situations (e.g., ideal gases, rigid rods, frictionless surfaces, perfect vacuums, and instantaneous velocities are all idealizations of physical states and objects) and "as if" assumptions, sometimes highly unrealistic, from which have been generated a set of nonobvious consequences possessing great explanatory power. To illustrate, Galileo's law of the inclined plane—that the distance traveled by a ball rolling down the plane increases with the square of time—

> . . . *does* ignore variables that may be important under various circumstances: irregularities in the plane or the ball, rolling friction, air resistance, possible electrical or magnetic fields if the ball is metal, variations in the gravitational field—and so on, *ad infinitum*. The enormous progress that physics has made in three centuries may be partly attributed to its willingness to ignore for a time discrepancies from theories that are in some sense substantially correct.[17]

Thus, assumptions (or axioms) are useful only because they *are* radical simplifications of the world.[18] What is at issue here is not the verisimilitude of our axioms but (1) whether concepts can be derived from the axioms that are descriptive of important aspects of voting bodies, and (2) whether nonobvious consequences linking these concepts, which are amenable to empirical validation, can be deduced from the axioms of the model. We shall return later to these considerations, as they apply to the model, but for now the adoption of Axiom 2 enables us to calculate the probability of agreement between two randomly-selected members i and j across a set of roll calls as simply the product of the (unconditional) probabilities of agreement on each roll call.

Theorem 1. The probability that two randomly-selected members i and j, present and voting[19] on m roll calls, agree all the time—on m out of m roll calls—is

$$P(AG_{ij})^{m,m} = P(AG_{ij})^1 P(AG_{ij})^2 \cdots P(AG_{ij})^m,$$

where the superscripted factors on the right-hand side of the equation indicate the probabilities of agreement of members i and j on all roll calls $1, 2, \cdots, m$, based on the actual number of "yes," "no," and "abstain" votes on each roll call.

Proof. Immediate consequence of Axiom 2.

Theorem 1a. This is a generalization of Theorem 1. The probability that two randomly-selected members i and j, present and voting on m roll calls,[20] agree on *exactly* k out of the m roll calls ($k \leq m$) is

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[15] Feller, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Italics in original.

[16] Milton Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 40–41. For a critique of this viewpoint, see Tjalling C. Koopmans, "The Construction of Economic Knowledge," in May Brodbeck (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 534–538.

[17] Yuji Iriji and Herbert A. Simon, "Business Firm Growth and Size," *American Economic Review*, LIV (March, 1964), 78. Italics in original. We owe this citation to Bruce M. Russett, "Is There a Long-Run Trend Toward Concentration in the International System?" in Russett (ed.), *Economic Theories of International Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968), p. 312.

[18] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realities, Assumptions, and Simulations," in William D. Coplin (ed.), *Simulation in the Study of Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968), p. 106.

[19] Later we shall consider various ways to include absentees in the analysis.

[20] For the special case in which the voting members of a body are the same across all roll calls, the probability that *at least one* of the $p = t(t-1)/2$ pairs of members agrees on all roll calls is

$$P(AG_{ij})^{m,k} = \sum_{\binom{m}{k}} [P(AG_{ij})^1 \cdots P(AG_{ij})^k P(DG_{ij})^{(k+1)} \cdots P(DG_{ij})^m].$$

Proof. Immediate consequence of Axiom 2.

The summation on the right-hand side of the above equation ranges over all combinations of m roll calls, $\binom{m}{k}$, on k of which members i and j agree and on $(m-k)$ of which members i and j disagree. The superscripts do not indicate particular roll calls but only the fact that in each term of the summation there must be k distinct roll calls on which members i and j agree and $(m-k)$ on which members i and j disagree. Since i and j may refer to any two randomly-selected members of the voting body, we can drop these subscripts and write the joint density (or mass) function of the probability distribution across m roll calls as follows:

$$f(m, k) = P(AG)^{m,k}$$

The key summation process of the model is embodied in the above theorems, which allow us to make probabilistic statements about agreement between members on more than one roll call. To calculate the probability, for example, that two randomly-selected members agree on two out of five roll calls, the summation on the right-hand side of the above equation would include $\binom{5}{2} = 10$ terms. Each of these terms would contain two factors equal to the probability of agreement on two specific roll calls (e.g., roll calls 1 and 2)—the two roll calls being different for each of the ten terms—and three factors equal to the probability of disagreement on the remaining three roll calls (e.g., roll calls 3, 4, and 5).

Definition 3. The probability that two randomly-selected members agree on *at most* k out of m roll calls (i.e., agree on 0 or 1 or . . . k roll calls) is the distribution function,

$$F(m, k) = \sum_{x=0}^{k} f(m, x) = \sum_{x=0}^{k} P(AG)^{m,x},$$

or the sum of the density function's images for all points $x = 0, 1, \ldots k$.

Definition 4. The probability that two randomly-selected members agree on *at least* k out of m roll calls (i.e., agree on k or $(k+1)$ or . . . m roll calls) is

$$G(m, k) = \sum_{x=k}^{m} f(m, x) = \sum_{x=k}^{m} P(AG)^{m,x}.$$

Definition 5. The expected (or average) number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members present and voting on m roll calls agree is

$$E(AG) = \sum_{x=0}^{m} xf(m, x) = \sum_{x=0}^{m} xP(AG)^{m,x}.$$

Theorem 2. The expected number of agreements for each roll call i is equal to the probability of agreement on each roll call i, i.e.,

$$E(AG)_i = P(AG)_i.$$

Proof. For any single roll call i, $m = 1$ in Definition 5. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} E(AG)_i &= \sum_{x=0}^{1} xP(AG)_i^{1,x} \\ &= (0)P(AG_i)^{1,0} + (1)P(AG)_i^{1,1} \\ &= P(AG_i)^{1,1} \\ &= P(AG)_i \qquad \text{from Theorem 1 or 1a.} \end{aligned}$$

Theorem 3. The expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members present and voting on m roll calls agree is equal to the sum of the probabilities of agreement on each of the m roll calls, i.e.,

$$E(AG) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} E(AG)_i = \sum_{i=1}^{m} P(AG)_i.$$

Proof. A well-known property of the mathematical expectation is that the expectation of the sum of a set of a random variables (whose values x on each roll call, given in the proof of Theorem 2, are equal to the number of agreements—0 or 1—for each pair) is equal to the sum of their expectations.[21] Since the expected number of agreements on each roll call i is equal to the probability of agreement on each roll call i from Theorem 2, it follows that the expected number of agreements across a set of m roll

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$$P(AG_{p \geq 1}) = 1 - [1 - P(AG_{ij})^{m,m}]^p,$$

since $[1 - P(AG_{ij})^{m,m}]$ is the probability that a randomly-selected pair of members disagrees on at least one roll call and $[1 - P(AG_{ij})^{m,m}]^p$ is the probability that all pairs of members disagree on at least one roll call. Furthermore, the number of pairs, p, such that the probability is $P(AG_{p \geq 1})$ that at least one of the pairs agrees on all roll calls is

$$p = \frac{\log [1 - P(AG_{p \geq 1})]}{\log [1 - P(AG_{ij})^{m,m}]},$$

since

$$[1 - P(AG_{p \geq 1})] = [1 - P(AG_{ij})^{m,m}]^p.$$

[21] This is true even if the random variables are not mutually independent, as assumed in Axiom 2. While this axiom is not necessary to the proof of Theorem 3, we shall see later that it will prove necessary to the proof of Theorem 8 in the summation of variance across roll calls.

calls, given in Definition 5, can be expressed more simply as the sum of the probabilities of agreement on each of the *m* roll calls.

We shall now postpone a further elaboration of the formal model in order to illustrate some of the concepts which have so far been defined and develop heuristically the rationale for some later theorems which incorporate these concepts. We shall then present further formal aspects of the model, attempting throughout, however, to interpret the theoretical consequences flowing from the model with more understandable intuitive justifications and appropriate examples.

III. AN ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION TO VOTING DATA

To show how the probabilities can be calculated from voting data, consider a voting body of five members whose votes on five roll calls are given in Table 1. The probabilities that two randonly-selected members agree, $P(AG)_i$, and disagree, $P(DG)_i$, are shown for each roll call i. Note that the probability of agreement is at a maximum when all members vote the same way (roll call 5) and at a minimum when the three kinds of votes are split 1-2-2 (roll call 2).

For all five roll calls, the probabilities, $f(5,k)$, that two randomly-selected members agree on zero through five roll calls are given in Table 2, along with the cumulative probabilities, $F(5,k)$ and $G(5,k)$, that two randomly-selected members agree on at most, or at least, zero through five roll calls. Graphs of the density and distribution functions are shown in Figure 2, with smooth curves drawn through the points given in Table 2. It can be seen that the votes of no two members agree on zero roll calls (i.e., disagree on all five roll calls), so the corresponding probability, $f(5,0)$, is necessarily equal to zero. The probability that two randomly-selected members agree on two or fewer roll calls is greater than one half ($F(5,2)=.57$), but the probability that two randomly-selected members agree on all five roll calls is very small ($f(5,5)=.01$). In fact, in the latter case a glance back at Table 1 will show that the votes of only members 1 and 2 coincide perfectly on all five roll calls.

TABLE 1.—PROBABILITIES OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT ON EACH ROLL CALL IN A HYPOTHETICAL VOTING BODY

Roll Call	Votes of Members					Probability of Agreement and Disagreement of Two Randomly-Selected Members on Each Roll Call i	
	1	2	3	4	5	$P(AG)_i$	$P(DG)_i$
$i=1$	Y	Y	N	Y	A	.3	.7
$i=2$	N	N	Y	A	A	.2	.8
$i=3$	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	.6	.4
$i=4$	N	N	Y	N	A	.3	.7
$i=5$	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	1.0	0.0

TABLE 2.—PROBABILITIES OF AGREEMENT ON FIVE ROLL CALLS IN HYPOTHETICAL VOTING BODY

Number of Roll Calls	Probabilities That Two Randomly-Selected Members Agree on		
	k $f(5, k)$	At most k $F(5, k)$	At least k $G(5, k)$
$k=0$	0.00	0.00	1.00
$k=1$	.16	.16	1.00
$k=2$	.41	.57	.84
$k=3$	.32	.89	.43
$k=4$	.10	.99	.11
$k=5$	.01	1.00	.01

What do these *a posteriori* probabilities tell us? First, they provide convenient summary indicators of agreement on roll calls that may be very helpful in measuring changes in the amount of agreement among members of a voting body over time. Not only are they useful for looking at the amount of agreement in a voting body as a whole, but they can also be applied to subsets of members (e.g., the members of a political party) to measure agreement within these subsets. For example, from Definition 5 the expected number of roll calls on which members 1 and 2 agree is

$$\begin{aligned} E(AG) &= 0f(5,0)+1f(5,1)+2f(5,2) \\ &\quad +3f(5,3)+4f(5,4)+5f(5,5) \\ &= 0+0+0+0+0+5(1.00) = 5.00, \end{aligned}$$

where the probability values for the first five terms on the right-hand side of the equation are all equal to zero. For members 3, 4, and 5, on the other hand, the expected number of agreements of two randomly-selected members is

$$\begin{aligned} E(AG) &= 0(0)+1(.45)+2(.44)+3(.11) \\ &\quad +4(0)+5(0) = 1.67. \end{aligned}$$

For all five members of the voting body,

$$\begin{aligned} E(AG) &= 0(0)+1(.16)+2(.41)+3(.32) \\ &\quad +4(.10)+5(.01) = 2.40. \end{aligned}$$

Alternatively, from Theorem 3 we could have summed the probabilities of agreement on each roll call to obtain the above values of $E(AG)$ for the body as a whole and the subsets. Note that

DENSITY AND DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS FOR HYPOTHETICAL VOTING BODY



Fig. 2

these are not necessarily values that we expect to observe, since we would never observe 1.67 or 2.40 agreements between a pair across a set of roll calls, but rather the over-all average number of agreements per pair in the subset or the body.

Thus, while members 1 and 2 can be expected to agree on 100 percent (five out of five) of the roll calls, two randomly-selected members of the subset comprising members 3, 4, and 5 can be expected to agree on 33 percent of the five roll calls and two randomly-selected members of the entire five-member body can be expected to agree on 48 percent of the five roll calls. The amount of agreement would therefore appear to be least in the subset containing members 3, 4, and 5.

Having made these calculations for subsets of different size, it might appear that we could compare the amount of agreement not only in such subsets but in voting bodies of different size as well. A quick calculation will show, however, that for a given distribution of yeas, nays, and abstentions in a voting body (say, in the proportion 3:2:1), the probability of agreement between two randomly-selected members on a roll call will be greater when there are more members (say, 60) so divided (30-20-10) than when there are fewer members (say, 6) so divided (3-2-1). In the latter case, the probability that two randomly-selected members agree is

$$P(AG) = \frac{3(2) + 2(1) + 1(0)}{6(5)} = .27,$$

while the probability in the former case is

$$P(AG) = \frac{30(29) + 20(19) + 10(9)}{60(59)} = .38.$$

We may formalize this result as

Theorem 4. As the size of a voting body, t, becomes larger and larger (with a constant distribution of votes),[22] the probability that two randomly-selected members agree on roll call i approaches the limit,

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} P(AG)_i = \frac{y^2 + n^2 + a^2}{t^2},$$

which in the case of the above distribution will be equal to

$$\frac{3^2 + 2^2 + 1^2}{6^2} = \frac{14}{36} = \frac{7}{18} = .39.$$

Proof. This involves proving that the function, $P(AG)_i$, for the limit postulated above, satisfies the definition of the limit of a function as $t \to \infty$. This proof is completely straightforward, though somewhat tedious, and will not be presented here.

IV. MEASURING AGREEMENT IN VOTING

Why is the probability of agreement between two randomly-selected members of large bodies necessarily greater than for small bodies? The reason for this surprising finding is that in larger bodies there are proportionally fewer pairs of members who can disagree. For a voting body consisting of only three members in which three kinds of votes are allowed, it is possible for all the members always to disagree on a roll call if one votes "yes," one "no," and one "abstain." If there are four members of a voting body, however, the votes of at least one pair of members must agree; and as the number of voting members increases, so does the *minimum number* of pairs that must agree. The *minimum proportion* of pairs that must agree, when the body is split as equally as possible among the different kinds of votes, is a nondecreasing (but not always increasing) function of the size of a voting body, as we see from the following theorem.

Theorem 5. In a body where the votes remain as equally divided as possible among the "yes," "no," and "abstain" positions, the proportion of agreeing pairs in the body will in-

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[22] If the distribution of votes does not remain constant and only some kinds of votes (say "yes" votes) tend toward infinity as the body becomes larger and larger, then $P(AG)$ will approach a different limit. For the case, for example, where only the "yes" votes approach infinity and the numbers of "no" and "abstain" votes remain finite as t increases,

$$\lim_{\substack{y \to \infty \\ t \to \infty}} P(AG) = \frac{y^2 + n(n-1) + a(a-1)}{t^2}.$$

crease as the number of members increases, except for the case where the size of the body increases from $(3n+2)$ to $3(n+1)$ members, where $n \geq 2$ (e.g., from 8 to 9 members); in this case where the membership increases to a multiple of 3, the proportion of pairs that agree in a body as equally divided as possible remains constant with increasing membership (e.g., 7/56 for 8 members equals 9/72 for 9 members). *Proof.* Available from the authors on request.

If the probability of agreement between two randomly-selected members for a given distribution of votes is greater in large bodies than in small bodies on each roll call, then the expected number of agreements between two randomly-selected members across a set of roll calls will also be greater in large bodies. This "bias toward agreement" in large bodies renders our previous measure of agreement—the expected number of agreements as a percentage of total possible agreements—incomparable in voting bodies of different size.

In order to make comparisons between voting bodies (or their subsets) of different size, we must be able to show how close the votes of members of a body approach "maximum disagreement" (or "minimum agreement") on a set of roll calls. The maxima for voting bodies of different size can then be used as a baseline against which to compare the relative closeness of different bodies to maximum division.

Theorem 6. *If three kinds of votes are allowed in a voting body, the probability that two randomly-selected members disagree on a roll call will be maximized when one-third of the members vote "yes," one-third "no," and one-third "abstain."*

Proof. This can be proved by showing that

$$P(DG) = \frac{2(yn + ya + na)}{t(t-1)} = \frac{2(yn + ya + na)}{(y + n + a)(y + n + a - 1)},$$

subject to the constraint,

$$t = y + n + a,$$

has an extreme value for

$$y = n = a = t/3.$$

This is easy to demonstrate using the Lagrange multiplier method. By finding partial derivatives of the function,

$$f(y, n, a, \lambda) = \frac{2(yn + ya + na)}{(y + n + a)(y + n + a - 1)} + \lambda(t - y - n - a),$$

with respect to the variables y, n, a, and λ, and setting them equal to zero,

$$f_y = f_n = f_a = f_\lambda = 0,$$

we can solve these four equations for y, n, and a (as well as the multiplier, λ), whose values are all equal to $t/3$. Since the bordered principal minors alternate in sign, the first being positive, the sufficient conditions for the extreme value to be a maximum are satisfied.[23]

When the number of members of a voting body is not exactly divisible by three, the probability of disagreement will be maximized when the addition or subtraction of one vote equalizes the yeas, nays, and abstentions. For example, in a 33-33-34 roll call in a 100-member body, the subtraction of one abstention would equalize the division, and thus such a vote would maximize the probability of disagreement between two randomly-selected members of the body.

For the two and three-member subsets in our hypothetical voting body, disagreement is at a maximum when each member votes differently from the other(s) on all roll calls. For such a distribution of votes, the probability that two randomly-selected members agree on one or more roll calls is equal to zero, and so, therefore, is the expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members agree.

The probability of disagreement for all five members of the voting body is maximized when two members vote one way, two another, and one the third way. Since two pairs of members must necessarily agree on each roll call in such a split, the expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members agree will therefore be greater than zero. In fact, for five roll calls the expected number on which two randomly-selected members agree is 1.00 when there is the above division among the five voting members on each roll call, as contrasted with an expected number of 5.00 if all five members vote the same way on each roll call. Since the expected number in our hypothetical voting body is equal to 2.40, we conclude that the voting behavior of this body is closer to the disagreement extreme than the agreement extreme. We may formalize this notion as

Definition 6. For a voting body of any size voting on any number of roll calls, its Agreement Level (AL) is

$$AL = \frac{E(AG) - E(AG_{\min})}{E(AG_{\max}) - E(AG_{\min})},$$

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[23] See Taro Yamane, *Mathematics for Economists: An Elementary Survey* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 348. When only "yes" and "no" votes are considered, the probability of disagreement will be maximized when the members come as close as possible to a 50–50 split.

where $0 \leq \mathrm{AL} \leq 1$ and

$E(AG) =$ expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members agree (Definition 5 and Theorem 3),

$E(AG_{\mathrm{min}}) =$ expected number when vote on each roll call is as equally divided as possible (i.e., when probability of agreement is minimized and disagreement maximized),

$E(AG_{\mathrm{max}}) =$ expected number when all members vote the same way on each roll call (i.e., when probability of agreement is maximized and disagreement minimized).

The *AL* index is the only "agreement" index of which we are aware that varies between zero and one for a voting body of any size, voting on any number of roll calls, using (in principle) any number of voting options.[24] The larger the value of the index, the greater the amount of agreement among the members. In our hypothetical voting body,

$$AL = \frac{2.40 - 1.00}{5.00 - 1.00} = \frac{1.40}{4.00} = .35.$$

This value compares with *AL* values of 1.00 for the subset containing members 1 and 2 and .33 for the subset containing members 3, 4, and 5. As before, the amount of agreement is less for the subset containing members 3, 4, and 5 than for the entire body ($AL = .33$ versus .35), but by a much narrower margin than our previous calculation (33 percent versus 48 percent expected agreement on five roll calls), which did not take into account the size of a voting body, suggested.

V. MEASURING VARIANCE IN VOTING

On occasion it is useful to know not only the level of agreement in a voting body, which may be the same for many different voting patterns (e.g., the same AL index may reflect high agreement on some roll calls and low agreement on others *or* moderate agreement on all roll calls), but also the deviation from this level of agreement averaged across a set of roll calls. In this regard, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, in a study of United Nations voting utilizing "standardized ranks" of countries on roll-call votes, employed factor analysis to construct an "index of divergence" to measure the lack of cohesiveness in voting groups on different issues over a number of years.[25] This index is "simply the mean deviation from the group average factor score,"[26] the factor scores having been derived from the correlation matrix which in turn was computed from the "standardized ranks" of all countries on all votes. The relation of this index to observable phenomena is so remote that we find it very difficult to attribute any substantive meaning to it.

A statistic for measuring the divergence (lack of uniformity) in the voting of members of a body that is "closer" to the data, and therefore more readily interpretable, can be computed from the probability measures already developed.

Definition 7. The mean squared deviation from the expected number of agreements across *m* roll calls (i.e., the squared deviations weighted by the probability of their occurrence), or variance in the number of agreements, is

$$\mathrm{Var}\ (AG) = \sum_{x=0}^{m} [x - E(AG)]^2 f(m, x),$$

where $\mathrm{Var}\ (AG) \geq 0$.

Theorem 7. The variance in the number of agreements on each roll call *i* is

$$\mathrm{Var}\ (AG)_i = P(AG)_i - [P(AG)_i]^2.$$

Proof. For any single roll call i, $m = 1$ in Definition 7. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned}\mathrm{Var}\ (AG)_i &= \sum_{x=0}^{1} [x - E(AG)_i]^2 f(1, x)_i \\ &= [E(AG)_i]^2 f(1, 0)_i \\ &\quad + [1 - E(AG)_i]^2 f(1, 1)_i.\end{aligned}$$

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[24] Though the proposition put forward by Aage R. Clausen that "measures of paired agreements cannot be converted into measures of group cohesion by simple summation" is not entirely clear, the AL index would seem to meet most of the objections raised by Clausen against other indices (in particular, the sensitivity of Grumm's "index of colligation" to group size and its inapplicability to individual roll calls). See Aage R. Clausen, "The Measurement of Legislative Group Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XI (May, 1967), 212–224; and John Grumm, "The Means of Measuring Conflict and Cohesion in the Legislature," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, XLIV (March, 1964), 375–388. It should be noted that the AL index does not allow one to determine the stability of factional alignments in a voting body (a particular AL value may reflect either permanent or shifting cleavages across a set of roll calls), but later in the article we shall develop an index which will be useful in determining the most cohesive voting blocs in a body.

[25] *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 255.

[26] *Ibid.*

From Definition 2 and Theorem 1 or 1a,

$$f(1, 0)_i = P(DG)_i = 1 - P(AG)_i,$$
$$f(1, 1)_i = P(AG)_i.$$

From Theorem 2,

$$E(AG)_i = P(AG)_i.$$

Substituting these values into the above equation,

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Var }(AG)_i &= [P(AG)_i]^2[1 - P(AG)_i] \\ &\quad + [1 - P(AG)_i]^2[P(AG)_i] \\ &= P(AG)_i - [P(AG)_i]^2.\end{aligned}$$

Theorem 8. The variance in the number of agreements across m roll calls is

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Var }(AG) &= \sum_{i=1}^{m} \text{Var }(AG)_i \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^{m} [P(AG)_i - [P(AG)_i]^2].\end{aligned}$$

Proof. This result follows from the property of the variance measure that specifies the variance of the sum of a set of random variables, which are mutually independent (Axiom 2), is equal to the sum of their variances.

As we showed for the expected value in Theorem 3, so we have shown here that the variance in the number of agreements across a set of roll calls is solely a function of the probability of agreement, $P(AG)_i$, on each roll call i. Thus, knowing only the distribution of different kinds of votes on each roll call, from which the probabilities of agreement on each roll call can be calculated, we can compute the over-all Agreement Level (AL) as well as the variance in the number of agreements across a set of roll calls.

For members 1 and 2 of the voting body, the variance is equal to zero because their voting on all roll calls is identical. The variance for members 3, 4, and 5 is equal to .44; for all five members of the voting body, the variance is equal to .82. Thus, the *dispersion* in voting about the expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members agree—that is, the "spread" or "scatter" in the distribution—is greatest in the entire body, despite the fact that the entire body has a slightly higher AL value than the subset containing only members 3, 4, and 5.

Roughly speaking, we might say that the addition of members 1 and 2 to the subset containing members 3, 4 and 5 has two effects: (1) it raises the Agreement Level among the members after the effects of body size have been removed; at the same time, (2) it increases the over-all deviation (variance) of the members from the expected value for the body. In other words, it is possible for members to have a high level of agreement, but the deviations from this level might also be high. In general, the variance will be greater across a set of roll calls when there is *moderate* agreement on each roll call $i(P(AG)_i \to \frac{1}{2})$—that is, some "spread" in the distribution of the number of agreements—rather than *high* agreement on some $(P(AG)_i \to 1)$ and *low* agreement on others $(P(AG)_i \to \frac{1}{3})$—that is, little "spread," with most members tending either to agree or disagree on each roll call. Why this is so can be seen from the next theorem.

Theorem 9. The variance in the number of agreements on any roll call i is maximized when $P(AG)_i = \frac{1}{2}$.

Proof. Let $y = \text{Var}(AG)_i$ and $x = P(AG)_i$. Then Theorem 7 states

$$y = x - x^2, \quad \text{where} \quad 0 \le x \le 1.$$

This function has an extreme value when the first derivative, y', equals zero, i.e.,

$$y' = 1 - 2x = 0, \text{ or } x = \tfrac{1}{2},$$

which is a maximum since the second derivative, $y'' = -2$, is negative.

Definition 8. For a voting body of any size voting on any number of roll calls, its Variance Level (VL) is

$$VL = \frac{\text{Var }(AG)}{\text{Var }(AG)_{\text{max}}},$$

where $0 \le VL \le 1$ and

$\text{Var}(AG) =$ Variance in the number of agreements across a set of roll calls (Definition 7 and Theorem 8),

$\text{Var}(AG)_{\text{max}} =$ Variance in the number of agreements across a set of roll calls when $P(AG)_i$ for each roll call i is as close to $\frac{1}{2}$ as possible.

We use the term "as close to $\frac{1}{2}$ as possible" to indicate the fact that in some voting bodies no possible division of the vote can give a probability value exactly equal to $\frac{1}{2}$. For example, in a three-member voting body with two voting options, $P(AG)_i$ may equal 1, $\frac{1}{3}$, or 0 on any roll call i. Since the value $\frac{1}{3}$ is as close to $\frac{1}{2}$ as can be achieved, this $P(AG)_i$ value would be used in the calculation of $\text{Var}(AG)_{\text{max}}$, and the VL index, across a set of roll calls for this body. This convention insures that the VL index always has a maximum *achievable* value of 1; for bodies of moderate size, however, the maximum achievable value will usually be very close, or equal, to the maximum theoretical value (i.e., where $P(AG)_i = \frac{1}{2}$ in the $\text{Var}(AG)_{\text{max}}$ term for each roll call i).

TABLE 3. VALUES OF $P(AG)_i$ ON EACH ROLL CALL i THAT MAXIMIZE AND MINIMIZE THE AL AND VL INDICES FOR A VOTING BODY WITH THREE VOTING OPTIONS

Index	Maximum Value When	Minimum Value When
AL	$P(AG)_i = 1$	$P(AG)_i \approx \frac{1}{3}$
VL	$P(AG)_i \approx \frac{1}{2}$	$P(AG)_i = 1$

Like the AL index, the VL index has a convenient zero-to-one range that makes it useful in the comparative analysis of voting bodies of different size, as well as those with different numbers of voting options whose members vote on different numbers of roll calls. In our example where the values of Var(AG) were .44 for members 3, 4, and 5, and .82 for all five members, the "normalized" VL values are .40 and .68, indicating that the difference in the amount of dispersion between the body and its subset is less than we were led to believe by the Var(AG) statistic, which does not give comparable values for bodies of different size. Incidentally, we do not define the VL index for a body containing only two members, because there are only two $P(AG)_i$ values for this body (0 and 1), which are both equally close to the value $\frac{1}{2}$ and which both make the denominator of the VL index, Var$(AG)_{\max}$, equal to the unruly value of zero.

Although we shall not formalize these results as theorems, it is interesting to note that the Agreement Level is at a maximum ($AL=1$) and the Variance Level at a minimum ($VL=0$) only when there is unanimous agreement in the body. That is, $AL=1$ if and only if $VL=0$ (i.e., when $P(AG)_i=1$ on each roll call i); on the other hand, minimal agreement ($AL=0$) is not equivalent to maximal variance ($VL=1$). This is so because when the body is as equally divided as possible among the different voting options ($AL=0$), the probability of agreement will not necessarily be as close to $\frac{1}{2}$ as possible, which maximizes the variance ($VL=1$). These results are summarized in Table 3 for a voting body with three voting options. In the minimum AL case, the "approximately equal to" sign ($\approx$) becomes an "equal" sign only in the limit as the body approaches infinite size; in the maximum VL case, it becomes an equal sign only if it is an *achievable* value for a voting body on a given roll call i.

VI. MEASURING AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAIRS

At times we may not have sufficient information to identify blocs of actors for the purpose of computing the Agreement Level and Variance Level in their voting. In order to identify blocs with a high degree of internal cohesion, it is often necessary to compute indices of agreement for all pairs of actors as a first step.

Many ingenious schemes have been devised for identifying and measuring the cohesiveness of voting blocs. Arend Lijphart, in reviewing defects in some of these schemes, singled out those schemes, among others, that required attitudes to be scalable along a single dimension, failed to take account of the incomparability of cohesiveness in groups of different size, ignored abstentions, etc. He then went on to propose an agreement index based on the percentage of times two countries agree or partially agree (one country abstains) on a set of votes, with partial agreement being accorded half the weight of complete agreement. From a sample of 44 roll-call votes on colonial issues in the UN General Assembly between 1956 and 1958, Lijphart computed agreement indices for all pairs of countries and then used them to identify, and measure the cohesiveness of, voting blocs.[27]

In the previously-cited study of UN voting by Alker and Russett, the authors assigned "standardized ranks" to each "yes," "no," and "abstain," in a manner too complicated to describe here, and used them to calculate correlation coefficients to measure voting agreement between pairs of countries.[28] In a more recent study, Russett assigned each country a voting score of 2 (affirmative), 1 (abstain and most absences), or 0 (negative) on all 66 roll-call votes which were not unanimous or nearly unanimous in the Eighteenth (1963) Session of the General Assembly and used the Q-technique of factor analysis to extract from the correlation matrix of countries, based on their voting scores, the most cohesive voting groups.[29]

Despite their obvious technical sophistication, all these recent studies suffer from one serious drawback: they ultimately rest on the assignment of arbitrary values to the different voting options in a body. In his analysis of voting groups in the Eighteenth Session, Russett offers no justification for his assignment of the arbitrary values 2, 1, and 0 to affirmative votes, abstentions and most absences, and negative votes, respectively, though the assumption implicit in this assignment is that abstentions and most absences fall between affirmative and negative votes on some kind of continuum.[30] We fail to see any stronger justification in Alker and Russett's use of "standardized ranks," though the claim is made that they have a "nice . . . operational interpretation."[31] Lijphart convincingly demonstrates the advantages of his index over others but confesses that crediting a partial agreement with half the weight of a complete agreement is a "tenuous assumption."[32] Although there may be no "sacrosanct technique," as Alker and Russett admit,[33] for assigning scores to the different voting options in a body, at a minimum any scheme should avoid the assignment of arbitrary numerical values or ranks to yeas, nays, and abstentions for the purpose of computing indices of agreement between pairs.

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[27] Lijphart, *op. cit.*

[28] Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–31.

[29] "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," this REVIEW, LX (June, 1966), 327–339.

Our *a posteriori* probabilities of agreement between a randomly-selected pair of members, because they are derived from the actual distribution of yeas, nays, and abstentions on each roll call, avoid this pitfall which has plagued previous studies. The expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members agree, based on these probabilities, seems to provide as good a yardstick as any against which to assess the extent to which two members agree in their voting. Expressing the deviation from the expected number of roll calls on which each pair of members agrees in relative terms, we arrive at

Definition 9. The Relative Agreement, RA_{ij}, of members i and j across a set of roll calls is

$$RA_{ji} = \frac{AG_{ij} - E(AG_{ij})}{E(AG_{ij})}.$$

where

AG_{ij} = the actual number of times members i and j agree across a set of roll calls,

$E(AG_{ij})$ = the expected number of roll calls on which a randomly-selected pair of members, for all roll calls on which members i and j are both present and voting, agree.[34]

Theorem 10. The maximum RA_{ij} for a voting body decreases as the body gets larger and larger, approaching the limit of 2 as the size of the voting body, t, approaches infinite size, i.e.,

$$\lim_{t\to\infty} (RA_{ij})_{\max} = 2.$$

Proof. Available from the authors on request. Basically, what is shown in the proof is that the maximum value of RA_{ij} does not depend on the number of roll calls but only on (1) the size of the voting body and (2) the distribution of votes. With regard to the distribution of votes, RA_{ij} for two agreeing members is at a maximum when the votes are as equally divided as possible among the "yes," "no," and "abstain" positions. As for size, the maximum RA_{ij} decreases as the size of the body increases: for a body of four members, the maximum RA_{ij} is 5.00; for five members, 4.00; for ten members 2.75; and for a body of twenty members, no two members can agree more than 2.33 times the expected number ($E(AG_{ij})$) of agreements per pair for the body. Thus, the maximum RA_{ij} for a body of four members (5.00) is more than twice as great as for a body of twenty members (2.33).

The RA_{ij} values for our hypothetical voting body are given in Table 4 and indicate that only members 1, 2, and 4 are positively linked, all with each other, with members 1 and 2 hav-

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[30] The consequences of such assumptions on the values of correlation coefficients are shown in Johan Galtung, *Theory and Methods of Social Research* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 216–218.

[31] Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*, p. 30, ftn. 18.

[32] Lijphart, *op. cit.*, p. 910, ftn. 41.

[33] Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[34] We append the subscripts i and j to $E(AG)$ in the index to underscore the fact that only the roll calls on which members i and j are both present and voting are used in the calculation of the expected value, $E(AG_{ij})$, for each RA_{ij} index. This index is adapted with modifications from one used, among other places, in Steven J. Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System," this REVIEW, LX (Dec., 1966), 880–898; and Steven J. Brams, "Trade in the North Atlantic Area: An Approach to the Analysis of Transformations in a System," *Peace Research Society: Papers*, VI (Vienna Conference, 1966), 143–164. Although the transaction-flow model is applied to international transaction data in the above articles, it is not necessary to assume that votes are transactions to use as a measure from the model to analyze voting data. For some purposes, however, the act of agreeing or disagreeing with other members of a voting body might be considered a "symbolic transaction." Another useful index for measuring agreement between pairs is the phi coefficient, but as used by Ulmer (*op. cit.*) and others it does not allow for more than two voting options. Jacobsen's measures of "voting agreement" and "voting concordance" do take into account abstention votes, but the theoretical import of these measures is left largely unspecified. See Kurt Jacobsen, "Voting Behavior of the Nordic Countries in the General Assembly," *Cooperation and Conflict*, III, No. 4 (1967), 139–157.

TABLE 4. RELATIVE AGREEMENTS (RA_{ij}'s) FOR EACH PAIR OF MEMBERS

Member	1	2	3	4
2	1.08			
3	−.17	−.17		
4	.67	.67	−.17	
5	−.58	−.58	−.58	−.17

ing more than twice the expected number of roll call agreements with each other ($RA_{12} = RA_{21} = 1.08$). Members 3 and 5 have no positive links with any other members in the body, including each other, and therefore might be properly classified as isolates. For larger bodies, of course, simple inspection of the RA_{ij} matrix will not be sufficient to identify the most cohesive voting blocs, but many data-reduction techniques are now available for delineating the most tightly-linked subgroups on the basis of a variety of linkage criteria.[35]

Given the identification of voting blocs on the basis of either empirical or *a priori* criteria, one may then be interested in measuring agreement between blocs. For this purpose we shall define a group RA_{IJ}.

Definition 10. The relative agreement of subsubsets I and J, each of which might comprise several different individual actors, is

$$RA_{IJ} = \frac{\sum_{I,J} A_{ij} - \sum_{I,J} E_{ij}}{\sum_{I,J} E_{ij}}.$$

Each of the summations on the right-hand side of the equation ranges over all individual actors i and j that are members of each of the respective (disjoint) subsets, I and J.

VII. MEASURING THE SUPPORT OF MEMBERS

So far the concepts we have defined, applicable to a voting body as a whole (AL and VL) and pairs of members (RA_{ij}), all have depended on the probability of agreement, $P(AG)_i$, between two randomly-selected members on each roll call i. We shall now lay the groundwork for a concept applicable to individual members that is analogous to RA_{ij} but based on a different set of probabilities, which we define below.

Definition 11. If t is the total number of members present and voting on roll call i, the probability that a randomly-selected member supports the majority (or plurality) is

$$P(S)_i = \frac{o_{\max}}{t},$$

where $o_{\max}$ is equal to the number of members choosing that option which receives, or is tied

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[35] For a review of some of these techniques, see Geoffrey H. Ball, "Data Analysis in the Social Sciences: What About the Details?" *Proceedings—Fall Joint Computer Conference*, 1965, pp. 533–559; J. J. Fortier and H. Solomon, "Clustering Procedures," in Paruchuri R. Krishnaiah (ed.), *Multivariate Analysis* (New York: Academic Press, 1966), pp. 493–506; Stephen C. Johnson, "Hierarchical Clustering Schemes," *Psychometrika*, XXXII (Sept., 1967), 241–254; and Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Statistics and Politics: The Need for Casual Data Analysis" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 5–8, 1967). A discussion of the relative merits of different clustering techniques would take us too far afield of our analysis at this time; our attempt here is only to suggest a measure of agreement for all pairs to which these techniques can be applied. We also note in passing that roll calls might be grouped into sets of issues by measuring "agreement" among them across the votes of the members. We can do this by first calculating the "total" probability of agreement for a randomly-selected pair of members on *two* roll calls as the sum of the products of the $P(AG)_i$'s and $P(DG)_i$'s for the two roll calls (assuming they are independent events). For example, for roll calls 1 and 2 given in Table 1, the probability that a randomly-selected pair of members will agree on both roll calls is $(.3)(.2) = .06$, disagree on both, $(.7)(.8) = .56$; for a randomly-selected pair, therefore, its "total" probability of agreement (by either agreeing on both roll calls or disagreeing on both roll calls) is $.06 + .56 = .62$. Since there are 10 pairs of members in a five-member body, the *expected number of agreements* for the 10 pairs is $(10)(.62) = 6.2$. In fact, for roll calls 1 and 2, 7 of the 10 pairs agree or disagree on *both* roll calls. In the same way in which we computed RA_{ij} for *members* i and j, we can compute RA_{ij} for *roll calls* as the difference between the actual and expected, divided by the expected, number of pairwise agreements on both roll calls. In the above example,

$$RA_{12} = \frac{7.0 - 6.2}{6.2} = .13,$$

which indicates a greater-than-expected (i.e., positive) level of "agreement" between roll calls 1 and 2. Thus, while our focus in this article has been on measuring agreement among members across a set of roll calls, the above procedure would allow one to compute RA_{ij} indices, analogous to those given in the text, that measure the "agreement" between pairs of roll calls instead of between pairs of members.

for, the greatest number of votes. Whereas $P(AG)_i$ was defined for a randomly-selected *pair* on roll call i, $P(S)_i$ is defined for a randomly-selected *individual member*, and its values for our hypothetical voting body are given in Table 5.

In the same manner in which we computed $E(AG)$ from the $P(AG)_i$'s on each roll call i, we can compute an expected value of support, $E(S)$, for the majority (or plurality) across a set of roll calls.

Definition 12. The expected number of roll calls on which a randomly-selected member votes with the majority (or plurality) is

$$E(S) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} E(S)_i = \sum_{i=1}^{m} P(S)_i.$$

For our hypothetical body, $E(S)=3.4$, which means that a randomly-selected member would support a majority (or one of the two tied pluralities on roll call 2) on an average of 3.4 out of 5 roll calls.

Now we could substitute $E(S)$ for $E(AG)$ in the AL and VL indices, and, with appropriate changes in the definitions of the minimum and maximum expected values in the AL index, come up with new measures of agreement and variance in voting based on the probabilities of support defined for members on each roll call rather than the probabilities of agreement defined for pairs. In addition to our desire to keep new concepts to a minimum, however, the main reason for not introducing these new concepts is that the member probabilities do not capture as much information as our previously-defined pair probabilities.

This is because $P(AG)_i$ for each roll call i is a function of the number of members voting on *all* options, while $P(S)_i$ depends only on the number choosing the option that receives the most votes. If there were three voting options and a plurality voted "yes," for example, $P(AG)_i$ would reflect not only this plurality but also the number of members voting "no" and "abstain," while $P(S)_i$ would be insensitive to the distribution of "no" and "abstain" votes. Thus, it would seem that the most useful measures of voting agreement and variance for the body as a whole are the previous AL and VL indices based on the $P(AG)_i$'s, which tap all information on the voting divisions in a body.

TABLE 5. $P(S)_i$'s FOR EACH ROLL CALL i

Roll Call i	$P(S)_i$
$i=1$	.6
$i=2$	.4
$i=3$	.8
$i=4$	.6
$i=5$	1.0

It is interesting to note that in a large body whose members split evenly among the different voting options on any roll call i, $P(S)_i \approx P(AG)_i$ ($\approx \frac{1}{3}$ when there are three options), but in general $P(S)_i$, defined for a randomly-selected member, bears no necessary relationship to $P(AG)_i$, defined for a randomly-selected pair. This is somewhat dismaying to our purpose of trying to explicate through theorems logical relationships among our different measures of voting behavior (as we were, for example, able to relate the AL and VL indices to each other because they were both based on $P(AG)_i$), but the introduction of the new probabilities, $P(S)_i$, has proved necessary in order to define a measure of voting support which individual members tend to give to the majority (or plurality) on roll calls.

Definition 13. The Support Level (SL_j) for each member j across a set of roll calls is

$$SL_j = \frac{A(S_j) - E(S_j)}{E(S_j)},$$

where

$A(S_j)=$ the actual number of roll calls on which member j votes with the majority (or plurality),

$E(S_j) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} E(S_j)_i = \sum_{i=1}^{m} P(S_j)_i =$ the expected number of roll calls on which a randomly-selected member, for all roll calls on which member j is present and voting (assumed in above summations to be equal to m), votes with the majority (or plurality).[36]

We can establish the upper and lower limits of SL_j in a more informal manner than we did for the RA_{ij} index. Clearly, SL_j will be minimal when member j never agrees with a bloc with the most votes ($A(S_j)=0$), so the lower limit of SL_j will always be equal to -1, regardless of the number of voting options. On the other hand, the index will be maximal when member j agrees with a largest voting bloc on all m roll calls *and* these largest blocs on each roll call are of minimal size ($E(S_j)=m/3$ when there are three voting options). For a voting body with three voting options, therefore, the upper limit of SL_j is

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[36] As with the RA_{ij} index, we append the subscript j to $E(S)$ to underscore the fact that only the roll calls on which member j is present and voting are used in the calculation of the expected value, $E(S_j)$, for SL_j indices of each member j.

$$SL_{j(\max)} = \frac{m - m/3}{m/3} = 2.$$

It will be recalled that RA_{ij} also ranges between -1 and 2 in large bodies, which should not be surprising since it is a completely analogous index, differing only in that it is based on probabilities defined for pairs rather than for individual members.

Values of SL_j for each member j of our hypothetical voting body are given in Table 6 and pinpoint members 1, 2, and 4 as supportive of the largest voting blocs (which mainly include each other) and members 3 and 5 as diverging sharply from the majority position. From the considerable difference between these two sets of values, it would appear that some members—out of conviction, influence being exerted on them, the desire to side with a largest voting bloc, or other reasons—vote with most of their fellow members and others do not.

It should be noted that even though members 1, 2, and 4 agree with the majority (or tied pluralities in the case of roll call 2) on all five roll calls, they differ substantially from the maximum theoretical upper limit of 2. This is due to the fact that SL_j is also a function of the size of the largest voting bloc and attains its maximum value for a member only when this bloc tends to be as small as possible on each roll call. In a five-member body with three voting options, two members are the smallest plurality possible, and this division occurs on only one roll call (roll call 2) in our hypothetical body. This accounts for the fact that even though members 1, 2, and 4 vote with a largest bloc on all five roll calls, they are only 47 percent more "supportive" than expected.

The concept of an expected level of support incorporated in the SL_j index, generated from the actual voting patterns in a body, could be particularly useful in comparative analyses of voting bodies. Without this expected level as a baseline for comparison, calculations of support for a member or bloc would not distinguish between support in bodies that tended to be closely divided and those characterized by large majorities on many roll calls. In those bodies that tended to be closely divided, the expected level of support would be low, so SL_j would be high for those members j who lent their support on most roll calls. In voting bodies where roll calls tended toward unanimity, on the other hand, the expected level of support would be high, so even the most highly supportive members would not exceed the expected level by a wide margin, and their SL_j's would therefore be low.

TABLE 6. SL_j's FOR EACH MEMBER j

$j=1$	.47
$j=2$	.47
$j=3$	−.41
$j=4$	.47
$j=5$	−.41

To be sure, the SL_j index will rank members of a body, who vote on the same roll calls, in the same order as the simpler statistic measuring "percentage agreement with a largest voting bloc."[37] For comparative purposes, however, SL_j would distinguish, by giving added weight to, a member of a closely-divided body who tends to support "minimal" largest voting blocs from a member of a less closely-divided body who tends to support large majorities. Thus, even though two voters might have the same "percentage agreement" scores in different voting bodies, our SL_j index credits the voter who tends to align himself with smaller pluralities in the closely-divided body with more "support."

This bias in the operational concept well reflects the greater marginal importance a coalition leader normally would attribute to the member or members who "just make" the coalition a largest bloc (or a majority) than the members who join later and are superfluous to victory.[38] Though we cannot determine in most voting situations the order in which members join a coalition prior to a ballot, it seems reasonable to assume that the "support" a plurality or majority of members receives from a voter is inversely related to its size: the more members a largest bloc contains, the less support that can be attributed to individual members of the bloc.

If less attribution of support results in smaller payoffs to members, then the coalitions which maximize payoffs will tend to be of minimal winning size. Indeed, insofar as voting can be considered a zero-sum game, Riker has shown that it is not rational for a coalition of minimal winning size to accept additional members, though it may not be able to exclude them in voting situations.[39] There may be circumstances, however, under which it is rational to allow additional members in a larger coalition when they permit the formation of *several* different minimal winning coalitions that can be put together from different subsets of the larger coalition and whose *combined* preferences are preferable to those that could be achieved by a single minimal winning coalition always containing the same members.[40]

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[37] A similar statistic is Edward T. Rowe's "win-loss score," described in his "Changing Patterns in the Voting Success of Member States in the United Nations General Assembly: 1945–1966," *International Organization*, 23 (Spring, 1969), 235.

[38] William H. Riker ("A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies," *op. cit.*) has incorporated this idea in his measure of the "significance" of roll-call votes. For a critique of some technical aspects of Riker's index, see William P. Yohe, "Riker's Method for Assessing the Significance of Roll Call Votes," *Public Choice*, IV (Spring, 1968), 59–66.

We need not restrict our measure of support only to a largest voting bloc. We could use it to measure the support of each member of a voting body for any particular subgroup of agreeing members, not necessarily a plurality or majority, above and beyond the number of agreements we would expect from a randomly-selected member. For example, if members 1 and 2 in our hypothetical voting body, who constitute a plurality (but not a majority) of members who vote the same way on all roll calls, were our standard of comparison, then $SL_1 = SL_2 = .47$ would remain the same as before, as would $SL_3 = -.41$, because member 3's two previous agreements with a largest voting bloc were also agreements with members 1 and 2. However, members 4 and 5 would each lose an agreement, namely that with a largest bloc of two abstaining voters (themselves) on roll call 2, which are not agreements with members 1 and 2 (also a largest bloc on that roll call). As a consequence, the SL_j's of members 4 and 5 are lower (.18 and $-.71$, respectively) than they were (.47 and $-.41$, respectively) when support was counted for *any* largest bloc on a roll call. Similarly, we could compute SL_j's of all members with member 3 or member 4 or member 5 as the standard of comparison, which would give us an index of support, in relation to an expected level for a randomly-selected member, for the voting of each member against these individual members.[41]

The notion of an expected level of support is not necessarily descriptive of any particular member's voting behavior but rather serves as a norm against which to assess deviations in each member's voting. Where this norm is based on support of the majority (or whatever the number required by the decision rule of the body), those with the highest SL_j's will be those who most consistently align themselves with the winning side. This is not an easy task for a member to perform across a set of roll calls in a closely-divided body, and it therefore may be interesting to measure how nearly each member approaches this ideal. While this is not a strategy each member wishes or tries to pursue, in some contexts being consistently on the winning side might be used as a measure of an actor's influence.[42]

These and other questions seem worthy of further investigation, and in the next section we shall suggest how the operational concepts derived from, or related analogously to, the model might be used in the testing of empirical hypotheses.[43]

VIII. APPLYING THE MODEL AND TESTING HYPOTHESES

In applying the model to specific empirical situations, it is usually convenient to assume that members who vote together share common attitudes and interests. The model can easily be adjusted, however, to situations where members may vote the same way for different reasons. If there were evidence, for example, that there was no commonness of interests reflected in abstentions (or absences) on a set of roll calls, one might either exclude abstainers (or absentees) from the analysis or assign them, on the basis of other information, to affirmative and negative positions. Alternatively, one could subdivide abstainers (or absentees) into finer classes (e.g., "weak" affirmative and "weak" negative) and compute the probabilities of agreement on the basis of more than the three kinds of votes assumed in the preceding analysis.[44]

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[39] William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 32–101.

[40] This may in part explain why a majority party in a legislature, of greater than minimal winning size, stays together: it can win on individual roll calls by pulling together *different* subsets of its members, which may be less costly than relying on one subset (i.e., a single minimal winning coalition with always the same members on each roll call), to hold the line.

[41] The standard might even be an ideological position (e.g., liberal versus conservative), where those voting "yes" on some roll calls, and "no" or "abstain" on others, would be interpreted as supportive.

[42] This would tend to be the case for the member instrumental in putting together winning coalitions but not for the member simply shrewd enough to foresee the winning position and so align himself with it. This is the "problem of the chameleon," recognized by Dahl in his attempt to rank the influence of United States Senators on the basis of the differences between the proportion of times a bill passed the Senate when a Senator favored it and the proportion of times a bill passed when he opposed it. See Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, II (July, 1957), 209–214.

[43] For this purpose, a write-up and source deck of a computer program called PROVOTE, which computes all the indices in the model, are available from the Academic Computer Center, New York University, Washington Square, 725 Commerce Building, New York, N. Y. 10003.

The analysis is, in fact, generalizable to whatever voting or nonvoting criteria the analyst chooses to use in identifying actors who take particular positions, however many, on a set of issues. Besides positions taken on roll calls, other kinds of commitments which actors periodically make in political life include decisions to join or withdraw from a coalition or alliance, establish or sever diplomatic relations, support or oppose candidates for political office, issue policy declarations, etc. Like roll calls, all these forms of political commitment suggest agreement with some actors and disagreement with other actors in a political system.

As an example of the application of the model to nonvoting data, consider Morton A. Kaplan's proposition that in a balance of power system "any alignment is as probable as any other alignment prior to a consideration of the specific interests which divide nations."[45] If we consider alignments to be defined by the different associations of countries in wars, where the belligerents in effect elect different voting options and the nonbelligerents abstain, then the equiprobability of different alignments could be translated into a proposition about the tendency of RA_{ij} scores to be equal, i.e., approach zero, for each pair. In the "classic" balance-of-power period of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a preliminary analysis of RA_{ij} scores of European countries, where the twelve wars during the period involving at least one major power (beginning with the Franco-Spanish War in 1823 and ending with World War I) represent the "roll calls" of the model, reveals that most countries tended to associate considerably more frequently with some countries than others, which would seem to reflect the upsetting influence of "specific interests" in the proposition.[46]

In some cases it is relatively easy to gather systematic information on the positions taken by a political actor (e.g., a newspaper); in other cases these data are more elusive, and it may not always be easy to draw up a homogeneous set of discrete acts of political commitment over time from which agreement or disagreement with other actors can be surmised. (Interviews and questionnaires would be possible instruments that could be used to make data on the positions of actors more comparable.) Provided suitable data can be obtained, however, the comparative empirical indicators described in this article would seem to provide one means for transforming the widespread and recurrent commitments made by political actors into testable hypotheses on such processes as census formation, coalition building, and conflict resolution in political systems.

To illustrate this point, consider Riker's "size principle," which states that in social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games where side payments are permitted, whose players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions occur.[47] As applied to voting bodies, we would expect that one implication of the size principle when the above assumptions are met is that the Agreement Level in a voting body will remain unaffected by the distribution of seats by party. For example, in a legislature containing only two parties, the Agreement Level should remain constant no matter what percentage of seats are held by the majoirty party.

For the roll calls of six recent sessions of the United States House of Representatives, David H. Koehler compared the percentage of seats held by the majority party in each session, which varied between 51 percent (83d Session) and 68 percent (89th Session), with the value of the AL index based on roll calls in that session.[48] On most roll calls, to be sure, the winning coalition had more than a bare majority,

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[44] This feature of the model would seem to make it especially useful in the study of judicial bodies, whose members may not only associate themselves with or against the majority opinion but may also express particular qualifications in individual affirming or dissenting opinions.

[45] Morton A. Kaplan, "Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other Models of International Systems," this REVIEW, LV (Sept., 1957), 695.

[46] Robert M. Rood, "Agreement in the International System: An Empirical Test of Balance of Power Theory" (unpublished paper, Syracuse University, 1968.).

[47] Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions, op. cit.*

[48] David H. Koehler, "Representational Consensus and the Size Principle" (unpublished paper, Syracuse University, 1968).



PREDICTION OF THE SIZE PRINCIPLE

FIG. 3

indicating that the size principle was not confirmed in an "absolute" sense on every roll call. Under a less strict interpretation, however, evidence supporting an implication of the size principle over a longer time span was found: the value of the *AL* index of the House in sessions where the party division was nearly equal did not differ appreciably from its value in sessions where one party held a lopsided majority of the seats.[49]

The size principle might be tested comparatively for a number of different legislative bodies by comparing the *AL* index based on roll-call votes in a legislative session with the *AL* index based upon the seat shares of each party. In the computation of the latter index, each party's seats, in effect, could be treated as the number of votes cast a particular way on a single roll call. As shown in Figure 3, the size principle would predict that the *AL* index based on roll calls would not depend on the *AL* index based on seats held by each party in different sessions.

As another example of the use of the *AL* index in the testing of a hypothesis, consider the observation that in *multi*-ballot national party conventions one candidate typically has almost a majority on the first ballot, loses strength on the next few ballots to other candidates, one of whom eventually moves toward a majority on the last few ballots. To frame this observation as a quantitative hypothesis and thereby make possible a more precise test of its validity, we would predict that, where the voting options are different candidates, the value of the *AL* index will be quite high on the first ballot, trial off on the next few ballots, and rise again on the last few ballots.

A test of this hypothesis reveals that it is in fact upheld only for the 1844 and 1852 Democratic conventions. In the twenty-four other Democratic and Republican multi-ballot conventions that have occurred since 1844, the *AL* index, on the average, tended to hover around .20 over about the first 75 percent of the ballots and then to increase slightly until the final ballot, when agreement soared rapidly over the level needed to achieve nomination. This pattern in which a point is reached in a convention when a large number of delegates suddenly decides to support a particular candidate (the "bandwagon effect") tends to characterize conventions operating under both a simple majority rule and those where a two-thirds majority is necessary for nomination (i.e., Democratic conventions prior to 1936, except for the conventions of 1860 and 1920).[50]

It would seem that other interesting questions might be asked, and hypotheses tested, utilizing the empirical indicators developed in the model. Like the *AL* index, is the *VL* index independent of party alignments in a legislative body? Are high SL_j scores of members associated with measures of influence not based on votes (e.g., seniority, committee assignments)? What are the best predictors of high RA_{ij} scores between pairs of members? These and other questions are all susceptible to empirical analysis which, given the applicability of the indices to any voting body as well as nonvoting situations, could probably most fruitfully be conducted on a comparative basis.

IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

To recapitulate, we began our analysis of voting in legislative and judicial bodies by showing how voting could be conceived of as a mapping between the members of a body and the voting options available in the body. This allowed us to determine the numbers of members who chose each voting option on each roll call, and with these numbers as the parameters of the model we were able to compute *a posteriori* probabilities that two randomly-selected members agree on zero or more roll calls. From these probabilities, we in turn were able to calculate the expected number of roll calls on which two randomly-selected members of a hypothetical voting body of five members, and subsets of the body comprising two and three members, agree. After noting that the number of pairwise agreements in a voting body would depend not only on the distribution of votes but also the size of the body, we then developed an Agreement Level (AL) index that eliminated the "bias toward agreement" effect in larger bodies and therefore could be used in the comparative analysis of voting bodies of any number of members. An analogous index of the Variance Level (VL) indicated that the voting of members of our hypothetical body and certain of its subsets exhibited different degrees of dispersion from the expected values.

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[49] An alternative explanation for the constancy in the level of agreement in different sessions might be "situational": if the ideological differences between the two parties are not great, then the cost of assembling a winning coalition *across* party lines, often necessary when the majority party has only a small edge over the minority party, would not differ appreciably from the cost of assembling a winning coalition *within* the majority party when it has a big edge. If the same amount is expended on coalition building in each case, it should buy winning coalitions of approximately the same size. Thus, when ideological differences between parties are slight and a fixed amount (or percentage) of resources tends to be spent on coalition building in a session, the level of agreement in the session should be approximately the same whether one's party majority is large or small.

[50] Timothy K. Barnekov, "Measuring Agreement in National Party Conventions" (unpublished paper, Syracuse University, 1969).

In order to identify the most cohesive voting blocs, we then defined Relative Agreement (RA_{ij}) indices for each pair of members (as well as groups) that avoided the arbitrary assumptions made in other studies about the assignment of voting scores to different voting options. These indices showed that not only was voting nonrandom in the body but that its members could be partitioned into one three-member bloc and two isolates on the basis of their voting. We concluded the development of the formal model by defining a Support Level (SL_j) index for individual members, related analogously but not directly to the Relative Agreement index for pairs, that measured the extent to which a member supported the majority, or any other, position taken by one or more agreeing members on each roll call. In sum, we were able to derive in our model comparative indicators of voting behavior for three different units of analysis—the body as a whole (AL and VL), pairs of members (RA_{ij}), and individual members (SL_j)—as well as to develop some implications of these indicators in the form of several theorems.

We then suggested how information about a voting body, in addition to the roll-call votes of its members, could be used to tailor the model more closely to a particular empirical situation. We also indicated how other forms of political commitment besides voting could be made amenable to the methods of comparative analysis described in the article. Finally, we presented some examples of testable hypotheses, with some preliminary empirical results, that incorporated indicators developed in the model.

In conclusion, we have tried to show in our formalization how meaning can be wrung out of a simple set of parameters and axioms in the form of new concepts derived from the parameters and new theorems deduced from the axioms that (1) logically organize important features of voting bodies in an economical and perspicuous way, and (2) provide operational indicators of voting behavior. While our indicators, like any summary measures, abstract only certain aspects of a situation, they at least are based on a set of explicit *and* interpretable axioms that suggest how and in what ways they distort reality. In particular, our simplifying "independence" axiom unquestionably does violence to the "reality" of voting in many actual bodies, but it gives us great leverage in generating a stock of concepts and theorems that throws into bold relief certain idealized aspects of a voting body. If at a later stage empirical research suggests other useful concepts and axioms (e.g., about coalitions), or a modification of old ones, then these can be formally introduced into the model and new theorems proved. Eventually these theorems should carry us beyond the realm of formulation and clarification of concepts—our primary task in the development of the model so far[51]—and instead should help us discover nonobvious relationships between concepts that shed light on basic political processes (e.g., of coalition building[52]). Insofar as these concepts can be operationally defined and hypotheses linking them tested, parts of the formal model will be subject to empirical validation. Then the further revision of the model, and the testing of its implications, can begin again.

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[51] We do not wish to stress, however, too rigid a distinction between "concept formation" and "theory formation," which in Hempel's words "are so closely interrelated as to constitute virtually two different aspects of the same procedure." Carl G. Hempel, *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 1–2.

[52] For an attempt in this direction, see Steven J. Brams and William H. Riker, "Models of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Boston, Dec. 26–31, 1969); and Steven J. Brams, "A Cost/Benefit Analysis of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies" (unpublished paper, New York University, Feb. 1970). The assumptions of the models in these papers, however, are not related to those of the present model.

ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE MODELS OF THE VOTING UNIVERSE: THE CASE OF PENNSYLVANIA: 1960–1968

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I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Of all the fields of political science where quantitative methods have been developed over the past generation, probably the one where scholarly understanding has been most enriched has been that of mass voting behavior. But while we know vastly more about this behavior on the individual and aggregate level than we did a quarter-century ago, there are still large territories on the map which are blank, or in which exploration has only very recently begun. There remain a number of doubtful areas in which issues of methodology and of substantive interpretation are still very much open to systematic inquiry.

One such area is that associated with the interrelation of socio-economic correlates of the vote.[1] That is, there is a real question as to whether such independent or predisposing variables should be conceptualized as making mutually independent or, alternatively, interdependent contributions to the prediction of voting patterns. The normal practice in research involving multiple correlation of aggregate voting behavior with a set of independent variables has been to assume implicitly that the relationship of these variables is additive (*i.e.*, non-interactive) and that the appropriate theoretical representation is of the general form $y = b + m_1x_1 + m_2x_2 \ldots + m_nx_n$. Such an assumption seems plausible so far as individual voting for American major parties and their candidates is concerned. Thus, for example, the authors of the MIT 1960 simulation study found strong evidence that predispositional factors summate, *i.e.*, are indeed additive in character.[2]

If these assumptions and findings provided the best fit to this portion of reality under all or nearly all circumstances, we would be justified in leaving the problem of independent variable interaction alone in this field, while remembering that interactive models might form a part of useful research strategies in other fields of political science.[3] But a recent contribution by Glaucio Soares and Robert Hamblin has reopened the question, at least on the macro level of aggregate data.[4] The authors argue that voting for radical parties (whether of left or right) is an act of positive or aggresive alienation; that such alienation is linked to feelings which are part of a class of involuntary responses; that it may well be that a (multiplicative) power function is the general form of relationship between the magnitude of stimuli and of non-voluntary responses; and that one might consequently expect to find, and does in fact find, that correlations based on an additive theoretical model explain substantially less of the variance in the radical vote than do correlations based on a multiplicative theoretical model. Whatever the adequacy of the conceptual framework of the Hamblin and Soares article may appear to other researchers to be, there is no doubt that their procedures produced a spectacular increase in the power of a relatively few socio-economic variables to explain the variance in the 1952 vote for Allende in Chile.

Such results, standing as they do in sharp differentiation from many implicit assumptions and some explicit findings regarding American and other voting behavior, present a challenge to further research in this area, and raise at once a number of questions to which answers seem rather urgently needed. Such questions include at least the following:

(1) Assuming the general validity—or at least plausibility—of the hypotheses developed in the Soares-Hamblin article as explanations of the greater power of the multiplicative model, it should follow that variation in voting for radical candidates or parties in other systems should be

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[1] Multiple correlations of predisposing variables over time, of course, are nothing new in voting-behavior studies. See as the *locus classicus* Harold F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937); and also his *Grass-Roots Politics* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1942).

[2] Ithiel de Sola Pool *et al., Candidates, Issues and Strategies* (Cambridge; M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 127–143 and especially Table 4.2.

[3] See Hayward Alker, Jr., *Mathematics and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 108–111 and Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), pp. 91–93.

[4] Glaucio Soares and Robert Hamblin, "Socio-Economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952," this REVIEW, LXI (1967), 1053–1065.

predicted more completely by multiplicative than by linearly additive models involving a set of socio-economic predictor variables. But it should also follow that variation in voting for non-radical candidates or parties should be predicted at least as well by additive models as by multiplicative. Is this in fact the correct pattern?

(2) On the other hand, it may be that when certain kinds of aggregate electoral and social data are employed, one can gain an across-the-board increase in explanatory power for all or most kinds of voting patterns (whether radical or not) simply by performing the appropriate transformations on variables to be included in multiple-correlation analyses. Such a result would be somewhat surprising, granted the MIT findings concerning American voting for major-party candidates at the level of the individual, but seems at least an *a priori* theoretical possibility. If converting to multiplicative models were a species of "black magic," the problem would lose most if not all of its theoretical interest, except as a possible empirical refutation of the explanatory hypotheses advanced by Soares and Hamblin. If, on the other hand, multiplicative formulation improves the power of socio-economic variables under some circumstances but not under others, then the use of a multiplicative model may have great potential as a tool of analytic discrimination in the study of aggregate voting behavior across time and space. Thus an additional question is simply, does conversion to multiplicative form tend to increase correlations across the board or not?

(3) What is the most appropriate way to conceptualize the difference between individual analysis based on the sample survey and aggregate-data analysis based upon official statistics from geographical units? This is one face of the units of analysis problem.

A word must be said about word usage. In this article we use the term interaction and interactive in a relatively loose way. The same can be said for our use of the terms additive, multiplicative, and linear. As a guide to the reader the term interactive can be thought of substantively as naming the situation where the effect of group membership on voting behavior is quite dependent for its magnitude or direction or both on the magnitude or properties of other groups in the same, context, *e.g.*, an intensification of blue collar tendencies to vote for Wallace as the density of non-whites increases. Technically we express this as a product among at least two variables measured on Pennsylvania counties and refer to this variously as a multiplicative or interactive model. Conversely, if the impact of a social grouping on voting behavior is not affected by the presence, absence, or magnitude of other groups in the environment we refer to a non-interactive or additive environment. This is expressed technically by the sum of at least two variables measured on Pennsylvania counties and we refer (blithely and loosely) to an additive, linear, or non-multiplicative model.

The distinction in meaning between our use of additive and multiplicative is crucial for understanding the argument, for each term stands in turn as shorthand for a very different way of viewing the impact of social structure on individual behavior. The distinction between additive and multiplicative involves not only different technical representations and different substantive interpretations but ultimately must produce different theoretical commitments.

II. RESEARCH DESIGN

We decided to attempt a preliminary answer to the first two questions by applying a partial replication of the Soares-Hamblin technique to recent American electoral politics. If it is assumed initially that correlations based on a multiplicative model explain more than additive ones on a selective rather than an indiscriminate basis—as their argument demands—it is reasonable to suppose accordingly that the alternative relationships between additive and multiplicative correlations correspond roughly to the paradigm of Table 1.

TABLE 1. THREE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ENVIRONMENT AND THEORETICAL REPRESENTATION OF ENVIRONMENT

"State of Political Nature" (Environment)	Representation: Additive Model		Representation: Multiplicative Model
Interactive	r^2	$<$	r^2
Non-interactive	r^2	$>$	r^2
Random	r^2	$=$	r^2

That is to say—and again assuming initially what is assumed in the Soares-Hamblin article—it can be postulated that in cases where socio-economic factors aggregatively interact with each other (or are interdependent), correlations associated with multiplicative models will provide systematically greater explanations of variance than will those associated with additive ones, but that this will be true for such cases only.

But what kinds of contexts or "states of nature" could be realistically described as "random"? Probably none in the real world; but such contexts might be artificially created. Here it is necessary to deal with the problem raised in question 3: what is measured by aggregate-data analysis and how does this relate to the behavioral measurements associated with survey-research work?

The answer to this question formulated by Erwin Scheuch is probably as good an approach as any to be found in the recent literature. His argument, essentially, is that research strategy is closely associated with the level of social analysis which the researcher chooses to study, and that as surveys provide the indispensable means for analyzing individual behavior in all of its ramifications, the analysis of aggregate data is an appropriate vehicle for the study of system properties and boundaries.[5] Certainly some of the most exciting and illuminating work on electoral behavior now being done—for example by scholars such as Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen—involve a skillful blending of survey and aggregate analysis, with each mode being employed to shed light upon those ranges of political behavior to which it is appropriate.[6]

Our position is that measures on aggregate units are not only measures of summary individual behavior but also are measures of the context of individual behavior and that, in particular, these measures of context of environment are both useful and necessary for the complete analysis of electoral behavior. Furthermore, a choice of technical model will be especially crucial for assessing the effects of context. It has recently been argued that these environments not only are not "random" in the real world, but that in American politics they appear to have enormous importance as well as very great durability.[7] Discussion of the environmental context in aggregate data can be found in the literature ranging back several decades. An outstanding example was provided by Herbert Tingsten when, in a survey of 55 groups of Stockholm precincts, he found that socialist voting and turnout among working-class voters are related in a curvilinear fashion to the proportion of working-class people in the entire electorate, *i.e.*, that both socialist vote and turnout among working-class electors (especially working-class women) decline more rapidly than does the working-class percentage of the electorate.[8] Similarly, the authors of *Voting*[9] found that in Elmira there is a kind of *ceteris paribus* or "breakage" effect: all other things being more or less equal, the "Republican atmosphere" of the city will produce more Republican votes than could be explained on the basis of socio-economic characteristics alone. The argument presented by Soares and Hamblin is not fundamentally dissimilar from this: it is that certain kinds of socio-economic attributes tend aggregatively to be associated with each other, that the macro environment of Province X is correlated with the macro environments of all other provinces, even additively, in such a way that there is a strongly non-random relationship between the relative importance of the predictor variables and of the vote for the radical left. What they have provided, however, is a technique which may prove to be of considerable use in the analysis of aggregate voting behavior, and thus of the influence and nature of the environmental contexts surrounding that behavior.

The first step in the present research was to develop a series of socio-economic and political indicators and apply them to an American setting. For this purpose the 67 counties of the state of Pennsylvania were chosen as primary units of analysis. It should be noted here that Pennsylvania was not selected at random. Rather, this state was chosen as the focus of this study for several reasons. Of these, perhaps the most important was the fact that Pennsylvania's electoral politics is structured heavily around a set of polarizations classically associated with the New Deal and post-New Deal eras. At the least, these cleavages are organized around foreign-born/native-born, working-class/middle-class, center city/suburbs, so that, among the white population, the more Catholic an area's population, the larger the working-class component, the higher the proportion of the labor force in manufacturing or mining, and the more urbanized, the higher the Democratic vote has tended to be since 1934. This structure of politics has—with the notable exception of Philadelphia city before 1949—been highly stable since the mid-1930's. If the existence of multiplicative relationships among predisposing variables were associated with the relative "modernity" of partisan alignment organized along class-ethnic lines, it should appear in major-party voting in Pennsylvania if anywhere in the United States. The evidential bases for the analyses we report come from three sources: (1) the 1960 census; (2) voter registration; and (3) election returns for 1960, 1964, and 1968.

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[5] E. K. Scheuch, "Cross-National Comparisons Using Aggregate Data," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Comparing Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 131–167; see also Nils Diderich, *Empirische Wahlforschung* (Köln, 1965), pp. 16–60.

[6] Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "Regional Contrasts in Norwegian Politics," in Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki, 1964), pp. 162–238; Henry Valen and Daniel Katz, *Political Parties in Norway* (Oslo, 1964), especially pp. 120–186.

[7] Walter Dean Burnham, "American Voting Behavior and the 1964 Election," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XII (1968), 1–40.

[8] H. L. A. Tingsten, *Political Behavior* (Stockholm, 1937), pp. 177–180.

[9] Bernard Berelson *et al.*, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 98–106. See also Warren E. Miller, "One-Party Politics and the Voter," THIS REVIEW, L (1956), 707.

A final caveat is in order concerning what we do *not* attempt in this paper. We are not attempting to find or present the "best" model for predicting variation in aggregate voting measures. Nor are we concerned with investigating the implications of the many different models we consider. Better predictions in the sense of tighter fit would undoubtedly be possible with so simple a variant as combining the additive and multiplicative models where the multiplicative contribution would enter as an index variable constructed by means of a separate regression. We are not attempting to settle the question of self-conscious model and theory construction but rather to raise it, and raise it in terms of the *form* of the model rather than in terms of the direction of causation. Thus, from the perspective of model construction and comparison in general, we are considering a very special case.

III. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Let us now turn to some methodological issues which are presented by the necessity of transforming variables if a multiplicative model is to be used in regression analysis. We may begin with a banal but necessary observation: geometric intuition is often used in discussions of correlation and regression problems but we wish to focus attention on algebra, not geometry. It is, after all, the algebraic form of a function which determines its properties.

Our first question can be rephrased in its simplest form as follows: given Y as a function of X_1 and X_2, does a model which "builds in" interaction between X_1 and X_2 predict better than one which does not build in interaction? An ancillary question is the following: Does the relative influence of the two predictors depend on the model chosen? Notice that these are very different kinds of questions, for it is certainly possible that both an interactive and a non-interactive model will have about the same predictive power but will lead to very different interpretations of the importance of the variables used as predictors. These two questions present issues of theory construction (choice of models) and also systematic description (what to observe). This is not just an exercise in curve fitting or selecting the transformations which best predict a criterion. The problem of choice of models at issue here has substantive and theoretical import, as we hope to show empirically.

Several of the methodologically relevant and important suggestions made by Soares and Hamblin can be recapitulated most conveniently by considering a three variable example with our Pennsylvania data. Let the Y variate, the criterion variable to be predicted, be percentage Democratic vote in 1960 in Pennsylvania counties. As predictors X_1 and X_2 we choose a measure of income and a measure of cultural variation in the rural-urban character of the counties.[10] All measures are expressed in percentage form.

We wish to ascertain which of the following forms is the best predictor of variation in Y:

(I) $Y = b + m_1X_1 + m_2X_2$

or

(II $Y = bX_1^{m_1} X_2^{m_2}$.

It is a happy accident of algebra that model II can be converted to a form which allows the application of least squares regression techniques for estimating the necessary constants.[11] The results of correlation analysis for these two models using our Pennsylvania data are given in Table 2. For these particular data model II provides a more adequate representation. If the square of the multiple correlation coefficient is used as a criterion, the interactive model accounts for more than 10 percent more variance. Substantively (and theoretically) the analysis suggests that wealth and social milieu (or culture) interact in influencing the voting behavior of individuals. Put another way, if we assume that the influence of income on the vote depends on the degree of urbanization (and conversely) we can predict more variation in the vote than if we assume they are independent. On the other hand, both models lead to the same interpretation as to the relative importance of income and culture if partial correlations are used

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[10] We selected here the 1960 county percentages of income receivers earning less than $3,000 per year and of rural-farm population of the county total. Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book,* 1962 ed.

[11] A succinct account of the two-variable case is found in F. E. Croxton and D. J. Cowden, *Applied General Statistics,* 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1955), pp. 508–512.

TABLE 2. CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE REPRESENTATIONS FOR $Y = F(X_1, X_2)$. (PENNSYLVANIA DATA)*

Model I		Model II**
$Y = b + m_1X_1 + m_2X_2$		$Y = bX_1^{m_1}X_2^{m_2}$
Multiple R^2	0.36	0.47
Partial r^2_{X1}	0.06	0.08
Partial r^2_{X2}	0.34	0.45
degrees of freedom	64	64

* Y is Democratic presidential vote in 1960 in percent, X_1 is income measured by percent receiving less than $3,000 annually, and X_2 is rurality measured by percent rural farm.

** Actual regression was

$$\text{Log}(Y) = \text{Log}(b) + m_1 \text{Log}(X_1) + m_2 \text{Log}(X_2)$$

as a criterion. For reasons developed below we will reject the interpretation of interdependence as being generally true for these variables even for these Pennsylvania data, but the example serves to demonstrate the real possibility and the potential significance of difference in form in the analyses of aggregate voting data.

Although the algebra by which a linear form for use in regression is obtained is straightforward, it is doubtless the case that some empiricists feel as we did: is this black magic? Indeed, one can find remarks in the statistical application literature which suggest that when dealing with logarithmic (or any other non-linear) transformation, caution is in order.[12]

It seemed that two tests would make us believers in the Hamblin-Soares results: first, that increases in explained variance did not automatically occur, no matter what the data, when a multiplicative was substituted for an additive model (this is our original second question); and second, using the results of the regression based on logarithmically transformed variables, it should be possible to predict the original untransformed dependent variable with the degree of accuracy indicated by the correlation associated with the regression based on transformation.

The first issue was quickly settled. Very few of the analyses attempted on aggregate data from Pennsylvania counties showed increases in prediction when a multiplicative model was used. Indeed, as Table 3 shows, for a set of three predictors and a distinct set of four predictors in both 1960 and 1964 an additive rather than a multiplicative model would account for more total variance.[13]

We turn now to the question of whether or not the analysis based on logarithmically transformed variables and the correlation coefficient associated with it seriously misrepresents the predictive power of multiplicatively written (untransformed) original measurements for these data. In the logarithmic equation the estimates of coefficients are the powers to which the various predictors are to be raised in the multiplicative equation. The constant in the logarithmic regression is the logarithm of the multiplicative constant for the multiplicative equation. As an empirical test we executed still another regression analysis.

The estimates of constants from the logarithmic regression, being estimated by least squares, are presumably unique. Hence, if a new variable is constructed using these constants to weight its components, and this is used in a simple regression on the original untransformed variables, we should expect: (1) approximately the same but slightly higher correlations, (2) a new regression constant close to zero in value, and (3) a new slope close to one in value.

The procedure is as follows: starting with the results of the logarithmic regression analysis create a new variable, X*, an index variable, given in the three variable case by

$$X^* = bX_1^{m_1}X_2^{m_2},$$

where b, m_1, and m_2 are obtained from the logarithmic regression. Next, do a simple two variable regression using X* as the predictor and obtain a new slope and intercept, b* and m*, *i.e.*, regress to obtain

$$Y = b^* + m^*X^*.$$

The correlation associated with this regression is a measure of the ability to predict the un-

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[12] The issue is whether or not variances are changed proportionately in all variables. Certainly no data will exhibit precise proportionality. What we do in the text below is exhibit a test procedure which assesses the consequences of the error that is (inevitably) introduced by transformation. The test is basically empirical. Paul G. Hoel asserts that these consequences are typically of small magnitude. See Hoel, *Introduction to Mathematical Statistics*, 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 178. On the other hand, transforming variables to meet distribution assumptions is a common practice engaged in for its statistical benefits. See for example, J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), especially pp. 44–45.

[13] Professor Hamblin has assured us that he does not always, or even usually, obtain dramatic results by resort to a multiplicative mode. Personal communication from R. Hamblin.

TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF THE SQUARE OF THE MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT FOR ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE MODELS (PENNSYLVANIA DATA)*

Multiple Predictors**	R^2			
	1960		1964	
	Additive	Multiplicative	Additive	Multiplicative
Non-white, Foreign Parents, Income Less than $3,000, and Rural Farm	.66	.56	.49	.43
Urban, White Collar, and High School or More Education	.27	.22	.20	.19

* The criterion measure was the percentage voting Democratic in both years.

** All variables are measured in percentages.

transformed original variable Y with a multiplicative model. If the correlations are not approximately the same, we have empirical, rather than methodological, grounds for suspicion.

Now consider the constants b* and m*. If the original estimates of constants were the unique least squares constants, then X* must be related to $bX_1^{m_1} X_2^{m_2}$ by an identity transformation, *i.e.*, m* should be one and b* should be zero. Otherwise the logarithmically estimated constants are not unique. This means that in our new regression b* and m* should be close to zero and one respectively, empirically.

Table 4 presents a comparison in terms of squared correlations. The comparisons of Table 4 show that the multiplicative model does as well as the logarithmic model on which it is based. The multiplicative correlation is somewhat larger and this bias becomes more pronounced as the correlation increases. The bias is not large, however, and no row shows a reduction in correlation.

TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS BASED ON LOGARITHMIC REGRESSION WITH THOSE BASED ON THE RELATED INDEX CORRELATION (PENNSYLVANIA DATA)*

Single and Joint Predictors**	Logarithmic	Multiplicative
Urban	.09	.10
Urban and Non-White	.17	.20
Foreign Parents	.38	.44
Foreign Parents and Non-White	.42	.49

* All variables are measured in percentages.

** The criterion is in each instance percent voting Democratic in 1960.

Table 5 gives the slopes and regression intercepts with standard errors for the same relationships as those of Table 4. Although there is no sampling problem here, the use of standard errors gives a measure of the magnitude of deviation from our hypotheses. The maximum error from our expectations is for the slope of the foreign parents regression, which is one and one eighth standard errors different from 1. Tables 4 and 5 are typical of what happens in all cases we have examined: correlations are slightly larger for the new regression, the slopes are close to one, and the regression constants close to zero. We conclude that empirical tests confirm the algebra—there is no black magic in the procedures advanced by Hamblin and Soares and the error introduced by transformation is small.

From the point of view of illustrating the possibilities of the paradigm set out in Table 1,

TABLE 5. SLOPES AND REGRESSION CONSTANTS FOR REGRESSION BASED ON PREDICTOR VARIABLE CONSTRUCTED FROM LOGARITHMIC REGRESSION (PENNSYLVANIA DATA)*

Predictors**	Slope	Standard Error	Regression Constant	Standard Error
Urban	1.13	0.42	−4.0	9.0
Urban and Non-White	1.20	0.27	−3.5	9.3
Foreign Parents	1.18	0.16	−6.3	7.8
Foreign Parents and Non-White	1.15	0.15	−5.5	7.4

* All variables measured in percentages.

** The criterion in each instance was percent voting Democratic in 1960.

there remains the case of a random "state of political nature." Tables 3 and 4 clearly show that it is at least empirically *possible*, interpretations aside, to obtain instances of both additive and multiplicative model superiority when judged by a correlation criterion. But how can a random "state of political nature" be created?

For this problem we offer the following solution.[14] Shuffle a random sample of United States voters and assign them to arbitrary groups of the same size. Compute percentage measures of group characteristics and proceed in analysis as if the groups were ordinary aggregate data, *i.e.*, as if they were the same as Pennsylvania counties. This procedure creates random counties by creating arbitrary environments—a lumping together of individuals who lack neighborhood and other relationships with other members of the group. The objective of the procedure was to approximate the hypothetical random state of political nature of Table 1 with systematic data, i.e., "real" observations.

If the paradigm of Table 1 is correct, then correlations associated with additive and multiplicative models should be about the same. Unfortunately our results were not that clear. Although sometimes the multiplicative model appeared superior, the preponderance of our analyses reveal a slightly better prediction for the additive model. Why is this the case? The fault lies with our conceptualization of the difference in correlations associated with the two different models. It tests only whether the predictors interact. But if predictor variables are randomly related they are independent, and this is another way of saying they do not interact. The additive model provides a theoretical representation of independent influences, but with the tools of analysis used here, this cannot be distinguished from a random state of political nature. Both random and independent political influences have the same formal representation and hence, from a technical point of view, row 3 of Table 1 is redundant for it asserts the same relationships as row 1. We found very weak relationships for the random groups. It may be that the appropriate prediction for row 3 is no relationship for either model.

IV. FINDINGS

Turning to the substantive aspects of this study, we may appropriately begin with an examination of the simple correlation arrays matching the percentage Democratic for 1960–1968 with five leading predictor variables.[15] Simple correlations are presented in Table 6.

TABLE 6. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN PREDICTOR VARIABLES: THE CASE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1960–1968*

Predictor Variable	Correlation (r) with Democratic Percentage of the Vote: 1960	1964	1968
Foreign Parents	+.72	+.58	+.68
Dem. Registration 1960	+.67	+.65	+.61
Non-White	+.41	+.23	+.32
High-school Graduate	−.13	−.12	−.09
Rural-farm	−.56	−.59	−.63

* All variables measured in percentages.

The first point of interest about this array is that it corresponds both to intuitive understanding about the mass base of party support in an industrial state and to the findings of survey analysis on the individual level: the Democratic percentage of the vote is strongly and positively correlated with ethnicity on one end of the continuum and strongly but negatively correlated with rurality on the other. Secondly, these arrays display an impressive continuity over three elections which had an extraordinary variety of short-term appeals and stimuli. There are not only no sign changes during the eight-year period, with a marginal exception in 1964; the variables also show very high continuity both in their absolute values and their ranking relative to each other.

But while this conveys an accurate picture of the profound stability of aggregate partisan allegiance, a third aspect—that of marked decline in the values of r in 1964, followed by a return nearly to 1960 levels in 1968—is also visible. It seems virtually certain that this change is intimately associated with the intense but probably mostly ephemeral short-term effect of the Goldwater campaign on voting behavior. As has been recently pointed out, the 1964 election was more heavily influenced by sectional response differentials than any other in at least a generation. In the case of Pennsylvania, as in those of other states in the Northeast, the Democratic landslide of 1964 was produced not by an across-the-board pro-Democratic surge, but by a surge which was heavily concentrated among normally Republican voting groups.[16] Such asymmetrical concentrations of shift within a given state seem to be central characteristics of temporary or permanent sectional realignment. It is obvious that to the extent that they occur, within-state differences—whether based upon cleavages associated with class, ethnicity or other factors—will be partially suppressed. The decline in overall prediction from our variables in 1964—particularly the decline in the r's associated with ethnicity and race—quite nicely captures this sectional skewing by revealing the expected decline in the explanatory power of within-state differentiations. Similarly, the resurgence in 1968, which may well be more complete than it looks because of the obsolescence of 1960 census data, must strongly imply not only that the 1964 surge was a short-lived "deviating" election situation but that in Pennsylvania the now-traditional contours of the New Deal alignment were substantially restored in 1968.

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[14] We report our results only in qualitative terms. The data were from the 1964 S. R. C. election study (courtesy of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research).

[15] As throughout this study, the Democratic percentage is of the three-party vote in 1968, and of the two-party vote in 1960 and 1964. As to the predictor variables, all are taken from the 1960 census, except for percentage Democratic of two-party registration. This is also, however, derived from a 1960 base.

A conversion of the major-party (Democratic) simple correlations to the function form $Y = bX^m$ generates an array, Table 7, which can be compared with that in Table 6.

TABLE 7. POWER FUNCTION MODEL* AND THE PENNSYLVANIA VOTE, 1960–1968**

Predictor Variables	Correlation (r) of Democratic Percentage of the Vote:		
	1960	1964	1968
Foreign Parents	+.62	+.51	+.65
Dem. Registration 1960	+.65	+.64	+.58
Non-white	+.35	+.21	+.29
High-school Graduate	−.12	−.11	−.07
Rural-farm	−.65	−.59	−.67

* Actual analysis was with Log (y) = m Log (x) + Log (b).

** All variables measured in percentages.

The most obvious conclusion to be derived from a comparison of the two tables is that, so far as major-party voting in Pennsylvania is concerned, there is generally very little difference in the explanatory power of the additive and power function models. Indeed, for all variables except percentage rural-farm, the simple linear model is somewhat to be preferred. Thus, there is no reason in such a case to prefer the more complicated interpretations associated with the power function model.

When one turns to the interrelationships between the variables in an additive multiple correlation set, Table 8, a pattern emerges which is remarkably different in its implications from that which is suggested by an array of simple correlations for each variable with the percentage Democratic of the vote.

TABLE 8. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN EXPLANATION/PREDICTION: SQUARES OF MULTIPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 1960–1968*

Predictor Variables	Partial R^2		
	1960	1964	1968
Foreign Parents	.55	.10	.32
Dem. Registration 1960	.45	.37	.31
Non-white	.26	.00	.03
High-school Graduate	.18	.01	.06
Rural-farm	.14	.27	.28
Multiple R^2	.88	.72	.80

* Degrees of Freedom = 61. All variables are measured in percentages.

What stands out here with remarkable clarity, using the partial correlation as a criterion, is the steep decline in the importance of the ethnic and racial variables, the increased importance of the rural variable, and the enduring if gradual declining significance of the registration or aggregate-party identification variable. The result is a massive short term difference in the relative weighting of the "independent" variables. Thus in 1960 ethnicity and party are the two most important factors, but these become party and rurality in 1964. The 1968 restoration, while it is a restoration, displays pointed differences from 1960. Again, the massive difference between the 1964 alignment in Pennsylvania and those which preceded and succeeded it stands out in bold relief. The loss of significance for the foreign-parents and non-white variables in 1964 is not to be understood, of course, as indicating a lessening of the absolute magnitude of support for the Democrats from such groups; to the contrary, especially among nonwhites. What is explicitly revealed is the effect of a within-state compression in which largely white, native-stock counties move more heavily toward the Democratic candidate than do those which have large concentrations of foreign-stock whites and/or nonwhites. This within-state compression, to reiterate, seems a direct consequence of the sectional impact of the Goldwater candidacy on this northeastern state. Thus, what is left to explain in within-state terms is a set of cleavages which revolve around party registration and a rural-nonrural dimension.

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[16] Burnham, "American Voting Behavior and the 1964 Election," *op. cit.*

Lest we lose sight of the curious mixture of change and continuity associated with these three elections, we pause for a moment in this discussion to present an array of much simpler data-reduction and autocorrelation measures associated with both the Democratic and Wallace votes during this period.

The data in Table 9 capture rather nicely the purely political side of Pennsylvania voting behavior at the county level during this period. The very great compression of county percentages Democratic between 1960 and 1964 comes into clear view—the variance is cut nearly in half—as is its 1968 return to a level substantially equal to that of 1960. Such a massive deviation was largely the result, first, of an anti-Goldwater movement which tended to be maximized precisely in areas of 1960 Republican strength, and, second, of a counter-movement between 1964 and 1968 which returned the aggregate profile of the state's Democratic vote back approximately to that of 1960. But this sectional distortion of 1964 only partially superseded, for the time being, the basic electoral divisions within the state: this is clearly evidenced not only by the rather high 1960–1964 autocorrelation, but also by the extremely strong 1964–1968 r, whether measured in two-party or three-party terms for the latter year. The 1968 Wallace vote on the county level stands out for its very low correlation with any major-party percentages during the whole 1960–1968 period; but this is a matter of discussion at a later point in

TABLE 9. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY, 1960–1968: THE CASE OF PENNSYLVANIA

A. Measures of Central Tendency and Dispersion

Year and Party	Variance	Standard Deviation	Mean (N = 67)	State Percentages	Difference
1960 Democratic	104.49	10.22	40.9	51.2	−10.3
1964 Democratic	59.51	7.71	60.3	65.2	−4.9
1968 Democratic (Of 3-party vote)	96.57	9.83	39.7	47.8	−8.1
1968 Democratic (Of 2-party vote)	111.31	10.55	42.8	51.9	−9.1
1968 Wallace	4.58	2.14	7.3	8.0	−0.7

B. Autocorrelations of Party Vote by County

	1960 D	1964 D	1968 D (3-party)	1968 D (2-party)	1968 Wallace
1960 D	1.000	+.869	+.932	+.941	+.006
1964 D		1.000	+.957	+.951	−.133
1968 D (3-party)			1.000	+.995	−.152
1968 D (2-party)				1.000	−.054
1968 Wallace					1.000

C. Squared Correlation Coefficients (r^2)

	1960 D	1964 D	1968 D (3-party)	1968 D (2-party)	1968 Wallace
1960 D	1.000	.756	.868	.885	.000
1964 D		1.000	.915	.905	.018
1968 D (3-party)			1.000	.990	.023
1968 D (2-party)				1.000	.003
1968 Wallace					1.000

this paper. So far as the basic political data for major-party voting in this period is concerned, the abnormality of the 1964 array stands out, but remains somewhat marginal. The political data alone suggest that continuity of aggregate voting structures through the 1964 upheaval is at least as important as that upheaval itself—at any rate, in Pennsylvania.[17]

Taken over the entire eight-year period, indeed, there is reason to assume that, while the short-term deviating effects of 1964 are again dramatically visible, the 1968 coalition is very similar to, but is not quite the same as, its 1960 predecessor. In particular, the ethnic and racial variables were markedly less important in 1968 than eight years previously, while the rural-farm variable was considerably more so. Granted the low correlations between the Wallace vote in 1968 and any of our variables presented below, it seems quite unlikely that this decline in importance for two variables and increase in importance for another between 1960 and 1968 can be directly causally related to this third-party intrusion.[18]

We have already noted that a power function model generates rather less explanatory power when correlated with major-party percentages than the additive model when one takes variables one at a time. The same relationship, not surprisingly, obtains when the model is extended to several variables. Taking the 1960 case, the pattern of Table 10 is instructive.[19] As is evident, there is little to choose between the aggregate explanatory capacity of these five variables in additive or multiplicative form. What is of considerable interest, however, is that the relative importance of each variable judged by a partial correlation criterion, results in radically *different* interpretations in the two forms. In the additive case, ethnicity looms large as the single most important of variables, with party coming in a close second. But in the multiplicative case, the party variable is clearly predominant. Which is to be preferred?

TABLE 10. WHICH MODEL DO YOU PREFER? CORRELATIONS BASED ON ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE (PENNSYLVANIA DATA, 1960)*

Predictor Variables	Partial R²	
	Additive	Multiplicative
Foreign Parents	.55	.24
Dem. Registration 1960	.45	.48
Non-white	.26	.08
High-school Graduate	.18	.02
Rural-farm	.14	.17
Multiple R²	.88	.81

* All variables measured in percentages. The dependent variable was Democratic vote.

The literature in the field—particularly the survey literature—places great stress upon the relevance of group-related characteristics in determining both party identification and voting choice by individuals.[20] Indeed, there are some spectacular recent examples, for instance in the voting behavior of Baltimore Negroes between 1964 and 1968, in which race not only virtually determined electoral choice but also assumed clear supremacy over party identification under conditions of conflict between the two.[21] On a speculative basis, we may conclude that the 1920 Republican landslide in all probability involved similar movements among ethnic voters, notably Germans and Irish Catholics. At this late date the argument that voters are anchored to partisan politics by a pre-existing network of primary and reference group relationships hardly needs elaborate defense.[22]

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[17] There is, of course, a longer historical dimension to the story which cannot receive very explicit treatment here. The 1964 variance of 59.51, for example, is the lowest in the electoral history of the state since 1940, although the Eisenhower landslide of 1956 produces an almost comparably low figure of 72.69. All others in the period show variances roughly the same as those of 1960 or 1968. Similarly, if one extends autocorrelations of contiguous pairs of elections back to, say, 1916/1920, evidences of massive realignment emerge between 1920 and 1940 which have no counterpart in the data *within Pennsylvania* for the 1960's. Thus, the squared coefficients (based on the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote except for 1924) are as follows during this period: 1916/1920: .76; 1920/1924: .77; 1924/1928: .00; 1928/1932: .46; 1932/1936: .61; 1936/1940: .91. Thereafter, except for 1956/1960 and 1960/1964, all pairs yield a squared coefficient of .91 or above. For a discussion of the changing socio-economic and demographic correlations of the Pennsylvania vote during this period, see Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Future of American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970). The appendix reports two tables relevant to these considerations.

[18] It may, unfortunately, be partly an artifact of census data which, while fitting the 1960 election closely, has become more or less obsolescent by 1968. It is more probable than not that the basic relationships among Pennsylvania's counties have not undergone sweeping changes since 1960, but only intercensal interpolation and analysis of 1970 data, once it is available, can settle this question.

[19] Patterns for major-party voting in 1964 and 1968 are similar to this.

[20] See, *e.g.*, Philip E. Converse, "Religion and Politics: The 1960 Election," in Angus Campbell *et al.*, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 96–124.

[21] The 1966 Democratic gubernatorial candidate

On the other hand, what rationale can be given for the proposition that party identification itself may predominate? While there is little point in elaborating what may be a chicken-and-egg argument, there is considerable evidence to support the view that party cannot be appropriately viewed as an exclusively dependent variable in the United States. Surveys have pointed to the significance of party identification, however established initially, in acting as a selective filter for the individual's cognition of political objects; so much so, indeed, that the availability of voters for shifts in accordance with short-term stimuli seems to be inversely and monotonically related to the strength of their perceived party identification.[23] At the extremes of strong party identification, movement can hardly occur except in the very rare case, like the Maryland 1966 election, in which the individual perceives a direct attack by his party and its candidates on his core group-related identity and values. Moreover, the electoral strategies employed by party leaders are frequently designed to prevent the erosion of party-identified perceptions and behavior by reactivating group hostilities and reinforcing the preceptual link between group and party.[24] Finally, one of the most dominant characteristics of party identification, one which has been abundantly demonstrated for the current period by survey methods and for earlier times by aggregate analysis, is its extraordinary *durability*. Once it is brought into being, it persists as a semi-autonomous determinant of perception and choice over long periods of time, and long after the group-related stimuli which brought it into being have faded from view. As Key and Munger pointed out ten years ago in their study of Indiana politics in the 1868–1900 period, the origins of American partisan commitments are frequently far more obscure and localized—even disaggregated down to the family level—than would be suspected by advocates of simple socially deterministic cause-effect relationships.[25] The truth of the matter seems to be, as Lee Benson has forcefully argued, that American voting behavior is chiefly marked by its *pluralism*. Not least among the attributes of this pluralism is the heterogeneity of predispositional factors which enter into partisan identification and partisan voting.

The point of this argument is not to make a choice between two possible "explanations" (ethnicity more important than party or conversely, partly more important than ethnicity), but to emphasize that each describes an important aspect of political reality under American conditions. The implication of different results in the two models is literally that form is substance. The additive model yields results which tend to stress the salience of group-related characteristics; the multiplicative model suggests unambiguously the supremacy of party as such as an explanatory variable. That this should be so suggests first, that which model is selected may well be a legitimate matter for research strategy, and second, that it may be very profitable for the investigator to set up comparative tables of partials and multiples, using each mode.

Our finding for the major-party vote thus far is that the additive model is superior in overall explanatory power to the multiplicative. In other words, aggregate voting behavior associated with major-party coalitions in Pennsylvania, whether measured in individual elections or over time, displays characteristics which are roughly inverse to those described by Soares and Hamblin for the "radical-left" vote in Chile. But

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received about 6% of the black vote in Baltimore, running as he did on an explicitly closed-housing platform. This contrasts with an approximately 97% Democratic of the two-party vote in 1964 and an approximately 93% Democratic of the three-party vote in 1968 in Negro precincts of Baltimore City. One of the ironies of contemporary American politics is, thus, that Negroes played a decisive role in the chain of events which was to elevate Spiro T. Agnew to the Vice-Presidency of the United States.

[22] For the nineteenth century, see Lee Benson, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 165–207 and 270–287.

[23] See, *e.g.*, Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," in Angus Campbell *et al., op. cit.*, pp. 9–39.

[24] Raymond Wolfinger, "Some Consequences of Ethnic Voting," in M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Ziegler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

[25] V. O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana," reprinted in Frank Munger and H. Douglas Price (eds.), *Readings in Political Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1964), pp. 366–384.

what effects are generated by a major third-party protest effort?

When we turn to the Wallace vote in 1968, the first salient point that can be noted from Table 9 is that its county variance is incomparably lower than the lowest major-party variance—indeed, this third-party variance of 1968 seems to be lower than in the case of any other third party casting 5% or more of the total vote in this state's electoral history—and that, as could be expected, the discrepancy between the county mean and the statewide total vote for Wallace is extremely low. In this context, it seems of particular significance that a critical differentiation occurs in the relative explanatory power of the two forms of regression model, as indicated in Table 11.

TABLE 11. THE WALLACE VOTE OF 1968: A DEVIANT CASE?

Predictor Variables* (1960 Data)	Partial R^2	
	Additive	Multiplicative
Foreign Parents	.07	.12
Democratic Registration	.02	.03
Non-white	.01	.14
High-school Graduate	.02	.00
Rural-farm	.01	.00
Multiple R^2	.07	.27

* All variables are measured in percentages.

Two aspects of this table are of paramount importance. In the first place, the county-level correlation of Wallace's percentage of the three-party vote with any available predictor variable is extraordinarily low, as is its correlation with any major-party vote in the 1960–68 period.[26] This is another way of saying that this vote cut directly across all major socio-political cleavages in Pennsylvania. Viewed in terms of this sub-universe of counties, it was a "wild vote." The inference is strong that individual responses outside ordinary group contexts were of unusually great significance in the building of Wallace's vote in this northeastern state.

George Wallace's support among Southerners and among blue-collar workers in northern cities is well known from the results of surveys and the analysis of aggregate data at the precinct level. As Table 12 reveals, this is clearly the case when the minor-civil-divisions of two counties of the Philadelphia metropolitan area are examined. Unfortunately, minor-civil-division data

TABLE 12. LEVELS-OF-ANALYSIS DIFFICULTIES? CORRELATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL VARIABLES WITH WALLACE VOTE, 1968[27]

Category Correlated	Delaware Co. Pa. (N=49)	Camden Co., N. J. (N=33)	Luzerne Co., Pa. (N=49)	Urban-Metropolitan Counties, Pa. (N=19)
Occupations (% of Males in Active Labor Force, 1960)				
Professional-Managerial	−.795	−.776	+.219	+.114
Clerical-Sales	−.567	−.698	−.349	−.131
Skilled, Semi-Skilled	+.872	+.822	−.129	−.060
Unskilled, N.A.	+.123	+.353	+.231	+.038
Political Behavior				
% Democratic, 1960	+.503	+.757	−.527	−.172
% Democratic, 1964	+.351	+.595	−.453	−.354

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[26] Research which has just been completed by several of our graduate students but not yet verified suggests the existence of similar interactivity in the Wallace vote in Georgia (43.4% of the total) and also in voting in Quebec for Real Caouette's *ressentiment*-oriented Social Credit movement in 1962. In the latter case, the vote for Progressive Conservative candidates was similarly analyzed as a "control"; the additive form of multiple correlation apparently had slightly greater explanatory power so far as Quebec voting for this Canadian major party was concerned.

[27] This table's fourth column includes the following Pennsylvania urban-metropolitan counties: Allegheny, Beaver, Berks, Bucks, Cambria, Cumberland, Dauphin, Delaware, Erie, Lackawanna, Lancaster, Lehigh, Luzerne, Montgomery, Northampton, Philadelphia, Washington, Westmoreland and York. The other three columns are based on minor-civil-decision data for the countries concerned.

for the 1968 election in Pennsylvania came to hand too late to be fully used in this study; but it would appear that similar relationships also obtain in white communities of the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. But they tend strongly to wash out at the county level, even when analysis at this level is confined to the nineteen largest SMSA counties in the state. To what extent does this represent a levels-of-analysis problem?

One may begin by noting that among Pennsylvania's metropolitan counties, the Wallace vote ranges from a high of 11.2% in Allegheny county to a low of 3.1% in Lackawanna, a county fully as "urban" in the gross census definition of the term as is Allegheny.[28] This suggests at once that, even if the relationships between the Wallace vote and class-party variables were similar from one county to another at the most minute level of aggregate analysis, the intercepts if not the slopes of the regressions would be quite diverse. A minor-civil-division correlation which lumped together stratification patterns which were generally similar but of wide geographical dispersion would produce a pretty severe erosion of the size of these correlations. Thus, for example, the Wallace percentage in a minor-civil-division in Lackawanna or Luzerne counties which had 50% of its male labor force in skilled or semi-skilled occupations would county subunit with 30% or even less; and tend to be equivalent to that of a Delaware cross-county correlations at the subunit level would reflect such local variations. Indeed, when the 122 minor divisions of four New Jersey metropolitan counties are so analyzed, this is precisely what we find.[29]

Moreover, one key to the problem seems to be provided by the results in Luzerne county. Here Wallace won 4.8% of the vote. Correlation of the Wallace percentage with occupational and political variables among its 49 comparable subdivisions yields a result which is both radically dissimilar from those of the two Philadelphia metropolitan-area counties and rather close to that yielded at the county level for Pennsylvania's metropolitan areas as a whole. A variety of explanations can no doubt be advanced for this

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[28] The Wallace vote in these metropolitan counties ranges from 3.1%, 4.1%, 4.2%, and 4.8% in Lackawanna, Lehigh, Northampton and Luzerne counties, respectively, to 9.8%, 10.6%, 10.7% and 11.2% in Beaver, Washington, Bucks and Allegheny counties, respectively.

[29] If one executes a simple linear correlation program with two independent variables—percentage professional-managerial and percentage skilled and semi-skilled in the 1960 male labor force—it can at once be seen that (a) very significant differences exist in the regression equations, the partials, the beta weights and the R^2's for four New Jersey counties at this level; and (b) an aggregation of the minor-civil division units of these four counties, taken together, yields an R^2 which accounts for only three-fifths of the variance. The arrays look like this:

County	N	$r_{12.3}$	$r_{13.2}$	$r_{23.1}$	b_1	b_2	R^2
Bergen, N.J.	61	−.868	+.907	−.945	−.103	+.810	.824
Camden, N.J.	33	−.825	+.821	−.934	−.455	+.396	.701
Hudson, N.J.	12	−.624	+.331	−.572	−.647	−.040	.391
Passiac, N.J.	16	−.513	+.483	−.648	−.346	+.258	.302
Four N.J. Counties	122	−.665	+.766	−.801	−.146	+.649	.594
Metro Counties, Pa.	19	+.114	−.060	−.766	+.164	+.065	.015

The regression equations are:

County	$Y_e =$
Bergen, N.J.	$0.501 - 0.021\ X_1 + 0.163\ X_2$
Camden, N.J.	$11.346 - 0.214\ X_1 + 0.166\ X_2$
Hudson, N.J.	$18.790 - 0.523\ X_1 - 0.029\ X_2$
Passiac, N.J.	$7.247 - 0.119\ X_1 + 0.106\ X_2$
Four N.J. Counties	$-0.143 - 0.059\ X_1 + 0.253\ X_2$
19 Metro Counties	$4.348 + 0.086\ X_1 + 0.032\ X_2$

Thus, while it is clear that a positive relationship exists between the magnitude of the Wallace vote and the percentage of blue-collar workers in New Jersey minor-civil-divisions, there is considerable variability in this relationship between the divisions in one county and another. The amount of variance in the Wallace vote which is accounted for by these two variables ranges from less than one-third to more than four-fifths.

striking divergence—for example, the durability and strength of ethnic and religious polarizations within this anthracite county, its geographical remoteness from conurbations despite its intense urbanization, and the absence of more than a trace of blacks in the population. Whatever the relative weighting which may be given to these and other possible hypotheses, the key point for our purposes is that both the intercept and the direction of the slope of the regression are utterly different as between Luzerne and Delaware counties. It is thus evident that the hypothesis of heterogeneity in the Wallace vote has validity even in the metropolitan areas of the state; the heterogeneity becomes more marked, of course, when nonmetropolitan and nonurban sources of Wallace support are added and patterns are studied for the state as a whole at the county level. Thus, while it may be the case that the low correlation of the Wallace vote with our predictor variables at the county level may involve a levels-of-analysis problem to some extent, clearly something more substantive is also present. This impression is merely reinforced by contemplation of such outcomes elsewhere as the 25.7% of the vote won by Wallace in Payette county, Idaho; his 20.8% in Alaska's 10th Election District; his 27.5% in Esmeralda county, Nevada; or, on the other hand, his failure to achieve even 5% of the vote in such Massachusetts proletarian centers as Fall River, Lawrence, New Bedford, Revere or Somerville.[30]

Secondly, the Wallace vote of 1968 provides the only convincing evidence in our series of the presence of interactive effects along the lines suggested by Soares and Hamblin. These effects, not surprisingly, are concentrated inversely between the ethnic and racial variables. It is very clear, of course, that the improvement in explanatory power by shifting from additive to multiplicative form of correlation is considerably less in absolute value than was found in the 1952 Chilean case. Even so, a result which produces a threefold increase in the explanatory power of our variables is not to be derided. That it exists at all in American conditions—far removed indeed from the world of the "radical left" in a relatively underdeveloped country—is significant enough. That it represents the only contemporary evidence of interactivity or interdependence among the predisposing variables which we have for American voting behavior is still more so. That the interactions can be traced to two variables which could intuitively be expected to interact under current conditions of escalating racial tension is gratifying—though, of course, only from an analytic point of view.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(1) *The structure and implications of the findings.*

The analysis performed here appears to cast significant light upon several major aspects of aggregate voting behavior. In the first place, we have discovered evidences of all three forms of relationships suggested in Table 1 in recent American voting behavior. The "normal case" appears to be one in which the predictor variables are more or less independent of one another. In contemporary major-party voting—at least in Pennsylvania—multiple correlations based on simple additive models appear to explain more of the variance than can be explained with a multiplicative power function model. This appears to be confirmation on the aggregate level of the proposition advanced by the authors of the Simulmatics study that predispositional factors at the individual level summate rather than multiply in the normal American case. Secondly, when we attempted to construct completely random, arbitrary "environments" composed of groups of individuals in the 1964 SRC sample, the result was a set of correlations consistent with the independence of environmental factors. Thirdly, the Wallace vote of 1968 stands out as a phenomenon which is quantitatively unique in this series, and which more closely resembles the 1952 vote of the "radical left" in Chile—and possibly the 1962 "radical right" in Quebec—than it does the apparent American norm. Finally, there are two methodological points which are worth considering: first, it is clear on both logical and empirical grounds that there is no across-the-board "black magic" in logarithmic transformation; and second, there may be a significant ambiguity which cannot be resolved on *a priori* grounds between the relative explanatory power of the contributing variables in additive and multiplicative forms, even when the multiple correlations are approximately the same.

Let us turn to the substantive implications of these findings, beginning first with the "normal case." It seems reasonable to suppose that the rather clear superiority of the additive to the multiplicative form of regression model as applied to voting for American major parties is related to some of their salient traditional characteristics. The first of these is that the major-party formations in the United States have normally been grounded on political oppositions which in most other societies would be described as marginal. These parties have both contributed actively to the maintenance of a massive national value consensus which emphasizes the primacy of the private over the public, the individual over the collective. This value system is probably the closest approximation to eighteenth-century Whiggish liberalism now in existence. It is hardly too much to say that the American political system as a whole, with its extraordinary diffusion of political power, makes sense only as a a structural precipitate of this pervasive liberal *Weltanschauung*.[31] Not surprisingly, the coalitional structure of the established political parties in a two-party system in this primordially liberal society is not specific to class, confessional or other polarizations. Of course such polarizations exist and are reflected in the structure of mass party identification and voting behavior; but they exist in a party system which has aptly been classified on comparative criteria as *heterogeneous*. This heterogeneity implies that there is a protean, labile quality to American voting coalitions that is rather unusually marked in western systems of electoral politics, and, in policy terms, ties in nicely with Theodore J. Lowi's observations that ". . . American parties represent outcomes *in general;* parties seldom shape or represent outcomes *in particular*."[32] In short, their coalitional structure no less than their organization, presupposes the normal absence of "hard oppositions" of the sort found in European politics; and it precludes any very effective coalescence of voting groups in a mass-based effort to capture the apparatus of state for positive social-transformation purposes. This too is reflective of a liberal political system one of whose most fundamental characteristics is the denial, both in theory and in operational terms, of internal or domestic political sovereignty.

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[30] The Wallace percentages in these cities were: Fall River, 2.9%; Lawrence, 3.9%; New Bedford, 4.1%; Revere, 4.8%; Somerville, 4.3%. Impressionistically, it appears that the same general pattern of relatively greater Wallace penetration in blue-collar areas than in middle-class areas obtains in Massachusetts as in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. But both the intercepts and the slopes probably vary considerably from those for either Delaware or Luzerne counties.

Such an interpretation of American politics carries with it some clear implications for its electoral-politics subsystem. There is no question that the threshold-of-representation features of the American electoral system—in particular the indivisible but immensely important office of the Presidency—have been enormously influential in maintaining and reinforcing a two-party norm in the United States.[33] But, important as they are, they do not absolutely determine the dominance of two and only two parties in the United States, much less the long-term trend over the past century for third parties to disappear, or the extent to which—both in political rhetoric and in the electoral laws of certain states such as Ohio and Nebraska—the two-party norm itself has increasingly become part of an "American celebration" in this century.

The persistence of this two-party norm, and most other of the salient peculiarities of American major-party politics for this matter, may perhaps best be explained by the thesis that questions of party or electoral politics in this country have not for the most part been questions of power. Putting the matter another way, electoral politics and voting are very rarely widely perceived here as vehicles for attacks upon any basic aspect of the social order. On only a very few occasions in our history have internal social tensions escalated to the point where serious efforts have been made to use electoral politics as a means for achieving sweeping redistribution of policy outcomes. These, of course, have been indissolubly associated with critical realignments.

The American two-party system, in short, is formed of two structural elements which share a common and most important political characteristic: the continuing supremacy of the traditional liberal middle-class value-system as it becomes concretized in terms of political demand, and the phasing out, non-recognition of morselization of potentially disruptive political demand. Such a structure and the value-system which it reflects do not preclude the existence of high levels of tension and violence in American society, but they do normally rule out the expression of active or aggressive political alienation through major electoral-politics instrumentalities.

In such a context, Theodore J. Lowi's argument that American parties are constituent rather than policy-making is reinforced.[34] What that constituent function is may perhaps be restated here: it is to contribute to the maintenance of a high wall of separation between society and polity in the interest of maximizing private, *i.e.*, middle-class, decision-making in the former. It follows from this, first, that under normal circumstances major-party electoral politics becomes something of an end in itself rather than a politically directed transformation in society which the majority coalition may think desirable; and, second, that this would be reflected in aggregate terms: that, for example, correlations based upon additive models would explain more of the variance in "normal" American electoral politics at the mass base than would correlations which reflected strong interactions among predisposing social variables.

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[31] For fuller elaboration of this argument, see Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Future of American Politics*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 7.

[32] Theodore J. Lowi, "Party, Policy and Constitution," in William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (eds.), *The American Party Systems* (New York: Oxford, 1967), p. 263.

[33] S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 1–64.

[34] Lowi, *op. cit.*

It may be here, by the way, that a possible explanation may eventually be found for the kind of semi-autonomous, extraordinarily durable and socially heterogeneous structure of party identification or aggregate party alignment which is found in the United States, and which our data has also suggested. For if the structure of traditional party identification has much to do with marginal differentials in policy outcomes and major differentials in ethnocultural prestige and recognition, it would be entirely to be expected that once set in motion, such identifications and alignments would have tremendous endurance over time and little clear relationship to policy outcomes.

(2) *Alienation and Multiplicative Power Functions: Wallace and 1968.*

The durability and marginality of American major-party operations bears with it a remarkable political stability. This stability has its price, however. It is becoming rather clear that there is a recurrent dynamic in American electoral politics; in particular an apparent oscillation, punctuated by third-party protest movements, between long-term stable phases and short but intense patterns of realignment. Very probably this peculiar pattern is a direct outgrowth of the interaction between the static, nondevelopmental or nonadaptive behavior of major-party elites, followers and structures on the one hand and a rapidly changing, politically largely unfettered socio-economic system on the other. Emergent political demand arising from these incessant social transformations tends in this political system not to be aggregated by the practitioners of a fairly closed producer-oriented, end-in-itself kind of electoral politics, until the demand has had time to reach explosive proportions. The eventual results scarcely conform to what might be expected from the equilibrium models which have often been used to analyze American politics.

That 1968 was not a year marked by profound nationwide realignment at the mass base is fairly obvious—our Pennsylvania major-party data indicate as much. But it was an election year which would rank close to the top of any imaginable scale which might measure the intensity of intergroup tensions, discontent, and aggressive hostility directed by significant elements of the public against existing institutions and leaders. Electoral politics had to compete directly through the year with the politics of direct action and confrontration up to the well-barricaded gates of the Democratic national convention itself. Insurrection within the Democratic coalition against the Johnson Administration took on such major proportions that a Republican presidential candidate could win a mere four years after one of the worst defeats in his party's history. Finally, of course, a third-party coalition of *ressentiment,* based on racial hostility and on the hostility of the periphery toward the center, won 13.6% of the three-party vote. This, it should be noted, was the second-best showing in American political history for any third-party movement which was not clearly associated with formal ruptures in the organizational structure and mass following of one of the major parties. It represents an exceptional, if regionally-concentrated, "act of aggressive hostility" against the leaders, parties and policies associated with the existing political order.[35]

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[35] Partitioning of the country between the "Greater South" (the eleven ex-Confederate states plus Oklahoma and Kentucky) and the remaining parts of the country reveals the following patterns in major third-party years since 1892:

Year	Greater South			Non-South		
	% D	% R	% Oth	% D	% R	% Oth
1892	37.9	27.3	14.8 Pop.	44.4	48.4	7.2 Pop.
1912	61.3	17.7	16.1 Prog. 4.9 Soc.	39.1	24.7	29.9 Prog. 6.3 Soc.
1924	60.0	34.2	5.8 Prog.	24.2	57.3	18.5 Prog.
1948	52.3	29.7	17.5 S.R. 0.5 Prog.	49.4	47.9	0.0 S.R. 2.7 Prog.
1968	**31.5**	**36.0**	**32.6 Wall.**	**46.3**	**45.8**	**7.9 Wall.**

It is probably appropriate to view the Southern wing of the Wallace movement as the latest, if one of the greatest, in a series of periphery-oriented revolts against a cosmopolitan center—revolts which have deeply involved, although they have been far from coextensive with, responses to efforts from the center to define citizenship in the American polity uniformly as between the races and as between one region and another. In this respect, the Wallace movement can be seen as an authentic continuation of an old regional tradition, a tradition in which colonial resentment against a dominant metropole or resistance of the periphery against the center's efforts at coordination is inextricably bound up with issues involving race relations. Thus, we find that in Oklahoma the Wallace vote is visible and positively correlated with the Socialist vote in the 1914 election, and particularly with the mean Democratic percentage of the total vote between 1932 and 1948.[36] It is also worth noting, however, that here the Wallace vote also reflects a pattern similar to that found in Pennsylvania: its variance is less than half of the 1914 Socialist variance, and one-third as large as that of the 1932-1948 mean percentage Democratic.

If it is the case that even border-South states such as Oklahoma yielded substantial shares of its vote to the 1968 insurrection against the established political order, it seems clear that the Northern wing of the movement was less "respectable" than the Southern. It seems reasonable enough to suppose that the Wallace vote in the North was composed essentially of a hard-core residue of voters who were strongly alienated from, and actively hostile to, the candidates of both major parties. The larger regional subcultural context in which they lived was not very supportive to their commitment to Wallace. Thus it appears quite reasonable to view the non-Southern Wallace vote as essentially a "radical" vote, indicating a very high intensity of political dissatisfaction by American standards.

Recapitulating our findings for Pennsylvania, we have suggested, first, that the Wallace vote correlated very weakly with all of our variables in the additive form, and that it alone revealed persuasive evidence of interaction among the "independent" variables. Such findings are entirely consistent with two hypotheses. (1) Viewed at least on the aggregate level of the county, this cutting across most or all traditionally significant group-related variables is probably indicative of a mass base which has an abnormally large component of idiosyncratic, negative, or "alienated-voter" elements. (2) The interactivity disclosed in the multiplicative model and involving two of our set of variables suggests the possibility that a "multiplicative power function" exists for this vote, and is associated with nonwhite and foreign-stock population elements. Is it possible that this is in turn linked in some way to the existence of some sort of abnormal involuntary-response phenomenon among these voters but not, it would seem, among voters for the major, "non-radical" parties?

The emergence of the Wallace movement as a mass-based phenomenon would probably be enough, taken alone, to indicate the presence of an abnormal, if perhaps transitional, stress on the American political system as a whole. If there is any one characteristic of that system which stands out above any others, it is probably its enormous inertial stability as an institutional and behavioral structure. Such stability is in turn probably dependent upon at least two conjunctures for its survival. The first of these is that our historical privatizing consensus, with its encouragement of disaggregation or "incrementalization" of policy outputs, continues to dominate the political culture. The price which this middle-class individualist consensus has exacted has been very high, particularly among the disadvantaged at the bottom of the social structure

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Not only does the Wallace movement represent the largest Southern third-party insurrection since 1860; it is surpassed in the *non-Southern* states since that date only by the 1912 and 1924 Progressives.

[36] The partial correlation of % Wallace with % Socialist in 1914 is +.316, while it is +.618 between % Wallace and mean % Democratic, 1932–1948. The latter two correlate at +.531. The relative significance of the former in correlations with the Wallace vote is clearly very small compared with the latter: $b_1 = -.017$, while $b_2 = +.627$. R^2 for both predictors = .382. Neither the partials nor the R^2 are quite as large as might have been supposed *a priori*. This corresponds to the fact that the Wallace vote was much more uniformly distributed across the state's 77 counties than were either the 1914 Socialist vote or the 1932–1948 Democratic vote. Thus, the variance for the Wallace vote was 43.52 and the standard deviation 6.60; for the 1914 Socialist vote (with a mean almost identical with the Wallace mean in 1968) the variance was 97.73 and the standard deviation 9.89; and for the 1932–1948 mean Democratic percentage the two figures were 119.69 and 10.94 respectively. The data for the latter measure were taken from Oliver Benson *et al., Oklahoma Votes* (Norman, Oklahoma: Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma, 1964), p. 18.

who have been largely virtually excluded from political participation in any form from the turn of the century until very recently.[37] But this consensus has worked admirably over the years to inhibit the rise of seriously dissonant political demand by inhibiting awareness of political man as a member of some collective sub-national entity rather than as an atomized individual acting in a political, economic, and social marketplace.

The second conjuncture which seems required is a negative one: that developments in society itself not be such as to raise overt or widespread doubts about the relevance or universality of this value consensus. Our great political upheavals of the past have apparently involved interactions between a dynamically transforming socio-economic system and a highly stable, if not static, political system. Such interactions have brought in their wake glaring and growing discrepancies between parts of the then-current American political formula and the exigencies of emergent political demand. Such also seems to be the case at the present time. But it may well be that the now well-known transformations which have occurred over the past generation in the demographic, social and economic structure of the United States have produced conditions in which the core values of this traditional individualist belief system are themselves brought into question. The major problems confronting the American polity at the present time—racial consciousness and racial antagonism, the galloping decay of the central cities, pollution of the human environment and so on—seem to arise directly from either or both of two sources: the rapidly growing dysfunctions of private-decision supremacy in the socio-economic system on the one hand, and the tendency among decision-makers to deal with collectivity problems—particularly, but not exclusively, those involving race—in morselized, individualist-liberal terms on the other. If so, then resolution of these problems may well require, among other things, some form of massively expanded central political control over and channeling of private decisions in the society and economy. Such expansion seems incompatible with the core premise of the traditional American political formula—the separation of political and social life, the dominance of private decisions in the latter sector, and the dispersion of internal sovereign power—and hence with the deeply-established behavioral and institutional structure and routines of American politics.

In Chalmers Johnson's terms, the dissynchronization which develops between political values and behavior on one hand and social transformation on the other has produced a condition of "power deflation" in the United States.[38] This is reflected in overt challenges to the legitimacy of hitherto-accepted political institutions and routines by growing segments of the public; in a widespread and increasingly self-conscious—hence aggressively hostile—political alienation which is scattered among the public and concentrated among newly politically mobilized minorities; and in perceptible increases in the magnitude and intensity of anomic behavior of an antisocial, though not necessarily political, type. It is in such periods, periods like the present, that patterns of voting can be found which diverge sharply from the "norm" identified by the voting studies of the 1950's, as well as other kinds of politically relevant behavior for which there are scarcely any domestic references at all from the literature of the 1950's. It would hardly be surprising if such patterns involved widespread responses to political stimuli of the sort which Soares and Hamblin found in a very different political and social system. In the case of the Wallace vote in Pennsylvania, they apparently do. It is, unfortunately, more than likely that the near future will reveal other instances of "acts of aggressive hostility" for scholars to examine.

(3) *Implications for further research*

Our findings, particularly when taken in tandem with the Soares-Hamblin study, suggest with some clarity that multiple correlation analysis based on interactive theoretical models is highly useful and might well be employed in a wide range of comparative studies of aggregate voting behavior. There are a number of questions regarding such use which remain unanswered.

One of these might be called the question of the "institutionalization" of a definably radical vote. Allende, for example, made his first of several bids for the presidency of Chile in 1952, winning 5.5% of the vote. By 1958 his vote had risen to 28.9%. It would be useful to ascertain whether, as the base of Allende's coalition expanded, the multiplicatively written variables retained the clear superiority of explanatory power in 1958 which they had over their additive form in 1962. It would be similarly desirable to learn whether the radical vote in other countries with a tradition of electoral support for the far Left which is both stable and substantial—France and Italy, for instance—manifest similar evidence of multiplicative relationships.

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[37] See, e.g., E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), pp. 97–113; Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," this REVIEW, LIX (1965), 7–28.

[38] Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 27–33.

A second area of uncertainty which might profitably be studied is the possibility that the vote for stable clientele parties in multi-party systems might generally fit into the "interactive" end of our paradigm, while the vote for more broadly-based "portmanteau" parties of a majority bent might display non-interactive characteristics similar to those associated with American major-party voting. One very recent discussion of German electoral politics has developed a finding which is particularly intriguing in this context: that the absolute magnitude of the vote for the CDU is strongly and inversely related over time with the absolute number of non-voters—in other words, that it has the same sawtooth characteristics as between "general" and "off-year" elections in the 1949-65 period as does American major-party voting—while the SPD vote in the same period describes an almost completely smooth linear increase.[39] Does this phenomenon indicate the kinds of differences in mass electoral support which can be captured by multiple-correlation analysis based on interactive models?

Finally, let us return to the American case. The discovery that the multiplicative model has greater explanatory power for the 1968 Wallace vote than does the additive raises a number of significant questions. Transitional stages marked by major third-party efforts and by rapid escalations in ideology and politically-related violence are not unique to the 1960's, but seem to have periodically recurred throughout American electoral history. Duncan MacRae, among others, has noted that major third-party movements seem to be integrally related to the processes of realigning change in the system, and serve as halfway houses for large numbers of voters who are en route from one major-party commitment to another.[40] While generalization is a tricky business, it may be suggested that, on the whole, such third-party movements have in the past tended to occur during the earlier stages of realignment.

If an appropriate model of American electoral politics over time is that of dynamic transformation, with interactions between long-term stable phases of party alignment and short-lived but massive bursts of realignment, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that predispositional factors entering into aggregate voting behavior would undergo sweeping changes associated with the realignments. In conjunction with this, certain questions can be asked.

(1) Is the superiority of the additive to the multiplicative theoretical form in explaining American major-party voting a constant or universal phenomenon? Or, on the other hand, might there be systematic differences in the relative explanatory power of the two forms dependent upon the existence or the absence of political realignment in the period being examined?

(2) Granted the development of an unidirectional set of changes in American voting behavior during the period 1904–1920, was the nineteenth-century major-party vote as clearly non-interactive as it is at present, or were the relationships between the explanatory capacity of the additive and multiplicative forms significantly different even during "stable phases" from the present?

(3) Does voting for other and earlier third party protests reveal a superiority of multiplicative to additive models similar to that of the Wallace vote in Pennsylvania or not?

Assuming that the theoretical argument developed by Soares and Hamblin is at least oriented in the right direction, assuming further that there is no as yet undetected factor which would serve to cast doubt upon the validity of the technique used, and assuming finally that the propositions presented here about American electoral politics are generally valid, it is easy enough to construct the following set of hypotheses. (1) Electoral alignments under "stable-phase" conditions will probably best be explained by an additive model, since American major parties are essentially "constituent" rather than policy-oriented, and are loose, majority-bent coalitions of horizontally linked elements. (2) Major third-party movements arise out of the failures, which tend to be cumulative, of the old party leadership to aggregate emergent political demand. It may be supposed (a) that where such third-party movements can be identified as organizational fractures of one of the two older party organizations, as with the Democrats in 1860 and the Republicans in 1912, the vote for these third parties will be approximately as strongly additive as the vote for the parent party in the same or contiguous elections; and (b) that where such insurgent movements arise as "grass-roots phenomena" outside the leadership-organizational structure of the two old parties, as in 1892, 1924, or 1968, multiplicative relationships may prove of greater explanatory power than additive ones. (3) Since ideological polarization seems to be a manifest characteristic or realigning elections at the level of elites, and since such elections produce abnormally large shifts in the mass base of support for the two major parties, it is plausible to suppose at the very least that the superiority of the explanatory power of additive correlations over multiplicative ones is drastically and systematically reduced in such periods. It may even be the case that significant evidence of interaction among predisposing variables will be found for one or more of the major parties' votes in such elections.

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[39] Klaus Liepelt and Alexander Mitscherlich, *Thesen zur Wahlerfluktuation* (Frankfurt a/M, 1968), pp. 32-36.

[40] Duncan MacRae, Jr., and James A. Meldrum, "Critical Elections in Illinois: 1888–1958," this REVIEW, LIV (1960), 669–683.

Such hypotheses can, of couurse, only be tested by further research. As of now, however, the prospects seem good that the techniques discussed in this article will prove useful in increasing our understanding of the process involved.

APPENDIX

The two tables below report more completely the data for footnote 17.

TABLE A1

Pennsylvania: Measures of Central Tendency and Dispersion based on Counties, 1940–1968

Year and Party	Variance	Standard Deviation	County Mean	State %	Difference
1940 Democratic*	90.11	9.49	46.6	53.5	−6.9
1944 Democratic	94.05	9.70	43.2	51.4	−8.2
1948 Democratic	103.42	10.17	41.5	48.0	−6.5
1952 Democratic	103.32	10.16	38.6	47.0	−8.4
1956 Democratic	72.69	8.53	36.4	43.4	−7.0
1960 Democratic	104.49	10.22	40.9	51.2	-10.3
1964 Democratic	59.51	7.71	60.3	65.2	−4.9
1968 Democratic (3-party)	96.57	9.83	39.7	47.8	−8.1
1968 Democratic (2-party)	111.31	10.55	42.8	51.9	−9.1
1968 Wallace	4.58	2.14	7.3	8.0	−0.7

* Percentages and the measures based on them are Democratic of the two-party vote, except in 1968.

TABLE A2

Comparisons in Autocorrelations of Contiguous Pairs of Presidential Elections, 1916–68: Pennsylvania and the United States

Election Pair (Percentage Democratic)	*U.S.A.* (States)		*Pennsylvania* (Counties)	
	r	r^2	r	r^2
1916–1920	+.90	.81	+.87	.76
1920–1924	+.98	.96	+.88	.77
1924–1928	+.75	.56	+.06	.00
1928–1932	+.78	.61	+.68	.46
1932–1936	+.94	.88	+.78	.61
1936–1940	+.90	.81	+.96	.91
1940–1944	+.98	.96	+.96	.91
1944–1948	+.96	.92	+.96	.92
1948–1952	+.74	.55	+.96	.92
1952–1956	+.60	.36	+.97	.95
1956–1960	+.54	.29	+.86	.74
1960–1964	−.11	.01	+.87	.76
1964–1968 (3-party)	+.86	.74	+.96	.92
1964–1968 (2-party)	+.23	.05	+.95	.91

FORMS OF REPRESENTATION: PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR IN THE COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM

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Debate over representation has been a continuing part of the Western political tradition at least since the writings of Hobbes. Recently, Hanna Pitkin, using the tools of linguistic analysis, has clarified, if not resolved, the debate by examining the disparate uses of the term in both political and non-political discourse.[1] In order to elucidate the issues, she discussed such different forms of representation as formal representation, descriptive representation, substantive representation and interest representation. In this paper I will utilize the distinctions she has developed as a framework for analyzing the process of representation within the community action program of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) during its initial formative period (1964–1966) in the cities of Chicago, Philadelphia and New York City.[2]

I will argue that 1) the manner of selecting representatives of the poor (formal representation) was a function of the political resources of competing interests in the city; 2) the orientations (interest representativeness) of the formal representatives affected their influence (actual representation); 3) the influence (actual representation) of the formal representatives affected the level of intra-neighborhood conflict, which in turn affected the representatives' orientations (interest representation); 4) the character of the actual and interest representation was affected by the type of formal representation; and 5) the social characteristics of the representatives (descriptive representation) influenced the character of actual and interest representation.

I. FORMS OF REPRESENTATION

The formalistic view of representation, as Pitkin described it, conceives of representation "in terms of formal arrangements which precede and initiate it."[3] It was Hobbes who used *formal representation* as the lynch-pin to hold together his Leviathan, the state in which all members of the political community had authorized the sovereign to exercise for them their political rights. Representation was in no way related to the substance of the acts of the sovereign; representation inhered only in the formal arrangements which preceded these acts. Hobbes' view was altered but not fundamentally changed with the development of democratic theory; the new formula focused on elections "as a grant of authority by the voters to the elected officials."[4] According to this view, anyone holding public office is a representative of the electorate who selected him. Formal representation, then, is representation dictated solely by the arrangements which establish the way in which the representative is selected.

Such a view enables one to specify rather easily *for whom* the individual is acting as representative. Whether or not an alderman takes a

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[1] Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

[2] The field research for this paper was conducted between June, 1965 and August, 1966. All statements refer only to community action program developments prior to August, 1966. Semi-structured interveiws with over 175 political actors in the three cities and in Washington, D.C. were held during the course of the research. Respondents included representatives of the poor, public officials, heads of public and private welfare agencies, civil rights leaders and newspaper reporters. In addition, the research involved detailed inspection of newspaper coverage, review of minutes of community action agency committee meetings, attendance at neighborhood and citywide poverty meetings, and examination of public and private documents. Statements in the text are thus based on the close familiarity with the program in the three communities that is achieved through discussion with a wide range of political actors. In all cases, reports of the behavior of actors is based either on written evidence or on oral evidence from several actors speaking from various perspectives. A more detailed description and analysis of the community action program in these three cities can be found in Paul E. Peterson, "City Politics and Community Action: The Implementation of the Community Action Program in Three American Cities" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967).

I wish to express my appreciation to the Russell Sage and Woodrow Wilson Foundations for assistance which made this research possible. I am indebted to J. David Greenstone, Theodore Lowi, Duncan MacRae, and Michael Lipsky for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

[3] Pitkin, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

narrow, parochial view or a broad, city-wide view of his responsibilities, he is still formally representative of the members of his ward, not of the city as a whole. Members of farmer advisory committees elected by farmers are formally representative of the farmers, not of the public as a whole. Individuals appointed to a labor relations board by the President formally represent the President, not the labor movement—even if they are all ex-union leaders themselves.

With such an understanding of representation it seems difficult to speak of an individual as being more or less formally representative, a difficulty which provides Pitkin with one of her reasons for rejecting as inadequate this definition of the term. This, however, is true only when speaking from the perspective of the representative. From the perspective of the constituency it is possible to say which of its representatives is formally the most representative. The criterion is the directness by which the population formally selects its representative. The more indirect the selection process, the less the formal representation. Thus, the change from electing United States Senators by the state legislature to electing them directly by the voters was a move toward greater formal representation of the voters by their Senators.

Formal representation, as the name implies, refers only to the arrangements by which the representative is selected; it in no way takes into account characteristics of the representative himself. For an interpretation of the concept that stresses the representative's characteristics, it is necessary to consider what Pitkin calls *descriptive representation.* Descriptive representation refers to the extent to which the representatives reflect accurately the characteristics of those whom they formally represent. Since no representative can reflect his constituents in all respects, it is necessary to state which characteristics determine representativeness. The representatives' social class, ethnic or racial background, age, and place of residence have all been considered by analysts and political actors as politically relevant social characteristics which affect descriptive representation. The social characteristics deemed politically relevant have no *a priori* standing, however, and in fact have changed considerably over time and from place to place. This provides Pitkin with one of her reasons for rejecting the socially descriptive definition of representation as inadequate.[5]

Since neither the formal nor the socially descriptive understandings of representation refer to the substantive behaviour of the representative, additional interpretations of representation must be examined in order to develop a typology of *substantive representation,* i.e., representation which takes into account the "realm of action."[6] Two aspects of the actions of representatives must be considered in order to assess the character of substantive representation—the representative's *influence* and his *orientation.* Ignoring momentarily the representative's orientation, it can be argued that the more influential the representative, the more effective his substantive representation. Thus, senior members of Congress argue that their position on influential committees makes them more effective representatives than their aspiring opponents would be. The degree of *actual representation* is thus a function of the representative's influence.[7]

However, influence alone cannot measure the quality of substantive representation; the extent to which the orientation of the representative is in accord with the interests of his constituents must also be assessed. But we encounter at this point a controversy of considerable complexity. Those who believe that interests of constituents cannot be known apart from their stated preferences have debated persistently for generations with those who believe that constituents have interests of which they may not be aware. Simply stated, the argument revolves around the question: Do people's *interests* include their needs as well as their wants? Although Pitkin's solution to this question is too complex to discuss adequately here, essentially she argues that

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[5] *Ibid.,* Ch. IV. Pitkin includes accurate reflection of political opinions as well as social characteristics within her definition of descriptive represention. Since we will confine our use of descriptive representation to considerations of social characteristics, we will call this *socially descriptive representation.*

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 111.

[7] Actual representation may be distinguished from symbolic representation. As Pitkin argues, "We distinguish practical activity rationally directed toward bringing about 'real' goals . . . from expressive, symbolic actions." *Ibid.,* p. 102. This latter form of representation, she says, "need have little or nothing to do with . . . enacting laws desired by the people." p. 106. Insofar as all formal representatives have the capacity to stimulate some favorable response among their constituents, symbolic representation is, to some extent, always present. Thus, where actual representation is almost nil, as it was in Chicago's community action program, it could be characterized by "only symbolic representation." In order to avoid introducing still another form of representation into the analysis, we have instead classified Chicago simply as "very low" on actual representation.

> the representative must act in such a way that there is no conflict [between representative and represented], or if it occurs an explanation is called for. He must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented without good reason in terms of their interest, without a good explanation of why their wishes are not in accord with their interest.[8]

Such a position, though not unreasonable, raises considerable problems for the empirical social scientist. In trying to establish which of two representatives is substantively acting in the most representative fashion, it becomes necessary for the analyst to secure intersubjective agreement on the quality of the reasons the representative gives for his disagreement with his constituents.

This and other difficulties have led many social scientists to equate interests with preferences of individuals. The objection here, as Pitkin and others have stressed, is that such an equation departs drastically from ordinary usage of the word.[9] One small example can illustrate this point. There is a tendency for preferences of individuals to change rapidly even when it is difficult to see any change in their interests. Such behavior is commonly referred to as changes in the individual's awareness of his interests rather than changes in the interests *per se*.

The concept of role provides a means by which this Gordian knot may be cut—at least for purposes of social analysis. A major reason for the difficulty in specifying a man's interests independent of his preferences is the complexity of factors which combine to make him a unique individual. The concept of role, however, selects out from the multitude of relationships that comprise the totality of an individual's social action and focuses on those patterns of behavior of interest to the analyst. The purpose of such a concept is to simplify for analytic purposes the subject for inquiry. Among other things, role analysis simplifies use of the concept of interest. Whereas determining the policies that are in the interest of, *i.e.*, are "good for," an individual is indeed difficult, it is a far easier task to specify policies that would enhance the desirability of performing a particular role. Policies which improve the life chances of incumbents of specific roles by increasing the wealth, power and/or prestige associated with the role serve their role interests, whether or not the role incumbents are in favor of these policies.[10] Thus, the representative provides more or less interest representation for individuals performing certain roles according to the extent to which he favors policies improving the life chances of the role incumbents. In the following analysis, then, interest representation will refer only to role as distinct from personal interests.

As long as the representative's influence is so marginal that actual representation is virtually nil, his orientation is not significant for determining the form of substantive representation. When actual representation does occur, however, it is possible to specify at least three points along a continuum ranging from negative to positive interest representation. A representative whose actions are oriented against improving the role interests of his constituents may be said to provide *negative representation.* This category will be of no concern to us in this exercise.

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[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 209–210.

[9] *Ibid.*, Ch. IX–X. Also, see Richard Flatham, *The Public Interest* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), *passim.*

[10] In attempting to identify the public interest with the interests of institutions, Samuel Huntington presupposes an argument along the lines I have set forth. Huntington argues that "Institutional interests differ from the interests of individuals who are in the institutions. . . . Individual interests are necessarily short-run interests. Institutional interests, however, exist through time; the proponenent of the institution has to look to its welfare through an indefinite future." "Political Development and Decay," *World Politics,* XVII (April, 1965), 412–413. But institutions are only complexes of role relations which individuals wish to sustain. In order to attribute interests to institutions, one must initially distinguish between personal and role interests. Speaking of the interests of institutions independent of the preferences of those with the authority to speak for the institution is thus perfectly parallel to speaking of role interests independent of the opinions of those occupying the social role.

Another solution to the problem of defining interests is to use the concept for heuristic purposes only. It can be argued, as does Ralf Dahrendorf, that it is analytically useful to postulate objective role interests in order to explain social conflict and social change. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 173–179. This solution rests on the explanatory power of making such an assumption about role interests. Although J. David Greenstone and I have adapted Dahrendorf's assumptions to the analysis of race conflict in our study of *Politics and Participation,* to be published by the Russell Sage Foundation, in this paper I am arguing that one can identify objective role interests on quite separate grounds. As Pitkin has pointed out, ordinary language usage justifies a definition of interest that is not simply dependent on the subjective feelings and desires of the individual.

Substantive action which seeks to improve the life chances of specific individuals among all those performing the designated social role may be called *particularistic interest representation.* Perhaps the best illustration of such representation is the machine politician who represented lower and working class immigrants.[11] In a style that accorded with particularistic norms familiar to the European villager, the friendly precinct captain could find "help" when a constituent needed emergency fuel, shoes for his children, or even a low-paying but badly needed job. Such actions, however, assist only particular individuals within a broad social classification.

Actions which seek to improve the life chance of all incumbents of the social role in question may be called *universalistic interest representation.* The welfare state, which has developed employment, housing, welfare, and health policies that have improved the life chances of the working classes, is the product of working class interest representation more universalistic in that it improves the conditions of nearly all those performing such a social role. Thus it may be said that universalistic interest representation provides *more* substantive representation that particularistic interest representation, which improves the life chances of only particular individuals within the role classification.

II. CONFLICT OVER FORMAL REPRESENTATION

The means of providing formal representation was one of the most hotly contested political issues during the formative period of the community action program.[12] Social engineers in the federal government sought to strengthen the political resources of low income and minority groups as part of the war against poverty.[13] Relying on the requirement in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 that community action programs be "developed, conducted and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served," federal officials within OEO issued regulations requesting that local communities specify the ways in which their programs would foster such participation.[14] The details by which this could be achieved were difficult to specify. However, it was immediately apparent that direct mass participation in policy formulation by low income or any other residents of the city was impossible. As normative and empirical political scientists have recognized for centuries, the participation of any segment of society in decision-making can only occur indirectly through the actions of its representatives. Political conflict over formal representation developed as conflicting factions sought arrangements facilitating the selection of representatives who would act in a manner consistent with their interests. OEO's early administrative "rule of thumb," which was later written into law by Congress, required that at least one-third of the policy-making body for local community action programs consist of representatives of the poor, chosen "whenever feasible" in accord with "traditional democratic approaches and techniques."[15] Even as the Congressional enactment requiring "maximum feasible participation was open to a variety of interpretations, so was this administrative guideline. Consequently, political action shifted from the national to the local arena, as local communities sought to develop a formula which both reflected power relations in the community and fell within OEO guidelines.

The mayors of New York, Chicago and Philadelphia all sought to control the appointments to the city poverty council. Robert Wagner of New York articulated the common mayoral reaction in testimony before a Congressional committee:

> When I testified a year ago, I urged that the local governing bodies, through their chief executives or otherwise, should have the ultimate authority, as they have the ultmiate responsibility, for . . . the conduct and operation of the anti-poverty program.[16]

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[11] See, for example, descriptions of the machine in Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Random House, 1955) and Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, *Politics, Planning and The Public Interest* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1955).

[12] The analysis of the political determinants of the arrangements for formal representation, which we are only able to sketch here, can be found in J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, "Reformers, Machines and the War on Poverty," in James Wilson (ed.), *City Politics and Public Policy* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), pp. 267–292.

[13] John C. Donovan, *The Politics of Poverty* (New York: Pegasus, 1967), pp. 41–43.

[14] U.S. Congress, *An Act to Mobilize the Human and Financial Resources of the Nation to Combat Poverty in the United States,* Public Law 88-452, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, p. 9.

[15] Office of Economic Opportunity, *Community Action Program Guide* (Washington, D.C., 1965), I, p. 18.

[16] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Education and Labor, *Hearings, Examination of the War on Poverty Program,* 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 483.

An early unpublished document of the Richard Daley Administration in Chicago stated the mayor's position in more convoluted yet more revealing language:

> Chicago believes the role of active and constructive citizenship cannot be imposed on the poor person by participation in an action committee which has ignored his personal development. That if development is postponed in order to involve the poor person immediately in committee action roles, his involvement may frequently lead to the negative involvement of protest.

Mayor James Tate echoed these sentiments in a letter to the *Philadelphia Bulletin:*

> Knowledgable Philadelphians appreciate the fact that it was the *city's* responsibility [as distinct from that of a body including representatives selected by the poor] to . . . get the beginnings of a program underway. . . .[17]

While the mayors in the three cities agreed that the city poverty council should be appointed by the chief executive, neighborhood groups in low income and black communities argued for selection of representatives of the poor by community organizations. Coalitions of these community organizations in New York and Philadelphia sought to establish the principle that at least one-third of the members of the city poverty council as well as all of the members of neighborhood councils should be selected by neighborhood organizations. In Chicago no coordinated opposition to the mayor's plan for appointing representatives was ever mounted, but sporadic criticisms were levied against mayoral appointments by one or two of the better organized and more militant neighborhood groups. Significantly, at no time did neighborhood groups in any city call for direct election of the representatives to the city poverty council; in place of mayoral appointment, they preferred election at meetings of existing neighborhood organizations. Neighborhood groups, as did mayors, preferred a means of providing formal representation which they themselves could control.

Although the polarization of conflict in the three communities was similar, the eventual arrangements for providing for formal representation of the poor on the city poverty councils differed considerably. Philadelphia's process of selecting the policy-making committees for its community action program provided the most formal representation. It was decided that representatives would be elected by residents living in low income sectors of the city, which were divided into twelve areas. The residents in each of these areas elected in May, 1965 twelve representatives who formed a neighborhood council.[18] Each of these councils elected, in turn, one of their number to sit on the city poverty council.[19] The neighborhood council was thus elected directly by low income area residents, and the citywide representatives were just one step removed from direct popular election.

In New York City there was less formal representation, because only organizational representatives could participate in the election of the neighborhood council. During the summer and fall of 1965, community conventions were held in twelve of the sixteen neighborhood areas into which the low income sectors of the city had been divided.[20] Organizations in the neighborhood were invited to send delegates to the convention, which elected representatives to the neighborhood council. The council then selected delegates to the city poverty council.

Chicago's selection process provided the least formal representation of the poor in the community action program. The neighborhood council was appointed by the director of the local neighborhood service center, who also selected the delegate from his neighborhood to the city poverty council.[21] Since the director was chosen by the executive director of Chicago's poverty program, a political appointee of the mayor, the representatives were indirectly selected by the mayor.

These varying arrangements for formal representation of the poor reflected the balance of power between the mayor and the organized voices of the black community. The neighborhood groups were in the strongest bargaining position in New York City, because the political leader supervising the poverty program was seeking vital political support from liberal and civil rights organizations in a closely contested mayoral election.[22] In Chicago the lack of significant opposition to a mayor supported by a powerful political machine deprived community groups of essential allies; anticipating the strength of their opponent, they failed to mount a sustained drive for greater control over the selection of representatives.[23]

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[17] Emphasis added. *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin,* February 8, 1965.

[18] The proper name for these councils varied from city to city. For purposes of simplicity and in order to emphasize inter-city comparisons, we shall refer to all of them as "neighborhood councils."

[19] Again, I am avoiding the use of proper titles.

[20] Procedures in the other four areas were even less formally representative; community leaders came together, formed an organization, and were recognized by the City as the policy-makers for the community action program in the neighborhood.

[21] Toward the end of my research, in the spring of 1966, it seemed that at least one representative from each neighborhood to the city poverty council would soon be chosen by the council instead of the director.

We are substituting a more general descriptive name for the proper title of Chicago's service centers in order to emphasize inter-city comparability.

Interestingly enough, Philadelphia's elections, which were given nationwide newspaper publicity, were a compromise that was the first preference of neither the mayor nor the neighborhood groups. A black political ally of the mayor advocated elections as a means of curtailing criticism of mayoral dominance without giving the protesting organizations control of the program. The proposal split the coalition of neighborhood groups, some of whom boycotted the elections, some of whom sought to elect their members to neighborhood councils. The compromise reflected the political support for the mayor, who was stronger than New York's but weaker than Chicago's.[24] He felt he must obviate sustained public criticism, but he did not believe it necessary to capitulate to demands for representation by the organized opposition.

III. SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION: THE INFLUENCE AND ORIENTATIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE

These varying patterns of formal representation in the three cities were associated with variations in the patterns of actual and interest representation. In this section we will first compare the community action programs on these two dimensions along which substantive representation varied and then show the way in which particularistic interest representation led to declining levels of actual representation. Representatives of the poor in Chicago provided almost no actual representation, the representatives in Philadelphia provided moderate amounts of actual representation, and in New York actual representation was considerable. The bases for making these assessments of the influence of the representatives were 1) the extent to which neighborhood councils controlled poverty resources, including the selection of staff, the allocation of funds, and the determination of local programs, and 2) the degree to which the funds allocated were distributed to independent neighborhood groups.

If formal representation was low in Chicago, substantive representation in the city was equally so, for the representatives scarcely had any influence over the operations of the community action program.[25] The neighborhood service centers carried on their activities with little or no direction by local neighborhood councils. Although the councils could "review" and "recommend" programs and policies, they had no authority over the operations of the center. They did not even have the authority to participate in the selection of the personnel for the neighborhood programs. It is true that the neighborhood council had the authority to spend a limited amount of money each year (somewhere between $25,000 and $50,000), provided that the money was administered by the service center personnel; but in practice the center staff decided the purpose for which these funds were spent, a decision which was then ratified by the neighborhood council. Moreover, as of January, 1966, small sums had been given only to four neighborhood groups in Chicago, amounting to but 2.2 percent of the total community action appropriation.

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[22] The declining political strength of the New York City mayor, who must contend with a virile reform movement, is described in a number of penetrating analyses of New York politics. See Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1965); Theodore J. Levi, *At the Pleasure of the Mayor* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964); James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966); and Edward N. Costikyan, *Behind Closed Doors* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1966). The relationship between the political strength of the mayor and the development of the community action program in all three cities is analyzed in Greenstone and Peterson, "Reformers, Machines . . . ;" *op. cit.*

[23] The power of the mayor in Chicago politics is well described in Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

[24] Although the style of politics has changed somewhat since this book was written, the best published introduction to Philadelphia's politics is James Reichley, *The Art of Government* (New York: Fund for the Republic, 1959).

[25] This analysis is based on research in three of Chicago's seven neighborhood service centers, including a white and Puerto Rican community on the North Side, a better organized, more stable Negro community on the South Side, and a disorganized slum providing the first home for southern Negro migrants on the West Side. I wish to thank Isaac Balbus, Marguerite Barnett and Rennie Davis for granting me their permission to use material they have gathered on Chicago's community action program. More supporting evidence for the argument presented here can be found in Peterson, *op. cit.*, Ch. III.

Not only were Philadelphia's representatives elected directly by voters in poverty areas, but they initially had considerably more influence over the community action program than their Chicago counterparts. Nonetheless, throughout the first two years actual representation steadily declined.[26] In the beginning, the representatives of the poor had been able to revise substantially a planned parenthood proposal so that it would include services rather than be purely educational.[27] But this kind of contribution to policy-making declined rapidly after the first few months of the program. For a small but significant illustration, in the summer of 1965 the newly elected representatives turned down a staff request seeking permission to join a national association of community action agencies formed to lobby Congress and the OEO. In the following summer, however, the representatives of the poor unanimously agreed to join the association; by this time they seldom turned down the staff's recommendations. On the other hand, during the first two years of the program the city poverty council allocated 16 percent of the community action funds to neighborhood and minority groups, which was considerably higher than the comparable figure for Chicago. Moreover, the representatives obtained considerable influence over the hiring of "nonprofessional" employees. They appointed hundreds of employees hired both by public and private agencies operating community action programs and by their own neighborhood service centers. Thus, it was an especially dramatic instance of declining power when in the spring of 1966 the representatives relinquished their authoritative control over the director of the neighborhood service center in exchange for the possibility that they could be hired to work in the service center. The service center, which had been under the formal control of the neighborhood council, came under the direction of the central staff, much as was the case in Chicago.[28]

Even though representatives were selected by neighborhood organizations rather than directly by the voters, actual representation was nonetheless greater in New York City than in Philadelphia. First of all, more than 46 percent of the community action funds were allocated to neighborhood and minority groups.[29] Also, neighborhood councils won increasing influence over the development of the community action program. In two of the three communities studied, the locally selected leadership had the status of independent contractors with the city government and controlled their own funds once the contract had been signed. Even in the other community which did not have this status, the local neighborhood council was successful in maintaining a large measure of local control over the selection of personnel, the determination of local programs, and the expenditure of community action funds.

This variation in the level of actual representation among the three cities was directly correlated with the variation in the level of interest representation. In New York representatives articulated universalistic interests, in Philadelphia they were oriented towards particularistic interests, and in Chicago they lacked influence to provide either positive or negative interest representation. In order to reach these assessments concerning the level of universalistic representation, we examined the extent to which representatives fulfilled OEO expectations that they would use their position to strengthen the political resources of their communities. Data were collected on 1) the extent to which the resources at the disposal of the neighborhood councils were actually used to organize neighborhood residents, and 2) the extent to which representatives, neighborhood councils, and organizations under their supervision articulated demands aimed at changing the quality of services to the poor.

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[26] In addition to observation of citywide developments in Philadelphia, research was conducted in three randomly-selected neighborhood council areas. This research is reported in further detail in *ibid.*, Ch. IV.

[27] Arthur B. Shostak, "Containment, Co-option, or Co-determination?" *The American Child,* XLVII (November, 1965), 17.

[28] Since the representatives of the poor continued to have some influence over employment of "nonprofessionals," it is an exaggeration to say, as did one close observer of the program, that the "poor were rendered as powerless as ever." Arthur B. Shostak, "Urban Politics and Poverty," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1966, p. 2 (Mimeographed.) Yet the fact is that this same observer had earlier reported such a glowing picture of poor people participating in policy-making that the statement clearly discloses the declining representation of the poor in Philadephia. See the article in footnote 27 for the earlier, optimistic analysis.

[29] Because of the need to examine operating programs in a city where the community action program was slow in being implemented, we selected for investigation the first three neighborhoods in which a community action program was operating. Thus, although data on citywide developments were collected, this report draws largely upon developments on the Lower West Side of Manhattan, in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn, and in East Harlem. New York's community action program is discussed in greater detail in Peterson, *op. cit.*, Ch. V.

Since the representatives in Chicago lacked influence, they were unable to provide universalistic interest representation. Instead, the community action program was operated in accord with the policy of the Daley Administration, which felt that political action in black neighborhoods was undesirable. As a leading local official pointed out to a federal observer: "[It] is through the public bureaucracies with their professional staff that mayors must now build their reputations with the poor and minority groups of the city." In accord with this emphasis, neighborhood service centers, which were the primary institutional expression of Chicago's poverty program, co-ordinated a wide variety of governmental services to the poor. The employees of the center were trained to provide personal services rather than to channel group demands; political activists were reprimanded and, in some instances, fired. The neighborhood service centers were efficient, highly bureaucratized institutions whose mission, as stated by personnel throughout the organization's structure, did not include strengthening the neighborhood's political resources. Nor did the representatives themselves make broad political demands for new policies that would improve the life chances of the members of their community. Neither the neighborhood councils nor the neighborhood service center employees encouraged voter registration drives or group efforts directed toward improving education, welfare, or housing facilities.

The representatives in Philadelphia had greater influence on the development of the community action program, but they were, for the most part, oriented towards securing particularistic benefits for themselves and their friends rather than towards promoting broad, universalistic changes in government policy. Thus, the two issues which dominated much of the discussion during the first two years of the program were 1) payment to the neighborhood council representatives for their services, and 2) neighborhood council influence over the hiring of poverty employees in their neighborhoods.

The great majority of neighborhood representatives felt that they should be paid. Monthly stipends for the representatives were proposed, grants to attend an in-house training institute received the backing of university professors, actual employment on the staff of the poverty agency was practiced, and, finally, generous expense allotments for the representatives were decided upon. Although the local poverty agency was receptive to these demands of the representatives of the poor, OEO refused to condone such use of limited poverty funds. Nonetheless, throughout much of the first year, elected representatives did hold jobs with the poverty agency, and only after a major confrontation between the City and the federal government did such practices diminish.

The representatives' influence over personnel selection was exercised, in many cases, on behalf of close friends and relatives. A minority of representatives objected to this practice in terms such as the following:

> "They get mothers, brothers, neighbors, and people they owe favors [for the available jobs]. I had my husband apply, because at least he's qualified."
>
> "The trouble is that a few of them get all the jobs for their friends. I have recommended people, but they don't get jobs. You can't get a job unless you say the chairman recommended you or something."

A more satisfied representative stated that one of the reasons she enjoyed her position was:

> "I know what's going on and this way I can help my family and friends."

In sum, much as the machine politician provided for the needs of particular members of the immigrant community, the Philadelphia council members sought particularistic benefits that would improve the life chances of specific members of the low income population.

The focus on particularistic benefits to the exclusion of broader policy questions contributed to the decline in actual representation in Philadelphia. Although the majority of respondents claimed that these centers had attempted some organizational activity, such as the formation of block clubs, identification of block leaders, and holding neighborhood meetings, only a few specific examples of the actual formation of new organizations could be given. Moreover, the representatives themselves rarely sought to make broad changes in the operations of other institutions serving the urban poor. The representatives did appeal to the state legislature in a well-coordinated effort to obtain revision of state welfare laws. But with the exception of one attempt to retard an urban renewal project, the representatives hesitated before criticizing local bureaucracies for fear that this would jeopardize staff support for the particularistic goals they sought. They also sacrificed authority over their neighborhood service centers for the possibility (which never materialized) of employment opportunity.

In New York, on the other hand, the representatives utilized their considerably greater influence to promote universalistic interests. Consistent with the autonomy of neighborhood councils mentioned earlier, the extent of universalistic interest representation in New York differed considerably from neighborhood to neighborhood. But in all three neighborhoods investigated intensively, staff members were charged by the neighborhood councils with the responsibility of organizing tenant groups, block clubs and other community groups. In Bedford-Stuyvesant community action personnel had begun to generate community pressures in favor of major changes in the operations of the welfare department and the school system. But it was in East Harlem that poverty resources were most obviously used to strengthen the political resources of the community. Although two factions were in competition for control of poverty funds, both factions used the resources at their disposal to organize the local population on behalf of causes which had some promise of improving the life chances of the neighborhood population as a whole. These resources helped to maintain a cadre of community activists who continually demanded changes in welfare, housing and educational policies in the community. Indeed, the political activity in East Harlem generated citywide movements for drastic reorganization of the city's educational system.[30] Whatever the merits of the goals of East Harlem leaders, it is clear that representatives of the poor addressed themselves to questions of broad public policy.

Particularistic interest representation, in the sense that representatives sought payment and jobs for themselves and patronage for their friends, was certainly not absent in New York City. But in contrast to Philadelphia these concerns did not become so predominant as to handicap the capacity of the representatives to provide universalistic representation as well. This difference between New York and Philadelphia was due in part to the way in which actual representation, conflict, and interest representation were inter-related.

IV. SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION AND CONFLICT

Higher levels of actual representation generated intra-neighborhood conflict, which in turn encouraged more universalistic interest representation. The greater the level of influence by community representatives over the program, the greater the level of conflict within the community—particularly in neighborhoods of ethnic and/or racial heterogeneity. As representatives of the poor gained more control over the allocation of poverty program resources, they found more at stake to divide them. But organized and extensive conflict reinforced tendencies towards universalistic interest representation. Competition for power within the community forced the competing leaderships to justify their appeal for community support by representing broad community interests.

The variation among the three cities in actual representation, conflict, and interest representation illustrates the relationship among these three variables. Given the low level of actual representation in Chicago, the major problem for the poverty staff in that city was to stimulate sufficient interest among council members so that a quorum necessary to conduct council business could be achieved. Conflict was sporadic, disorganized, and related to specific issues that occasionally arose. In Philadelphia, where the representatives had some influence over hiring policies, conflict revolved largely around the distribution of employment opportunities to claimants sponsored by different members of neighborhood councils. Conflict was the greatest in the community where racial factionalism was apparent, as black and white councillors opposed each other over the selection of council employees. The animosity was subdued, however, and did not reach the level of public discussion. Although the agreement tended to break down in the heat of the electoral campaign, the two sides had even formed an agreed slate for the second poverty election.

The relative serenity of community action politics in Chicago and Philadelphia contrasted sharply with the community action politics in New York City, where the much greater level of actual representation gave rise to organized and extensive conflicts worthy of more detailed attention. Conflict was organized in all three New York neighborhoods, as two factions competed for control of the neighborhood's community action program. These factions can be characterized as the traditional community leadership faction and the partisan-oriented faction. The traditional community leadership in the field of welfare was vested in settlement houses, YMCAs,[31] and Catholic, Protestant and Jewish churches and welfare agencies. Even though these groups did not have a common view towards welfare policy, they buried their differences in order to obtain lucrative community action funds. On the Lower West Side of Manhattan memories of conflict between a prominent settlement house and the Catholic Church strained relationships but did not prevent surprisingly close co-operation in the development of community action plans. In Bedford-Stuyvesant the community had a paucity of community leadership, for private welfare agencies had deserted the community as the neighborhood became black. Only the YMCA, supported by local Negro clergymen, doctors, lawyers, and other middle class professionals, remained to provide the traditional leadership. In East Harlem a settlement house and a combined church and welfare agency provided basic institutional strength for the traditional community leadership. Despite the diversity of the leadership grouping among these three neighborhoods, they bore in common the burden of being known as "the Establishment," which was the favorite epithet leveled against them by their opposition.

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[30] A detailed analysis of the attempts by representatives of the poor to change the structure and policies of East Harlem's educational system can be found in Paul E. Peterson, "The Politics of Educational Reform," in Frank Lutz (ed.), *Dynamics in Urban Education* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Jones, 1970).

[31] Young Men's Christian Associations.

The opposing faction in each of the communities is more difficult to characterize, but inasmuch as they had more overt political ties than the "Establishment" faction, we shall call them the "partisans." We do not mean to imply that the "Establishment" had no political connections, but it is possible to say that these connections were secondary sources of strength, connections which were the result of (rather than the cause of) their basic institutional importance to the community. The "partisans," on the other hand, were more vulnerable to the charge of "playing politics," for their base of support appeared to be more narrowly political. On the Lower West Side the institutional base of support for this faction was the reform club movement, which is the predominant partisan political force in that part of New York City. In Bedford-Stuyvesant the general lack of any stable political force inhibited the development of a stable partisan faction. But the director of the neighborhood service center in the community, a politically astute and capable administrator, sought to develop an alternative, more political base of power in order to free herself from the constraints that the "Establishment" placed upon her. Within two years, the "Establishment," realising the dangerous possibility her attempts to mobilize a power base on a previously apathetic population would have for their own position, removed the director from her job and replaced her with a more traditional social worker. In East Harlem the partisan faction rested primarily on an ethnic base. Since the traditional community leadership came from and serviced the black population in this racially heterogeneous community, the partisans appealed to Puerto Rican pride in order to mobilize support from another wing of the community. Led by an attractive and personable Young Puerto Rican social worker, they depended on close ties with Democratic leaders in the Robert Wagner Administration and in the United States Senate.

The extensive character of the conflict was evident both in its duration and in the range and significance of the issues. In East Harlem both factions had separate access to poverty funds, and each side attempted to secure control of all resources allocated to the community. On the Lower West Side the debate was over the method by which council representatives should be selected in the future and the kind of programs that should be operated by the neighborhood service center. In Bedford-Stuyvesant the debate was over relations with private welfare agencies and the balance of power between the council and its staff. In all three communities the conflict was detectable at least as early as the summer of 1964, and it continued into the summer of 1966 when this research was completed. During this period the conflict between Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the heterogeneous community of East Harlem became so intense that on more than one occasion physical force was threatened.

Organized and extensive conflict reinforced tendencies towards universalistic interest representation. In Chicago and Philadelphia the relatively amiable relationships among the representatives of the poor hindered community discussion of the representatives' obligations to their constituencies. In New York both factions, constantly competing for community support, sought to establish their credentials as vigorous defenders of the community's interests. Public officials in East Harlem frequently dismissed community agitation against their agency as simply the byproduct of organizational aggrandizement. Their observations, though an oversimplification, cannot be dismissed entirely, for the competition for power kept both organizations searching for means by which they could expand their support. In this way, community conflict functioned to generate the articulation of demands for broad changes in governmental services to the poor.

V. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION

Table 1 sets forth the patterns of representation and conflict we have observed in the community action program in Chicago, Philadelphia and New York. The relationships among actual representation, conflict, and interest representation have already been noted. It remains for us to analyze the relationships between formal and substantive representation. It is apparent from Table 1 that differing arrangements for formal

TABLE 1. FORMAL REPRESENTATION, SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION AND CONFLICT IN CHICAGO, PHILADELPHIA AND NEW YORK CITY

Patterns of Political Action	Cities		
	Chicago	Philadelphia	New York City
1. Formal Representation	Low (Indirect via mayor)	High (Direct elections)	Moderate (Indirect via neighborhood organizations)
2. Substantive Representation			
a. Actual Representation (Influence)	Very low	Moderate and declining	High
b. Interest Representation (Orientation)	—	Particularistic	Universalistic
3. Conflict	Low	Mild	Organized and extensive

representation of the poor are associated with differing patterns of substantive representation. Formal representation of the poor controlled by an elected city official (Chicago) was associated with such a low level of actual representation that the orientations of the representatives were insignificant. Formal representation controlled by neighborhood groups (New York) preceded relatively high levels of neighborhood control and universalistic interest representation. Direct election of the representatives of the poor (Philadelphia) was the precursor of moderate influence and particularistic orientations. Are these relationships causal or spurious? With only three cases to draw upon, a definite answer is obviously impossible. Yet a reasonable interpretation may emerge from analysis of the patterns that were observed.

Serious consideration must first be given to the possibility that the formal arrangements had no significant effect on the influence and orientations of the representatives of the poor. As was pointed out at the beginning of this analysis, the neighborhood groups in New York were the strongest and in Chicago they were the weakest. The settlement over formal representation may be understood simply as an initial statement of the power relations between the city government and the community organizations. It can be argued that the subsequent pattern of substantive representation may be due basically to this underlying power relationship rather than to the arrangements for formal representation, which merely reflected this power relationship. Such an interpretation is persuasive, for it stresses informal, extra-governmental political relationships rather than the technical arrangements of governmental institutions.

However, it would be incorrect to dismiss the significance of formal governmental arrangements altogether. To do so would, in the first place, ignore the fact that political actors regarded these formal arrangements as critical and were in many cases willing to invest many resources in securing a process of selecting representatives which they could influence.[32] Secondly, it is possible to identify a factor which helps to explain the empirical association between formal and substantive representation. The constituency for the representative, as shaped by the arrangements for formal representation, influenced the patterns of substantive representation.

Formal representation in Chicago provided a constituency for representatives of the poor that facilitated a low level of actual representation. The constituency of the representatives, as shaped by the selection process, was a powerful political institution whose interests were hostile to the mobilization of new political energy among low income groups. The constituency was the same center of power towards which demands that necessarily accompany universalistic interest representation must be directed. But the representatives found their position too insecure and their independent base of political power too weak to attack those that appointed them.

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[32] *Supra*, p. 121.

The constituency of the representatives of the poor in Philadelphia encouraged substantive representation particularistic in character. The poverty elections were an extreme case of "friends and neighbors" politics. In *Southern Politics* Key informs us that friends and neighbors politics is likely to occur when there is an

> absence of stable, well organized . . . factions of like-minded citizens formed to advocate measures of common concern. In its extreme form localism justifies a diagnosis of low voter-interest in public issues and a susceptibility to control by the irrelevant appeal to support the home-town boy. . . .[33]

One indicator of the low voter interest in the poverty elections, which was widely broadcast by the news media at the time, was the less than 3 per cent of the eligible population participating in the balloting. Closer analysis of the election data suggests that those few who voted were influenced by localist considerations. Each of the twelve areas in which neighborhood council representatives were chosen was divided into four sections for polling purposes. In order to determine the relationship between the residence of candidates and voting behavior, each candidate was classified according to the polling section in which he lived. A voter was eligible to cast his ballot upon presentation of evidence that he resided within that section. Since votes were tallied by voting section, it was possible to determine localist influences on the voting behavior.

Localism influenced, first of all, the voter's decision as to whether he should vote at all. Among all forty-eight voting sections in the twelve neighborhood council areas, there was a strong correlation between the number of council candidates residing in that section and the number of voters on election day. Table 2 reveals the sharp increase in the number of voters as the number of candidates increased.[34] The data suffer from our inability to state the voter turnout in percentage terms. But for those twelve voting sections (chosen at random) for which we did estimate the percentage turnout,[35] the relationship between the number of candi-

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[33] V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1950), p. 37.

[34] While records were kept on the number of voters for each CAC area as a whole, the number of voters for each voting section within the areas could not be obtained directly. Although the number of votes cast for each candidate within each voting section was available, the sum of these votes could not be accepted as a direct measure of the number of voters because each person was permitted to vote for as many as twelve candidates. Neither was the solution to divide the total number of votes cast in an election by twelve, since many people did not fully utilize all twelve votes. The best, though far from satisfactory solution, we felt, was to assume that at each of the four polling places within a CAC area the voters used equal amounts of their total voting power. Such an assumption enabled us to formulate the following proportion:

$$\frac{S_v}{S_b} = \frac{A_v}{A_b}$$

where S_v equals the total number of voters in the voting section, S_b equals the total number of ballots cast for all candidates in the voting section, A_v equals the number of voters in the CAC area, and A_b equals the total number of ballots cast for all candidates in the CAC area. Since three of the four quantities were known, we were able to solve for the fourth, giving us an estimate of the number of voters in each voting section.

Where more candidates ran for office in a section, it is possible that voters used more amounts of their voting power in order to vote for several of their friends and neighbors on the ballot. If so, this would mean that our assumption that voters used equal amounts of their voting power in estimating the number of voters biases the findings in the direction of estimating more voters in sections that had more candidates. Some of the high correlation between number of candidates and voter turnout, therefore, may be attributable to the exercise of greater voting power by voters in those sections that had more candidates. Even if this were the case, however, it would in no way be contrary to our basic contention that voting behavior was affected by friends and neighbors politics.

[35] The size and characteristics of the total population in the sample areas were estimated from data made available by Richard H. Uhlig of the Philadelphia Health and Welfare Council. Since areas (and sections within areas) did not correspond with census tracts in a number of cases, all calculations based on these data are subject to some error. In addition, our estimate of the population was based on all people eighteen years and older reported in the 1960 census data. Since voting was limited to those twenty-one years and older, our figures underestimate the percentage of those eligible that voted. However, unless the age distribution for the three years eighteen to twenty-one varies substantially from one neighborhood to another, it is unlikely that this affects inter-area comparisons.

TABLE 2. NUMBER OF CANDIDATES LIVING IN SECTION AND VOTER TURNOUT IN FORTY-EIGHT VOTING SECTIONS

Number of candidates living in section		Number voting in section
0–3	(9)	60.9
4–6	(14)	252.2
7–9	(13)	316.5
10–12	(12)	433.1

dates and voter turnout was even more dramatic. The rank order of the two variables for these twelve sections was nearly identical, and the product-moment coefficient of correlation attained a value of .86. The details are in Table 3. In an election having such a low turnout, people did not vote unless there was some particularly compelling reason for them to go. In this case the most powerful force inducing voters to participate was a friend or neighbor running for office; the more candidates in an area, the more people would do a friend a favor by showing up at the polls.

The pattern of support for each candidate within his neighborhood council area revealed that a voter tended to vote for candidates that lived within the same voting section that the voter did. An index of localism was developed in order to state the degree to which localist influences were revealed by the voting behavior. The rationale for this index is stated in the Appendix. In brief, the index of localism states numerically the proportion of votes received by a local candidate as compared to the average proportion received by all non-local candidates, holding constant the general popularity of each candidate. If the local candidate did proportionately no better than non-local candidates, the value of the index is 1.00. If his proportion is less than that of non-local candidates, the value is less than 1.00.

TABLE 3. NUMBER OF CANDIDATES LIVING IN VOTING SECTION AND VOTER TURNOUT IN TWELVE SAMPLE SECTIONS

Number of candidates living in section	Per cent voting in section
1	5.6%
12	5.7
10	2.2
8	1.4
8	1.2
6	2.3
6	.9
5	2.0
4	.7
0	.4
0	.1
0	.1

TABLE 4. PROPARTION OF NON-WHITES IN COMMUNITY ACTION COUNCIL AREA AND AREA'S SCORE ON INDEX OF LOCALISM

Percent non-white in community action council area	Index of localism score
0%–15%[a] (2) (Predominantly White)	2.03
25%–45%[a] (6) (Racially Mixed)	2.00
65%–90% (4) (Predominantly Negro)	2.03

[a] No CAC areas had 16 to 24, or 46 to 64 percent nonwhite populations.

As measured by this index, localism pervaded Philadelphia's poverty election. Out of 348 candidates 93 percent ran proportionately better in their home section than did the average non-local candidate.[36] Only 6 percent did not do as well, while two candidates ran proportionately as well as did the average non-local candidates. The index of localism for the average candidate was 2.07. Thus, the average candidate did proportionately twice as well in his own section as did the average non-local candidate in that section. This pattern of voting behavior appears not to have been due simply to racial loyalties which would appear as localist influences because of segregated housing patterns. If such had been the case, one would have found a lower index of localism in those neighborhood council areas which consisted largely of one racial group. But, as can be seen in Table 4, the racial complexion of an area had little effect on the index of localism.

The tendency for the voter to favor the neighborhood candidate, together with the strong correlation between the number of candidates living in a section and voter turnout, suggests that personal acquaintance with one or more of the candidates crucially affected both the decisions to vote and for whom to vote. Indeed, friends and neighbors politics, in this context, takes on a literal meaning that could not have been quite the case in the southern states that Key analyzed. The neighborhood council areas were so small that non-local candidates often lived only a few blocks away. Finding localism in the voting within these supposedly compact council areas reveals an extreme instance of friends and neighbors politics. This friends and neighbors style of politics indicated the lack of issues disputed by organized competing factions, which usually stimulate citizens to vote. During the six weeks before the election no significant issues and no citywide organizations contesting the elections emerged. The Congress of Racial Equality and the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, realizing their own weaknesses, decided to let "the poor people choose their own representatives." The party organizations accepted the decision of community action program officials that party activists were not eligible to participate in this election. Such neighborhood slates as were formed were little more than hastily arranged agreements for temporary gain rather than a coalition of interests with a discernible perspective concerning the proper approach to ameliorating the plight of low income citizens.

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[36] Two candidates were excluded from the analysis, because it was impossible to ascertain in which voting section they lived.

Certain structural characteristics of poverty elections encouraged this issueless, friends and neighbors political style. The elections were held separately from other elections. They were electoral contests between politically unknown individuals for an obscure and relatively unimportant post with almost totally undefined responsibilities. The announcement that such an election would be held was made only six weeks prior to election day, an inordinately short period for the selection of candidates, the organization of campaigns and the development of issues.

The constituency formed by the arrangements for formal representation contributed to the representative's particularistic orientation. To the extent that the newly elected representatives had any constituency at all, it consisted of those few personal acquaintances who had been mobilized by the candidate to support him on election day. Since the representatives lacked a strong, organized constituency upon which they could depend for future political support, they sought to develop a small, personally loyal following by distributing particularistic benefits. The bureaucratic staff and the Tate Administration won the acquiescence of the representatives on larger policy questions by encouraging their interest in questions of patronage and financial remuneration. Friends and neighbors politics in Philadelphia, as in the South, extended the power of the dominant political force in the community, the City Administration. It is not surprising that in subsequent years, the City fought for continued election of the representatives of the poor—even after OEO had lost enthusiasm for this innovation.

The constituency for New York's representatives, as shaped by the processes of formal representation, encouraged substantive representation of a universalistic interest character, because the representative's constituency was organized through neighborhood groups. Since the concerns of the organizations in the community did not, for the most part, depart radically from the interests of the population, their very organization helped them to become effective links binding representatives to their constituents. Representatives thus spoke for and were accountable to an organized constituency which could be relied upon in moments of crisis. Whatever disagreements existed among community leaders, they drew together to protect the local community action program from the city's intervention. Representatives sought to protect the autonomy of their local organizations rather than simply to secure particularistic benefits for themselves. Although examples of combined community efforts to ensure autonomous local influence over the poverty program occurred in all three (and many other) neighborhoods, we shall illustrate the pattern by briefly describing events in Bedford-Stuyvesant.

The community action program in that community had been developed by a staff responsive to the interests of "the Establishment," but as prospects for funding by OEO improved, a new, more politically oriented director took the helm. The Wagner Administration, noticing the growing split within the Bedford-Stuyvesant community, seized this opportunity to bring the program under more central direction. The community responded to this threat with unexpectedly unified political action. Community meetings were held, telegrams and phone calls were sent to Congressmen (and even to the Vice-President), and a vigorous defense of the decentralized arrangements was made in personal discussions with city officials. Representatives from the community on the city poverty council were able to use their position to protect local control of the community action program. In the face of this opposition, city officials retreated from their attempt to centralize authority. It was the availability of the resources of an organized community that enabled New York's representatives of the poor to win the local control which was essential for the universalistic interest representation peculiar to that city.

This relationship between formal and substantive representation may be peculiarly characteristic of representatives of disadvantaged groups in society. The formal process by which corporations, labor unions, and professional associations are selected as representatives on official policymaking bodies probably has little effect on their subsequent behavior. Analyses of group influence in policy-making throughout the federal system in the United States suggest that such groups are capable of providing quite effective interest representation under a variety of formal and informal relationships with policy-makers.[37] The multiplicity of access points—both formal and informal—available to higher status groups reduces the significance of any one channel of influence. If a particular representative does not provide effective interest representation, the high status group may be crippled temporarily in its relations with the government, but sooner or later it will find a more effective channel or representation. To guard against loss of position within their own group, representatives thus tend to be vigorous exponents of the group's interests.

Among low status groups the number of alternative channels through which the group can influence public policy is likely to be significantly less. Thus, the importance of any one channel of representation is thereby enhanced. The representative's bargaining position *vis a vis* the agency he is trying to influence is minimized and his bargaining position *vis a vis* the group he is representing is strengthened. Other factors being equal, he is more likely to make greater concessions merely to maintain his position as formal representative. Consequently, the formal selection process has particular significance for the substantive behavior of representatvives of the poor.

VI. SOCIALLY DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

Socially descriptive representation was far less controversial in these three cities than were the arrangements for formal representation. Neighborhood groups were far less insistent that any income limit be placed upon those chosen to represent the residents of low income communities. Their reticence on this point may have been due to the tendency for organizations to recruit the more skilled, better educated, and more affluent members of the community; many of their leaders would be disqualified from participating if a strict income limit were placed on those who could serve as representatives of the poor. The extent to which socially descriptive representation was implemented must be attributed to OEO's dogged insistence that at least some of those representing the poor come from similar backgrounds themselves. In New York and Chicago no more than one-third of the representatives on the neighborhood councils and an even smaller percentage on the citywide councils had incomes within the poverty zone.[38] In Philadelphia, on the other hand, election regulations required that *all* members of neighborhood councils have incomes of less than $6000 annually (the limit for any individual council member varying with the size of his family).[39] Forty percent of the city poverty council consisted of representatives who also conformed to these income restrictions. Moreover, Negroes were also well represented among the elected council members. Although nonwhites (mostly Negroes) comprised only 44 percent of the population in designated poverty areas, 70 to 80 percent of the one hundred and forty-four elected representatives were nonwhite.[40]

This difference between Philadelphia and the other two cities enables us to inquire as well into the effect that socially descriptive representation had on the patterns of actual and interest representation. In general, it seemed that lower income representatives were more interested in securing particularistic benefits, whereas more middle income representatives were interested in achieving both influence and universalistic changes in government services to the poor. As we noted earlier, Philadelphia's representatives focused on payment for themselves and positions in the agency for their family and friends as major goals which they wished to pursue. Similarly, on New York's Lower West Side, the partisan factions, who agitated for greater involvement of the poor, were repeatedly disappointed by the support which low income representatives gave to their opponents in exchange for particularistic benefits.[41] Thus, the particularistic character of interest representation in Philadelphia might not have been so pronounced had income restrictions on candidates been less severe. Certainly, the middle class organization leaders in New York in many cases were more concerned about strengthening their power and influence in the program than in gaining material benefits for themselves or their friends. Thus, whereas the Philadelphia representatives were slowly losing influence in the hope of securing material benefits, this trend was not apparent in New York City. In fact the victory of the Bedford-Stuyvesant community in its conflict with the mayor must be attributed in part to the skills and positions of influence which the middle class leaders of the neighborhood organization had at their disposal.

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[37] See, for example, Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1966), *passim.*

[38] Both the level of income which was the upper limit of the poverty zone and the percentage of poor on neighborhood and citywide councils fluctuated over time. In general Chicago's social representation increased somewhat from a very low level, whereas New York's decreased in 1966. More detailed information can be found in Peterson, "City Politics and Community Action," pp. 56–59, 133–153.

[39] There is some evidence that enforcement of this rule was not excessively rigid, but it was nevertheless apparent that the overwhelming majority of council members had incomes below the upper limit and the remainder were in only slightly better economic circumstances.

[40] In three randomly selected areas, the distribution was 72 percent Negro, 25 percent white and 3 percent Spanish-speaking. A close observer of the program estimated that in the city as a whole about 80 percent of elected representatives were nonwhite. Shostak, "Urban Politics and Poverty," p. 1.

But it is too facile an explanation to say that Philadelphia and New York community action programs took different directions because lower income representatives seek material gain whereas middle income representatives sought influence for their organizations. Such an interpretation ignores the extent to which political power relations and the arrangements for formal representation strengthened the representatives of the poor in New York. Lower income representations in East Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant fought for greater neighborhood influence over the program with a vigor unknown in Philadelphia. It was the coincidence of disorganized politics *together with* restrictions on the income of representatives in the latter city that explains their particularistic interest representation.

This tendency of socially descriptive representatives to provide particularistic rather than universalistic representation may well be peculiar to representatives of disadvantaged groups in society. Lower status representatives, on the other hand, are more likely to have personal financial difficulties which can be eased by trading power and influence for monetary assistance. The greater dependence of his constituency upon him as a representative enables the representative to strike such a bargain with the agency he is trying to influence without losing his status *vis-à-vis* his constituency. Moreover, perhaps because of the realities of power relations, this pattern of behavior does not depart from the norms of lower class culture. The machine politician was respected for his power, even though it was well known he used his power for personal gain. Since political power was one of the few avenues for social mobility, the culture condoned such a political style. The Philadelphia representatives provided but another illustration of this pattern of behavior.

VII. SUMMARY

The following hypotheses are supported by the data in this comparative case study:

1. Representation of universalistic interests of low status groups is associated with the occurrence of:

a) an organized relationship between the formal representatives and the low status group, provided that this organizational link is not controlled by interests antithetical to those of the low status group;

b) political competition and conflict among those seeking to be the formal representatives of the low status group;

c) formal representatives who are related to the low status group in an organized manner, but who are not socially descriptive of the low status group with respect to such status variables as occupation, education and income; and

d) substantial influence by formal representatives over the operations of the relevant governmental program.

2. Representation of particularistic interests of low status groups is associated with the occurrence of:

a) little organized competition for the position of formal representative together with selection of representatives more for their personal qualities than for their position on political issues;

b) few, if any, organizational mechanisms systematically linking formal representatives to their constituencies as a whole;

c) ample opportunities for the distribution to constituents of divisible, material benefits by the formal representatives;

d) moderate influence over the operations of the relevant governmental program by formal representatives; and

e) formal representatives who are socially descriptive of the low status group with respect to status variables.

3. Representation of scarcely any substantive interests—either particularistic or universalistic—of low status groups is associated with the occurrence of:

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[41] Community action program officials in Oakland also eliminated middle class neighborhood leadership seeking to provide universalistic interest representation by requiring that representatives be socially descriptive of their constituency (i.e. having annual incomes of less than $3000). Nicholas Masters *et al., Politics, Poverty and Education: An Analysis of Decision-making Structures,* Report submitted to the Office of Economic Opportunity, Washington, February, 1968, p. 253.

a) a relationship between the formal representatives and the low status group which is organized by an interest contrary to those of the low status group; if this factor is present, other variables are unlikely to affect significantly the character of substantive representation.

APPENDIX[1]

Any measure of friends and neighbors politics or localism must be based on votes cast for various candidates in various constituencies, which in this case were called sections. These data may be arranged in a matrix whose rows correspond to candidates and whose columns correspond to sections. Thus we define as an entry in the data matrix

v_{ij} = The number of votes cast for candidate i in section j.

Then, let

Si = the sum of the votes cast for candidate i in all sections.

T_j = the total of the votes cast for all candidates in section j.

V = the sum of all votes cast for all candidates in all sections.

From this an index of over-representation R_{ij} for candidate i in section j can be calculated.[2] R_{ij} simply states the ratio of the *actual* proportion of candidate i's total vote that he received in section j to his *expected* proportion, or:

$$R_{ij} = \frac{v_{ij}\text{ (actual)}}{v_{ij}\text{ (expected)}} . \tag{1}$$

The excepted proportion is the proportion candidate i would have received in section j had his vote been distributed in equal proportions among all sections, or:

$$v_{ij}\text{ (expected)} = \frac{S_iT_j}{V} \tag{2}$$

Substituting the right-hand of equation (2) for v_{ij} (expected) in equation (1) and dropping the no longer necessary designation "actual" from the numerator in equation (1) yields:

$$R_{ij} = \frac{v_{ij}}{\frac{S_iT_j}{V}} . \tag{3}$$

which equals

$$R_{ij} = \frac{v_{ij}V}{S_iT_j} . \tag{4}$$

For purposes of measuring localism this index suffers from the overlap between the data upon which both the "expected" and actual proportions are derived. T_i is the column summation of all cases of v_{ij}, including the instance of v_{ij} which is the basis for determining the actual proportion of candidate's i's total vote that he received in section j. As a result, the index of over-representation tended to measure not only localism but also the concentration of candidates among sections, a variable which conceptually has nothing to do with localism. This difficulty is eliminated by dividing the index of over-representation for local candidate l by the index of over-representation for non-local candidate m. This yields an index of localism L_l for local candidate l:

$$L_l = \frac{R_{lj}}{R_{mj}} . \tag{5}$$

Substituting from (4),

$$L_l = \frac{v_{lj}V/S_lT_j}{v_{mj}V/S_mT_j} , \tag{6}$$

which reduces to:

$$L_l = \frac{v_{lj}/S_l}{v_{mj}/S_m} . \tag{7}$$

In order to reduce the effect of random error, an average of all values v_m/S_m may be an improvement on the denominator of (7). Thus:

$$L_l = \frac{v_{lj}/S_l}{av(v_{mj}/S_m)} . \tag{8}$$

Thus, the index of localism as stated in (8) is simply the proportion of a local candidate's total vote that he receives in his own district divided by the average of the corresponding proportions for all non-local candidates. Note that this formula includes no T_j term, which frees the index from distortions resulting from an overlap between v_{ij} and T_j. However, the S_i term (visible in (8) as S_l and S_m) was not eliminated from the formula upon which the index of localism was based. Consequently, variations in the size of the vote among sections has affected the index to some extent. It is extremely unlikely, however, that any resulting imprecisions in the measurement of local influences in the Philadelphia elections were so great as to affect the substantive argument of the paper.

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[1] Duncan MacRae provided considerable assistance in the development of the index of localism.

[2] The index of over-representation has been used widely by political scientists and sociologists. See, for example, Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), pp. 273–74.

THE POLITICS OF REDISTRIBUTION*

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A comparatively new line of research in political science involves the systematic investigation of political, social, and economic factors important in the formation of public policy. So far, such research has yielded temptingly persuasive evidence that political variables exert little or no independent influence on policy outcomes; that policy outcomes are governed overwhelmingly by socio-economic factors. Stated more succinctly, these findings have raised the question: Does politics make a difference in the policy formation process?[1]

We suggest in the following analysis that these prior findings have been the result of the examination of a measure of public policy in which the influence of the political system is likely to be negligible, that is *levels* of public revenues and expenditures. To examine this proposition empirically, our study shifts attention to the allocation of the burdens and benefits of state revenue and expenditure policies across income classes. In redirecting analysis to allocations rather than levels of state revenues and expenditures, we focus on a province we believe to be more predictably political.[2]

We have taken as our dependent variable the net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures as represented by the ratio of expenditure benefits to revenue burdens for the three lowest income classes in each state.[3] The major hypothesis of our study is that, in regard to the allocation of the burdens and benefits of state government revenues and expenditures, political variables will have a stronger influence on policy outcomes than will socio-economic variables.

I. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature of the systematic analysis of public policy was launched with the publication in 1952 of Solomon Fabricant's *The Trend of Government Activity in the United States since 1900*.[4] As part of his analysis, Fabricant used a multiple regression statistical model to examine interstate variations in levels of per capita state and local expenditure in the United States in 1942. He found that more than 70% of the variance in these levels could be explained by the impact of differences in per capita income, urbanization, and population density. Both Fabricant's focus and his method have inspired subsequent research.

For example, a number of studies published in the *National Tax Journal* have elaborated on Fabricant's initial findings within the basic framework of the multiple regression approach and with continued reliance on socio-economic independent variables. These efforts were directed mainly at extending Fabricant's analysis over time and breaking down the dependent variable to determine the differential impact of his three independent variables on various components of expenditures. What the studies indicated was, briefly, that the explanatory power of

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* Some of the data used in this analysis were taken from information made available by Thomas R. Dye. Computation time was provided by Stanford Computation Center, Stanford University. Machine and secretarial assistance were provided by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, as well as by the Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University. Our thanks also go to Raymond E. Wolfinger, Heinz Eulau, Hubert Marshall, and William Paisley for their encouragement and criticism.

[1] This question is obviously a gross oversimplification of the problem. See Charles S. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," this Review, LXIII (September 1969), 858–866.

[2] Easton, of course, has defined politics as "the authoritative allocation of values." See David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley), p. 21.

[3] This measure is a direct statistical analogue of Lasswell's and Kaplan's indulgence-deprivation ratio. See Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 61.

[4] Solomon Fabricant, *The Trend of Government Activity in the United States Since 1900* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952), ch. 6.

the independent variables has decreased since 1942, accounting for little more than half the variance in levels of state expenditures in 1957,[5] and for only 18% of the *changes* in levels of state expenditures between 1957 and 1960.[6] Further, these studies demonstrated that the effect of this set of independent variables varies with different facets of expenditures, having its least influence on welfare expenditures in the states.[7] Probably the most impressive overall finding of these studies, however, is the consistently high explanatory power of the socio-economic variables employed relative to absolute levels of expenditures.

In 1963, Dawson and Robinson, through the explicit introduction of political variables, initiated an exploration of the political dimension of public policy outcomes.[8] Drawing their inspiration from a V. O. Key hypothesis,[9] they examined the relationship between interparty competition and welfare policies as evidenced by an amalgam of state tax and expenditure measures which they labeled "welfare orientation." They found that interparty competition is indeed fairly closely related to welfare orientation in the states, but this relationship disappears when controls for per capita income are introduced.

Subsequent research into the impact of political variables has tended to confirm Dawson's and Robinson's initial findings. For instance, Hofferbert followed Dawson's and Robinson's lead, but refined the definition of welfare orientation and added divided party control, malapportionment, and regional controls (South vs. non-South) to interparty competition as independent variables.[10] He reported low zero-order correlations[11] for divided party control and malapportionment, and no independent impact for any of the political variables considered.

Thomas Dye reported a veritable catalog of results in his book *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States*.[12] He employed the multiple regression model to analyze the relationship between certain socio-economic variables (urbanization, industrialization, income, and education) and political variables (division of party control, interparty competition, voter participation, and malapportionment) on the one hand, and a wide variety of expenditure and tax measures on the other. Dye's findings were generally consistent with those of his predecessors: for forty-seven of fifty-four tax and expenditure measures, socio-economic variables had more influence on policy outcomes than did political variables. As Dye states:

> . . . correlation analysis reveals that these [political] system characteristics have relatively little *independent* effect on policy outcomes in the states. Economic development shapes both the political systems and political outcomes, and most of the association that occurs between system characteristics and policy outcomes can be attributed to the influence of economic development. Differences in the policy choices of states with different types of political systems turn out to be largely a product of different socio-economic levels rather than a direct product of political variables.[13]

But a few more positive results have appeared in the literature. Lineberry and Fowler shifted the level of analysis to American cities to determine the impact of reformism (reformed cities are defined as those having city manager government with nonpartisan and at-large elections) on tax and expenditure policy.[14] The authors ran separate multiple regression analyses in reformed and unreformed cities and found that socio-economic variables accounted for less of the variance in tax and expenditure levels in reformed cities. They saw the difference as an effect of reformism. Unfortunately, however, their methodology did not permit an assessment of the relative impact of political and socio-economic variables on policy outcomes. Grumm developed a new independent variable, an index of legislative professionalism, which he found to have an independent relationship with public welfare expenditures.[15] Sharkansky and Hofferbert factor analyzed a number of variables and discovered that the "political" factor positively correlated with welfare-education policies after controlling for their socio-economic factor.[16]

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[5] Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis," *National Tax Journal,* XIV (December 1961), 349–355.

[6] Roy W. Bahl and Robert J. Saunders, "Determinants of Changes in State and Local Government Expenditures," *National Tax Journal,* XVIII (March 1965), 50–57.

[7] Fisher, *op. cit.,* p. 353.

[8] Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States," *The Journal of Politics,* XXV (1963), 265–289.

[9] V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York: Random House, 1949), pp. 298–311.

[10] Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW, LX (March 1966), 73–82.

[11] Four statistical terms used in this paper might be unfamiliar to some of the readers. A *zero-order correlation coefficient* is the simple, bivariate correlation coefficient. It is a summary measure of association. A *partial correlation coefficient* is a measure of association or the strength of a relationship between two variables—e.g., urbanization and redistribution—controlled for a third or more variables. Thus, it is a measure of the unique portion of the association after the common portion has been controlled. The *multiple-partial coefficient* is a summary measure of the "explanatory" power of a group of variables. It states the unique portion of the variance attributed to one set of variables—e.g., political variables—after another variable or set of variables—e.g., economic variables—has been controlled. The *coefficient of determination* associated with any of the three above measures is the square of the coefficient of correlation (simple or multiple) which is equal to the portion of variance explained by the measures.

[12] Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 293.

Two authors have followed a different approach, alterations in the dependent variable, in arriving at their more positive results concerning political variables. Sharkansky proposed that a distinction be drawn between public policy (expenditures and other indicators of official concern) and policy outputs (the results of those policies).[17] He examined the relative impact of environmental variables and policy variables on high school attendance and completion (output measures). Sharkansky found policy measures more closely related than environmental variables to levels of attendance and rate of graduation, though that relationship was reversed in regard to dropouts. Walker, on the other hand, devised a non-monetary measure of public policy: his innovation index measures the extent and rapidity of adoption of eighty-eight policies among the states.[18] Walker found that, although each of a number of political variables (party competition, party turnover, legislative apportionment, and legislative professionalism) correlated fairly closely with innovation, the relationship disappeared when socio-economic controls were introduced for all but the malapportionment-innovation correlation (a finding of no mean significance in itself).

This brief literature review highlights a number of findings relevant to the present analysis. First, socio-economic variables have relatively high explanatory value in terms of policy as it is measured by levels of taxes and expenditures in the states. Second, where political variables have been examined in relation to tax and expenditure levels their effect has usually been overshadowed by that of socio-economic variables, and often have shown no independent impact whatsoever. Third, the relationship between socio-economic variables and fiscal policies varies according to the specific components of these policies, and the relationship is particularly weak in reference to welfare policies.

The first two findings suggest that the political analyst may have to look beyond levels of taxes and expenditures to find politics having an independent or dominant influence on policy outcomes in the states. The third finding indicates that, as Key originally hypothesized, a fruitful area of search for such influence may be the redistributive policies of state governments.

Accordingly, as stated earlier, this analysis takes as its dependent variable the net redistributive impact of state revenues and expenditures. The political relevance of this variable has been suggested by Jacob and Lipsky in a review of research on public policies:

> The distribution of benefits or sanctions is perhaps the most significant output dimension for political scientists, since much of the conflict preceding adoption of a program is not about whether it should be embarked upon but who will pay and who will benefit. Even programs that apparently benefit most of the population—such as education and highway construction—have a variable incidence of benefits.[19]

Implicit in this statement and in our analysis is a conception of politics as a bargaining process in which trade-offs are made at the margins in deciding among alternative policies. The product of this process is embodied in the final configuration of penalties and rewards, which we are measuring in terms of the net redistributive impact of state revenues and expenditures. In sum, though one would expect that environmental conditions would largely determine at what *level* revenues and expenditures will be set, politics is likely to be pivotal in establishing the *allocations* of rewards and benefits at that level.[20]

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[14] Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," this Review, LXI (September 1967), 701–716.

[15] John G. Grumm, "Structural Determinants of Legislative Output"; paper delivered at Conference on the Measurement of Public Policies in the American States, Ann Arbor, July 28-August 3, 1968.

[16] Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," this Review, LXIII (September 1969), 867–879.

[17] Ira Sharkansky, "Problems of Theory and Method: Environment, Policy, Output, and Impact"; paper delivered at Conference on the Measurement of Public Policies in the American States, Ann Arbor, July 28-August 3, 1968.

[18] Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States," this Review, LXIII (September 1969), 880–899.

[19] Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," *Journal of Politics*, XXX (May 1968), 510–538.

Our purposes in this study are twofold: (1) to develop a statistical model that has a fairly high degree of explanatory power in regard to the redistributive policies of American states, and (2) to examine the relative importance of political and socio-economic variables within that model. We shall use multiple regression analysis as an instrument for accomplishing those purposes.

II. DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The obvious first requirement of this analysis is to devise a satisfactory measure of the net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures. We use as a basis for this derivation the Tax Foundation study, *Tax Burdens and Benefits of Government Expenditure by Income Class, 1961 and 1965.*[21] This study, as the title implies, distributes revenue burdens and expenditure benefits across income classes. To do this, Foundation researchers selected a number of allocation bases which appeared to describe the incidence of revenue burdens and expenditure benefits by income class and applied these bases to revenue and expenditure totals. For instance, elementary and secondary education expenditure benefits were assumed to be distributed according to the number of children under 18 in families in each income class, so that if 20% of children under 18 were in families with an income of $4,000 to $4,999, 20% of expenditures on elementary and secondary education were assigned as benefits to that income class. Similarly on the revenue side, if 20% of total expenditures on alcoholic beverages were made by families with an income of $6,000 to $7,499, it is assumed that 20% of the alcoholic beverage tax was paid by families in that income class. This process, with an appropriate allocation base for each revenue and expenditure category, was repeated for all federal government revenues and expenditures and for aggregate category totals of state and local government revenues and expenditures. Expenditure totals by level of government were taken from Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics reports, and the allocation bases from Department of Labor data.

For our study we have calculated by revenue and expenditure category the percentage distributions of state revenue burdens and expenditure benefits from the Tax Foundation study. However, since Office of Business Economics expenditure and revenue figures, which are the basis for the Tax Foundation study, are not available on a state-by-state basis, we have used Census Bureau expenditure and revenue state totals as the base to which allocation factors are applied.[22]

Our analysis is restricted to revenues and expenditures for state governments only, rather than a combination of state and local totals, for several reasons. First, it would appear that the state-local combination is more a statistical construct than a coherent governmental jurisdiction. As Sharkansky puts it:

> . . . the fusion of state and local government activities confuses the efforts of politically-distinct units. The state-plus-local aggregate is artificial, and not the arena in which policy-makers decide about the size of their budgets or the allocation of funds.[23]

Second, the state level has traditionally been a level at which redistribution has been sought both in an attempt to overcome regional differences in tax bases and expenditure policies and in the name of equity. Third, previous research has indicated that state and local levels are analytically distinct, responding in different ways to different influences.[24] Fourth, and in a more practical vein, there is a potential ecological problem in analyzing state-wide political, social, and economic indicators in relation to local output measures. Were local outputs to be included in the analysis, the prudent but difficult course to follow would be to collect data on the independent variables at the local level. The theoretical case for the state-local separation is not clear-cut, but we feel that the above considerations are sufficiently persuasive to justify that separation in this analysis.

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[20] Dawson and Robinson attempted to get at the concept of redistribution in the article already cited, but their perspectives were restricted by the measure of welfare orientation they chose and a concentration on levels of taxes and expenditures. See Dawson and Robinson, *op. cit.* We propose a considerably more comprehensive measure addressed specifically to allocations of benefits and burdens.

[21] Tax Foundation, Inc., *Tax Burdens and Benefits of Government Expenditure by Income Classes, 1961 and 1965* (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1967).

[22] This shift raises a procedural problem, since the Census Bureau and the Office of Business Economics define revenue and expenditure categories somewhat differently. To counter this difficulty, we have either grouped the Census Bureau figures into categories at least nominally equivalent to those set up by the Office of Business Economics or we have used allocation bases which appear to be appropriate to the Census Bureau categories. A number of technical differences prevent a direct comparison between the categories so derived and the Office of Business Economics data, but comparability is not a major consideration, since it is only necessary to assume that the allocation bases are appropriate for the revised categorization of the Census Bureau figures.

[23] Sharkansky, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

A number of additional factors should be noted in our development of the dependent variable. First, we have included intergovernmental revenues and expenditures in state revenue and expenditure totals. This inclusion was made on the assumption that political and socio-economic conditions within a given state are related to both the level and nature of intergovernmental revenues and expenditures in that state. We have distributed intergovernmental expenditure benefits across income classes according to the distribution of each category of intergovernmental expenditures. We have distributed intergovernmental revenues in proportion to the distribution of the burden of all federal revenues. Second, we have treated unemployment compensation as a state program.[25] Finally, though the

TABLE 1. STATE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (1961)

Category	Amount (millions)	Basis for Allocation
Direct Expenditures	$24,578	
Education	3,792	
Elementary & Secondary	226	Number of Children under 18
Higher and Other	3,566	Higher Education Expenditures of Families
Highways	6,230	Half Auto Operation Expenditure and Half Total Current Consumption
Public Welfare	2,311	Income from Public Social Assistance and Private Relief
Agriculture[1]	435	Farm Money Income Before Taxes
Liquor Store	873	Alcoholic Beverage Expenditures
Insurance Trust[2]	4,701	Public Unemployment & Soc. Security Benefits
Interest[3]	584	Interest Income
Other—General	5,652	Half Family Money Income Before Taxes & Half Number of Families and Unrelated Individuals
Intergovernmental	10,114	
Education	5,963	Combined Allocation for all Education Expenditures
Highways	1,266	Same as Direct Highway Expenditures
Welfare	1,602	Same as Direct Welfare Expenditures
General	1,283	Same as Direct General Expenditures
Total Expenditures	$34,693	

[1] Prorated share of nonseparable intergovernmental expenditures deducted.
[2] Unemployment compensation classified as a state program.
[3] Interest paid.

Sources: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *State Goverment Finances in 1961*. Washington, D. C., U.S. Government Printing Office; and Tax Foundation, Inc., *Tax Burdens and Benefits of Government Expenditures By Income Class, 1961 and 1965*. New York, Tax Foundation, Inc., 1967. pp. 11 and 12.

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[24] *Ibid.*

[25] This classification is somewhat ambiguous since the federal government levies a tax on employers but allows a credit for state taxes up to 90% of the amount of the federal tax. Since most states have adopted a tax to take advantage of the credit, and in accordance with the Tax Foundation classification, we have considered unemployment compensation to be a state program.

TABLE 2. STATE GOVERNMENT REVENUES (1961)

Category	Amount (millions)	Basis for Allocation
Taxes	$20,175	
Sales and Gross Receipts	14,328	
Alcoholic Beverage[1]	1,893	Alcoholic Beverage Expenditures
Tobacco	1,001	Tobacco Expenditures
Motor Vehicle[2]	4,948	Automobile Operation Expenditures
All Other[3]	6,486	Total Current Consumption
Individual Income	2,355	Personal Taxes
Corporation[4]	1,712	Half Total Current Consumption and Half Dividend Income
Property Tax	613	Half Housing Expenditures and Half Total Current Consumption
Death and Gift	501	Completely to the $15,000 and Over Income Class
All Other	648	Total Current Consumption
Severance	451	
Other	197	
Social Insurance Contributions[5]	4,067	Combination of Social Security, Railroad, and Government Retirement Contributions and Total Current Consumption
Charges and Miscellaneous	2,854	Total Current Consumption
Intergovernmental[6]	6,412	Distribution of All Federal Taxes
Total Revenue	$33,508	

[1] Includes alcoholic beverage tax, alcoholic beverage license fee, and liquor store revenues.
[2] Includes motor fuel tax and motor vehicle license fee.
[3] Includes general sales and gross receipts tax, other license fees, and other sales and gross receipts taxes.
[4] Includes corporation net income tax and corporation license fees.
[5] Excludes earnings on investments.
[6] From federal government only.
Sources: Same as Table 1.

Tax Foundation analyzed revenues and expenditures for 1965, we have used their revised data for 1961 because both their allocation bases and the information used in our independent variables are based on figures for the earlier period. Expenditure and revenue totals, and the allocation bases for each revenue and expenditure category, are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Tables 3 and 4 display the percentage distribution of revenue burdens and expenditure benefits by income class for each type of revenue and expenditure.

Given the revenue and expenditure totals and the allocation factors, the remaining steps in the calculation of the dependent variable are relatively simple:

1) Apply the allocation factors to the amounts collected and the amounts spent in each revenue and expenditure category in each state. This computation yields the amounts paid in revenue and received in benefits by income class for each category of revenues and expenditures in each state.
2) Sum the benefits received and revenues paid for each income class. The sums are the total revenue burden and expenditure benefit for each income class in each state.
3) Calculate the ratio of expenditure benefits received to revenues paid for each income class in each state.

The summary measure of the net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures in each state is simply the ratio derived in step 3 for the lowest three income classes in each state. This gives us a directional measure of redistri-

TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE BENEFITS BY INCOME CLASS (1961)

Expenditure Category	Under $2,000	$2,000 -2,999	$3,000 -3,999	$4,000 -4,999	$5,000 -5,999	$6,000 -7,999	$7,500 -9,999	$10,000 -14,999	$15,000 & Over	Total[1]
Direct										
Elem. & Sec. Education	5.0%	8.0%	10.1%	14.3%	15.6%	19.9%	17.1%	8.1%	1.9%	100.0%
Higher & Other Education	1.4	2.1	3.4	6.6	10.0	15.7	20.6	25.3	14.7	99.8
Highways	3.2	5.1	8.2	11.4	13.7	19.4	20.5	13.5	4.9	99.9
Public Welfare	49.7	24.8	8.1	5.3	5.1	2.8	1.8	2.2	—	99.8
Agriculture	5.5	8.6	11.6	11.1	12.6	14.5	15.1	11.5	9.4	99.9
Liquor Store	2.4	3.7	8.0	9.8	11.6	18.8	22.3	17.0	6.3	99.9
Insurance Trust	21.4	20.0	17.2	9.7	9.2	9.3	7.8	4.7	0.6	99.9
Interest	4.8	9.9	10.1	8.9	8.2	11.5	16.4	14.9	15.1	99.8
Other—General	8.6	7.8	9.1	11.2	12.4	16.6	17.4	11.3	5.5	99.9
Intergovernmental										
Education	4.5	7.1	9.1	13.1	14.7	19.3	17.6	10.7	3.9	100.0
Highways	3.3	5.1	8.2	11.4	13.8	19.4	20.5	13.4	4.9	100.0
Public Welfare	49.8	24.8	8.1	5.3	5.1	2.8	1.7	2.2	—	99.8
Other—General	8.6	7.8	9.1	11.2	12.4	16.6	17.4	11.3	5.5	99.9

[1] Rows may not total 100.0% due to rounding.

Source: Tax Foundation, Inc., *Tax Burdens and Benefits of Government Expenditures by Income Class, 1961 and 1965.* New York, Tax Foundation, Inc., 1967, pp. 48–51.

bution (assuming, as is the case, that the ratios are higher in the lowest three income classes than in the remaining income classes), with higher summed ratios indicating more redistribution to the lowest income groups. Since it is commonly believed that the lowest income groups are denied access to the decision-making chambers of government, the limitation of our analysis to redistribution to the three lowest income groups poses a rigorous test for hypotheses involving political variables. The ratios for the lowest three income classes in each state are shown in Table 5.

There are a number of problems in this explication of the net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures which should be kept in mind in interpreting the results of this study. First, the Tax Foundation analysis was not done for each state, but only for aggregate state and local revenues and expenditures, with nationwide allocation bases. In applying these allocation bases to state-by-state revenue and expenditure totals we have necessarily assumed that the allocation base distributions are constant in all the states. Thus, for instance, in apportioning the burden of the cigarette tax, we assume that cigarette expenditures in each state are distributed across income classes in the same manner as in the nation as a whole. This is clearly an unrealistic assumption, but one necessitated by restrictions on available data. To the extent that these distributions diverge among the states, of course, the data will be in error. Second, in the interest of simplification, the Tax Foundation study embodies a number of assumptions about the incidence of revenue burdens and expendi-

TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE BURDEN BY INCOME CLASS (1961)

Revenue Category	Under $2,000	$2,000 -2,999	$3,000 -3,999	$4,000 -4,999	$5,000 -5,999	$6,000 -7,499	$7,500 -9,999	$10,000 -14,999	$15,000 & over	Total[1]
Alcoholic Beverage	2.4%	3.7%	8.0%	9.9%	11.6%	18.9%	22.3%	17.0%	6.3%	100.1%
Tobacco	4.9	7.5	9.8	12.6	14.2	19.3	19.0	9.5	3.3	100.1
Motor Vehicle	1.9	4.4	8.2	12.0	14.5	20.6	21.0	13.4	4.1	100.1
All Other Sales & Gross Receipts Taxes	4.6	5.8	8.1	10.9	13.0	18.2	20.1	13.5	5.6	99.8
Individual Income	0.6	1.7	3.6	7.6	10.1	17.1	22.6	18.8	17.8	99.9
Corporation	2.7	4.2	7.7	7.5	10.2	13.2	15.5	17.7	21.3	100.0
Property	5.2	6.1	8.2	10.8	13.1	18.1	19.7	13.1	5.7	100.0
Death & Gift	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	100.0	100.0
All Other Taxes	4.7	5.9	8.2	10.9	13.0	18.2	20.0	13.5	5.6	100.0
Soc. Ins. Conts.	3.7	5.2	7.7	11.1	13.5	19.0	20.8	14.0	5.1	100.1
Charges & Misc.	4.6	5.9	8.1	10.9	13.0	18.2	20.1	13.5	5.6	99.9
Intergovernmental	1.8	3.2	5.7	8.6	11.1	16.6	20.1	16.8	16.1	100.0

[1] Rows may not total 100.0% due to rounding.

Source: Same as Table 3.

ture benefits in allocating burdens and benefits to income classes. Perhaps the most controversial are the assumptions concerning the incidence of the corporation income tax and general expenditures. In recognition of this problem, the Tax Foundation has offered alternatives in both of these areas. In the present study, in deference to arguments among economists concerning the incidence of the corporation income tax, we have adopted the alternative which assumes that half the corporate taxes and fees are borne by stockholders and half are shifted to the consumer. We have also followed a middle course concerning general expenditures, assuming that half of these benefits are distributed in proportion to family money income before taxes and half in proportion to the number of families and unrelated individuals in each income class. The relevant question, in terms of this analysis, is whether or not these assumptions accord with the perceptions of fiscal policy-makers. We feel that our assumptions do no great violence to those perceptions, but this, of course, is a matter for empirical investigation. Third, some of the allocation bases employed in the Tax Foundation study would appear to be more applicable to federal revenues and expenditures than to those of the states, particularly in regard to income taxes (allocated according to the federal income tax burden) and insurance trust revenues and expenditures (both allocated in part according to the distribution of the burdens and benefits of social security taxes and expenditures). The practical effect of the choice of these allocation bases is probably to reduce our level of measurement from an interval to an ordinal scale. Here we assume that the *order* of the relative redistributive impact of the revenue and expenditure categories is preserved despite the fact that the relative *degree* of redistribution is probably distorted. For instance, we assume that state income taxes have a higher redistributive impact than most other state revenue sources although the relative degree of redistribution is probably overstated because of the Tax Foundation assumption that the distribution of the burden of state income taxes is the same as that of the federal income tax. Finally, in our consideration of only revenues and expenditures, the deficit of the states has been ignored; therefore revenue burdens are understated. To the extent that this omission has an equal impact in all the states, there will be no distortion in the regression analysis.

TABLE 5. REDISTRIBUTIVE RATIOS FOR 48 STATES[1]

	Ratio[2]		Ratio[2]
1. Massachusetts	3.320	25. Washington	2.093
2. Missouri	2.712	26. Maine	2.060
3. New York	2.644	27. Tennessee	2.031
4. Oklahoma	2.567	28. West Virginia	2.011
5. Connecticut	2.486	29. Iowa	2.001
6. Rhode Island	2.482	30. Kansas	1.998
7. Colorado	2.464	31. Montana	1.962
8. Oregon	2.446	32. Utah	1.954
9. Kentucky	2.428	33. Maryland	1.923
10. Illinois	2.376	34. Michigan	1.920
11. Wisconsin	2.340	35. North Carolina	1.900
12. California	2.322	36. Florida	1.850
13. Mississippi	2.274	37. North Dakota	1.845
14. Alabama	2.267	38. New Hampshire	1.830
15. Louisiana	2.252	39. Nevada	1.826
16. Ohio	2.242	40. Nebraska	1.813
17. Arkansas	2.212	41. Texas	1.800
18. Idaho	2.205	42. Indiana	1.793
19. Vermont	2.199	43. South Carolina	1.775
20. Delaware	2.190	44. New Mexico	1.720
21. New Jersey	2.135	45. South Dakota	1.715
22. Georgia	2.127	46. Arizona	1.694
23. Pennsylvania	2.107	47. Wyoming	1.660
24. Minnesota	2.098	48. Virginia	1.620

[1] Alaska and Hawaii have been excluded from the analysis because data for some of the independent variables were not available for the time period considered.

[2] The ratio of expenditure benefits to tax burdens for the three lowest income classes.

III. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Consonant with our first objective, developing a model with relatively high explanatory power, we have embarked on a frankly exploratory expedition in choosing independent variables. Hofferbert provided the general structure for this exploration when he suggested that independent variables be drawn from several dimensions: historic-geographic conditions, socio-economic composition, mass political behavior, governmental institutions, and elite behavior.[26] We have attempted to draw variables from all of these dimensions save that of historic-geographic conditions, though our classification is admittedly arbitrary.

The socio-economic variables used in this analysis are median family income,[27] industrialization,[28] urbanization,[29] education,[30] percentage of families with less than $3,000 annual income,[31] and the Gini index of income inequality.[32] The first four variables—income, industrialization, urbanization, and education—were chosen because of the high explanatory power they have exhibited in previous studies as correlates of levels of revenues and expenditures. We hypothesize that as a state develops economically and more completely fulfills basic service functions, a larger portion of its resources becomes available for other functions which tend to be more redistributive in character. The use of these variables also allows a direct comparison between the results of this and previous studies. The percentage of the population with income under $3,000 and the Gini index were both added on the assumption that the greater the inequality of income in a state and/or the larger the proportion of low income families in that state, the greater the perceived need for redistribution through state revenue and expenditure policies.

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[26] Richard I. Hofferbert, "Elite Influence in Policy Formation: A Model for Comparative Inquiry"; paper delivered at 1968 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2–7, 1968, p. 8.

[27] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of the Population, 1960* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 1–288.

[28] Industrialization is measured by one minus the percent of the work force engaged in farming, fishing and forestry work; drawn from *ibid.*, p. 1–249.

[29] Urbanization is measured by the percent of the population living in urban areas; from U.S. De-

Political participation,[33] Democratic vote,[34] interparty competition,[35] and legislative inducements to participation[36] are used as indicators of mass political behavior. First, we hypothesize that the participatory aspect of the political system will have a positive impact on state redistributive policies. Both overall measures of political participation and legislative inducements to participate are related to this hypothesis. Our decision to consider political participation, as measured by the average rate of voter participation in gubernatorial races between 1954 and 1962, was prompted by the well-established proposition that lower income groups are less likely to vote than higher income groups.[37] Thus we assume that the higher the voter participation, the more likely it is that voters in the lower income groups have participated in the election. With more electoral participation by the lower income groups, we further assume there will be increased pressure for measures favorable to those groups. Our use of the Milbrath index of legislative inducements to vote was based on much the same rationale. On the premise that legal barriers to participation have a differentially greater effect on lower income groups, we assume that removal of these barriers—or positive encouragement to vote—will have its greatest impact on the lowest income groups.

We are also concerned with the partisan component of mass political behavior: interparty competition and Democratic vote are employed to measure this dimension. The inclusion in our analysis of the Hofferbert index of interparty competition follows a hypothesis posed by V. O. Key in *Southern Politics*—that interparty competition promotes the distribution of benefits to lower income groups.[38] Key asserted that in-

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partment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1968* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 367.

[30] Education is defined as the median school year completed by persons 25 years of age; drawn from *U.S. Census of the Population, 1960,* p. 1-248.

[31] *U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1968,* p. 286.

[32] The Gini index is a summary measure of the inequality of income in a given population. It is derived from a Lorenz curve on which the percentage of total income is arrayed along the y-axis and percentage of consumer units is arrayed along the x-axis. A line drawn at a 45-degree angle across the graph describes perfect equality, since a given percentage of the consumer units will claim an equal percentage of total income at points on this line (e.g., the lowest 10 percent of the consumer units have 10 percent of total income). The Gini index describes, roughly, the area between the 45-degree line and the line representing the actual distribution of income. The larger the area—the higher the Gini index—the more unequal the distribution of income in the population. The Gini index used in this study is from David Verway, "A Ranking of States by Inequality Using Census and Tax Data," *Review of Economics and Statistics,* XLVIII (1966), 314.

[33] The participation index is defined as the votes cast for the state's Governor as a percent of voting age population. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1968* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 367.

[34] Measured in terms of average Democratic vote for Governor as in *U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1968,* p. 367.

[35] The measure of interparty competition is a rank order measure integrating the state's competition in the presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial races. For more detail on the measure, see Richard I. Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," *Journal of Politics,* XXVI (1964), 550-567.

[36] The legislative inducements to participation index is a summed measure noting the extent to which each state has legal measures facilitating participation, e.g., absence of literacy tests and residency requirements, permanent registration, etc. See Lester Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 46.

[37] Robert Lane, *Political Life* (New York: Free Press, 1959), p. 49.

[38] Key, *op. cit.,* pp. 298-311.

terparty competition leads to the organization and subsequent representation of lower income groups as the "outs" replace the "ins" and policies favorable to the new groups result. With the introduction of Democratic vote, we have taken the analysis of party behavior a step further. Here we attempted to probe the programmatic content of partisan behavior. We assume that the Democratic party propounds programs more favorable to lower income groups than does the Republican party. Hence we hypothesize, the greater the electoral support for the Democratic party in a given state, the more directionally redistributive will be the revenue and expenditure policies of that state. Democratic vote is measured by the average percentage of votes received by Democrats in gubernatorial elections between 1954 and 1964.

We have selected four variables to represent Hofferbert's next dimension, governmental institutions: legislative apportionment,[39] legislative party cohesion,[40] gubernatorial powers and gubernatorial tenure.[41] Malapportionment has been a subject of considerable interest and analysis, and despite generally negative findings, the suspicion lingers that it has an important political impact. This suspicion is based on persuasive theoretical arguments which, in terms of redistribution, can be summed up rather simply: since malapportionment usually reflects underrepresentation of urban areas, and since the strongest demand for redistributive policies is likely to emanate from these urban areas, it is assumed that the degree of malapportionment will vary inversely with the extent of redistribution in a state.

Governor's tenure and power were included in the analysis on the basis of two assumptions. First, we assume that governors are likely to press for redistributive measures in response to the varied pressures of the broad-based constituency required for their election. Second, we assume length of time in office, re-election possibilities, and structural sources of power will provide the governor with the tools necessary for the accomplishment of his purposes. Legislative party cohesion is used on much the same rationale. Here we assume that the accommodation of the varied interests necessary to produce party cohesion will lead to the enactment of redistributive measures.

The final dimension suggested by Hofferbert is elite behavior. The variables we have chosen to represent aspects of elite behavior are interest-group strength,[42] percentage of state employees under civil service coverage,[43] Grumm's index of legislative professionalism,[44] and Walker's innovation index.[45] In regard to interest-group strength, we hypothesize that redistribution to the lowest income groups is *negatively* related to the strength of interest-groups in a state. This hypothesis is based on Schattschneider's contention that a society with many interest groups incorporates a bias against the lower income groups, which typically are not represented in the interest-group system.[46] We would expect that the stronger the interest-group system, the lower the probability of success for political strategies based on the mobilization of the lower income classes. The inclusion of the percentage of employees covered by the civil service system can be justified in two ways. The more conventional explanation, expounded by such authors as Herring and Key, is that as civil service appointments replace political appointments, state services (in this case measured by revenue and expenditure policies) replace patronage as an inducement or a reward for party loyalty.[47] The allocation of these rewards or inducements is here assumed to be redistributive in character in response to the broad-based coalitions which form political parties. An alternative formulation links civil service coverage with the indexes of legislative professionalism and innovation as measures of what may be termed the "progressive" character of the state political system. Fenton contends that as civil service coverage expands in state offices, "job-oriented" employees are succeeded by "issue-oriented" employees who perceive rewards more in terms of service than in terms of employment security, and that redistribution results.[48] The high incidence of professionalism in the legislature and policy innovation in the states can be taken as indicators of the same type of emphasis on "equitable, efficient, issue-oriented politics" that is associated with the progressive tradition in American politics.

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[39] Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malapportionment," this REVIEW, LVIII (December 1964), pp. 969–70.

[40] The measures of party cohesion and interest-group strength were derived from a questionnaire "sent to two or more competent persons in each state, including political scientists . . . , director of . . . research, agencies or bureaus, legislative officers and politicians. At least one reply was received from each of the 48 states—in most cases two or three." See Belle Zeller, *American State Legislatures* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1954), pp. 190–192.

[41] The measure of gubernatorial tenure is an index combining the gubernatorial length of term and the legal possibilities for re-election. The gubernatorial power index combines evaluative indices of budget powers, appointive powers, and veto powers. See Joseph Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, pp. 220, 222, 226–27, 229.

[42] Zeller, *op. cit.*, pp. 190–91.

[43] Council of State Governments, *Book of the States, 1962–63* (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1962), pp. 178–81.

[44] Grumm, *op. cit.*, p. 25. The index combined four important qualities of legislative life: (a) compensation of legislators, (b) total length of sessions in 1963–64, (c) expenditures for legislative services and operations, (d) a "legislative services" score.

[45] Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 882–883. The innovation index measures the rapidity and extent of adoption within the states of eighty-eight different programs. Such programs ranged from "the establishment of highway departments and the enactment of civil rights bills to the creation of state councils on the performing arts and the passage of sexual psychopath laws."

[46] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 30–33.

IV. HYPOTHESES

Our basic hypothesis in this study, as indicated earlier, is that political variables are more closely related to the net redistributive impact of state revenues and expenditures than are socio-economic variables. However, in our attempts to develop an explanatory model of redistribution in the states, we have suggested a number of subsidiary hypotheses which can be tested in this analysis. These subsidiary hypotheses are listed below.

I. Socio-Economic Variables
  A. Redistributive policies of the states vary directly with the level of economic development in the state.
    1. Redistribution varies directly with median family income in the states.
    2. Redistribution varies directly with the degree of industrialization in the states.
    3. Redistribution varies directly with the degree of urbanization in the states.
    4. Redistribution varies directly with the level of education in the states.
  B. Redistributive policies of the states vary directly with the perceived need for such policies in the states.
    1. Redistribution varies directly with the degree of income inequality in the states.
    2. Redistribution varies directly with the proportion of families with less than $3,000 annual income.
II. Mass Political Behavior Variables
  A. Redistributive policies of the states vary directly with the extent of participation of lower income classes in the electoral process.
    1. Redistribution varies directly with the overall rate of political participation.
    2. Redistribution varies directly with legislative inducements to political participation.
  B. Redistributive policies of the states vary directly with the nature of partisan activities in the states.
    1. Redistribution varies directly with interparty competition in the states.
    2. Redistribution varies directly with the extent of the support for the Democratic party in the states.
III. Governmental Institution Variables
  A. Redistributive policies of the states vary directly with the quality of apportionment in the states.
  B. Redistribution varies directly with the degree of the governor's power in the states.
  C. Redistribution varies directly with the extent of the governor's tenure in the states.
  D. Redistribution varies directly with legislative party cohesion in the states.
IV. Elite Behavior Variables
  A. Redistributive policies of the states vary inversely with the degree of interest-group strength in the states.
  B. Redistribution varies directly with the extent of the coverage of the civil service system in the states.
  C. Redistribution varies directly with the degree of legislative professionalism in the states.
  D. Redistribution varies directly with the degree of innovative tendencies in the states.

V. FINDINGS

To test the hypotheses, we have run separate multiple regression analyses in 48 states and for non-Southern states.[49] We will examine the overall coefficients of multiple correlation and determination as indicators of the explanatory power of our model, zero-order and partial coefficients of correlation to test the relationship between each independent variable and redistribution in the states, and multiple-partial coefficients of determination to assess the relative importance of political and socio-economic variables in determining interstate variations in redistributive fiscal policies. Our statistical findings are summarized in Table 6.

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[47] See for example Pendleton Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1940), p. 362; and V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (5th ed.; New York: Thomas Crowell, 1964), pp. 696, 698.

[48] John Fenton, *People and Parties in Politics* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1966), pp. 46–49, 50–78.

[49] For the purposes of this paper, the following

As Table 6 indicates, we have achieved a measure of success in our efforts to develop a fairly powerful explanatory model. For all 48 states, the multiple coefficient of determination (R^2) is .55, indicating that the model "explains" 55% of the variance in interstate redistributive fiscal policies.[50] When separate regression analyses are run for the socio-economic and political variables included in this analysis, we find that socio-economic variables alone account for 17% of the variance in redistribution in the 48 states, and that political variables account for 38% of that variance.

The importance of the regional distinction (South separated from non-South) is indicated by the multiple coefficient of determination derived from a separate regression analysis performed for non-Southern states. For these states, the multiple coefficient of determination for all independent variables increases to .67, with both socio-economic variables ($R^2 = .28$) and political variables ($R^2 = .46$) accounting for more variance than in the 48 states as a whole.[51]

The subsidiary hypotheses generated with the introduction of the independent variables in the analysis will receive only perfunctory attention since they are of secondary importance in this study. Table 6 provides a listing of zero-order and partial coefficients of correlation for each independent variable with redistribution for both the 48 states and the non-Southern states. In general the independent variables selected bear the hypothesized relationships to redistribution in both the 48 states and the non-Southern states.

In terms of zero-order correlations in the 48 states, all relationships are as hypothesized with the exception of education, Democratic vote, interparty competition, the Gini index of income inequality, and the proportion of families with less than $3,000 in annual income. As one would expect, Democratic vote is redeemed when Southern states are excluded from the analysis, with a positive correlation between Democratic vote and redistribution for non-Southern states. The same reversal occurs for the Gini index of income inequality.

Shifting our attention to partial coefficients of correlation, a measure of independent impact of each independent variable on redistribution, we find somewhat longer lists of contrary correlations. For the 48 states, the partials for median income, industrialization, interparty competition, proportion of families with less than $3,000 annual income, and legislative party cohesion are

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states were considered to be in the "South": Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

[50] We have not used tests of statistical significance in this analysis, since all 48 states have been included.

[51] Analysis of the impact of political variables in the 12-state area of the South is proscribed by limitations on the degrees of freedom. However, regression analysis of the lesser number of socio-economic variables permits some speculation about the South-non-South differences: the multiple coefficient of determination for the socio-economic variables in the South is .74, higher than for either the 48 states as a whole or for the non-Southern states. Thus, in this analysis we have a situation in which the socio-economic variables account for more of the variance in each region examined than in the 48 states as a whole. Though a precise investigation of this anomaly is not possible within the statistical confines of the present study, we presume that the 48-state analysis contains a number of suppressed relationships which become statistically apparent only in the regional breakdown. The fragmentary data available to us support this presumption. An examination of the zero-order correlations between the socio-economic variables and redistribution in the South reveals that median income, industrialization, urbanization, and education have a strong *negative* relationship with redistribution. On the other hand, both the Gini index and the percentage of families with less than $3,000 in annual income have a strong positive relationship with redistribution. In short, redistribution varies inversely with what appear to be measures of ability to pay and directly with perceived need for redistribution. Since we would expect federal aid to vary in the same manner, with assistance provided to those states most in need and least able to pay, we assume that South-non-South differences in redistribution can be accounted for largely by differences in the impact of federal aid, and that this differential impact produces relationships obscured in the 48-state data. This conclusion can only be considered tentative and in need of more direct substantiation, but it suggests a fruitful area for future research.

TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

	48 States		Non-South	
	Zero-Order	Partial	Zero-Order	Partial
I. Variables				
Socio-Economic Variables				
Ability to Pay				
Median Income	.18	−.27	.23	−.40
Industrialization	.29	−.02	.33	−.05
Urbanization	.34	.15	.42	.23
Education	−.01	.17	−.08	.19
Need (Demand)				
Gini Index	.00	.22	.13	.47
% under $3,000	−.14	−.07	−.21	−.23
Political Variables				
Mass Political Behavior				
Political Participation	.14	.37	.06	.36
Democratic Vote	−.06	.11	.11	.17
Interparty Comp.	−.21	−.14	−.16	−.19
Leg. Inducements	.03	.07	.11	.33
Government Insts.				
Apportionment	.04	.01	.10	.09
Leg. Party Cohesion	.24	−.05	.25	.00
Governor Power	.26	.12	.24	−.04
Governor Tenure	.17	.12	.12	.17
Elite Behavior				
I. G. Strength	−.04	−.17	−.01	−.07
Civ. Ser. Coverage	.33	.34	.35	.48
Leg. Professionalism	.51	.28	.56	.14
Innovation Index	.46	.07	.50	.17
II. Multiple Coefficients of Correlation and Determination				
	R	R^2	R	R^2
All Variables	.75	.55	.82	.67
Socio-Economic Variables	.42	.17	.53	.28
Political Variables	.62	.38	.67	.46
III. Multiple-Partial Coefficients of Determination				
Political Variables Controlled for Socio-Economic Variables	.46		.54	
Socio-Economic Variables Controlled for Political Variables	.27		.39	

all related to redistribution in a direction opposite to that hypothesized. For non-Southern states, all of the same reverse relationships persist and the index of governor's power is added.

Two of these variables—interparty competition, and proportion of families with less than $3,000 annual income—are related to redistribution in a direction opposite to that hypothesized for both zero-order *and* partial coefficients of correlation and regardless of regional breakdown. For these two variables, then, the statistical evidence is most convincing for rejecting the assertion that they are correlated as hypothesized with the degree of redistribution in the states. For interparty competition, our data lead us to reject the venerable Key hypothesis that an increased level of interparty competition will increase the level of redistribution in the states. The negative relationship between the proportion of families with less than $3,000 annual income and the extent of redistribution should be evaluated in light of the positive relationships between redistribution and both legislative inducements to participate and the overall rate of participation. If we are correct in assuming that the latter two measures indicate the extent of electoral participation by lower income groups, we can tentatively conclude that, as might be expected, redistribution to the lowest income classes is more a function of participation by these classes than of their size.

The most interesting and significant finding in this study, however, concerns the relative importance of political and socio-economic variables in determining redistributive fiscal policies in the states. As indicated in the introductory section, previous studies of policy outcomes in the states have been hard pressed to find an independent impact for the political variables considered, and where the relative impact of political and socio-economic variables has been examined the socio-economic variables have predominated. In the present analysis, these findings are reversed. Not only do the political variables have an independent impact on redistributive policies in the states; they also account for considerably more of the variance in redistribution than do socio-economic variables. The relative explanatory power of the political and socio-economic variables is indicated by the multiple-partial coefficients of determination displayed in Table 6. For the 48 states the multiple-partial for political variables controlled for the socio-economic variables is .46 while the multiple-partial for the socio-economic variables controlled for the political variables is only .27. For the non-Southern states, the results are similar. The multiple-partial for political variables controlled for economic variables in the non-South is .54 while the multiple-partial for the socio-economic variables controlled for political variables is only .39. In other words, in the 48 states and in the non-Southern states, the political variables included in our analysis are considerably more powerful than the socio-economic variables in explaining variance in state redistributive policies.

Two objections which can be raised about the above interpretation of the multiple-partial coefficients of determination are: (A) the finding may be an artifact of the number of political variables used in the analysis (12) relative to the number of socio-economic variables employed (6); and (B) there may be variables not yet considered which could alter the observed relative impact of the political and socio-economic variables. The first objection is susceptible to a direct statistical confrontation. Taking only the five most powerful political variables (measured in terms of sums of squares reduction) versus the five most powerful socio-economic variables, the multiple-partial for the political variables controlled for the socio-economic variables is .42, while the multiple-partial for the socio-economic variables controlled for the political variables is .20 for the 48 states. Making the same comparison in the non-Southern states, we find the multiple-partial for political variables controlled for socio-economic variables is .47, while the multiple-partial for socio-economic variables controlled for political variables is .34. Thus, our finding concerning the relative impact of political and socio-economic variables is not simply the product of the number of each type of variable incorporated in this study. The second objection, the possibility that a variable not considered in this analysis could alter the observed relationships, cannot be answered definitively. We have attempted to minimize this possibility by developing a model with a high degree of explanatory power. Our findings, of course, are only tentative and subject to modification by future research.

VI. CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis has been specifically addressed to an investigation of the determinants of variations in the net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures in American states. In a broader sense, however, this study has been concerned with the more general question of whether or not the political system exercises an independent impact on public policy outcomes, and with the specification of an arena in which such an impact is likely to be found.

Previous analyses of policy outcomes have generally indicated that socio-economic variables have a dominant influence on those outcomes, with few reported instances of political variables exerting an independent impact. We have contended that these results have been the product of a continuing concentration on policy outcomes as measured by levels of taxes and expenditures. Accordingly, we have shifted the focus of our analysis to an examination of allocations of burdens and benefits in state systems of revenues and expenditures.

Our statistical results indicate that the shift in focus has been fruitful. First, we have been able to develop a statistical model that accounts for more than half the variance in redistribution among the 48 states included in the analysis and more than two-thirds of the variance in non-Southern states. Second, and more significantly, we have found that the political variables employed in the model are considerably more powerful than the socio-economic variables in explaining interstate variations in redistributive patterns. Thus, our data not only support the assertion that politics makes a difference, they suggest that politics plays a dominant role in the allocation of the burdens and benefits of public policies.

It is obvious that this study represents only a preliminary exploration of the theoretical utility of the concept of the net redistributive impact of revenues and expenditures as a dependent variable. The summary measure of redistribution employed in this analysis (the ratio of expenditure benefits to revenue burdens for the lowest three income groups) is only one of many possible measures with a variety of political implications. The complex interrelationships among the independent variables used in this analysis are susceptible to more systematic treatment. Longitudinal analysis could avoid the dangers inherent in the present research design of drawing dynamic inferences from a cross-sectional model of analysis. Our effort is meant to be but a first step in an intensive analysis of a dependent variable whose value we feel has been demonstrated.

THE SALIENCE OF AMERICAN STATE POLITICS*

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Research emphasizing the correlates of state policy outputs and the performance of particular institutions has overshadowed the role of the citizenry in the drama of state politics. One question of basic concern is the relevance of state government and politics for the inhabitants of a state. At the level of public policy and institutional performance the answer to this is factual and straightforward. The nature, amount, distribution, and to some extent the quality of a state's services and policies can be specified. Since states perform most of the traditional functions of governmental units and since these functions affect the fortunes of the citizens, state politics has an obvious, tangible, objective relevance for a state's inhabitants.[1] At another level, however, the answer is not so clear-cut. Here we are dealing with the idea of what is subjectively relevant. Large numbers of people apparently pass their lives being touched by political institutions in a variety of ways without becoming particularly interested in or involved with these institutions. Other people become intensely, purposively related to these same institutions. Still others fall along a continuum between these two poles. If substantial variations exist in the general salience of politics, there is little reason to doubt that the same conditions may be found in particular subsets of political matters. In the case at hand this subset consists of the cluster of institutions, actors, and processes known as state political systems.

I. THE CONCEPT OF SALIENCE MAPS

It may be assumed that for every individual at a given point in time some aspects of politics are more salient than are others. These varying degrees of salience result in cognitive maps yielding surfaces with divergent contours and topographies. Analytically, at least two kinds of mapping operations can be visualized. One is laid out according to issue domains. For some people civil rights issues are most salient, for others tax and fiscal issues, for still others questions of foreign affairs predominate, while education may be the prominent part for yet another cluster of people. Some individuals may place equal stress—ranging from high to low—on a host of disparate issues, but given the opportunity costs involved it seems likely that at any point in time the mapping operations result in an ordering of issue salience.

More germane for present purposes is a salience map arranged according to geopolitical units. A variety of investigations have suggested that people do, in fact, develop such maps.[2] Perhaps the most noted shorthand expression of this differentiation is the local-cosmopolitan dimension. Important ramifications for political systems stem from differentiated salience maps. One has only to think of the stresses and strains in the emergent countries or the separatist enclaves in established polities to grasp these possibilities. The difficulties encountered by national governments as a partial consequence of sub-national loyalties are impressive. Proclivities toward independence in the Canadian province of Quebec, the Nigeria-Biafra confrontation, the uneasy federalism of India, and the failure of the American South to be incorporated fully into the mainstream of American politics testify to the magnitude of these difficulties.

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[1] The literature on the correlates of state policy outputs is becoming voluminous. Thomas Dye's *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966) perhaps represents the zenith of this approach. Other questions are also receiving attention, however. See, for example, some essays in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little Brown, 1965); Samuel C. Patterson, "The Political Cultures of the American States," *Journal of Politics,* 30 (February, 1968), 187–209; Norman C. Thomas, "The Electorate and State Constitutional Reform: An Analysis of Four Michigan Referenda," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 12 (February, 1968), 115–129; and Wayne Francis, *Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A Comparative Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967). Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky provide a sound and enlightened discussion of the field in their "Outputs, Structures, and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," *Journal of Politics,* 30 (May, 1968), 510–538.

[2] For an example and references to the literature see M. Kent Jennings, "Pre-Adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Government," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 11 (August, 1967), 291–317. An historical perspective with a different focus is found in Samuel P. Hays, "Political Parties and the Community-Society Continuum," in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham

As with salience maps oriented around issues, the maps dealing with levels of government could in fact attach equal relevance to the component parts. That is, a person could be equally interested (or uninterested) in international, national, state, and local public affairs and politics. Yet this would seem to be an inefficient mode of operation if nothing else, and as we shall see momentarily it is a deviant pattern.

Upon what basis would a person distinguish among these four levels of politics? Assuming that he had equal information about all of them, or at least access to equal information, two dimensions can be suggested. First, he may arrange them according to his interest in the policy outcomes involved. Whereas some find local outcomes about services and amenities of greatest subjective relevance, others are more intrigued by the results of military encounters and diplomatic skirmishes at the international level. A second dimension rests not so much with outcomes as with the demands and conversion processes at work within a given system. Here the interest comes from watching how the game is played rather than in what the final scores are. Charismatic political leaders, factional fights, and broader societal cleavages are kinds of forces which can lead to differential salience along this dimension. Attention to outcomes and conversions may operate simultaneously and feed upon each other. Interest generated by a strong, personable governor might be combined with concern over a state tax program to produce a heightened salience for state politics. Should such convergences occur, the two types of salience maps begin to merge. That is, the overlay of the issue salience map on the system salience map begins to produce a single topography. Although the question of overlap between issue and system maps is an important one, our major concern is with the system map arrangement.

II. THE PLACE OF THE STATES VERSUS OTHER LEVELS

For a variety of reasons one could predict that the states generate but a modicum of interest amongst their residents. Many of these reasons are either explicit or implicit in a statement by Dahl, made in the context of a discussion about optimum units for popular democratic government:

> Yet in the perspective I am suggesting the states do not stand out as important institutions of democratic self-government. They are too big to allow for much in the way of civic participation—think of California and New York, each about as large in population as Canada or Yugoslavia and each larger than 80 percent of the countries of the world. Yet an American state is infinitely less important to citizens of that state than any democratic nation-state to its citizens. Consequently the average American is bound to be much less concerned about the affairs of his state than of his city or country. Too remote to stimulate much partcipation by their citizens, and too big to make extensive participation possible anyway, these units intermediate between city and nation are probably destined for a kind of limbo of quasi-democracy. . . . It cannot even be said that the states, on the whole, can tap any strong sentiments of loyalty or likemindedness among their citizens.[3]

In a sense the states are caught between the immediacy of the local system and the glamour and importance of the national and international systems. Without wishing to become embroiled in the question of the appropriate units for a democratic polity, we can nevertheless introduce some material which will clarify the location of the states in the salience maps of Americans.

Our data are drawn primarily from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's 1966 election study, which utilized a national probability sample of the adult population. In order to obtain the interest accorded various levels of politics a series of questions was put to the respondents, beginning with an initial question designed to filter out those people (17 percent) who barely attend to matters of the body politic.[4] The remainder rank-ordered which

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(eds.), *The American Party Systems* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 152–181.

[3] Robert A. Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," this REVIEW, 61 (December, 1967), p. 968.

[4] This question ran: "Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested.

TABLE 1. RANK ORDER DISTRIBUTIONS FOR SALIENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS AT FOUR LEVELS

Level of Governmental Affairs	Rank of How Closely Followed				Total[a]	N
	First	Second	Third	Fourth		
International	20%	16%	22%	42%	100	983
National	32	31	26	10	99	983
State	17	33	27	22	99	983
Local	30	20	25	25	100	983
	99%	100%	100%	99%		
	N = 983	983	983	983		

[a] Total percentages do not equal 100% due to rounding. Cases involving tied ranks or missing data have been deleted in this table. Their inclusion in any rows or columns would have a maximum effect of but 1 percent on any cell value. The total number of cases for analysis will be 1,008.

kinds of public affairs they follow most closely—international, national, state, and local.[5]

One immediate result of the ranking operations is that it reveals the readiness of Americans to distinguish among the four levels. All but 6 percent of the sample (excluding the inattentive) gave complete orderings. The ease with which the rankings were obtained as well as the meager proportions declining to give complete orderings indicates that people at least believe they have salience maps characterized by a rugged terrain rather than a smooth plain.

It is apparent that, while some respondents place state affairs above all other levels, the majority share of first rank attention is devoted to national and local affairs, such as Dahl predicted (Table 1). If one wants to consider international affairs a mental extension of America's role in world affairs (which some respondents undoubtedly did), then state affairs is even more clearly in last place. Taking only the leading rankings demonstrates that the attentive public for state politics is not particularly large.

The danger in closing the argument on the basis of first ranks is nicely demonstrated in two ways. Looking at fourth ranks, for example, reveals that state affairs has next to the lowest proportions in this category. More compelling evidence is provided by moving to the second ranks. State affairs has strong second-place strength, being in fact the level selected most often at that rank. The contrast with the fate of international affairs is the most striking, since it too (compared with national and local affairs) had abundant opportunity to pick up second place strength. The result of combining first and second ranks finds one-half of the sample placing state matters either first or second, thereby moving it to an equal footing with local affairs, well ahead of international affairs, but still to the rear of national affairs. While the states may not be uppermost in the political thoughts of their residents, they do occupy a secure niche.[6]

What are the risks in using the respondents' rank orderings of interest in the four levels of politics as a way of deriving their interest in state politics alone? Three immediate justifications for the measure can be offered. First, it should be reemphasized that these orderings reflect those of the national sample *minus* an apolitical stratum, the 17% who avowed they paid no attention to public affairs and politics. Thus we have eliminated at least a substantial proportion of those people who might have contributed idiosyncratic, error-prone estimates of the differential salience of various levels of politics. Second, these kinds of rank-orders have been

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Would you say that you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?" Those selecting one of the first three alternatives are considered to be members of the attentive public.

[5] After handing the respondent a card showing the four levels of public affairs, he was asked to rank them in this fashion: "Which one of these kinds of public affairs do you follow most closely?" "Which one do you follow most closely?" "Which one do you follow least closely?" With first, second, and fourth ranks thus determined the residual level automatically occupied the third rank.

[6] It should be recognized that we are not merely playing with numbers in order to make a case for the saliency of state politics. There is no logical necessity, given the nature of the questions used, that state affairs attract any second rankings. All respondents after making their first choice could have ranked state affairs third or even last had they been so inclined.

TABLE 2. RELATIVE VERSUS ABSOLUTE LEVELS OF INTEREST IN STATE POLITICS[a]

Rank of How Closely State Politics Followed	Attention Paid to State Politics			Row Totals	Marginal Totals	N
	Great Deal	Some	Not Much			
First	58%	39%	04%	101%	15%	(166)
Second	44	50	06	100	38	(407)
Third	27	55	18	100	28	(307)
Fourth	22	56	22	100	19	(204)
Marginal Totals	37	51	12		100%	(1084)

[a] Data are drawn from the Survey Research Center's 1968 national election study.

subjected to a spatial scaling technique which indicates the prominence of at least one major dimension running through the rank orders, *viz.*, that of the geo-political domain encompassed by given governmental levels.[7] Essentially, this means that the ranking of state politics nestles reasonably well within an overall, multi-level salience framework.

A third argument is perhaps the most persuasive. It could be charged that the *relative* salience of state politics bears but little correspondence to its *absolute* salience. Illustratively, a politically passive person ranking state politics first might actually pay less attention to it than a political activist ranking it third or fourth. While the plentiful presence of such inconsistencies could be overlooked on the grounds that one is primarily interested in the workings of individual preference orders regardless of intensities, our concept of salience maps will acquire an extra dimension if it can be shown that this is not the common pattern. The 1966 election study did not ascertain absolute levels of interest in politics at multiple levels, but the 1968 election study did this as well as obtaining the rank orderings of interest.[8] A moderately satisfying result would take the form of little association between relative and absolute salience. This would at least allow for the play of relative salience across a spectrum of people having about the same absolute interest in state politics. A much more gratifying result, of course, would be a clear positive relationship between the two dimensions.

The cross-tabulation of the two measures (Table 2) is unequivocal in demonstrating a moderate correspondence between absolute and relative salience, in terms of self-reports. We can say with some confidence that, on the average, those who attend relatively more often to state affairs also tend to pay more absolute attention. By the same token (if the table is percentaged vertically) it is clear that the attentive public in absolute terms comes disproportionately from the ranks of those for whom the state is relatively more salient. There is little reason to suspect that different results would have been obtained from the 1966 respondents, had they been asked the additional questions. One indirect piece of evidence, for example, is that the marginals for the rank-ordered interest in state politics are remarkably similar across the two samples.[9]

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[7] See Jennings, *op. cit.*, for an application of the Coombsian unfolding technique to data of this type from a national adolescent sample. Separate analysis with the sample at hand yields similar results.

[8] In the 1968 study the respondents were, as in 1966, first put through a screening question which eliminated the apoliticals. They then replied to questions about their attention to the four levels of politics. For state politics the question read: "And how about affairs here in (STATE WHERE R LIVES); do you pay a great deal, some, or not much attention to state affairs?" Rank orders of relative interest were obtained after these questions.

[9] Since we have both relative and absolute measures for the 1968 sample, it might be asked why we do not utilize that sample rather than the earlier one. The reasons are two-fold: 1) in order to capture a "purer" reflection of the salience of American state politics it seems desirable to base the analysis on data gathered during a period relatively uncontaminated by the forces of a national election, for much the same reasons that studies of state voting turnout, division of the vote, and party strength often separate the off-year from presidential year statistics; 2) a number of questions of direct relevance for state politics were asked in the 1966 study, but not in 1968. On the other hand, subsequent work in this general area might well utilize both absolute and relative measures of salience in order to arrange people in a multi-dimensional mode.

Given previous work with the local-cosmopolitan dimension, a positive association between rank orderings for state and local affairs would be hypothesized. Rank order interrelationships can be demonstrated in a fairly straightforward way without the added refinement of spatial or scaling techniques. The respondents' rankings of state politics were crossed against their rankings of each of the other three levels of politics. From these matrices were extracted the sum of respondents who allocated either a first or second rank to each of the other three levels. These proportions are as follows:

First or Second Rank Given to:	State Affairs Ranked:			
	First	Second	Third	Fourth
International	5	9	30	40
National	43	38	42	37
Local	52	52	28	23
	100%	99%	100%	100%

Without doubt, the higher the salience of state affairs the higher is that of local matters and, on the other hand, the lower is that of international affairs.

An easy transition between and intermixing of state and local politics creates a sizable cluster of people who are state and locally oriented. Another way of viewing these rankings is to think of people living in the same geographical area, but focussing their attention upon different political objects. There is a state public—overlapping in great part with the local—and a more cosmopolitan public. Both cosmopolitan and state-local political processes operate simultaneously within a given area; but the "separate" publics of each level probably filter out to varying degrees the information about processes less relevant for them.

Having set forth the concept of salience maps and the place of the states in such maps, we can now turn to two major sets of questions. First, we are interested in the attitudinal and behavioral corollaries or consequences of differential state salience. Other things being equal, the various psychological theories of balance, congruence, and consonance would suggest a probable linkage between high state salience and the favorable evaluation of objects associated with states, and a negative evaluation of objects foreign to the states. Similarly, high salience should be associated with greater behavioral activity in the domain of state politics.

Second, we are concerned with the determinants of distinctive state salience maps. These may be presumed to flow from two sources, one social and the other political. A variety of social experiences are ordinarily associated with narrower, more provincial perspectives. These lead us to predict that state salience will vary with the nature of these experiential histories. The strictly political factors to be considered are state-specific. Although theoretical underpinnings are less apparent here, we will take as a point of departure the progressive, "good government" model of politics. This model would suggest that the more the state political system conforms to the tenets of progressive democracy, the more interested will be the citizenry in the state as a political institution. That is, salience maps will vary with (good) systemic properties, *ceteris paribus*.

In the analysis to follow we have collapsed the four rankings of state politics into two by combining ranks one and two into "high," and three and four into "low."

III. SALIENCE, ATTITUDES, AND BEHAVIOR

While one can argue that determining the distribution of differential salience maps is important in and of itself, the subject will be more compelling if it can be shown that certain attitudes and behaviors accompany the different configurations. For instance, it can be demonstrated that there is a connection between salience levels and affective orientations. Those following state affairs could, in fact, be responding to negative impressions about the state's institutions and leaders. Given the need for consonance rather than dissonance in the human psyche, it seems more likely that there would be a "strain toward congruity."[10] Attention and favorable dispositions do, indeed, occur together. One example is that those who pay more attention to state politics accord higher prestige to the occupation of governor than do those paying less attention ($\gamma = .32$).[11] That is, there is greater identification with a symbol (role) connected with the more salient level of government.

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[10] For experimental evidence see, *inter alia*, Milton J. Rosenberg, *et al.*, *Attitude Organization and Change* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960).

[11] The question read: "Now we're interested in learning what kinds of work Americans respect most highly. Which of these occupations do you respect the most?" Three choices were made. The list included, in this order: "U.S. Senator, Bishop or other church official, general or admiral, famous doctor, justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, atomic scientist, professor at a large university, President of the U.S., well-known athlete, president of a large corporation like General Motors, governor of your state." Altogether governor was the fourth-most choice, being tabbed by 29% of the sample. The correlation in the text is based on first choices.

By drawing upon data from the 1968 election study it is possible to show more precisely the connection between salience and affect. Respondents rank ordered their faith and confidence in the three levels of the American federal system—national, state, and local.[12] Comparing salience and confidence levels reveals that as the salience of a state's politics rises so does the evaluation of that government's performance. Just as people tend to pay more attention to candidates they like, and vice versa, so too they seem to operate in a selective fashion with respect to political units such as the states. Again, there is no particular reason to suppose that this pattern would not hold for the 1966 sample with which we have been dealing.

Inferentially, the relatively more attentive public for state politics would seem to provide sources of political support for the ongoing performance of state officials.[13] While the overlap of attention and support is a pleasing state of affairs for state officials, it also raises the possibility of a tacit exchange between these officials and the supportive public. The convergence between support and favorable perception suggests that the values of the attentive public are echoed and legitimized by the state's elites. In any event, if people for whom state politics is highly salient have socio-political views differing from those of the less attentive public, and if there is meaningful interaction between and among elites and attentive publics, then it should follow that the state's political life would vary according to the mix of people more closely attuned to state affairs. It becomes relevant, then, to assess the political values of this attentive public.

We may begin by noticing that people who pay more attention to state politics are basically less trusting of the world about them. They are more likely than others to say that one can't be too careful when dealing with other people rather than affirming that most people can be trusted ($\gamma = .31$). They are also more inclined to think that their fellow man is primarily looking out for himself rather than trying to be helpful to others ($\gamma = .19$). By ranking state politics higher than national and international affairs an individual has given a hint that he may be suspicious of larger, more remote environments. His more distrustful orientation toward other people rests comfortably in this outlook.

Attitudes more manifestly political give some glimpse into the way state-oriented individuals view national government and its role in their own lives. Those inclined toward state affairs avow more often that what Washington does makes less of a difference in their personal lives ($\gamma = .30$). In one sense this is a confirmation of our earlier speculation that a system-level salience map reflects in part an issue salience map, since state-oriented citizens see less subjectively important outcomes at the highest level of the federal structure.

Given the subjectively lesser importance of Washington decisions, it would be anticipated that the special public of the states is concerned about the increasing erosion of state decision-making by the federal government. Such concern is present, though not as visible as might be expected. Those attuned to state matters more often say that the federal government is playing too powerful a role in society ($\gamma = .16$). By the same token they more often oppose Washington's taking a strong role in integrating the nation's schools ($\gamma = .21$). The lack of stronger relationships may proceed from the fact that such people may simply not feel threatened by an actor (Washington) which is of lesser importance to them in general.

It should be noted, incidentally, that the prominent political orientation of party identification bears almost no overall relationship to state salience: ($\gamma = .08$), using the S.R.C. seven-point party identification measure which runs from strong Democrat to strong Republican. This is so despite the fact that, nationally, the Republican party is often linked with a states' rights position. Acually the only region in which party identification has an observable connection with state salience is the South, where Democrats more often rank state affairs higher ($\gamma = .21$). For the other regions the relationship is nil.

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[12] The questions ran: "We also find that people differ in how much faith and confidence they have in various levels of government in this country. In your case, do you have more faith and confidence in the national government, the government of this state, or in the local government around here?" "Which level do you have the least faith and confidence in—the (——) or the (——)?"

[13] Any further exploration of the linkage between salience maps and support structures needs to take into account such support dimensions as delineated by David Easton, namely, specific-diffuse; overt-covert; and direct-indirect. See his *A System Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 153–340. For an investigation of support processes at the state level see G. R. Boynton, Samuel C. Peterson, and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Structure of Support for Legislative Institutions," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 12 (May, 1968), 163–180.

Although virtually all the above relationships persist within each category of the control variables employed,[14] they are more marked among some strata. The prime example is not socio-economic or spatial; rather, it is by political strata. Non-voters in the 1966 general election (and to a lesser extent non-voters in the 1966 primary contests) exaggerate the original correlations. Thus the relationships are heightened for non-voters versus voters when salience is related to a disavowal of Washington's impact (.54 vs .15); belief that the federal government is too powerful (.30 vs .11); and being against federal intervention in school integration (.28 vs .17).[15]

Identification with the state is as much or more symbolic than active for the non-voters. Denying the relevance of a disliked national government, they interpose the state as a symbolic barrier between the national government and themselves. These and other variations denote a multiplicative effect, whereby salience maps are especially linked to views about the federal government among citizens with certain characteristics. Consequently, the practical, political effects of varying proportions of state-oriented residents in the state depend upon other traits of these residents.

Perhaps the most acute test of the impact of differential attention toward state politics comes in examining overt behaviors. If the concept of diverse salience maps is to have viability, some behavioral manifestations are in order. Should these be found, it would suggest that the fabric of a state's politics is further mediated by or informed by the distribution of interest orderings.

It may be stated at the outset that close followers of state politics are, in many respects, slightly less participative than are those less devoted to state politics. For example, they report following public affairs and politics often ($\gamma = -.20$), they vote less often in presidential elections ($\gamma = -.16$), they had less interest in the 1966 congressional campaign ($\gamma = -.13$), knew a little less about the candidates ($\gamma = -.10$), and were just a shade less likely to vote in the congressional election ($\gamma = -.08$). These relationships seem at first glance to cast doubt on our earlier demonstration (with the 1968 sample) that relative interest in state politics was linked to absolute interest. However, the declining magnitude of these correlations as one moves *from a general interest in politics on through to* activities reflecting participation in congressional races contains a hint that the closer the activity is to state and local matters the more likely will this pattern be erased or even possibly reversed.

Such proves to be the case. There is absolutely no difference in turnout for the gubernatorial election in those states where that office was at stake. Furthermore, those most interested in state politics more often reported voting in the 1966 primaries ($\gamma = .15$). Finally, an indirect indicator of a linkage between state-level salience and forms of participation is that the more attention paid to state matters the greater is the likelihood of voting a straight party ticket in the 1966 state and local elections ($\gamma = .17$).[16] The general drift of these admittedly modest correlations over a range of behavioral phenomena suggests that a higher focus on state affairs may depress participation within nationally oriented politics but enhance it at state and local levels. Thus the concept of attentive publics is given a behavioral as well as attitudinal dimension.

These overall relationships disguise some fascinating interplay between state level salience and other factors associated with political participation. It is well-known, for example, that education is positively related to both spectator and participatory levels of politicization. Since—as shall presently be demonstrated—education is inversely related to the attention paid state politics, it might be assumed that the generally negative relationships between state level salience and political participation are a function of education. If this were so, it would not account for the absence of a relationship with turnout in the gubernatorial election and the presence of a positive association with turnout in the primary balloting. Nevertheless, it is true that at least some portion of the meager relationships are a function of the confounding influence of educational attainment. What is much more intriguing, though, is that education and the attention directed toward state affairs interact with each other to produce strikingly divergent patterns of political behavior.

This process is best illustrated with three measures: interest in the 1966 congressional campaign, voting in the 1966 general election, and voting in the 1966 primary. It will be recalled that the bivariate correlations between interest in state politics and affirmative responses to these three items were either slightly negative (for the first two) or positive (for the latter). By noting the correlations at each of four educa-

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[14] Controls included region, urbanization, education, subjective social class, interest in public affairs, voting regularity, and party identification.

[15] The results obtained when controlling for voting participation are not artifactual of differential turnout rates by region or urbanization.

[16] This holds true among Democrats and Independents, but not for Republicans.

FIG. 1. Relationship Between Salience of State Politics and State-Level Participation, by Education.



tional levels it is possible to see the profound interaction effects between education and state interest. There is considerable deviation around the aggregate bivariate correlations. This is shown in Figure 1, which contains plottings by educational level for each of the three measures. Among the less educated, following state politics is marked by less interest and voting. As education rises these negative relationships either decline or move to the positive side. Finally, among the well-educated being attuned to state politics exerts a very positive effect. A similar pattern holds among the subsample located in states with a gubernatorial contest in 1966.

These changing relationships are not easily accounted for. One line of explanation is that the salience of state politics for the poorly educated and the well educated attentive publics rests upon different bases of psycho-political orientations. For the poorly educated, who have much less factual knowledge about state politics, the attachment is primarily affective, a buffer against a fearsome intruder. For the better educated, high interest in state politics takes a more instrumental form, whereby participation becomes more meaningful. If, indeed, the better educated transform their attention levels into more participation via an instrumental orientation, then it should follow that the participation levels in state (and local) elections would be higher for those paying more attention to state politics. As we observed, this is precisely the case.

It is more difficult to say why the attention level is inversely related to participation among the poorly educated. Perhaps their more affective orientation, when combined with a higher interest in state politics, results in a perspective that voting accomplishes relatively little. High affective symbolic orientations may reduce the need for participation. Inner gratification flows from withdrawal and non-participation.

IV. INDIVIDUAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC BASES OF STATE-LEVEL SALIENCE

The place of state politics in an individual's attention frame will be a function of formative experiences—summed up in the term political socialization—as well as more contemporary factors denoting the type of life space occupied by the individual. Here we concentrate on the various "static" characteristics rather than on those reflecting dynamic elements.[17]

Where a person was reared says something, in gross terms, about his family of orientation, the life style around him, and the nature of the surrounding political culture. It is apparent that the more urban a person's upbringing the less likely he is to pay attention to state politics (panel 1, Table 3). A similar pattern may be discerned in terms of contemporary residence. For convenience, we have categorized locations in terms of the twelve largest standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA), other SMSA's, and non-SMSA areas. The more urban or metropolitan the area the less compelling are state affairs (panel 2, Table 3).

A third locational factor is that of region. As with the other spatial variables, region is a summary construct. That is, it often captures (imperfectly to be sure) a set of historical experiences, socialization patterns, life styles, and political culture differences which are relevant to certain political phenomena. Two recent illustrations of "regionalism" are the findings that the adoption of policy innovations and the patterns of state expenditures have distinct, independent regional components.[18] It can also be argued

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[17] An attempt to look at the nuances of state level salience over the life cycle will be found in an extended version of this article to be published in Edward C. Dreyer and Walter A. Rosenbaum (eds.), *Political Opinion and Electoral Behavior* (rev. edition, Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, forthcoming).

[18] Jack L. Walker, "The Adoption of Innovations by the American States," this REVIEW, 63 (September, 1969), 880–899; and Ira Sharkansky, "Econo-

TABLE 3. SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES OF STATE POLITICS SALIENCE

Proportion of People Paying First or Second Most Attention to State Affairs, by:				gamma[a]
Where Reared				
Farm	Small Town	Small City	Large City	
65%	50%	42%	40%	−.30
(323)[b]	(256)	(169)	(240)	
Current Residence				
Non-SMSA	Medium SMSA	Large SMSA		
62%	51%	38%		−.31
(359)	(357)	(292)		
Current Region				
South	West	Midwest	Northeast	
62%	54%	46%	43%	—[c]
(288)	(167)	(310)	(243)	
Education				
0–8 grades	Some high school	High school graduate	Some college or more	
64%	59%	52%	34%	−.32
(208)	(164)	(362)	(269)	
Subjective Social Class				
Working	Middle			
59%	41%			−.34
(543)	(441)			
Length of Residence in State				
0–19 years	20 years or more, but less than entire life	Entire life		
42%	47%	54%		.17
(120)	(236)	(620)		

[a] These represent the correlation between the overall high-low salience dichotomy and the accompanying social and demographic characteristics.

[b] These are the N's upon which the percentages are based.

[c] Gamma computation inappropriate because region is a nominal variable.

that, even if region as a term simply disguises the "real" underlying dimension at work, this still does not alter the fact that the distribution of opinion and behavior within a region—hence the states in that region—is different, and that these differences may either reflect or produce different political processes. In the case at hand it turns out that the salience of state politics does vary among the regions, with Southerners being most attuned to state matters, Westerners next, and Midwesterners and Northeasterns least (panel 3, Table 3).[19] Similar proportions emerge by taking the individual's region of birth instead of current region.

A slight diversion is necessary here to comment on the possible historical and contemporary reasons for these regional divergencies. In one cluster are the Southern states, bound by the pains, memories, and dislocations of an historical trauma. To say that the states have a unqiue place in past and present Southern politics is to repeat a commonplace. At the other extreme is the cluster of Northeastern and Midwestern states, those states generally considered most cosmopolitan in outlook, the major repositories of the great economic, cultural, social, and political institutions of the nation. Between these two clusters are those states which may be characterized as Western and hybrid in nature. Settled in large part by immigrants from other states, carved in part out of the former federal territories, ushered into statehood at a time when the trend was toward stronger state government,[20] and physically remote from the centers of national power, these states have neither the high cosmopolitanism of the Northeastern-Midwestern tier, nor the scars and ethnocentrism of the South. It remains to be seen whether these regional patterns persist in the light of various controls which shall subsequently be applied.

To the locational factors may be added those characteristics reflecting a person's social status and life style. The higher a person's formal education and subjective social class the less interest he evinces in state politics (panels 4 and 5, Table 3). This pattern echoes the well-known propensity of the better off and better educated to be more concerned than lower status people with broader environments. In view of this it is

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mic Development, Regionalism, and State Political Systems," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 12 (February, 1968), 41–59. See also Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955); Norval D. Glenn and J. L. Simmons, "Are Regional Cultural Values Diminishing?" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 31 (Summer, 1967), 176–193; and M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler, "Political Expressivism Among High School Teachers: The Intersection of Community and Occupational Values," in Roberta S. Sigel (ed.), *Learning About Politics: Studies in Political Socialization* (New York: Random House, 1970).

[19] Regional groupings follow Census Bureau classifications: Northeast = New England and Middle Atlantic states; Midwest = East North Central and West North Central states; South = South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central states; and West = Mountain and Pacific states. Other regional combinations were employed, but with less rewarding outcomes.

[20] Daniel Elazar discusses the historical tendencies toward state centralism versus localism in *American Federalism: A View from the States* (New York: Crowell, 1966), pp. 186–193.

not surprising that those from the working class and lower educational strata are more likely to form a portion of the attentive public for state politics.

While the demographic and social strata components supply a substantial amount of differentiation, there are also temporal factors at work. One of these is simply the individual's length of residence in his state. The common-sense hypothesis that the longer a person resides in a state the higher the salience of that state's politics for him is borne out by the data (panel 6, Table 3). At this aggregate level the differences are not marked, but are clearly in the hypothesized direction.

We now know that the amount of attention devoted to state affairs differs according to several social and spatial characteristics. Of additional importance is whether the observed patterns hold under a variety of control conditions and whether there are cumulative effects at work. The answer to the first query is unequivocal. With only one exception[21] the original bivariate associations are maintained when controls are exerted for each of several other variables. For example, the basic negative relationship between SMSA size and state level salience persists regardless of rearing site, region, education, social class, and length of state residence. With some confidence one can say that the social and locational factors cited above have an independent impact on the probable occurrence of divergent salience maps.

Although the staying power of the various characteristics constitutes an important aspect of the analysis, it is significant that there are also cumulative processes at work. Two examples will depict what is, for the most part, a common form of behavior when two of the predisposing factors are combined and then related to state politics salience. One instance of this process comes by combining educational attainment and the site where the individual was reared. It was established previously that the higher one's education and the more urban the rearing site environment the less salient is state politics. Now if these two factors operate in an additive fashion when combined it should mean, for example, that the highly educated from urban areas would be especially prone to rank state affairs low. Without doubt this is the case. Only 28 percent of the college educated persons reared in a city placed state politics high. On the other hand, 74 percent of the elementary educated respondents who were reared on farms gave high prominence to state affairs. Percentages between these two poles tended to reflect very faithfully the operation of additivity principles.

A second example of the cumulative processes at work merges education and region. In addition to knowing that education is negatively related to following state affairs and that pronounced regional variations exist, we also know that educational differences persist within each of the four regions (α: South $= -.32$; West $= -.34$; Midwest $= -.34$; Northeast $= -.23$). Under such conditions it should come as no surprise to find that by categorizing people in terms of both education and region the range of high interest in state affairs is elongated. Furthermore, the elongation conforms remarkably well to the predicted values, assuming additivity.

Figure 2 contains two lines, one showing the predicted order of values under an additivity model, and the other showing the actual values attached to those predicted for each region-education combination. While the lines do not follow the same precise path, the actual proportions adhere rather nicely to the predicted ones.[22] That is, given four overall regional means, the effects of education are roughly similar across each region. Conversely, given different educational strata means, the effects of region are approximately the same across each educational strata.

Because we are dealing with a national sample, none of the foregoing results would apply with certainty to particular states. Yet to the extent that the nationally-based findings provide state-specific clues it is clear that salience maps possess quite different configurations according to some well-defined individual and demographic properties. Short of dramatic events, the states thus seem destined to be populated by unequal proportions of state-attentive publics.[23] How

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[21] The deviant case is that of length of residence controlled by region. Interest in state affairs does not increase with length of residence in the West (−.05), a finding no doubt occasioned by the continued Westward migration of the populace. Correlations for the other three regions are South = .39; Northeast = .26; Midwest = .16.

[22] The monotonic ordering and predicted values for given combinations were constructed by taking the marginal values from the appropriate column and row intersected by the cell (combination), and adding these row and column effects to the grand mean. The intercorrelation problem was handled by utilizing Multiple Classification Analysis, a program which helps remove the intercorrelation effects. Nearly identical results were obtained by using James Coleman's partitioning formulas. See his *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), Ch. 6.

[23] The sheer rates of interstate mobility impose a strong restraint on change. Contrary to popular impressions Americans do not change state of

FIG. 2

Predicted and Actual Values of High State Level Salience for Region-Education Combinations



[a] Grades 0-8, 9-11 have been combined because of small N's.

much and in what ways these inequalities affect the state's political life cannot be answered here, nor are they easily solved questions. Their solution, however, should enrich our comprehension not only of intra-state politics but also that of the linkages among the various levels of politics in the federal union.

V. SYSTEMIC BASES OF STATE-LEVEL SALIENCE

Each state comprises a set of distinctive social and political phenomena. Assuming individual-system interaction, the question is whether the individual's salience map will vary with the particular kind of political system in which he finds himself. To some extent, of course, the summary variable "region" freights a political element; but here we wish to treat specific political indicators. In particular we will introduce a number of systemic properties which should be positively linked to state-level salience according to the good government, healthy competition, active citizenry view of politics.

One of the more significant and obvious aspects of a state's political life is the level of malapportionment in the state legislature. It might be thought that the better the apportionment, the more interested would people be in state politics: such is the "good government" view of the political world. That it is a false view is demonstrated by the negative relationship (−.27) between following state affairs and the fairness of apportionment—using the 1960 David-Eisenberg Index.[24] This association shows

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residence with great frequency. For the present sample 63% had lived their entire lives in one state and another 24% had spent at least 20 years there.

[24] From Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, *Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote,*

a remarkable persistence under a variety of control conditions. Region is an especially critical control to impose here since the South, which is relatively malapportioned, is also the area containing the largest number of state-oriented respondents. Nevertheless, with Southerners removed from the sample, the negative association persists (−.21); and in no region does a positive trend emerge.

Much the same conclusion can be reached about the degree of inter-party competition. Let contests for the governorship and Hofferbert's omnibus inter-party competition index serve as indicators of state-level competition.[25] While it might be expected that the more spirited the competition between the parties the more salient would be the politics of the state, the opposite is true. Regardless of which measure is used the relationships are negative, even though not strong (−.24 and −.22 for the governorship and Hofferbert's index, respectively). Again the pattern tends to persist under a variety of control conditions, including region.

Another common variable used to characterize the state's political culture is that of election turnout. In general it is argued that the higher the turnout the more vigorous the level of politics. Turnout for gubernatorial and U.S. senatorial contests will be used as a safe guide to the state-specific forces activating differential turnout. The common-sense hypothesis is that the higher the voting participation the higher the salience of state politics for the state's inhabitants. Such is not the case, however. There is, in fact, a small tendency (−.12) for salience levels to decline as turnout rises. Whatever forces are acting to develop a high following for state matters, they are not very well described by the differential participation of the electorate.

It has become apparent that for many people the affairs of government are wrapped up in what a few of the very visible political officeholders do. Accordingly, it might be advanced that the stronger the office the more salient would be the institutions, activities, and processes surrounding that office. While it is obviously true that a personable, aggressive governor can capture a substantial amount of attention regardless of the statutory limitations on his power, it seems reasonable to suppose that the same sort of governor with an arsenal of legal powers could do even more to make himself and the state government topics of conversation. As it turns out people living in states with powerful governors[26] are no more likely to follow state affairs than are people living in a state with weak chief executives. What correspondence exists is actually on the negative rather than the positive side (−.12).

As noted earlier, many of the recent investigations about state politics have treated the determinants of public policy outputs. Because the great share of operational measures so far developed for assessing state policy outcomes are based on expenditure items, we are restricted in examining the connection between salience and state performance. The "good government" advocate would argue that the more active the state government, the more salient it would be for its residents. There is but meager support for that proposition. Trivial, positive relationships (ranging from .02 to .14) exist between high salience and the number of state government employees per one thousand population, state expenditures per $1,000 income, and state expenditures per capita. Slight negative associations are found between salience and state aid to cities and recent (1950–1960) changes in general state expenditures. These are all single indicators. Employing a ranking of the states based on Crittenden's "Scope of Government" factor[27]—which has very high loadings on tax level per capita, tax level per income unit,

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Vol. I (Charlottesville, Virginia: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia, 1961). Although widespread reapportionment has occurred since the *Baker v. Carr* decision of 1962, most occurred after 1964. Indeed the latest reapportionment of *both* legislative houses occurred as late as 1965–66 for thirty states and 1967–69 for eight states. Given the time lag between legal changes of this sort and their imprint on the mass public, it seems advisable to use the 1960 malapportionment figures for our 1966 sample. To utilize this measure and the ones to follow the respondents have been allocated into roughly equal quartiles or quintiles according to the scores of the state in which they resided. It can be shown that the distribution of the sample across *groups* of states with varying score ranges approaches the distribution for the universe.

[25] The gubernatorial measure is based on contests from 1946–62, and is taken from Dennis Riley and Jack Walker, "Problems of Measurement and Inference in the Study of the American States," (unpublished paper, University of Michigan, 1968). Hofferbert's index is reported in Richard I. Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (August, 1964), esp. pp. 562–563. More recent single elections were also used in our analysis; these produced results similar to those for the above two measures.

[26] The rankings come from Joseph Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, Chap. 6.

[27] John Crittenden, "Dimensions of Modernization in the American States," this Review, 61 (December, 1967), 989–1001.

spending level per capita, and governmental employment—again produces an extremely modest positive correlation (.08). Regional controls reveal the association to be slightly higher in the Midwest and West.

Walker, among others, has argued that it is essential that non-expenditure policies be included in any attempt to explicate the articulation between state performance and socio-economic and political characteristics. In response to his own admonition he developed a set of policy innovation scores for the several states, stretching from the late nineteenth century to mid-twentieth century.[28] The "good government" position is that the innovative states would command more interest from their residents than would the laggardly ones. This is hardly the case, however, for the association is but slightly above zero. Unfortunately, few other reliable indicators of state performance are at hand. If we are to judge by the innovative pattern, non-expenditure performance measures are no more likely to affect salience maps of state residents than are those based on expenditures.

Most of the associations involving the foregoing political characteristics exhibit an exaggerated mode among non-voters. For better or worse, the less participative citizens react to the political culture in a more severe fashion than the more participative. That is, if a system manifestation such as malapportionment accompanies greater interest in state affairs, it is especially prone to do so among the less participative. One can picture them as less autonomous and self-assured than their more participative fellows. Environmental forces thus come to have more impact on them. There would seem to be a certain perversity about this, but apparently the less active citizens are, in effect, bolstered by these aberrations from what the reformers and democratic theorists see as progressive democracy.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The concept of salience maps has been used to explore the relationship of the citizenry to their state governments as a particular set of institutions in the American political system. People do organize their cognitive views of the political world such that some system levels assume more prominence than others. There are indications that cognitive and affective dimensions of state salience are inter-locked. Attitudinal and behavioral corollaries of differentiated salience maps depend in part upon one's social and political status. One of the most emphatic though somewhat puzzling findings is the degree to which these corollaries are exaggerated among less participative citizens. Correspondingly, the salience of state politics among these less active people varies more according to environmental forces than is true for the more active.

Broadly speaking, the forces which contribute to following state politics can be grouped into two cateogories. On the one hand, there are those factors which are essentially "given" or uncontrollable. On the other hand, there are other factors which are more subject to elite manipulation and political change. Place of residence, education, social class, and the like are—to a greater or lesser extent—set for the individual. To a similar extent, the states have limited control over these aspects of a person's life.

Asserting that these factors are given is not to adopt a crudely deterministic stance. Rather, it is to hold them in contrast to another set of variables that are substantially more malleable. State outputs, such as program expenditures or policy innovations, are more amenable to the short-run persuasive efforts of elites and the occasional demands of masses. These are the areas of a state's political life that attract a good deal of attention from political scientists and specialized publics, but have precious little positive impact upon the salience maps of individuals. The contours of such maps are determined largely by the individual's life experiences and the characteristics of his immediate life space.

We have suggested (though not demonstrated) that a state's policies are partially determined by the attitudes and behaviors of its attentive public. However, the obverse of this proposition is not necessarily correct: the attitudes and behaviors of the attentive state public reflect dimly, at best, the quality of a state's public policy. Arguments that a vigorous, strong, and innovative state government produces an interested public are open to question. So, too, are the emphases placed on such touchstones of liberal democracy as inter-party competition, equal representation, and enthusiastic electoral participation.

Whatever the correlates of state-level salience, it is apparent that the states still loom large in the perspectives of the American public. Any attempted juggling of political units involving the states would probably confront a reservoir of mass attachments to the states as political entities. Coupled with the historic traditions, legal preserves, and political utility of the states, this salience helps assure the continued prominence of the several states within the federal system.

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[28] Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 883, Table 1.

THE "MOOD THEORY": A STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY*

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This paper is concerned with assessing the stability of the American public's attention to foreign affairs, and the relationship of this to public support of international programs and commitments. In particular, the paper presents an empirical investigation of the evidence for the "mood theory" proposed by Gabriel Almond as one element of his classic study, *The American People and Foreign Policy*.

The mood theory contends, first of all, that attention to or interest in foreign policy is generally low and subject to major fluctuations in times of crisis.

> The characteristic response to questions of foreign policy is one of indifference. A foreign policy crisis, short of the immediate threat of war may transform indifference to vague apprehension, to fatalism, to anger; but the reaction is still a mood.[1]

On the basis of this premise about attention, Almond predicts that the *public* will not provide stable support for international commitments undertaken by the U.S. Government.

> Because of the superficial character of American attitudes toward world politics . . . a temporary Russian tactical withdrawal may produce strong tendencies toward demobilization and the reassertion of the primacy of private and domestic values.[2]

The acceptance of this view by scholars is evidenced by its presentation in important textbooks and treatises.[3] As far as I have been able to determine it has not been challenged.

The empirical investigation in this paper considers evidence on both of these variables—attention=interest, and support for foreign policy commitments.

It should be remembered that Almond warned against over-reaction to the Soviet threat as well as the tendency to demobilize. Discussion in this paper of popular support for American foreign policy should not be taken as indicating the author's support for the "globalism," the "Pax Americana" strategy that characterizes that policy today.

I. STABILITY OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR OVERSEAS INVOLVEMENT

In marked contrast to the mood theory is a result we have obtained from national public opinion poll data gathered by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). This result is the remarkable stability of strong popular support for an active U.S. role in world affairs. Trend data on the item: "Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs?" are shown in Figure 1. The

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* This research is a segment of a larger project on public reaction to international events (see also, William R. Caspary, "United States Public Opinion During the Onset of the Cold War," *Peace Research Society (International), Papers,* IX (1968), 25–46; and "Dimensions of Attitudes on International Conflict," *Peace Research Society (International), Papers* XIII (1970, forthcoming). This research has been partially supported by grants from Northwestern University and Washington University. Survey data of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), and the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO), was obtained from the Roper Public Opinion Research Center. Supplementary survey data was provided by the library of NORC. The author gratefully acknowledges the help he received from these sources and from individuals associated with these institutions.

It may interest the reader that, during the more than four years that have elapsed since this article was first written in substantially the present form, my own interests have shifted considerably. If one is passionately concerned as I am with the injustice of the U.S. globalist—or, if you will, imperialist—foreign policy, research of the sort presented here seems a rather sterile exercise. My current work is devoted to a study of the economic, ideological, and bureaucratic sources of American interventionism in the undeveloped world.

[1] Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 53.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 55. See also pp. 60, 80, 99, 106.

[3] See for example, James N. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 35–37; Martin C. Needler, *Understanding Foreign Policy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), p. 23; Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., and Richard C. Snyder, *An Introduction to American Foreign Policy* (New York: Rinehart, 1955), p. 198; Bernard C. Cohen, *The Political Process and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 55.



FIG. 1. Percent supporting an active part in world affairs for the U.S., over time.

average percentage favoring an active part is 71%. The standard deviation of the points from the average is only 1.8%, less than the expected sampling error. This remarkable stability occurred over a time of violent change in world affairs from war to peace and demobilization, through the onset of the cold war and the shock of the Korean struggle. The popular commitment to an active U.S. role, however, did not appear to waver.

Some of these data were available when Almond wrote. His evaluation of this item on an active part in world affairs, however, stressed that it is an "emotionally loaded question" which evokes responses which misrepresents the amount of concern Americans have for foreign affairs. Nevertheless, I find that the respondent's answers to this question is an excellent predictor to his response on a wide range of policy questions involving international commitments. The tests of this relationship are shown in Table 1. Across 47 different tests, the average value of gamma is .50.

In the light of the strong association between the stable internationalism indicator and specific policies, it is not surprising to find that support for individual policies is also fairly stable (see Figure 2). Support for military aid to Europe was followed in NORC polls over an eight year period. The support which fluctuated around 50% of the sample during the late forties gave way to slightly higher, but equally stable support after the Korean war. Though data were collected for shorter periods, the results for Marshall plan aid, military aid to Europe, support for NATO, and willingness to intervene militarily against a Communist attack also show impressive stability.

To a certain extent, Almond's interpretation allows for these findings. He formulates the concept of "permissive mood" to characterize the passive acceptance by the public of internationalist policies formulated and urged by its offical leaders.[4] He sees this permissive mood as a particular characteristic of the Cold War situation in which the threat of the Soviet Union at least temporarily forces Americans to accept international commitments. Almond repeatedly warns, however, that this is a mood response and not an intellectually structured one. The mood may change if the international environment does. "The undertow of withdrawal is still powerful."[5]

The question is whether Almond would have anticipated the amount of stability that our data indicate. Suppose we give a more precise

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[4] Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

TABLE 1. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR AN ACTIVE U.S. ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS, AND SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL POLICY COMMITMENTS

Survey Number	Policy	Gamma
124		
	Korea worth fighting	.58
	Talks fail: pull out, hold line, attack	−.48
	Defend other countries if Communists attack	−.61
127		
	Too many sacrifices for defense	−.39
137		
	Aid, as cut, is too much, right, not enough	−.35
	Do more to help Indochina	.48
105		
	U.S. was right to send troops to Korea	.64
	If Communists attack other countries, help defend	.74
	Continue Marshall aid	.50
	Approve NATO agreement	.66
	Send military supplies to Europe now	.50
	Send troops to Europe now	.39
	Too many sacrifices for defense	−.39
	Send military supplies to Asian countries threatened by Communists	.28
	U.S. has gone too far with the problems of the world	−.76
94		
	Send military supplies to Europe now	.50
	Continue Marshall Aid	.53
	Marshall Aid is too much	−.38
	As cut by Truman, Marshall Aid is too much	−.44
	Stop Communists from spreading in Asia	.53
	Important for U.S. to cooperate with Arab countries	.35
	Important for U.S. to cooperate with France	.47
	Important for U.S. to cooperate with Greece	.47
	Important for U.S. to cooperate with Israel	.33
	Important for U.S. to cooperate with India	.42
	Important for U.S. to obtain Middle East oil	.42
	Important for U.S. to stop spread of Communism in the world	.48
091		
	Continue Marshall aid	.58
	Marshall aid too much	.51
	Aid really helps U.S.	.64
	Aid has been stopping Communism	.42
	Countries would go Communist without aid	.26
	Aid is getting Europe on its feet	.22
	They could get along without aid	−.58
	Use U.S. troops to stop Communist attack in Europe	.57
	Use U.S. troops to stop Communist attack in South America	.37
	Use U.S. troops to stop Communist attack in India	.49
	Send military supplies to Europe	.34
	Stop Communism in Asia	.58
	Real concern for England's finances	.62
078		
	Satisfied with Marshall Plan	.46
	Continue Marshall Plan next year	.73
	Spending too much on Marshall Plan	−.54
	Send military supplies to Europe now	.44
	Keep occupation troops in Germany	.74
	Keep occupation troops in Japan	.68
	Keep occupation troops in Korea	.65

formulation of Almond's analysis as follows: the percentage of people supporting international commitments will vary directly with the percentage perceiving a given level of threat from the Soviet Union. To test this, we will use as an indicator of perceived threat, the expectation of war. This indicator has several things to recommend it. It correlates strongly with various other items on expectations of Russian behavior, and trend data is available which is sensitive to changes in Soviet behavior and pronouncements.

Comparison between the trends in expectation of war and in support for an active U.S. role is shown in Figure 3. As we have already seen, support for an active role scarcely fluctuates. Expectation of war, on the other hand, shows fluctuations up to 50%. Clearly a direct ratio between the two variables does not hold.

A weaker formulation that is also consistent with Almond's analysis is that support for an active role should remain steady at some high level as long as perceived threat is above some threshold value. In this formulation, support for an active part would decline sharply if perceived threat fell below the threshold. From 1947 through 1953, the period covered by our data,



FIG. 2. Percent supporting internationalist policies, over time.



FIG. 3. Internationalism and perceived threat, over time.

more than 47% of the population expected war within ten years. But in November 1946, when NORC first asked about expectation of war, only 28% thought it likely within ten years. If the question had been asked in the immediate post-war lull, the figure would probably have been even lower. Nonetheless, support for an active part remained steady around 70% at these times.

In any event, the threshold formulation has weaknesses on theoretical grounds. The aggregate results with which we are dealing come from summing over individuals who are likely to exhibit different thresholds and to perceive different amounts of threat at a given time. A slight easing in Soviet pressures would probably mean that all individuals would perceive slightly less threat. If Almond is correct that the commitment is only a response to threat, some individuals would cross their personal thresholds and no longer feel compelled to support an active U.S. role.

II. MENTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AS AN INDICATOR OF "ATTENTION" OR "INTEREST"

Almond's pessimistic expectation of unstable commitments is based on his belief that the characteristic response of Americans to foreign policy issues is indifference. His data lead him to see "(1) the extreme dependence of public interest in foreign affairs on dramatic and overtly threatening events; (2) the extraordinary pull of domestic and private affairs even in periods of international crisis."[6] This conclusion is based upon trend data on one questionnaire item.

> One of the most interesting accumulations of evidence on this general question of the focus of public attention is a series of Gallup polls which has been conducted since 1935. On more than twenty occasions during the fifteen year period the American Institute of Public Opinion has asked a sample of the public: "What do you regard as the most important problem before the American people today? . . . The form of this question has the advantage of registering spontaneous responses. In the multiple choice or 'yes-no' type of question one can never be sure that the respondent draws a clear distinction between what really is on his mind and what he thinks ought to be on his mind. The undirected response is a more reliable indication of the real degree and extent of spontaneous interest in foreign policy problems.[7]

This question was coded for whether the respondent mentioned an international problem or a domestic one. The percentage of the sample mentioning international problems over the years, as reported by Almond, is shown in figure 4.[8] If this item is indeed an indicator of attention to or interest in foreign affairs, then it is plain that there have been dramatic fluctuations in interest and/or attention. It is also clear, as Almond elaborates in his book, that the peaks of the trend line come at times of international crisis such as the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Italian elections of 1948. Similarly the troughs of the curve show preoccupation with domestic concerns such as economic reconversion in the wake of World War II.

But is the mention of an international problem really an indicator of interest or attention? It would seem on the face of it that this is so, but surprisingly enough this response shows rather weak association with the respondent's judgment of how interested he is in China (gamma = .157), the United Nations (gamma = .141), and England's financial crisis (gamma = .146). It may be that, as Almond says, the open-ended question is a more trustworthy indicator since it does not structure the replies or favor a particular alternative. On the other hand, one would expect a somewhat stronger association between the two.

To test this further, let us look at another indicator of attention—whether the respondent says he has heard or read of a particular foreign policy issue or international event. This item was frequently used and we have a total of 12 tests of association between it and mention of an international problem. These are shown in Table 2. Although the association is quite weak (gamma less than .13) for five of these, the rest show stronger association. In all but one of these cases it turns out that the attention items cut the population into a large group aware of some important event and a small group that is unaware. It appears that only the people at the bottom of the attention scale differ significantly from the rest in their tendency to mention international problems. I shall discuss the significance of this finding in Section III.

The question about hearing or reading of an event, like the one about interest, may tempt the respondent to give a false report in order to gain the interviewer's approval. The respondent cannot, however, falsify replies to requests for factual information. Five such questions have appeared on surveys along with the item on the most important problem facing the country. The results of tests of association between these two variables are shown in Table 3. Three of the tests show very weak association (gamma less than .09). Of the other two, one uses an indic-

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 73.



FIG. 4. Percent mentioning international problems as most important, over time.

ator that discriminates a small group at the bottom of the attention scale. Finally, some additional miscellaneous indicators of attention were used. The results are shown in Table 3. All the associations were weak (gamma less than .14).

The result of these tests (with two minor exceptions) appears to be that for all but the very least attentive respondents an increase in mention of international problems is not likely to be associated with an increase in attentiveness. Though there might have been reason to doubt this negative result on the basis of any one of these indicators, the consistent findings across all of them strengthen that interpretation.

As a further check on the validity of the various attention indicators we constructed a matrix of intercorrelations among them as shown in Table 4. Some of the cells of the matrix are fuller than others because on many surveys not all of the various kinds of indices occurred together. We see in this matrix that all but three of the tests of association show gamma greater than .30 and that most of them are quite strong (gamma greater than .50). This suggests that there is a single dimension of attention which is tapped more or less by all of these items. Structured and unstructured questions, reports of interest and factual knowledge, and actual behavior such as membership in organizations where foreign affairs are discussed all seem to be loaded on this dimension. Does trend data exist on these other attention indicators that compares in frequency with the most-important-problem data. The best that is available is four occurrences of the item, "How much interest do you take in the United Nations Organization?" A comparison between this item and the mention of international problems as most important is shown in Figure 5. It is fortunate that the National Opinion Research Center Poll which showed no change in interest in the U.N. at the end of 1958 was taken within a few days of the Gallup poll which registered a striking decline of mention of international problems. This indicates stability of attention to international affairs at a time when domestic events appear to have been exerting a great pull on people's attention. Thus we have not only cast doubt on the evidence from which Almond inferred instability, we have found evidence to the contrary.

III. RATE OF MENTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS BY THE MOST ATTENTIVE RESPONDENTS

We have seen that the mention of international problems does not seem to be associated

TABLE 2. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN MENTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, AND AWARENESS OF ISSUES

Survey Number and Date	Heard or Read About	Gamma	% who did not hear or read
078, June 29, 1948			
	Reorganization of Berlin, (and have opinion)	.22	60
084, January 26, 1949			
	Tito-Stalin split	.08	53
	Indonesia dispute	.11	48
	Truman's Inaugural Speech	.04	40
510, January 9, 1953			
	H-bomb	.12	20
	Universal Military Training	.00	40
596, March 4, 1958			
	Foreign Aid Bill	.07	43
628, May 24, 1960			
	U-2 Incident	.26	6
631, July 14, 1960			
	U.S.—Cuba Relations	.26	17
648, July 25, 1961			
	Berlin Dispute	.27	13
663, September 18, 1962			
	Our Troubles with Cuba	.65	6
664, October 17, 1962			
	The Peace Corps	.24	28
	Berlin Dispute	.39	11

TABLE 3. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN MENTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, AND FACTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND OTHER INDICATORS OF ATTENTIVENESS

Survey Number and Date	Indicator or Attentiveness	Gamma	% don't know or wrong answer
066, April 1947			
	Know that the U.S. has joined an organization for world peace	.26	36
084, January 26, 1949			
	Know who is Secretary of State	.03	40
078, June 29, 1948			
	Know if fighting still going on in Palestine	.08	51
	Know if some Jewish groups are opposed to the Jewish government in Palestine	.09	66
648, July 25, 1961			
	Know what a geiger counter is	.25	29
066, April 1947			
	Belong to organization in which foreign affairs are discussed	.09	
078, June 29, 1948			
	Report some impression of the Greek government (favorable or unfavorable)	−.05	
	Report some impression of the Chinese government (favorable or unfavorable)	−.11	
084, January 26, 1949			
	Believe that a citizen can influence his government by writing letters, or taking miscellaneous other actions; or don't know, or believe citizens can't or shouldn't have influence	.13	

with this attention dimension, except to the extent that those very low on attention mention international problems somewhat less. Almond, on the contrary, singles out the *most* attentive group as the one that should be different! He expects that stable attention will be characteristic of only those individuals whose attitudes show "intellectual structure" and factual content.[9] To meet this criterion, an individual must "have explicit evaluations of the relative costs and efficiency of alternative means of maximizing the value position of [his] country."[10]

Have we actually shown that this top attention group is not more likely to mention international problems? That would be demonstrated only if the attention tests we have used are finely enough calibrated to discriminate between this group and the others. Almond does not give a clear operational procedure for isolating this "attentive public," but Rosenau estimates on the basis of circulation figures for quality media that the attentive public is "no larger than ten percent of the population and possibly much smaller."[11] Roper gives a similar estimate.[12]

A few of the attention indicators we have used discriminate a top group on the order of ten percent of the population or less, but show weak association with mention of international problems. To check this result, scales were constructed by taking the sum of the scores on two or three separate items. In no case is the top attention group sharply distinguishable from the neighboring ones in frequency of mention of international problems.

If the attentive public indeed has a stronger and more stable tendency to mention international events this difference should show up most at times when the overall percentage of people mentioning international events is low. At times of relative international calm, or at times when domestic events preempt attention, only the attentive public would continue to have its eye focused on international problems and mention them to the interviewer. The lowest level reached in mention of international problems was 28% (AIPO Survey No. 596, March 1958).[13] The degree of association between men-

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] Rosenau, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

[12] Quoted by Rosenau, *ibid.*

[13] A slightly different interpretation of these

TABLE 4. ASSOCIATION (GAMMA) AMONG INDICATORS OF ATTENTION TO OR INTEREST IN WORLD AFFAIRS

	Heard or read	Interest	Factual knowledge	Active part	Well informed	Belong to organization
Heard or read of event, person, program, etc.	*098:* .64					
	084: .81					
	664: .79					
Interested in event, issue, person, etc.		*091:* .73				
		.56				
		.58				
		088: .65				
		.64				
		.57				
		054: .60				
		.40				
		.65				
	088: .70					
	.44	*077:* .75				
	.51	.58				
		.69				
	077: .34	.48				
	.37	.59				
	.12	.70				
	.21					
		082: .72				
		.67				
		.70				
		.75				
		.74				
		.83				
		083: .16				
		.51				
		.77				
Factual knowledge of event, person, etc.		*648:* .69				
	084: .67	*054:* .31				
	.70	.53				
		.31				
Want U.S. to take an active part in world affairs	*094:* .54	*091:* .48				
		.43	*127:* .57			
	078: .44	.37				
Consider self well informed about event, person, etc.		*688:* .51				
		.34				
		.35				
		.18				
		.53				

TABLE 4. (continued)

	Heard or read	Interest	Factual knowledge	Active part	Well informed	Belong to organization
Belong to organization in which world affairs are discussed			*066:* .36			
			079: .78			Number in italic is identification number of survey
			.71			
			.73			
			.77			
			.74			
			.81			

tion of international problems and one indicator of attention (heard or read of foreign aid bill) was still quite low (gamma = .07, see Table 2). For all other surveys on which attention measures were available the percent mentioning international problems was 37% or over, and for all but three it was greater than 50%.

IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE WEAKNESS OF MENTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AS AN INDICATOR OF ATTENTION

It would appear, then, that a strong case has been made against using the mention of international problems as most important as an indicator of attention. The reader may wonder why such a major effort was mounted in this paper on behalf of the negative result of contesting the validity of a single indicator. There are several reasons: (a) the indicator has been widely used:



FIG. 5. Interest in the U.N. and mention of international problems, over time.

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marginals from AIPO Survey No. 596, item 2, has appeared in an article by Deutsch and Merritt. See appendix for details.

TABLE 5. VARIATION IN ATTENTION WITH INTERNATIONALISM *WITHIN MENTION-INTERNATIONAL-PROBLEMS-GROUP*

Measure of Attention	Mention international problems			Mention domestic problem		
	Military aid to Greece			Military aid to Greece		
	Approve	Disapprove	Total	Approve	Disapprove	Total
Acheson named	47%	34%	40%	41%	39%	40%
Aware of change	22	27	25	23	24	23
Not aware of or don't know	31	39	35	36	37	37
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Heard or read of Tito-Stalin dispute	59	50	54	49	38	44
Didn't hear or read	41	50	46	51	62	56
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Heard or read of Indonesia conflict	64	56	59	54	43	49
Didn't hear or read	36	44	41	36	57	51
	100	100	100	100	100	100
	n=246	322	567			
	Send Military Supplies to Europe now			Send Military Supplies to Europe now		
	Approve	Disapprove	Total	Approve	Disapprove	Total
Acheson named	47	31	40	40	35	38
Aware of change	23	27	25	24	22	23
Not aware of change	30	42	35	36	43	39
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Heard or read of Tito-Stalin dispute	61	41	53	43	49	46
Didn't hear or read	39	59	47	57	51	54
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Heard or read of Indonesia conflict	62	51	57	50	52	51
Didn't hear or read	38	49	43	50	48	49
	100	100	100	100	100	100

in addition to Almond's work and the many citations of it, Smith, and Deutsch and Merritt have made important empirical studies which rely upon this indicator;[14] (b) a major proposition about the instability of American foreign policy attitudes based on this indicator may now be called into question; (c) we may be at a stage in the development of this area of inquiry at which it is appropriate to turn from sweeping and imaginative theory construction to the more mundane task of rigorous testing of individual indicators and propositions; (d) we have striven by using a variety of indicators and techniques to make the most of a data pool not designed to produce answers to this particular question. What would be desired, of course, would be an elite sample as well as a general population sample, and a battery of interest and attention measures. Given such data we conceivably could still find that the "most-important-problem" indicator proved to discriminate between the general public and a much smaller elite group on the order of less than 1% of the population. Even for such a elite, however, there are reasons to suspect that this measure will not be a valid measure of attentiveness.

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[14] Paul A. Smith, "Opinions, Publics, and World Affairs in the United States," *Western Political Quarterly,* 14 (1961), 698–714; Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).

(a) This indicator is a measure of primacy of attention, not of strength of attention. An individual who is inattentive to both international and domestic problems might be slightly less inattentive to international ones and mention one of these as most important. Conversely an individual strongly interested in politics may be slightly more interested in domestic than international issues and mention a domestic one to the interviewer.

(b) The use of the word "today" (or "now" in some variants) may do a great deal of structure the responses by focusing upon immediate problems and crises rather than broad, long term issues. The crisis dominated aspect of public responses which Almond found[15] may be purely an artifact of this wording. Though this interpretation cannot be tested with available data, it is not hard to see how it would be tested in the future. One could simply substitute the phrase, "over the next ten years" for "today."

(c) Mention of international problems as most important is also uncorrelated with indicators of isolationism. Thus there must be substantial numbers of people whose responses were coded as international who are of isolationist persuasion. When they mention international problems it may be with the thought of how best to withdraw from them. If the isolationists tend to be less attentive than the rest of the population, then their presence would lower the attention score for the group that mentions international problems. Evidence that this does happen is shown in Table 5. The variation within the four major cells of the table is greater than the variation between them.

V. CONCLUSION

The Mood Theory was summarized at the start of this paper as having a premise—generally low and unstable attention to foreign affairs —and a conclusion—unstable support for foreign policy commitments. Empirical evidence has been presented in these pages to show that both the premise and the conclusion are false.

On the basis of these findings I suggest the following alternative interpretation: that American Public Opinion is characterized by a *strong* and *stable* "permissive mood" toward international involvements. Although I have not included any data analysis on current opinion it is tempting to speculate that the support by the long-suffering American public of 10 years of fighting—and 4 years of heavy combat—in Vietnam is an indication of the existence of a permissive mood. It also indicates that such a mood provides a blank check for foreign policy adventures, not just a responsible support for international organization, genuine foreign assistance, and basic defense measures. Almond by no means ignored this line of thought—indeed the notion of permissive mood is his own and he stressed its dangers. There is no indication, however, that he anticipated the strength or stability of commitment to American foreign policy that our data suggests. He appears to have been heavily influenced (as have a number of other commentators) by evidence which we have demonstrated on closer examination to be of dubious validity. Finally it should be noted that we have dealt here with only one element of the rich array of theory and findings in Almond's classic work.

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[15] Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 72 (see quote, above, p. 5, footnote 6).

APPENDIX

INTERPRETATION OF RESPONSES ON "MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM," AIPO SURVEY NO. 596, MARCH 1958

AIPO Code[a]	% responding[b]	Gallup Press[c] Release	Deutsch and[d] Merritt	This Paper
"11 Peace; prevention of war; keeping out of war; fear of war, etc.	8%	"keeping the peace 17%	"foreign policy interest 17%	international problems 28%
12 Foreign affairs; international problems, general	4%			
13 Relations with Russia (general)	2%			
14 Threat of Russia, threat of Communism; communism	3%			
15 World Economic problems	0%			
16 Foreign aid, general	1%			
17 Problems of Space (general)	0%			
18 Arms race—atomic bombs, missiles	3%			
19 Rockets, missiles—space problems	4%			
21 Problems of the Atomic age (general)	1%			
29 Miscellaneous International Problems				
31 National Security; preparedness, national defense; defense program"	3%	"national defense 3%		
Total	29%			
"32 Clean Government; honest leaders, etc.				domestic problems 63%
33 Balancing the budget	63%			
34 Taxes (etc., 35–52; other domestic problems)"				

[a] obtained from Roper Public Opinion Research Center

[b] tabulated from survey cards

[c] " 'unemployment' Named No. 1 Worry for First Time Since '37," *Public Opinion News Service*, for release March 23, 1958, American Institute of Public Opinion

[d] Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," in Herbert G. Kelman, ed., *International Behavior*, New York Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, p. 161 (note: an error in the text of the Deutsch and Merritt article states that the survey took place in May but their information clearly identifies it as number 596 which was done in March 1958.)

THE RURAL AFRICAN PARTY: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN TANZANIA*

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I. INTRODUCTION

Because the codes, rules and ideology of mass, single-party systems reach the village areas more slowly than do the tangible personalizations of party authority, a situation of potential misuse of power exists where rural party organizations operate. Peasants are aware of face-to-face confrontations by a familiar figure who has gained a party position; they are unaware of the precepts and regulations that the national party has laid down for the village level functionaries. Consequently, political victimization is most prounced at the very grass-root level that national leaders are attempting to integrate politically. Moreover, by its nature the rural party is a multi-faceted organization that is acceptable to the peasants because its leaders provide services that in more structured societies are carried out by specific agencies and contracts. Functions such as family arbitration, police investigation and criminal adjudication are mixed with the more classical party activities of representation and the dispensing of patronage.

Taken together, the above two characteristics of a rural party—potential abuse, and the multi-faceted nature—significantly influence the extent and form of political participation in the areas they serve. This article attempts to analyze these characteristics in Tanzania, and thereafter to assess rural party participation, and more broadly to suggest the theoretical dimensions of political participation in a new nation.

Participation, it may be argued, is the problem *par excellence* for leaders of the new nations. The building of a state, both in terms of economic development and in the creation of a national consciousness, depends upon some type of participation by the citizens. If the citizen population is dispersed throughout the state in remote homesteads and hamlets, as many African populations are, then the problem becomes one of linkage between the government and the remote populace. To gain participation, new political structures must be built at the rural level, and old institutions must be changed to fit into national goals. Rebellious attitudes by the people must be neutralized and consensus, or at least some support of the national goals, must be gained. It is necessary that rural people be brought into the government's plan, that they accept the government's general viewpoint, and that they provide the will and the manpower to change the status quo. In essence, peasant energy must be expended, muscles used, and attitudes altered if government goals are to be met.

The concept of mass participation presupposes a population shift from a disinterested mass to a participating citizenry. People must accept ideas of individual worth, loyal opposition, and electoral equality. In many new states stimulus for such participation comes from the ruling elite who see participation as a means to insure political stability. In essence, political participation, a degree of political integration, and some economic growth are the price the ruling elite must pay to gain the political stability in heterogeneous societies that will insure their own survival.

Participation, to be meaningful, must be within institutions that have channels of redress to the national level, and, simultaneously, have the capability of bringing about grass-root improvement. In one respect the process is essentially the building of new institutions at the grass-roots level. Mundane changes such as the development of agriculture, the encouragement of land reform, the creation of welfare and extension services, and the building of rural schools, roads, and clinics are necessary for orderly political growth. Participation in rural institutions such as the political party, the local administration, the local councils, the marketing cooperatives, and the local voluntary associations may be either voluntary or coercive. The essential fact is that participation, that is involvement, occurs.[1]

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* I am indebted to the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building (Ford), for field support in 1967–68, and to the African Studies Center, Michigan State University for research funds. Some data used in this article was collected during 1964–66 under a grant from the International Development Research Center (Carnegie), of Indiana University. Additional field work was done in 1969 while I was on leave with the American Universities Field Staff. Professors Paul R. Abramson, Henry Bienen, Walter W. Bowring, John Collins, and Carl Rosberg, Jr. generously offered comment and advice.

[1] For further discussion of the concept of participation and its importance in political science,

In summary, the argument is this: two overriding characteristics of rural parties are potential political abuse and a multi-faceted nature. These are in essence countervailing forces. Multi-faceted activities promote individual party participation. Abusive party authority tends to cause the individual to withdraw from party participation. When this occurs, political participation in the broader sense is also nullified; this is because the rural party is one of the few institutions that have communication links between the various upper levels of government and the people. Under these countervaling pressures, the individual pursues one of three courses of action: (1) participation in party activity, (2) non-participation, (3) active resistance to party activity. The continuance in one of these three patterns depends on the satisfaction the individual receives on a wide range of issues of direct interest to him. Intervening factors, such as the individual's expectations, personal links with party leaders in decision-making positions, the actual process by which a conflict situation is resolved, and the time needed to reconcile an issue, will all effect the process of issue satisfaction. They will in turn effect the individual's party participation. Constant pressures exist for the individual to participate. Pressures are exercised directly by local party officials, or indirectly by the propagandizing national leaders. How these processes work may be seen with an analysis of a particular rural party situation.

II. CASE FOR ANALYSIS: TANZANIA

The Rural Party

One of the most impressive efforts to create a party structure that would avoid the local abuse of authority phenomena while integrating the nation politically and mobilizing the people economically has been led by Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU),[2] the legal single party, has been particularly successful in penetrating the village areas and establishing viable rural branches in some 7,200 locales. Compared to other African states this is an important accomplishment. In most nations rural parties are election-year phenomena; they become vaiable organizations only to serve the campaign, nomination, and election functions. TANU's rural organizations operate throughout the year, engaging in many official and semi-official activities which are often geared to aiding the government's local development schemes. The party's rural component is doubly impressive when the obstacles are known. Tanzania is an economically poor nation, generally devoid of mineral wealth, and divided into 120 different ethnic groups.

TANU was founded July 7, 1954, as a nationalist independence movement, evolving in part from the earlier Tanganyika African Association. Although at the outset several of the founders of TANU, including Julius Nyerere, wished to keep the party a compact, elite organization for more concerted action, it gradually took on the dimensions of a mass movement. Since independence in 1961, the party has had the quality of an all-encompassing union, open to any citizen and extending to all sections of the society. At the present time TANU is the single legal party in Tanzania.

Although reorganization and experimentation is constantly going on, the party is basically organized into four tiers below the national headquarters: the regional, district, rural (or local), and cell levels. General policy is set through the National Executive Committee in the capital, interpreted by the regional offices and implemented through the district and rural branches. The district branch is generally coterminous with the 61 administrative districts in Tanzania, and will have within it anywhere from 20 to 300 rural party branches, depending on district size and population. The rural branch usually serves an area designated for local government tax pur-

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see Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); and Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[2] Since the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April, 1964, the United Republic of Tanzania has kept two autonomous political parties, the Afro-Shirazi Party on Zanzibar and TANU on the mainland. For the most important literature on TANU see Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). See also George Bennett, "An Outline History of TANU," *Makerere Journal* (No. 7, 1963), 15–32; and Harvey Glickman, "One Party System in Tanganyika," *The Annals*, 358 (March, 1965), 136–149. For party activity on Zanzibar see Michael F. Lofchie, "Zanzibar," in James S. Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Jr. (eds.), *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1964), 482–511. For literature on the administration and its relation to the party, see William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1967); and Stanley Dryden, *Local Administration in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968).

poses as a village.[3] Incorporated within each rural branch are the TANU Youth League (TYL), the women's organization (UWT), and in many areas, the TANU elders.[4] Each of these affiliates has an administrative counterpart at the national, regional, and district levels. The party cell structure is organized below the rural party branch. Cells are made up of 10 homesteads; each family head has specific duties, such as chairman, vice chairman, or the officer in charge of education, agricultural, medical, security, roads and paths, and forests. The cells are organized for education and economic mobilization, but in many areas they carry out security and police functions.[5]

Rural party organizations have several intrinsic characteristics. They are institutional nerve endings of the national party structure. They are the local institutions by which the people are brought into the national political system and through which the commands of the governing elite are channeled. At the rural level, the government and party functions are largely fused. TANU is the coordinating organization responsible for a wide range of nation-building activities.[6] While keeping its identity, the party has extended its influence and personnel into most rural organizations, including the more important local administration and semi-governmental marketing cooperatives. The rural party is by nature an authoritative mechanism, operated by local influentials who are able to manage the allocation of scarce resources. In most areas the party is composed of poorly paid enthusiasts who hold other jobs as farmers, drivers, carpenters, and store keepers. Their political actions are only loosely controlled by the higher-level district offices.

Such rural party leaders are able to remain in power for at least three reasons. First, they offer the peasant, who may be in domestic or legal difficulty, the possibility of representing him at higher levels of authority. Second, the party leader is privy to information outside the village area by virtue of his contacts with the party organization. He can, therefore, provide the peasant with specific information, as well as an interpretation of new events. Third, the party leader often controls, or has influence over, the allocation of local jobs and other scarce resources. Such mundane matters as the dispensing of medicines, free transportation, or honorific ceremonial duties, fall within the political arena dictated by a rural party leader.

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[3] In Tanzania, the term village generally means a wide area of dispersed homesteads. There are few concentrated villages as those found in the West.

[4] The TANU Youth League is usually the most important of the rural affiliates because it serves as a village police force. In most areas members have the right of arrest. They also serve as messengers, official escorts, and general party functionaries. Most TYL are between ages 18–35 and as a group may carry on commercial ventures such as operating a local bar or sponsoring sport or ceremonial activities. In some areas the youth groups have been subject to criticism from party leaders for becoming overzealous, taking the law into their own hands, holding illegal trials and occasionally forcing younger boys to drill with imitation rifles. Changes since the Arusha Declaration (1967) have included other, more politically oriented youth movements such as the Green Guards.

[5] The administrative organization of the party is more complex than this brief statement suggests. For example, in some districts there are interim branch offices between the district and local branches. In other areas the village development committee (VDC), which ostensibly is a part of the local government apparatus, is often one and the same as the rural party branch. The officers, by government decree, are the same. In the early months of 1970 some village branches were reportedly to be consolidated into new TANU local branch offices which would be coterminous with district council wards. A new TANU constitution in 1965 reorganized the party structure in terms of the working and executive committees, and the annual conference of delegates at each level. Party leaders were empowered to summon witnesses, take evidence, and call for documents. A commission of inquiry was also established which gave citizens a means of airing their grievances against wielders of party and government authority. The commission received some 1627 complaints in 1966–67, some 439 were rejected as out of its jurisdiction, 114 were investigated, 54 found justified, and 443 under consideration at the end of 1967. See: *Tanzania, Permanent Commissions on Inquiry: Annual Report, 1966–67* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1968). Also see a review article on this unique constitutional entity by Robert Martin, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, VII (April, 1969), 178–183.

[6] With the Arusha Declaration, the party has been charged with implementing the teachings of African Socialism and self-reliance. The party was declared the supreme government institution in Tanzania during the 14th TANU Conference (June, 1969), with the government its instrument in implementing policies. (*East African Standard*, June 9, 1969). See *Tanzania, The Arusha Declaration* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967). Also see Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), and *Ujamaa—Essays on Socialism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

A key organizatonal aim of the national party headquarters has been to gain mass involvement in political affairs. To this end a full ideological campaign has been in operation for amplification by the rural branches. From several points of view the results are impressive. Mass participation has occurred in voting, local government councils, marketing cooperatives, and self-held activities. There is general support for party rallies, party slogans, and local mobilization efforts, all of which are usually couched in terms of African socialism. As a coherent ideology, however, African socialism as yet has little meaning in the rural areas. The attending pronouncements on Pan-Africanism are poorly understood and the running anti-imperialism critique is reacted to more on a specific-issue basis than as a part of an on-going ideology. Within the ideology there has been an emphasis on national culture and on the historical uniqueness of Tanzania. African Socialism is referred to by national leaders as the rationale for governmental control of economic institutions. Such statements have meaning in the rural areas only in terms of job opportunities, salaries, and commodity prices. In sum, the parochial nature of the rural party precludes at the present time acceptance or understanding of a unifying national ideology. The ingredients of such parochialism can be seen graphically in the day-to-day activities of a rural party.

The Rural Party's Multi-faceted Activities

The types of activities carried out by rural party branches fall broadly into five classes. First, family and marital mediation is commonplace and includes giving assistance in divorce cases, arbitrating husband-wife disputes, fining wife deserters, and intervening when family heads cannot resolve a problem. Second, village administrative activities are carried out in the writing of reports on local projects, arranging self-help schemes, ordering building materials, and the like. Third, a welfare activity is exemplified in making public announcements, delivering public complaints, and aiding in specific problems such as sanitation or health. Fourth, a form of police activity is seen in protecting private property, warning troublemakers, investigating, and sending individuals to court. Fifth, the party serves as social critic in chastizing unpatriotic behavior, in condemning certain acts, or in encouraging compliance in such matters as school attendance and tax payment. Concrete examples of these activities are seen in forty messages transmitted *to,* and received *from,* a typical rural party (Table 1).

The party activities reflected in the messages are varied and far-reaching. They tell us a good deal about TANU and allow for several points of analysis. First, it is obvious that TANU leaders perform nearly all authoritative acts that can be initiated within the limits of the rural political system. The party itself becomes a catch-all organization, its leaders acting as counselors, guides, father-confessors, investigators, and judges. The leaders reprimand and chastise, cajole and announce. They become personally involved in the full range of personal problems. Love quarrels, family feuds, and house-burnings are within their domain. Moral issues and money issues are common concerns. In terms of conflict resolution, party leaders provide a "safety valve" for community tensions by allowing individuals to transfer problems and complaints to them. Direct personal confrontations in many cases are thereby avoided.

Second, there are few guidelines to the leaders' legitimate areas of operation. In reality the party operates in all sectors in which the local chairman or other leaders wish to become involved. Formal authority channels are not recognized, and a leader will delve into administrative or legal matters if he feels he has a sympathetic audience. Nor is there a clear-cut pattern of when an individual will take a problem to a party official in lieu of a former traditional headman, although customary law disputes usually begin with mediation by the traditional headman.[7] Authority is constantly being tested as party leaders try to win support and either succeed or are rebuffed. Other village leaders in more traditional positions such as former chiefs or headmen hesitate to test their long-established authority for fear that new conditions may have undermined their authority. Instead, they spend a great deal of effort in simply negating the party leaders who are attempting to take initiative.

Third, the messages give an indication of the rural people's attitude to the party. TANU is viewed much like a parental authority. Individ-

[7] Although traditional chiefs, sub-chiefs, and headmen were officially removed from power in 1963, many were able to retain influence by taking party or administrative jobs. Other traditional leaders relied on their religious-magical, ritual, and customary law functions to retain local influence. A headman usually presided over what is now designated as a village. See Norman N. Miller, "Political Survival of Traditional Leadership," *Journal of Modern African Studies,* VI (July, 1968), 183–201.

uals send greetings to the party, beg the party's forgiveness, and wish to stay on good terms with party leaders. There is little questioning of higher authority and usually there is compliance with a direct order. Such attitudes undoubtedly spring from fear of what the party leaders can do as public prosecutors, and as public informants. The authoritative nature of the traditional political system conditioned such attitudes.[8] The backing the government now gives the

TABLE 1. A RURAL PARTY'S COMMUNICATIONS*

Content of Incoming Messages	*Result***
1. Old woman asks TANU's help in getting divorce certificate	Referred to local court
2. Bar owner reports quarrel and requests investigation	No action
3. Woman complains of husband's mistreatment	Letter sent to husband ordering him to improve his behavior
4. Farmer requests vote for local representative to district council be secret and that a box in a private room be used	Party promises to study the request
5. Old man confesses, after a hearing, that he failed to tend his sick wife, who has since recovered and left him	Party fines man 40 shillings and instructs him to pay his wife an additional 5 shillings; wife agrees to return home
6. Local government officer requests forms be completed which give composition of village development committee	Forms completed
7. Village medical officer complains of "great water shortage" at clinic and asks for help	Public water brigade formed
8. Young woman complains a man (named) has repeatedly accosted her in her hut	Party chairman warns man to improve his behavior
9. Farmer complains someone has set his hut on fire, and requests an investigation	Found to be caused by a field fire out of control
10. Teacher complains five children (named) are not attending primary school	Party chairman warns parents
11. Local government officer requests party chairman inspect an individual's house who is suspected of practicing witchcraft, and to look for specific medicines and poisons	Chairman investigates with three other party leaders; suspect banished, but order later rescinded
12. Shopkeeper asks party chairman to remind farmer of debt for kerosene and cloth	Farmer ordered to pay
13. Old woman writes to party chairman: "I am sending my bed on top of the bus and do not trust the bus driver. Please see the bed is put off at the house of Hamud Shams."	Problems given to TANU Youth League
14. Local government officer notes that all teachers are encouraged to stand for local election	Notice posted
15. Farmer writes: "This letter is just to say Salaam (Peace) . . . Salaam, that is all."	No action
16. Local government officer gives procedure for elections, and stresses need for peaceful voting	Announcement made
17. Divorced woman agrees to stop "misbehavior" in the maize fields, and begs party's forgiveness	No comment
18. Farmer informs TANU that his case against a named individual, and his dog, has been settled without trial. Farmer was bitten on ear while "resting" on beer-hall floor	10 shilling settlement

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[8] Based mainly on the institution of chieftaincy, the traditional political system in its purest form would be equated with pre-European administration (Tanzania, 1890). Remnants from the traditional system persist into the present period. Both

TABLE 1. (continued)

Content of Incoming Messages	*Result***
19. Beer-making license requested for local farmer from local government official	Granted
20. Announcement of TANU parade to open new dispensary	Announcement posted
21. Woman is accused by TANU in theft of 89 shillings (12.70)	Referred to court
23. Gift to be given people when new dispensary is officially opened	Large clock presented by party official
24. Village beer sale hours are weekends 3-7 p.m. only	Posted
25. Legal action threatened those who failed to take part in self-help project to repair road	No action taken
26. Agenda announced for next party meeting to include local bus problems, building grass roof for school, and new clinic annex	Agenda sent to 20 party leaders
27. Man given receipt for his bicycle, confiscated when Youth League caught him riding without brakes	Claims he needs no brakes; action deferred
28. Two men charged in court for failing to work on community self-help scheme	Released by agreement with party leaders
29. Complaint sent to district headquarters that local bus runs infrequently, passes many who wish to ride, is too small, and is very dirty	No action
30. Youth League ordered to stop threatening violence	Request acknowledged
31. Chairman seeks job for villager in local government administration	No action
32. Announcement made that party leaders and Village Development Committee (VDC) members must have proof of paid-up tax	Circulated and posted
33. Public notice is made that the new TANU office is open.	Posted
34. Man who harvested and ate another man's crops is charged and sent for trial	Trial results not known
35. Divorced woman told 100 shilling bride-price must be returned to her former husband	Woman refers party leader to her father who received the money
36. Complaint to the cooperative union that crop prices are far too low	Complaint not acknowledged
37. Public collections for independence day celebrations will be one shilling per man	Announced
38. Citizens ordered to bring tools, rope, poles, and grass to build new clinic annex, or pay one shilling fine	Building completed
39. Man who used abusive language against TANU secretary is charged in local court	Paid 10 shillings fine
40. Letter to all citizens: "Warning, keep the peace during independence-day celebrations"	Circulated and posted

* Source: Random sample of correspondence files, Usagari TANU branch, Tabora District, Tanzania, for period January, 1964 to January, 1966.

** Messages written by party chairman or secretary, on behalf of the party.

rural party allows the modern leader unlimited possibilities to exercise influence. The leader's role is increasingly proliferated.

Fourth, the party performs general police functions such as investigations, arrests, formal court charges, trials, fines, confinements, and property confiscations. The opportunity for party activities of this nature exists because in

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German and British administrators relied on chiefs for indirect rule, and although chiefs were often appointed, in lieu of hereditary claimants, their local authority was considerable in terms of law, tax collections, and riutal. *Ibid.*, pp. 188–196.

most rural areas there are no police or formal trial structures immediately available. Trails are held by the party because the approximately 600 primary, or local, courts are spread so thinly over Tanzania that it is a major undertaking to use them. The party fills the void as the most authoritative organization operating in immediate contact with the people. In dealing directly with the people, party leaders are occasionally coercive. The messages substantiate this, particularly if a dichotomy is drawn between messages which reflect voluntary behavior, and those reflecting that which has been forced by party leaders. From this point of view, nineteen of the forty messages may be considered coercive or enforcing. Another six cases are mildly enforcing. On the other hand, fifteen cases deal with situations where coercion is not involved.[9] As the messages indicate, TANU Youth League members carry out most of the police functions, and much of the coercion comes through this organization.

Fifth, rural party activities are supportive of broader government modernization goals in the sense that they generally enhance village solidarity, help to settle disputes, promote cohesion, build consensus, and aid communications. Activities which would have the *opposite* effects could be argued to negate modernization programs. Assessed in these terms witchcraft allegations, unwarranted party threats, or unfair arrests which cause withdrawal from self-help schemes would be included. Only four of the messages fall into these categories, suggesting that the party is usually a positive modernizing agent.[10]

Potential Abuse of Party Authority

Misuse of party authority occurs because most peasants are not aware of the limits national party leaders have placed on local leaders. In part this is because such regulations have been in effect a relatively short time. In the traditional political system, and the colonial system, the general limits on the main authority—the local chief—were known because they had evolved over time. Historically, there was little chance of flagrant abuse of powers because checks on the chief existed in the form of withdrawal from the chiefdom, or if necessary, violent dethronement by armed attack or assassination. In the modern period, the only recourse for the individual who becomes disenchanted with the local political process is to oppose the process or to withdraw from it. The latter is in essence non-participation. In a political sense it is usually caused by alienation from local party leaders who have committed some abuse of power which has directly affected the individual.

It is important to note that when a rural party leader abuses his powers, it is an abuse of the national party regulations set down and defined by national leaders. It is in the application of party policy at the district and village level that individual misconduct occurs and rights are abused.[11] The criticisms leveled at rural leaders by national officials are broadly of four types.

First, local party officers are chided for their treatment of Asian traders who control a large sector of commerce. Local party leaders argue that the Asian has traditionally exploited the people, that most do not have Tanzanian citizenship and are probably not going to remain in the country. It is further argued that the Asians have made great wealth at the expense of the Africans and should be expected to contribute funds and take an active part in party projects. Tensions are also increased by the Asians' exclusiveness, and rumors of some merchants leaving the country with great wealth made at the expense of the African. Asians feel that local party leaders maltreat them: credit is demanded, bills not paid, financial contributions requested, shops closed for endless ceremonies, and shop-owners forced to work on self-help schemes. The result is to entrench Asian entrepreneurs in the towns, and to make them economically inter-reliant.

Second, the local party is criticized for financial irresponsibility. This usually takes the form of petty theft by minor officials, misuse and loss of party funds, unpaid debts, or inefficient record keeping. Higher level party leaders point to the increased spot-check and audit procedures and realistically argue that it is impossible to keep tight control on the remote rural branches. Nevertheless, villagers often mistrust local leaders and refuse to contribute financial support.

A further criticism involves attempts to force participation in party activities. Peasant refusal to pay fees, attend meetings, or take problems to the party often leads to accusations of disloyalty to the nation, and to harsh collection campaigns. The contrast between the current lack of participation in some rural areas, with the strong involvement the same area exhibited in the pre-independence, nationalistic period, causes local

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[9] Those messages classified as indicating coercive pressure were 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 34, 35, 38, 39; mildly coercive: 15, 17, 20, 32, 37, 40; non-coercive: all others.

[10] Messages 11, 28, 30, 39.

[11] The Permanent Commission of Inquiry was established essentially to hear such abuses. *Tanzania, The Permanent Commission, op. cit.*

TABLE 2. INCIDENTS INVOLVING MISUSE OF PARTY AUTHORITY*

Incident	Result
1. Rural party leader intimidates local court magistrate by insisting he find an individual guilty who allegedly spoke against the party	Magistrate requests guidance from District court officials and incident is referred to higher authority
2. Man is either murdered or commits suicide (hanged). Rural party officials force family to bury body without inquest or police report	Rumor reaches police post, inquest ordered, rural leaders criticized
3. Rural branch holds "court" and fines individuals who do not cooperate with the party	Rural leaders reprimanded by district party officials
4. Rural chairman holds second job as bus driver. On several occasions he halts bus and collects license fees from passing bicyclists, but fails to turn in money to local government clerk	Police investigation requested
5. Leaders of Muslim welfare society claim party leaders used discriminatory tactics and abuse Islam followers in public meetings	Complaint sent to district party office; No action
6. Rural chairman controls rental of TANU-owned tractor. He charges exorbitant fees to some farmers, and allows his father, brother and father-in-law to use tractor without charge	Complaint to district party office causes tractor to be sent to another village
7. Agriculture extension worker threatened with beating for alledgedly telling farmers not to join TANU or pay party fees	District party officer hears of threat, warns local branch, and complains to Agriculture department
8. Rural party chairman conducts membership campaign by forcing all farmers who wish to ride local buses or enter clinic to buy party membership card.	Chairman relieved of duties and incident referred to as an abuse of powers
9. Meeting at headman's house to resolve husband-wife dispute is broken up by party chairman. He dismisses husband and forces wife to return to his home where he allegedly accosts her	Chairman relieved of duties by district TANU officials and criticized for using party name as his authority; local court case brought by irate husband
10. Asian store owner complains of mistreatment by party leaders who demand contributions, impose store hours, and force road work	Complaint sent to regional party office; No action
11. Hospital staff complains of impromptu "investigation" by local party officials who threaten staff for being "inefficient, drunken, and mistreating patients"	District party officer promises to investigate problem
12. Prosperous bee-keeping coöperative accuses party of controlling their marketing procedures and of engaging in profiteering	After two-year delay regional office settles issue in favor of cooperative
13. Rural office demands and receives credit from local merchant for $478; refuses to settle account	Merchant complains to regional party office; no action
14. Five village-level local government employees (ADEO's) forced out of jobs by the party and "TANU men" put in their places	Administration complains to regional party headquarters of unfair pressure which undermines efficiency; no corrective action taken
15. Audit of rural branch shows cash shortage, no control of membership cards, no cash box, and loss of President's picture	Rural chairman warned to discharge duties in accord with regulations

* Source: Survey of eight rural party organizations in Tabora District, Tanzania. Data based on interviews with party leaders, local government officers, district administrators, and a survey of administrative files of Tabora District Administration, 1964–66, 1968. The cases are not reflective of specific individuals or leadership positions.

leaders to intensify their campaigns. Their justification is that better participation in the past has been forthcoming. The result, however, is often only to elicit minimal tolerance of the party, lip-service to its aims, and little tangible support.

Fourth, the broadest form of criticism leveled at rural leaders involves their misconduct for personal gain, carried out in the name of the party. Financial gain, status rewards, or self-aggrandizement may be sought by using a party position in a coercive manner. Such situations are often characterized by a powerful, local individual exerting personal authority; the fact that he is a TANU leader is incidental to the fact that he has a strong personal base of authority.[12] The misuse of this authority may involve forced payment, illegal trials, threats of violence, temporary imprisonment, and outright extortion. When such incidents come to light, higher level party authorities are quick to counter them. The corrective action, however, in some cases taken by the Permanent Commissioner of Inquiry, does not nullify the incident's effect on the rural people. Withdrawal from any form of political participation is often the result.

Specific case-level examples of the misuse of rural party authority will illustrate the problems faced by national leaders in gaining local support for the party and participation in its activities. It should be emphasized that such incidents are precisely the basis upon which the national leadership criticizes rural officials.

Analysis of the incidents supports the initial departure point that party abuse occurs most often in rural areas where local branch leaders can use their party for a personal authority base, but where party rules are not yet operating. Party activities at the district level and above are usually rational and actions are usually taken for the best interest of the farmer. At the rural level, party activities are often the result of individual initiative and may be irrational. There are several reasons for such behavior by a rural leader. Rural leaders act as free agents a majority of the time, and there are no close checks on their activities by superiors. Rural leaders have little fear of loss of position because they are not paid well enough to make the positions highly prized. There are no clearcut ideas among rural people of what a party leader's job is, or what the role involves. Such ambiguity allows the leader to reshape the job to his own ends. Viewed from the farmer's vantage point an abuse is individualistic. It is not so much TANU which is causing the difficulty, but a well-known individual who is incidentally the TANU leader; a man who, the farmer vaguely realizes, has gained some authority over him.

Policy ambiguity also exists. Much of all party business is a reaction to some event. Each level above the village has a corrective function; wrongs are set right by decree from higher party officials and usually on an *ad hoc* basis. There is little evidence that a formal policy is pursued or that a series of mistakes helps to establish a policy that is followed in the rural areas. More often rumor or gossip about an incident will set the guidelines of policy as a farmer understands them. The reported experience of a particular individual carries more weight than a formal statement, announcement, or circular.

III. FORMS OF PARTY PARTICIPATION

Findings on the behavior of individuals in rural party situations suggest that participation in the party takes one of three forms.

Active Participation: Under these conditions the individual is actively involved in the party process. He accepts most of the party rules as they are interpreted to him, helps enforce such rules, and generally does so on a voluntary basis. His compliance with the system indicates his general support of the political process, although he may differ on specific issues directly effecting him. His continued support of the party will depend on the satisfaction he gets from his party activities, and the decisions made on his behalf by party officials.

The extent of active participation, the reasons for taking part in party activities, and questions related to the process of active participation may be seen in survey data concerning rural party leaders and randomly selected farmers collected in three widely separated districts.[13]

Satisfaction with Party: Participation in the party may also be seen in terms of a *satisfaction expected*[14] and *satisfaction received* ratio.[15] The responses to the question "What does the party do for the people?" indicate a general satisfaction with the party. Only 1.3% reported negative attitudes. The findings also support the general thesis that the party is a multi-faceted organization that engages in a wide range of activities.

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[12] The Arusha Declaration and subsequent pressures by Julius Nyerere have been aimed at keeping party and government officials from making personal gain by virtue of their positions. The efforts have been more successful on the national and regional levels, than with the isolated rural leadership.

[13] For details of the sample survey, see the Appendix.

[14] Regarding satisfaction expected, an important parenthetical question is what is the rural party's ability to actually satisfy expectations. In most areas the local party leaders are increasingly able to control resources. The party has been declared the supreme governing body of the nation and the national party propaganda gives local leaders and cell chairmen continuous support and legitimacy.

TABLE 3. WHAT DOES THE PARTY DO FOR THE PEOPLE?

29%	Party leads economic development projects.
18	Party is the government; administers, maintains law and order, governs the people.
14	Party unifies the people, promotes cooperation, ends colonialism.
12	Party is the representative of the people, voice of the people, interpreter of government policy, voice of the government.
12	Party is an educator. Party teaches political ideas, agricultural methods, health and welfare improvements.
1	Party is a negative influence.
14	Other.
100% (N = 434)	

The question "whom do you go to when you have a political problem?" also gives an indication of the satisfaction with the party. Over 70% of the respondents stated they took their problems either to the chairman of the party cell (42%) or to the chairman of the village party branch (19%). Some 10% stated they would take their political problem to a local government officer. Less than 2% stated they would seek satisfaction on a political problem from a traditional leader (headman, subchief). About 22% failed to answer the question. The findings indicate an overall satisfaction with the party as an agent for settling disputes and problems. The figures, however, probably underestimate the importance of the family head and the traditional leader in the settlement of problems. My obvervations indicate that people go to the political party office with problems that have been already judged—perhaps unsatisfactorily—by family heads. The same people may have gone to a traditional leader for interpretation and mediation. However, the only "proper" channels of settlement would be through the party, the government agents or the courts; traditional leaders are officially out of power. Our interviews indicate that peasants are aware of political realities, but the figures fail to reflect the *de facto* power of traditional authorities.[16]

Party Membership. Active party participation is indicated in questions concerning party membership. About 92% claim to be members of the party (at one time), and about 61% state they joined when first asked. Some 16% admitted to waiting for several months to join. Over a third of the respondents said they actively volunteered for party membership and another 25% said they joined because they were approached directly by a party official. Most members claim to have joined the party prior to independence (1961), and nearly 40% claim to have joined the party in the early years of its activity (1954-57).[17]

When asked why they joined the party, over half of the respondents said to "fight for independence" or to "get rid of the colonials." Some 10% joined because they saw the party as an organization to help build national unity and to develop the country economically. Some 8% reported they joined TANU under somewhat coercive conditions.

Other indicators of basic support and participation in the party activities are reflected in the nearly 50% of the respondents who knew the name of the leading political party leader in the district (Area Commissioner). Only slightly fewer knew the provincial political party leader (Regional Commissioner). In response to the opinion question: "Do you agree or disagree that political matters should be left to government officials and village people should not become involved," a total of 87% of the respondents disagreed. The finding indicates a strong feeling among farmers that they at least "should" be involved in local political affairs.

The extent of party activity is also seen in what the respondents believe to be the purpose of the party cell system (10-house cells).

The result is party control over such basic resources as new jobs, local wages, access to some schooling, appointment to honorific positions, access to important meetings, free transportation, and the like.

[15] Other approaches to analyzing participation such as formal-informal, and leader-follower typologies or the comparing of relative degrees of commitment to various roles, are considered less appropriate for an African rural party setting.

[16] Indicating the problem of getting totally candid responses from farmers on government matters. There is good reason to believe farmers are guarded in an interview situation and are less critical of the government in an interview than they are in their day-to-day exchanges.

[17] Observations indicate the figures are high; farmers are inclined to falsely claim membership or to claim current membership if annual dues were paid in any one year.

Officially, the purpose is to educate farmers to new agricultural techniques, to bring together the 10-house *families* for cooperative purposes, and to provide a local cell chairman for the settlements of disputes. Villagers however ascribe far wider purposes to the party cell system.

TABLE 4. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE 10-HOUSE PARTY CELL?

12%	To provide police functions, to detect criminals, to observe newcomers, to report suspicious activities, to prevent crime.
8	To settle disputes and to judge cases.
8	To collect taxes.
11	To promote cooperation in communal work.
15	To bring about economic progress in agriculture.
15	To disseminate news and propaganda.
10	To aid government administration.
3	To aid the party.
9	Doesn't know.
9	Other/omitted.
100%	
(N = 434)	

Non-participation: In addition to our basic assumption that individual abuse causes withdrawal of support from the party, non-participation can occur for at least three other reasons. First, if individuals perceive that the party leaders cannot make authoritative decisions that resolve local conflicts, a shift to stronger authority figures such as traditional leaders or administrative leaders will occur. Second, unwanted party decrees or excessive demands can cause a group of individuals to pay lip service to the party, and at the same time, to withdraw from it. This is often done by villagers supporting a non-local, alien individual as a party chairman, and using him as a buffer against the unwanted decrees from the district party office. When the lack of participation is noted by higher officials, it is the tribally alien party chairman who is criticized, not the individual farmer. In essence the alien leader lacks kinship ties and other levers to effectively gain local support.

Third, the individual's realization that rural party officials do not have an economic base to their authority, such as controlling land usage, dictating job opportunities, allocating free transportation, and the like, will cause farmers to shift their support to leaders in the local administration or the marketing cooperative who do have economic influence. Shifting allegiances are particularly likely to occur if the administrative grid in a given district is weak. The strength of the local administration varies graphically throughout Tanzania.

Specific data concerning non-participation is seen in the survey findings and in the statements made by both regional and local party officials. The most significant findings were:

Nearly 75% of the respondents had never had written communication with the party. About 8% had sent one or two letters during the year and another 8% had done so more than three times.

When asked why they joined the party about 6% gave answers indicating they had joined under some pressure, and would not be active participants. Such answers included "I was forced," "I folowed others under pressure," "I had no other choice," or "my employer 'encouraged' me to join."

When asked what is the line of authority for settling disputes beyond the village level, 72% refused to express an answer—indicating a basic desire not to be committed to an authority system beyond their immediate neighborhood. Some 13% indicated they would follow the village-district-regional party system, the remainder indicated a mixing of party, local government and traditional authorities.

Although the majority of the respondents felt that the party had done something positive for the village, those who expressed dissenting opinions (about 2%) did so for the following reasons: "party leaders do nothing for the people," "they are destructive and self-seeking," or "they demand money."

Although the findings shed some light on why non-participation in party activities occurs, they must be interpreted in light of other field observations. The survey findings on written, formal communication with the party, for example, indicate there is little overall communication. In fact, there is a great deal of informal discussion with party leaders. Written communication is initiated in extreme circumstances, when party leaders indicate a message is needed, or when distance separates the individuals. The difficulty in getting letters written and the shortage of public scribes hinders written communication. The findings on the reasons to join the party, and on what the government and the party had done for the village, also need amplification. Indications are that the people are more critical than the figures indicate. The fear of giving open opinions, and the distrust of the interview situation, would lead the respondent to give "safe" political answers. In fact most peasant farmers keep up a running criticism of the government for failing to provide more for the village. In the eyes of the farmers there is usually no differentiation between the party and the government beyond the local leaders that are known on a face-to-face basis.

The lack of participation in some rural party branches is also a recurring theme among party officials above the village level. The usual criticism is that the rural branch is not active enough, that the people do not regard the party as an organization to solve their problems, and that the party is not "speaking for the people." Relations between local government officials and rural party officials are often strained. The result is a lack of support for the rural party branch by the local administration.[18]

Comments from rural party leaders in Central Tanzania indicate the general problem.[19]

> Party chairman Itaga village: ". . . progress here is slow due to misunderstandings between TANU and local government officers . . . people receive different orders from these leaders. . . . Most are not paying their monthly fees. The party hardly gets any new members."
>
> Party chairman Uyui village: ". . . people have stopped coming to TANU to report their difficulties and troubles . . . they go straight to the local government employees. . . ."
>
> Party chairman Uyowa village: "I hardly collect any monthly fees as they don't value the office now. . . ."
>
> Party chairman Upuge village: ". . . before (pre-independence) many people joined and fees were paid by most of this chiefdom. TANU offices were always full of people with troubles. Some were settled and some referred to court. After independence (1961) TANU has been dropping down . . . people don't attend meetings even when they are told to do so. . . ."

On balance, non-participation is gauged by rural leaders in terms of fees paid, the use of TANU for problem settlement, and the general traffic in the TANU office. The higher levels of authority were equally concerned with the same problems and also with questions of respect for the party, and the broader organizational questions of the party's relations with local and central government organizations.

Dissatisfaction with the party as an agent and partner of the national government is seen in responses to the question "What has the government done for the people of this village?" Over 40% of the respondents stated the government had done nothing for the village. Another 10% didn't know of any contribution, or refused to answer the question. Other responses include specific contributions as "provided tools and material goods" (10%), "provided administrative help" (7%), "financed an agricultural or construction project" (14%), "financed an education project" (8%), or "provided freedom and independence" (3%). Only 3% said the government had done a great deal for the village, or gave details of several contributions.

A further indication of dissatisfaction that would lead to an individual's failure to participate in party activities is seen in the responses to the question: "Do you agree or disagree that government matters and politics are so complicated that the average man cannot really understand what is going on?" Nearly 75% of the sample agreed with this statement, 18% disagreed, and 2% were uncertain. The remainder did not answer the question. Overall, the findings indicate a widespread dissatisfaction with the "outside party" and the "outside government." This finding also lends credence to the suggestion that peasants see the government as remote, disinterested, and ineffectual within their village.

Satisfaction is, of course, conditioned by peasant *expectations*. On the one hand, peasants expect the government to aid them and are annoyed and dissatisfied when this does not occur. On the other hand, the general cynicism reflected in the responses to the survey questions indicates a general expectation of abuse and maltreatment. Most peasants expect leaders to be self-seeking and to engage in petty theft. There is a general feeling that any man who gets into a high-level job will exploit the situation.[20] These attitudes are coupled with a broader belief in the inevitability of ill-fortune. Conditioned initially by the harsh life style, the expectation of ill-fortune extends into the political arena. Maltreatment, for example, is expected if one ventures outside the face-to-face world and deals with a distant people or government.

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[18] The above specific criticisms were leveled against rural party leaders by the then Regional Commissioner for Tabora, R. S. Wambura in "TANU and the Government" (Tabora: District Council Pamphlet, 1963, cyclostyled). The comments are indicative of similar problems in many areas of Tanzania.

[19] Selected as representative comments from a survey of rural party organizations in Tabora district, 1965–66 and 1968.

[20] In the general elections of 1965, the voters' expectation that many of the incumbents had gotten rich in office led them to vote the man out of office on the basis that another man should have a chance at wealth. See Bismark Mwansasu and Norman N. Miller, "The Fall of a Minister," in Lionel Cliffe (ed.), *One-Party Democracy* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967).

Other peasant attitudes illustrate the relationship between satisfaction and expectation. Approximately 64% of the respondents expected to stay in their village the rest of their lives and only 14% were willing to say definitely that they would leave their village. When asked "What job would you do if you could change your work," over 50% indicated no change was desired. Approximately 12% indicated they would simply improve their present work, and another 11% indicated they would return to farming from their present type of work. Only two respondents (0.46%) indicated they would move to a political party job, and less than 6% indicated preference for government administrative posts. Jobs such as carpenters, drivers, shop-owners, traders, and positions in the police and the army accounted for less than 8% of the total. A similar question, "What would you like to be doing 5 years from now?" showed that 68% of the respondents expected no change or simply hoped for an improvement in their farming work. When asked "How much money do you expect to make in 5 years, per year," 47% didn't know and an additional 7% expected to make less than 100 shillings ($14.00) per year.

In essence, satisfaction on personal issues may be impossible for some peasants because they are apathetic, because their expectation levels are unreal, or because they negate the party process by refusing to believe it will serve them and by refusing to participate in it. Seen in this perspective, it is understandable that mild dissatisfaction with the party—and non-participation in its activities—would be in line with the larger dissatisfaction with one's life style. For most individuals, such a situation usually leads more to apathy, disinterest and acceptance of the status quo. In extreme cases of dissatisfaction, active resistance to the party could also result.

Active Resistance: Under these conditions either coercion by party leaders has caused withdrawal from party activities and the individual is actively resisting party leaders, or an organization outside the party sphere has brought pressure on the individual to oppose party activities. The party rules and codes are broken and an attempt is made to either destroy the rural party organization, or to unseat its leaders. Rural party leaders in turn may react by lashing out against the individuals inolved, or by calling on higher party authority. When knowledge of anti-party resistance reaches the district or regional party authorities, prompt action is usually taken, either in the form of investigation and rebuke, or when necessary, containment by the police or the field force.

Resistance to party leaders may be mixed with general resistance to government activities. Such a situation usually springs from one of two sources. First, resistance to a specific demand or decree; in essence a collective refusal to follow party leadership for a specific reason which can easily become generalized to a refusal to follow party leadership on any issue. Second, resistance may spring from historical animosity. Groups that were at one time out of the party, such as former chiefs, Muslim organizations, or labor groups, are currently included in the broad party structure. Old antagonisms and old rivalries, however, create factions within the party which on the local level can lead to overt resistance to the existing leadership.

Examples of active resistance take several forms. The refusal to pay TANU dues or local taxes, and the stoning of Land Rovers when officials come to collect (Rungwe District); The refusal to support party or local government leaders to the extent that the President denounces the people as *wadui* or enemy of the state, (Kisarawe District); The attack on a TANU office by a dissident group, who after seizing the files and record books of the party, claim to be the new party leaders, in fact claiming legitimacy in symbols (Tabora District), are all indicative. Most cases of resistance are directed at the local leadership. There is little indication that organized wide-scale disenchantment exists with the national party organization, as was the case in Ghana the latter years of the CPP. Cases usually erupt spontaneously, are resolved, and generally have no implications beyond the village area. Leaders of the dissident groups generally find no support for continued active resistance and they slip back into an ongoing pattern of non-participation in party activities.

IV. FACTORS AFFECTING PARTY PARTICIPATION

In addition to the forms of party activity, four other questions must be analyzed for an understanding of rural party participation. First, what is the context of political life in which rural party participation takes place; second, what are the processes by which issues are resolved for the individual by party authorities; third, what are the links between village and national party organizations that effect peasant participation; and fourth, what are the broader implications for national leaders concerning the political participation of rural peoples.

Context of Political Life

A rural society is often a pedestrian society. There are limited means of transport, the peasant is largely immobilized, and movement to the outside is a major undertaking. The distance a man can easily walk to have a dispute settled or to gain assistance from a higher authority is the effective boundary of village political systems. For most rural individuals the world is in essence a microcosm with the village as the center. Attitudes toward movement are dictated by the relative magnetism of the home village versus the attraction of the outside world.

Political relations are based on kinship ties, clan membership, and the face-to-face, day-by-day interaction with familiar people. Locale, the neighborhood or chiefdom boundaries, and the dictates of an agrarian society heavily influence political life. The planting and harvesting cycle directly affects political considerations. Litigation diminishes during harvests; ritual and ceremony to resolve conflicts increase during planting. Flood, draught, or other natural calamities may cause a revival of traditional sorcery or witchcraft beliefs. Such beliefs provide causal explanations and serve as mechanisms of social control. In turn, witch cleansing, witch trials and banishment may occur with the full involvement of the local political leadership.

Three leadership groups tend to operate in the rural context, and to vie for political power. These include party functionaries such as chairmen, vice chairmen, secretaries, and officers in the youth league, women's group, TANU elders, and the cells. Administrative leaders such as resident local government officers, clerks, teachers and members of a central government ministry posted in the village, such as dispensors, agricultural instructors, forest guards, and game wardens comprise the second group. The third leadership group is composed of traditional leaders such as the former chiefs and headmen, secret society leaders, diviners, prophets, ritualists and soothsayers. The three groups together comprise the political leadership on nearly all issues. In most cases the administrative leaders have less local legitimacy and mainly serve the technical and clerical functions. Party leaders tend to serve mobilization and propaganda functions, and traditional leaders serve mainly to mediate, explain and translate demands made on the peasants.

The most important structures operating within this political context are the rural party and party cells, the village council (Village Development Committee), the marketing cooperatives, and voluntary associations such as parent-teacher groups, welfare societies, dance groups, and in some areas, secret societies. If the village serves as communications center for out-lying areas, it may also include a primary court, and a local government divisional headquarters. Other local structures often involved in political activities include the local stores and markets, primary schools, tea houses, beer-shops, dispensaries, and mosques or mission stations.

The relationship between these structures at the rural level is characterized by overlapping leadership, a great deal of economic interaction, and communication linkages based on the informal village network, and rumor diffusion. The Village Development Committees (VDC) usually have 20 members who represent sections of the dispersed village area, as well as specific positions (teacher, dispenser); the party chairman is the VDC chairman, and members of the VDC are likely to include the leaders of the marketing cooperative, the local administration, and other organizations. Meetings are open to any individual with complaints or problems. Rural party functionaries are usually members of other social and economic structures and business tends to be transacted informally. Roles tend to be fused. This is not the case for relationships between the party and other organizations at the district, regional and national level. These relations are formalized by written contract and letter, although overlapping leadership exists among the national elite.

Process of Issue Satisfaction

The various survey findings give a picture of what issues are taken to the party. In fact, any potential conflict situation can become a party issue. There are no hard rules, and no precedents are followed except for the interests of the peasant who initiates the incident. He, as noted, will take the issue where he has the best chance of satisfaction. This is conditioned by his view of who is the most authoritative figure in his political arena—and, of these individuals, who would receive his request with the greatest sympathy. It is in part the peasant's view of the relative balance of power between a few local influentials. Since traditional authorities have been severely curtailed in their legal exercise of power, and since government administrators often lack legitimacy in the village areas, the most potentially useful leaders for the peasant are often party functionaries. However, the peasant is usually the initiator of the resolution process and the arena he chooses will depend on where he believes he can get the greatest satisfaction. He may demand, for example, that both traditional and administrative authorities have some voice when party officials are judging his case. Essentially, then, party participation is based on how satisfied the individual peasant continues to be with a number of issues taken to the party. The peasant is in fact a political chameleon. The situation can change with the issue at stake.

The actual grass-roots process by which a peasant's grievance would be resolved through the party is basically as follows. When a conflict between individuals or groups arises, the issue is either taken by them to the party authority, or the party authority hears of it informally through the neighborhood communication network. If he hears of it informally he may either intervene on his own or do nothing. If the issue is taken to him he usually will either take action on his own, or, after hearing the particulars, call for a broader "public" meeting of other party influentials and elders. Such a public call has two consequences. It brings the issue up to the level of neighborhood knowledge and permits anyone who is interested to participate in the debate. Second, as the messages go out to convene the meeting, the time lag gives the leader an opportunity to consider the problem, to put it in perspective with similar issues, and to debate it informally with others.

When the public meeting begins, the limits of discussion may be framed by a few key leaders, but debate is generally open and evidence may be volunteered from the family, friends, or neighbors of the disputants. Evidence may also be called for by the party leaders and be given either by a specific individual, or in "Greek chorus" fashion. The latter technique also serves to test the feeling of the community at large. If the chorus is not largely unanimous, and there is in fact a counter chorus, the issue divides the community, and the leaders proceed more cautiously. This slower, more laborious process is tedious and has the effect of eventually driving away all those who do not have a vital stake in the issue.

Leadership under these circumstances is generalized; no single party individual dominates. When a consensus is sensed by a few of the leaders, this fact is noted. The decision will then be framed by one or two leaders and usually delivered by the "convening authority." To give the decision legitimacy, the pronouncement may be in the name of the party, in the name of the government, or occasionally in the name of a chiefdom or traditional authority. In most cases the finding would be accompanied by a threat of harsher punishment if the decision of the group is not carried out. Punishment might include a beating, a fine, or banishment from the village. The right of appeal to a higher authority would probably not be noted or discussed.

Links Between Village and National Party

The Tanzania party structure is organized to incorporate the village party officials under the administrative direction of a district branch which is usually headquartered in one of the sixty-one district capitals. The effective linkage between the village and the outside world is in this district-village connection. Although communications from the national and regional offices supposedly filter down to the village through the district offices, the district-village tie is the weakest link in the party structure.[21] Communications are often non-existent, and requests are often misunderstood or unheeded. Guidelines from the district headquarters on how village leaders should deal with various problems are followed at the whim of the local leader. The immobilized and remote nature of the country creates a situation in which party authority is essentially "Land Rover" authority. District officials come to the village, confer with local leaders, settle problems, and depart. The circuit-riding nature of the system in fact only offers temporary solutions to village problems.

Because of the infrequency of the visits from district officials, villagers generally believe that the district office does very little for their local branch. Higher officials are thought to be mainly interested in collecting membership fees, and of only helping "richer" villages where newly established cash crops create exploitable wealth. Other difficulties arise from the fact that higher party officers are usually staffed by younger, more educated men whose views of village leaders can be hyper-critical.

A portion of the communications problem between the two party levels lies within the district party office. Like the village branch, the district office engages in a multitude of activities. No guidelines are created however, and village leaders are often confused as to what action is appropriate for them to take. Problems considered for settlement by district officials might include a marital quarrel in the district town, a bad-debt problem, an allegation against a merchant or trader, or a complaint concerning an unfair act by a government official. Welfare acts are also considered party business. If a man is released from prison and has no bus fare to his village, the party will assist him. Money for medicine may be given and medical advice offered. Special investigations are launched concerning such problems as thefts, beatings, school abuses, cheating by a shopkeeper or complaints about the hospital. The party is also engaged in economic enterprizes. Building small party hotels, organizing cooperative societies such as carpenters groups and building societies are commonplace. Resettlement schemes, homes for TANU employees, and facilities for destitute elders are within the district party activities.

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[21] Party directives in 1969 indicate awareness of this problem and an increased desire by the national party to facilitate local-level communication.

The many sides to the party create a basic problem for its district leaders: how to *differentiate between an administrative activity* that should more properly be carried out by a government organization, and a "political activity." Most district party officials are unable to define exactly what a political issue would be. One district official in western Tanzania suggested that it would be "any offense against the government." Another suggested a political issue was "anything needing investigation." The Area Commissioner, the chief party official of the district in Tabora, said the party could legitimately enter any issue "involving tensions and conflicts —such things as clashes between the staff of an organization, a man pushing too hard to get ahead, or a verbal attack on the government."

Although functionally diffused, party leaders do admit officially to some distinction between their areas of responsibility and those of the police, judiciary, and administration. Usually, however, no clear-cut idea exists when a party official's investigation encroaches on a police investigation, or when the party's right to judge and hold small trials encroaches on the judiciary. Although the district level officials are less flagrant in such mixing of channels, some confusion also exists at this level. The Area Commissioner, for example, is the head of both political and administrative functions in his district, and gives directions to both political and administrative leaders. Such confusion filters down to the village level and helps to create the local situation in which there is no distinction between administrative, party or police activities.

The difficulties in communication between the two party levels tend to inhibit participation in party affairs and to keep information and resources from flowing to the village areas. This breakdown in communication linkage is perhaps most graphically seen in statements made by a district party official and a village party official about how the *other man* carries out his work.[22]

Village Party Chairman—a 47-year-old Zaramo who has lived in the village some 11 years. He came originally in 1957 as a *Kiongozi* or party organizer (spearhead) and initially was extremely unpopular. He was accused of being a thief, of collecting party dues for his own purposes, and of being a rabble-rouser. He was often threatened with attack and initially made little headway until the local chief quietly lent his support to the party activities. By 1961, however, the village party leader had personally gained enough popularity to be elected the representative of the village to the district council. He has also held the party chairmanship since it was formed in 1959. His leadership position is reinforced by a partial ability to read and to write, by a flair for public speaking, and by virtue of his trade as a tailor which gives him constant contact with the public.

District Party Official—a 36-year-old Nyamwezi who has had 8 years of schooling and a great deal of experience in various jobs throughout East Africa. Before independence he worked on the Mombasa docks and as salesman for a tabacco company. He joined the party early in its formation, probably around 1956, and after independence was paid for his efforts with the chairmanship of a district office. He has drawn criticism for pushing the membership campaigns too hard, and for threatening people with mild forms of punishment if they do not pay their party dues.

District Party Leader	*Village Party Leader*
1. "The village chairman is lazy and slow and often does not do his work properly."	"He pushes too hard and threatens to close the hospital and local buses to those who do not pay party dues."
2. "He is often not serving TANU and is sometimes looking after his own interests."	"I have wondered if his real interest is in the nation or in himself."
3. "He does not understand my problems and does not understand how to organize a local party."	"It is too difficult to talk to him. If I bring up a problem, he will interfere and some action will be taken against me. He does not understand my problems, he is not well-informed, so I do not go to him very often."
4. "He is getting to be an old man and his effectiveness is seeping away."	"He is often acting as a *bwana mkubwa* (big man), although he is young."

Key factors affecting the links between the district and the village areas are the graphic differences between district-level leaders and their village-level counterparts. On the other hand, the survey findings indicate a strong similarity between village leaders and randomly selected farmers. No significant differences, for example, emerge between these two groups in such categories as age, education, attitudes toward magic and witchcraft, attitudes on why to send a child to school, etc. When village leaders, however, are compared to district leaders, several major differences occur.

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[22] A Tabora District official and a Uyui village official interviewed 1965–66. The situation typified here was essentially the same in 1968, during a restudy of the area.

The ages of district leaders tend to be younger than village-level leaders in all districts (Table 5).

TABLE 5. AGE OF VILLAGE-LEVEL LEADERS

	Birth Date			
	Before 1910	1910–1930	1930+	N.
District Leaders	3%	45%	52%	150
Village Leaders	26%	54%	20%	171

$x^2 = 49.23$, df = 2, $\propto = 0.0$

The religion of district leaders tends to be Christian; there are no leaders at this level who claim pagan beliefs. On the other hand, village leaders tend to be Moslem.

Type of school attended also correlated significantly. District leaders tended to be graduates or have been enrolled in government schools whereas village leaders overwhelmingly had attended mission schools or Koranic schools. Implications in these findings suggest that the chance to reach a post as a district-level leader is significantly enhanced by the attendance of a government-run school.

Considering length of party membership, district leaders in two out of three of the districts surveyed tended to have been party members a significantly shorter period of time than had village leaders. These districts (Kisarawe and Rungwe) were also the districts in which the age difference between district leaders and village leaders tended to be the greatest, a factor which partially explains the findings. For Tabora District, which historically gave support to the party later than other areas of the nation, there was no significant difference between the length of party membership for the two leadership groups.

Other differences between the village leader and the district leader appeared in terms of life style. For example, the district leader's education, income per year, amount of travel, and frequency of travel tended to be higher in almost all cases. The district leader tended to have fewer numbers of wives, fewer numbers of children, and understandably to have more possessions such as radios, bicycles, and tools. The overall picture of the district leader indicates a less parochial, less isolated individual who has some contact outside his immediate community. He has generally greater mobility and is more enlightened on the events affecting his time. He tends to have a technical competence in specialized areas as opposed to the more generalized skill of the village leader. He has probably resided in his community a shorter period of time and has fewer inter-personal contacts within the community. He is probably more inclined to accept the changing political symbols and fads as they come from the capital. The differences between the two groups in age, education and income can be graphic and lead to antagonism. The district leader's ideas for initiating changes in the village may be based on a legitimate desire to bring advantages that he has seen elsewhere. The local leader, conversely, may have had no similar experience and obstruct any such changes. Such differences lead to rigidity and entrenchment. Village leaders retreat to the traditional beliefs and justifications of the past while district leaders escape into petty professionalism. Village leaders will then demand more fact-to-face confrontations before they will act on a specific project whereas their counterparts may wish fewer personal meetings and attempt to rely on bureaucratic channels. The result is a continued disruption in a communication between the two most vital levels of the political party.

Implications for the National Government

Political participation in the rural party is the implicit goal of TANU. To gain the continued participation of the peasant is the overriding problem facing national leaders. One of the key problems is that the party at the rural level is suffering the throes of general economic disenchantment following the high hopes of the nationalistic period. In spite of peasant expectation, little has changed in their essential routine. The economic life of the people has not been greatly altered and most of the lofty expectations of the pre-independence period are unrealized. The party has been forced to shift from a nationalist protest organization to an agency for the mobilization of human and natural resources. Its new role is creative and positive. It is a role which in some respects is a contradiction of the earlier goals which were to bring about the destruction and downfall of the colonial regime. Those individuals who lead the nationalist protest had personal qualities which could arouse mass dissent. Although these nationalist leaders have remained in important offices, they do not necessarily have the talents nor the personal inclinations to provide the more mundane form of administrative leadership necessary for building a state.

Even those leaders who do combine administrative talents with some form of charismatic ability, face continued problems of peasant apathy toward the party, unpaid membership, and cynicism toward the government. As noted, links between the district and rural branches are difficult to maintain. Representation of the individual peasant's problems is on an *ad hoc* basis. The two-way highway that Julius Nyerere envisioned by which the goals and plans of the government reached the village and by which the problems and wishes of the people reached the government, is often simply not operative. The government's recruitment of rural leaders encounters basic problems of an individual's status, his traditional basis of legitimacy, and his kinship obligations. In many ethnic groups, there are strong pressures not to assume leadership for fear of alienating neighbors or of gaining undue economic advantages. In other areas there is little understanding of what a party leadership position entails.

Perhaps the most important problem concerning the political participation of peasants lies in how the central government consciously plans for such participation. There is a tendency for officials, particularly those in ministries dealing with resource planning to either implicitly or explicitly oppose political participation in specific geographic areas. This is because resources are allocated on a priority basis for economic development. Political participation without accompanying economic change is considered unwise, particularly if political stability of the geographic area is in question.

However, this form of Machiavellian banishment of inaccessible, semi-desert or exceptionally backward areas, mainly on a rationale of economic priority, may in fact be more politically dangerous than the cost-benefit thinking anticipates. Political participation is necessary for the entire population. If national leaders attempt to create "holding areas" where rural institutions are not encouraged, the inhabitants of these areas are politically alienated as well as economically depressed. This process does not, however, exclude peasants from travelling to see strikingly better human conditions in the privileged areas. Nor does this form of planning prohibit migration out of the rural sectors to the over-crowded, socially-deprived urban areas. When such exposure does take place, the individual is in fact in the larger political arena. His disenchantment with the events in his home region and his knowledge of better conditions elsewhere make him a potential dissident and agitator. It may be argued that the difficulties this individual can cause the central government would be eliminated if he had opportunities to participate locally in political institutions which are engaged in economic development. If rural political institutions are to survive, they must be created universally. No amount of Machiavellian banishment and isolation, no amount of government refusal to plan for a depressed region will keep agitation from beginning. Once begun, it is impossible to predict the speed at which agitation can lead to collective, destructive political action.[23]

In spite of the difficulties in gaining party participation, there are other strong reasons why national leaders persist in promoting such involvement. First, the party has a potential capability of economic mobilization. It serves as a catalyst of several local interests and, if supported, can be effective in reducing the conflicts brought about by rapid economic change. The rural political party is at the cutting edge of the national plans for agricultural development; its leaders can stimulate support for these plans and gain their acceptance among the local populace. Second, if there is no participation in the rural party, checks and balances on party leaders will not exist. The party apparatus has been constructed but, if it is not used and supported by the people, it can be misused by self-seeking local leaders who gain support from the remote higher party levels.

A further reason for the national leaders to encourage local participation is to facilitate the building of local institutions such as the cooperative societies and voluntary welfare associations. Like the party, these rural institutions introduce specific innovations that may benefit the peasant. Other reasons for participation exist. Party leaders at the local level are often alien to the village in which they are working. Acceptance of alien party leaders will eventually mean the acceptance of local leaders in other positions.

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[23] See Samuel Huntington "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April, 1965), 386–430.

The process aids in the breaking down of ethnocentrism and the establishment of new forms of legitimacy. The local party, by encouraging peasant participation, is forcing the individual into a broader political system and exposing him to institutional structures that can represent larger numbers of people, and more effectively introduce modernizing innovations for the village.

Perhaps the most convincing argument for national leaders to promote and channel local participation is that political involvement by the peasant in some form has always occurred. Traditional political systems stimulated political participation in several forms as indicated by the constant intrigue and subversion that occurred within and between chieftains. Individuals have, and will participate politically over what affects them directly: their purse, their dignity, their job, their food, their status, or their future. What is new is the individual's participation in a broader system of values and in new institutional forms. As events move along in a new nation like Tanzania, it may be that peasant participation on a broader scale cannot be avoided.[24]

V. TOWARD A LOCAL-LEVEL THEORY OF PARTICIPATION

This section briefly summarizes the major conclusions of the study, puts forth a simplified model on the process of individual participation, and suggests several propositions that emerge from the model and the data. The propositions are the first step in establishing testable connections between data and a more theoretical scheme about participation.[25] The aim is to provide links to more generalizable micro-political concepts.[26]

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[24] Goran Hyden, *Political Development in Rural Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), based on research in the Bukoba area, is directly related to the above findings. Comparison of the two studies shows similarities in the high degree of confidence the peasant has in the party, particularly as a "parental' 'authority; both studies indicate, however, the peasant feels the government does little for the people (pp. 180–212). Misuse of party authority exists in Bukoba, and many complaints similar to those in Tabora were reported by Hyden. These include extortion, peculation, undue court pressure, irregular party procedures, and coercion of Asians. Active resistance to the party directives also occurs, particularly surrounding the orders to up-root coffee trees. Clashes are common, often between old and young coffee planters in the party (pp. 184–191). Similar findings also exist on the multi-faceted nature of the party, and that the party essentially operates in an immobilized, pedestrian society. Both studies indicate a significant improvement for peasants' opportunities to participate in local political issues since 1963 (p. 139). Difficulty in making distinctions between claimed party membership and actual party membership was also reported by Hyden (p. 151). In both studies party support exists outside party membership, and membership does not necessarily mean compliance with the party. Dissatisfaction with income, education and housing are similar in both studies (pp. 200–201).

By contrast, several differences exist in the findings. Bukoba region has more highly developed communication facilities, and there is a greater dependence on the Village Development Committees to disseminate news. Higher levels of literacy and wealth explain some of the differences. Hyden's findings also differ on the assertion that the district and regional level officials are usually equalitarian and corrective of abuses. He points out the numerous dismissals President Nyerere has instigated for abusive or incompetent Regional and Area Commissioners. A further difference lies in the degree of expressed alienation and cynicism; Hyden reports far less than exists in Tabora Region (p. 216).

Only partial agreement exists on the role of traditional authority (pp. 106–124). In Bukoba, peasants are divided on the chief's contemporary legitimacy, whereas in Tabora, traditional leaders still exercise considerable authority. The Bukoba study indicates the Haya have a more cosmopolitan outlook than do the Nyamwezi—again a function of greater wealth, more educational possibilities, and proximity to an urban center, Kampala (p. 157). Political involvement, the level of discussion about politics, the frequency of such discussions, and relative political knowledge are all about equal in the two studies (pp. 217–228). The comparisons were discussed with Professor Hyden in Nairobi, July, 1969.

[25] The model's key variables are suggested by the empirical findings of the study; the model should have the capability of explaining how local-level participation occurs, and at the same time, serve to suggest propositions on peasant political behavior.

[26] The importance of local-level analysis is a recurring theme in recent literature in the sub-fields of political anthropology, local politics and development administration. For a methodological discussion of the implication of these sub-fields, see essays by Fred Burke, David Brokensha, Ronald Cohen, Nelson Kasfir, Alvin Magid, Melvin Perlman, Aiden Southall, Marc Swartz, and Rodger Yeager in Norman N. Miller (ed.), *Research in Rural Africa* (East Lansing, Michigan:

The major conclusions are:

1. The rural party is a multi-faceted institution that is acceptable to the rural people because it provides a broad range of services of value to the individual in his local political microcosm. Rural party functions include family mediation, administration, adjudication, police, welfare and propaganda.

2. Misuse of individual power exists in rural party situations because the regulations established by national leaders are not known to rural peoples, or because peasants are unable to communicate such abuses to higher authorities.

3. There remains a heavy reliance on traditional authority. The traditional political system with its institution of chieftaincy has socialized most peasants in their expectations of authority; there is little inclination to question the legitimacy of higher authority.

4. Although peasants hold varying ideas on what the party does for the people, there is overall satisfaction in Tanzania with the party as an agent for settling disputes; however there is a widespread feeling among peasants that the government and the national party have not done enough for local villages.

5. The political context in which the rural party operates is essentially an immobilized pedestrian society. Most important political considerations are face-to-face relations, kinship ties, localized boundaries, and the ecological dictates of an agrarian culture. Within this political context the process of issue satisfaction is informal, consensual and pluralistic with most peasant allegiances dependent on the issue at stake.

6. Communications within the rural party are effective because they are based on daily exchanges and rumor diffusion within neighborhood networks. Communications linkages between the rural party and other party levels are ineffective. In addition to logistic problems, communication failure is based on the major differences that exist between village-level and district-level leaders in terms of age, religion, wealth, education, type of schools attended, and general life stlye. The result is often a failure of information and resources to reach the rural areas.

7. The opposition of natural leaders to the building of local institutions and to political participation in depressed areas for cost/benefit reasons may be unwise; such planning could trigger immigration to over-crowded areas, disenchantment with events in the home regions, political unrest, and large-scale hostility to government.

For the purposes of the model, specific variables that determine the process by which an individual participates in local-level institutions may be isolated as follows:

Key Variables	*Intervening Variables*
naturing of specific issue	mores and customs
perception of potential issue	time
perception of potential rewards	method of processing issue
patterns of participation	individual's links to government authority
expectations	issue's importance to government
satisfactions	how government could intervene
inclinations to change pattern	how government does intervene
feedback	

The flow chart (Figure 1) illustrates the relationships between the variables. The basic process is first, that local-level participation depends initially on how a specific political issue is viewed by the individual, (1). If the issue is vital to his self-interest he will take a preliminary position and assess whether he should or should not participate. This is often determined by his perceived rewards from the many activities of the institution, as weighted against the potential

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African Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1969), parts I, II. For a discussion of processional analysis at the local level see Marc Swartz, *et al.*, *Political Anthropology* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); also see Swartz (ed.), *Local-Level Politics* (Chicago: Aldine, 1968). A number of local-level studies relate directly to the present article. For comparisons on the evolution of political changes in Tanzania see particularly J. Gus Liebenow, "Response to Planned Political Change in a Tanganyika Tribal Group," this REVIEW, L (June, 1956), 442–461; and Liebenow, "Legitimacy of Alien Relationships: The Nyatura of Tanganyika," *The Western Political Quarterly*, XIV (March, 1961), 64–86. For comparisons on the role of chiefs and traditional political systems in Tanzania see Hans Cory, *The Indigenous Political System of the Sukuma* (New York: Eagle Press, 1954). For comparison to local government processes see Fred G. Burke, *Local Government and Politics in Uganda* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1965).


Intervening Variables
Mores and Customs
a
Time
b
Issue processing
c
Links to govt. authority
d
issue's importance to govt.
e
How govt. could intervene
f
How govt. does intervene
g
5
Probable effects
Issue
1
Reward Perceived
2
Participation
3
Expectation
4
Satisfaction
6
Yes
No
Participation
7
Non-participation
7
Active Resistance
7
Abuse Perceived
2
Non-participation
3
Expectation
4
Satisfaction
6
Yes
No
Non-participation
7
Active Resistance
7
Active Resistance
3
Expectation
4
Satisfaction
6
Yes
No
Active Resistance
7
Non-participation
7
Feedback—8

Flow-Chart: Relationships Determining Local-Level Participation

Figure 1

abuse he may suffer through involvement, (2). Potential abuse and the potential rewards are countervailing pressures. If he decides to participate on this particular issue, his personal expectations will immediately come to bear, (3, 4). If he decides not to participate or to actively resist the institution, his expectations on these decisions will also be activated, (3, 4). The degree of satisfaction each course of action gives the individual will be determined by his expectations, and by several intervening variables, (5). These include the prevailing mores and customs surrounding the issue, and his position on the issue, (5-a); the amount of time that the issue has been under consideration, (5-b); how the issue is processed locally, (5-c); what the local links are between the individual and higher levels of authority, (5-d); the issue's importance to higher levels of government, (5-e); how higher levels of government could intervene, (5-f); and how higher levels of government do intervene, (5-g). The intervening variables also influence the individual's expectation and satisfaction levels.

Depending on these factors, satisfaction in the course of action taken can either be attained or not attained, (6). The result at this point will influence a continued course of action in the same pattern, or will cause a move to one of the two alternative patterns, (7). This decision will in turn feed back to influence the individual's reaction to the next specific political issue that affects him directly, (8). The *sum* of the individual's actions on several issues over time determines the overall institutional participation by the individual. Participation is the collective result of an individual's reaction to specific, concrete political issues that affect him directly.

Several specific propositions could be evolved directly from the model. For example:

1. If satisfaction on the specific issue is attained, the individual is inclined to continue the pattern of political participation he has begun.

2. If abuse on a specific issue or action is expected, the individual will be inclined to withdraw from participation or actively resist the institution.

3. Because expectations of rewards are often unreal, satisfactions on individual issues are often not attained, and withdrawal from the institution's activities occurs.

4. Local-level participation is based on the individual's collective response to specific political issues that he perceives to be of immediate importance to him.

More general propositions emerge from the model when considered in conjunction with the findings of the study:

5. If a local leader must use force to obtain his goals, an inverse relationship exists between the amount of force, and the benefits his constituents see themselves receiving from his presence in office.

In realistic terms, the "force" a leader uses may in fact be varying degrees of persuasion. The benefit the constituents see themselves receiving from the individual may overlap with the benefits they expect from the "office" of which the leader is a particular incumbent. The ratio of expectations to satisfactions gained from the leader is not exact, and one particular expectation is not necessarily measured against the satisfaction received on a particular issue.

6. If abuse of power by a local authority occurs, it may be related to the demands of the national government to bring about rapid economic and political change at the local level.

Misuse of authority is inevitable when the national leadership permits and encourages various forms of coercion to be used to mobilize a local area. The distinction between acceptable pressure and unacceptable coercion is a delicate balance that constantly needs redefinition at both the policy-making and the implementation level. Such pressures are the net result of government demands to create rapid economic and political change in relatively short periods of time. For the individual, it may be argued, pressure becomes coercion when he is forced to act in spite of strong personal objections to doing so.

7. If pre-independence, nationalistic leaders are retained at the local level, administrative efficiency and rural economic advancement will be impaired.

Leaders who came to power during the pre-independence nationalistic period tended to do so on the basis of charismatic, crowdpleasing abilities. Many are entrenched in leadership posts, although they often lack the administrative talents, or inclination, to deal with the more routinized, mundane tasks of rural development.

8. Local-level institutions grow, and are probably more successful, when leaders who are alien to the local area are accepted by the people.

Because party leaders who were born in the village area tend to be well known and to have many kinship ties and obligations, they are often drawn into biased judgments. Local leaders alien to the area can promote confidence and participation in the party because they offer more objective judgments.

9. Because of distrust for outside authority, the peasant will attempt to keep the process of issue settlement at the local, face-to-face level.

Local party leaders generally hold the same view of the world, and are similar in attitude to randomly selected peasants. The peasant is unsure of the views of higher level authorities and is therefore inclined to keep most conflict issues within the confines of his political microcosm. He will maximize his future bargaining potential by maintaining relations with all leadership groups: traditional, administrative and party.

The model of political participation, and the propositions should help to generate further questions about how local-level institutions function. The vital importance of such questions lies in the primary purpose of the rural organization. Organizations like the rural party which deal *directly* with the people are the institutional nerve-endings of the entire governmental process. They are the point of the elaborate administrative apparatus, the point of the total bureaucratic system. If there is no understanding of how these local institutions operate, and if there is no understanding of the political character of the rural peoples, then there is no effective way government can channel resources and information to the villages. There will be no way the assault on rural deprivation can be continued. Most important, there will be no way the national leaders can avoid being overtaken and run down by unforseen, uncontrolled events in the rural areas.

APPENDIX

The survey of 434 peasants and peasant leaders was carried out in Tabora, Rungwe and Kisarawe Districts between March 1965 and January 1966. The instrument consisted of 120 questions on biography, life-style, political and economic opinion, and political and economic awareness. The interviews were conducted by three research assistants, each a resident of his respective district and a member of the main ethinic group. The questionnaire was pre-tested for six months, and each assistant did 20 trial interviews to assure his total understanding of the questionnaire. The interviews were conducted in Swahili, following lengthy briefing of the research assistants on the meaning of key terms in the questionnaire and their commentators. Distinctions between terms such as "government," "party," "politics," "nation," and "leader" were particularly noted. Because of the difficulty in administering questionnaires to some peasants, interviewers were allowed to give limited interpretation of questions, but were cautioned on leading respondents.

The 434 respondents were selected by one of two methods. Approximately half were randomly selected farmers whose names were taken from the tax rolls of the local government. The remainder were selected as village leaders. The latter method was a combination of the standard reputational, positional and panel-of-judges techniques. A preliminary list of leaders from each of the twelve villages under study was compiled. The list included elected members of the Village Development Committees (VDC), plus local administrators, party officials and traditional headmen, sub-chiefs or chiefs and other suggested influentials. This complete list of potential leaders was then presented to each member of the VDC. This panel of judges rank-ordered the names in terms of their relative influence in the village. The results were tallied and the top 25 names were considered to be in the village leadership class. They were thereafter interviewed in the same manner and with the same questionnaire as the randomly selected farmers. For this article the distinctions between leader and non-leader are not focused upon; in the data presented there were no significant differences between the two groups. For discussion of the techniques used see Wendell Bell, Richard J. Hill and Charles R. Wright, *Public Leadership* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1961), ch. 1.

The location of the three rural areas (districts) was initially chosen on the basis of the traditional political system that existed among the major ethnic groups of the area. Thus the Zaramo people of Kisarawe District (coastal area) were chosen because they represented an acephalated, fragmented authority system which traditionally had no political integration above the clan level. The Nyakyusa of Rungwe district (highland area) were considered a middle-range example of political authority; they traditionally had some 90 small chiefdoms, each of which was largely autonomous. There was no political integration above the petty chiefdom level, although the Nyakyusa as a whole share a common language, customs and history. Third, the Nyamwezi of Tabora district (plateau area) were chosen as a research area because they represented a political system, that although basically made up of petty chiefdoms, had experienced some political integration under senior chiefs such as Mirambo and Fundikira. The three districts also represented diverse agricultural and geographic conditions (coastal, highland, plateau). Tanzania's main religious and educational institutions were also represented in the selection.

The actual field method was to spend seven to eight months in each of the three districts; in each area a basic research village was chosen in which to reside. Interviewing was done in this village and thereafter in three villages located in representative sections of the district. The interviews were usually conducted at the farmer's homestead, or in the case of party and administrative leaders, at local offices.

The data was coded and processed at Michigan State University. Interviewer bias between the three assistants was tested with negative results. The general findings and impressions were reevaluated during a re-study in East Africa in 1967-68 and 1969. At this time several of the findings included in the preliminary drafts were eliminated.

Although the sample is not representative of all of Tanzania, the findings would hold for a major portion of that nation. Subsequent local-level research will hopefully test these findings in other areas. For background literature on the three areas under study see for Tabora and the Nyamwezi, Rev. Fr. Boesch, *Les Banyamwezi peuple de l'Afrique orientale* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1930), and R. G. Abrahams, *The Political Organization of Unyamwezi* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967); for the Nyakyusa of Rungwe district see Monica Wilson, *Good Company: A Study of Nyakyusa Age-Villages* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951); and for the Zaramo of Kisarawe district see A. H. J. Prins, *The Swahili Speaking People of Zanzibar and the East African Coast* (London: International African Institute, 1961).

THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

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The scientific study of politics requires an environment which accepts free inquiry and discussion. Scholars must be permitted to ask questions of their own choosing, gather data without hindrance, and communicate freely with one another about their findings. To be sure, freedom to investigate sensitive policy matters is limited by all governments. Moreover, political scientists themselves inevitably introduce some measure of their own values or ideological predispositions into their works. But it is obvious that without the guarantee of certain minimum freedoms, political science as we know it in the West could never exist.

Communist regimes traditionally have made independent inquiry or objective discussion of political phenomena impossible. In the Stalinist period, scholarly analyses of politics—or, for that matter, of aesthetic, literary, moral or economic questions—amounted to little more than doctrinal exegesis or the elaboration of practical measures to implement the Party's demands. An autonomous social science in Stalin's Russia or Eastern Europe was simply unthinkable.

Since the dictator's death, however, Communist governments have modified their hostility toward the social sciences in general, and toward political science in particular. A decade of de-Stalinization has been accompanied by steps to encourage the scientific study of politics. In several East European countries, political science now enjoys recognition as a discipline in its own right.

This does not mean that political science in Communist countries has freed itself of political controls, or that what is presented as political science is always of scholarly merit. On the contrary, one of the greatest difficulties in evaluating the emergence of a Communist political science stems from the lack of any clear cut dividing line between ideological or political works on the one hand, and studies of genuine scholarly merit on the other. In making distinctions between these two categories of writings on politics it is necessary to apply criteria which take into account the realities of the political science profession in Communist countries, while following broadly accepted standards of what may properly be termed political science.

First, it is clear that propaganda and dogma do not properly belong within the discipline. At the same time, there is no justification for rejecting works as unscholarly or unscientific simply because their approach is Marxist. The principle that separates propaganda and polemics from scholarship is the elusive but fundamental consideration of independence of judgment. As F. Burlatskii, a Soviet philosopher, has remarked, political science asks questions "whose answers are not known beforehand."

A second criterion for distinguishing between works which are political science and those which are not concerns the extent to which Communist scholars rely on authorities other than the standard works of Communist doctrine. Such a practice, of course, is subject to abuse by writers who seek to give official dogma a scholarly veneer by reference to non-Communist as well as Communist sources. On the other hand, attempts to exploit Western scholarship for official ends cannot disguise the fact that in those countries where political science has been allowed to develop, there has been a sharp break with Marxist-Leninist approaches to politics, and much of the terminology, method and conceptual framework of Western political science has been adopted. In such cases, one can speak of a fundamental change in method, in which the standards of the discipline replace those of the ideology in determining the validity of research and scholarly analysis.

Finally, it should be noted that contributions of real merit can be made to the study of politics by persons who are trained in other fields, particularly in countries where political science is not officially recognized as a discipline in its own right. Given the hostility to the discipline present in many Communist countries, this may be the only way in which the scientific study of politics can develop.

We do not devote equal attention to each country of the Communist world. In Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany and Hungary, and in the non-European Communist states as well, there has been little or no public discussion of the merits of political science. Studies on political questions published in these countries are dogmatic and polemical. In other Communist countries, conditions vary widely. Poland and Yugoslavia have shown the most progress; Rumania and Czechoslovakia have only recently accepted the concept of political science as a discipline. The Soviet Union has yet to officially sanction research and teaching in political science, but maintains a political science association and tolerates research on political subjects by social scientists in related fields. Our discussion will deal first with the USSR, and then turn to Eastern Europe, where the primary focus will be on the two countries in which political science has developed the furthest—Poland and Yugoslavia.

With these remarks in mind, we can now proceed to a more detailed examination of political science in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

I. POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION

Conditions in the Soviet Union are far from congenial to the development of a genuine political science. While many of the stultifying constraints on intellectual inquiry introduced by Stalin have been discarded or modified, and social science research has in some measure replaced Marxist-Leninist dogma, adherents of a Western-style political science still face almost insuperable obstacles. Soviet leaders have, by and large, been extremely reluctant to permit research and writing on the essential questions of political science.

Soviet writers blame Stalin and his "cult of personality" for the slow development of social science in their country. Under Stalin's rule, social science involved a process of "dogmatic deduction, alien to the spirit of Marxism, which 'fitted' real phenomena and facts to the ideas of J. V. Stalin. Inductive research . . . was forgotten."[1] Stalin's views "on any question, and most of all on the development of social phenomena, were considered 'truth of the highest order.' "[2] With Khrushchev's assaults on Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 and the 22nd Congress in 1961, conditions for creating an empirical social science were materially improved.

Progress, however, has been slow. The 1961 Party Program, for example, while encouraging social scientists to investigate contemporary political problems, reminded them that such studies:

> . . . must disclose the law-governed process of mankind's advance toward communism, the change of the balance of forces in favor of socialism, the aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism, the breakup of the colonial system of imperialism, and the upsurge of the national-liberation movement of the peoples.[3]

The conclusions, already dogmatically established, are thus to be confirmed by research. This is hardly social science. Rather, it requires conscious selectivity and dedication to (or willingness to be used for) a political purpose.

The past decade has seen Soviet scholars increasingly willing to engage in empirical research —or, as it is known in the USSR, "concrete sociological investigations." Their earliest efforts were far from rigorous; the first public opinion polls lacked methodological sophistication and had an obvious political bent.[4] The intellectual community was officially committed to the empirical approach in 1962, when the USSR Academy of Sciences formally resolved that, "a necessary condition for the success of scientific work on urgent problems of the social sciences is the comprehensive development of concrete sociological investigations. . . ."[5] Since that time, Soviet social scientists have acquired considerable sophistication in the use of modern research techniques and have recently begun to apply these to the study of political matters. Indeed, many of the techniques familiar in the West are now employed: scaling techniques (e.g. Guttman and Coombs scales), factor analysis, content analysis, and the use of computers.[6]

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[1] G. V. Osipov, *et al.*, "Marksistskaya sotsiologiya i sotsiologicheskyye issledovaniya [Marxist Sociology and Sociological Research]," *Nauchnyye Doklady Vysshey Shkoly,* No. 5, 1962, 24.

[2] V. P. Kazimirchuk, "Nauka prava i metod konkretno-sotsiologicheskogo issledededovaniya [Legal Science and the Method of Concrete Sociological Research]," *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (hereafter SGP), No. 1, 1964, 35.

[3] *XXII S"ezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Stenograficheskii Otchet* [*22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stenographic Report*], 1962, Volume III, 324.

[4] The first poll was published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* the Young Communist League newspaper, on May 19, 1960. For a critical evaluation of early polling efforts, see "Voprosam metodologii izucheniya obshchestvennogo mneniya [Problems of Methodology in Studying Public Opinion]," *Vestnik Statistiki,* No. 6, 1961, 82–84. See also Emilia Wilder, "Opinion Polls," *Survey,* No. 48 (July, 1963), 118–129; and Allen Kassof, "Moscow Discovers Public Opinion Polls," *Problems of Communism,* 10, No. 3 (May-June, 1961), 52–55.

[5] Kazimirchuk, *op. cit.*, 35–36.

[6] See V. N. Shubkin, "Kolichestvennyye metody v sotsiologii [Quantitative Methods in Sociology]," *Voprosy Filosofii* (hereafter *VF*), No. 3, 1967, 33; F. T. Selyukov, "Kolichestvennyye metody v sotsial'nykh issledovaniyakh [Quantitative Methods in Social Research," SGP, No. 8, 1967, 143; M. I. Zhabskii, "Testirovaniye voprosnika v sotsial'nom issledovanii [Pretesting Questionnaires in Social Research]," *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta* (hereafter *VMU*), Seriya VIII, Filo-

It should be pointed out that some Soviet social scientists, like their counterparts in the West, have expressed concern (or perhaps a measure of insecurity) over the increasing emphasis on quantitative methods. They have spoken out against what they regard as "the fetishism of numbers" and even expressed doubts about such concepts as arithmetic average, degree of error, or correlation. They refer to sampling surveys as "creeping empiricism" (*polzuchii empirizm*) and accuse certain polling enthusiasts of "questionnaire mania" (*anketomaniya*).[7] They have found powerful support in the Party's Central Committee, whose members have little regard for empirical research lacking in "serious theoretical and practical importance."[8]

Given the indifference or even hostility of the highest Party authorities, plus the traditionally value laden orientation of Soviet social science, two facts become clear. First, only by emphasizing the utilitarian character of their research can empirical social scientists gain the necessary latitude to move in new directions. And second, it is difficult for a discipline such as political science to gain official acceptance, for its value free, "pure science" approach may threaten the existing order. Adherents of political science, then, must adopt an indirect approach toward establishing their discipline: by focusing on methodology and concrete sociological investigations, they may be able to build a science of politics. It is precisely such empirical investigations, conducted by representatives of other disciplines, which have already produced studies appropriately called political science. At the same time, they have stimulated a number of Soviet scholars to seek the creation of political science as an independent field.

There is at present no academic discipline in the Soviet Union known as political science.[9] Nor are there political scientists. There is, however, a Soviet Political Science Association (SPSA),[10] an organization which, for the past decade, has brought together Soviet scholars studying political institutions and practices. While such a body would seem a likely vehicle for establishing an independent political science discipline, it is, paradoxically, one of the major obstacles to such a development.

The SPSA is comprised mainly of legal scholars, a fact with far-reaching implications for its orientation toward political science as a specialized field of study.[11] These will be dealt with more fully below. Here we may point to the legal-institutional focus of the Association and its members. The organization is rather small, with total membership amounting in 1966 to only some 360 persons.[12] The current President (V. M. Chkhikvadze), his predecessor (V. S. Tadevosian), and four of the Association's six vice-presidents are legal scholars, as are seventeen members of the nineteen-man executive committee.[13]

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sofiya, No. 4, 1967, 63–69; N. V. Golubeva and M. I. Ivanyuk, "Tekhnika provedeniya nestandartizovannogo interv'yu [Techniques of Conducting Non-Standardized Interviews], *Filosofskiye Nauki*, No. 1, 1969, 110–116.

[7] A. M. Rumyantsev and G. V. Osipov, "Marksistskaya sotsiologiya i konkretnyye sotsial'nyye issledovaniya [Marxist Sociology and Concrete Social Research]," *VF*, No. 6, 1968, 4; E. Lisavtsev, *et al.*, "Na nauchnoi osnove: sotsial'nyye issledovaniya v praktiku partiinoi raboty [On a scientific Basis: Apply Social Research to Party Work]," *Pravda*, May 11, 1965, 2. See also Shubkin, *op. cit.*, 31.

[8] "O merakh po dal'neishemu razvitiyu obshchestvennykh nauk i povysheniyu ikh roli v kommunisticheskom stroitel'stve [On Measures for Further Developing the Social Sciences and Increasing Their Role in Communist Construction]," *Pravda*, August 22, 1967, 1. See also V. Yadov, "Prestige in Danger," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, February 28, 1968, 11; translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter *CDSP*), 20, No. 10 (March 27, 1968), 7–8.

[9] When writing for a foreign audience, Soviet scholars sometimes suggest that political science is a recognized field of study in the USSR. See, *e.g.*, M. Zvorykin, "The Social Sciences in the USSR: Achievements and Trends," *International Social Science Journal* (hereafter *ISSJ*), 16, No. 4 (1964), 588–602; Makar Gorianov and Igor Glagoliev, "Notes Concerning Research on Peace and Disarmament Conducted in the USSR," *ISSJ*, 17, No. 3 (1965), 417–419. Zvorykin (596–597) defines political science as "the study of the political superstructure of a given society."

[10] Until 1965, this organization was known as the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences. Its present name is, more properly, the Soviet Association of Political Sciences.

[11] E. V. Tadevosian, then President of the Association, is reported to have assured a Western scholar that creation of the organization did not imply recognition of political science as an independent discipline. See Gordon Skilling, "In Search of Political Science in the USSR," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 29, No. 4 (November, 1963), 519.

[12] I. T. Pomerantsev, "V Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politicheskikh nauk [In the Soviet Political Science Association]," *SGP*, No. 6, 1966, 135.

[13] G. S. Ostroumov, "Nauchnyye osnovy politiki —v tsentre vnimaniya Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politi-

The SPSA has two purposes: (1) to facilitate Soviet dealings with Western political scientists, particularly through the International Political Science Association, and (2) to criticize Western political science, especially those works which challenge Soviet ideology or conduct.

Soviet delegates have been increasingly active at IPSA meetings and have attended IPSA Congresses and round table discussions since the Fifth Congress in 1961. For some time, they expressed concern about their subordinate role in the organization and demanded that they be accorded the status appropriate to a Great Power. At the Seventh Congress, held in Brussels in 1967, Chkhikvadze was named a vice-president of the IPSA, and another SPSA representative delivered one of the major addresses to the Congress. These developments, an official of SPSA has argued, are evidence of the impressive stature of Soviet political science.[14]

To the Soviet Association, an international gathering is an ideological battleground and a proper forum for East-West confrontations. Indeed, the SPSA has even attempted to use the IPSA as a vehicle for official Soviet foreign policy. Thus, in 1962 the SPSA appealed to the American Political Science Association to "raise its voice in protest" against the "persecution" of the Communist Party of the USA.[15] Having failed to persuade the American Association to act, the Soviets turned to the IPSA with a similar protest.[16] The IPSA, too, chose not to accept the Soviet challenge.

The purpose of the SPSA, then is not simply scholarly contact and exchanges of views. It is also required to "unmask the slanderous fabrications" of "bourgeois political science" and the horrors of "bourgeois" political life. The first conference of the SPSA was told that "criticism of contemporary bourgeois political science is not conducted sharply and actively enough. A comprehensive criticism of bourgeois political science is needed . . ."[17] Western political science, far from being the scientific study of politics, is depicted as a prescriptive, value-laden pseudo-discipline. It supports the existing order by devising reformist schemes and by conducting "an active struggle with Marxism."[18]

Clearly, the Soviet Political Science Association is more interested in polemics and official dogma than in developing a scientific study of politics. Those anxious to create a genuine political science have had to approach their objective from another direction.

The removal of Nikita Khrushchev from power in October, 1964 provided adherents of political science with an opportunity to state their case. On January 10, 1965, *Pravda* published a major article by F. Burlatskii, a philosophy professor and member of the executive committee of the SPSA, explicitly calling for the establishment of such a science.[19] Emphasizing the utilitarian purposes of his proposals, and citing Khrushchev's errors as evidence of what an unscientific, unsystematic approach to political problems can lead to, Burlatskii urged that a genuine political science be created. Although he focused on its instrumental value, Burlatskii's essential purpose was quite different. He sought to take the study of politics out of the hands of the dogmatists and place it the hands of true social scientists. He dismissed "the tendency to

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cheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk [The Scientific Bases of Politics—At the Center of Attention of the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences]," *SGP,* No. 7, 1965, 151.

[14] S. Z., "Mezhdunarodnyi forum po voprosam politicheskoi nauki [International Forum on Questions of Political Science]," *SGP,* No. 1, 1968, 140.

[15] V. P. Shatrov, "V Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politicheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk [In the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences]," *SGP,* No. 8, 1962, 127.

[16] V. P. Shatrov, "Tret'e ezhegodnoye sobraniye Sovetskoi assotsiatsii politicheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk [Third Annual Meeting of the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences]," *SGP,* No. 7, 1963, 163.

[17] V. Slavin, "Pervoye ezhegodnoye sobraniye Sovetskoi assotsiastsii politicheskikh (gosudarstvovedcheskikh) nauk [First Annual Meeting of the Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences]," *SGP,* No. 7, 1961, 133.

[18] *Ibid.,* 131–135; Shatrov (1962), *op. cit.,* 127; S. Z., *op. cit,* 139; V. G. Kalenskii, "O predmete i metode burzhuaznoi politicheskoi nauki [On the Scope and Method of Bourgeois Political Science]," *SGP,* No 9, 1966, 37; G. S. Ostroumov, "Teoriya gosudarstva i prava kak politicheskaya nauka [The Theory of State and Law as Political Science]," *SGP,* No. 2, 1968, 29-30. Soviet writers are particularly critical of the American literature on systematic political theory and pluralist theory. See Kalenskii, *op. cit.,* 41; B. A. Shabad, "O sovremennykh antikommunisticheskikh teoriyakh gosudarstva [On Present-Day Anti-Communist Theories of the State]," *SGP,* No. 8, 1968, 82–89; V. Ye. Guliyev and E. L. Kuz'min, "O nekotorykh burzhuaznykh teoriyakh gosudarstvennoi vlasti [Several Bourgeois Theories of State Power]," *VMU,* Seriya XII, Pravo, No. 2, 1968, 31–38; V. Kalenskii, *Politicheskaya nauka v SShA* [*Political Science in the USA*], 1969.

[19] F. Burlatskii, "Politika i nauka [Politics and Science]," *Pravda,* January 10, 1965, 4.

comment"—the established practice of interpreting and elucidating known Marxist texts. A "truly profound investigation" of politics, according to Burlatskii, "presupposes the raising of questions whose answers are not known beforehand." This is a demand for a true political science.

Burlatskii also called for the scientific discussion of a wide range of political questions, both domestic and international. He thus challenged the traditional Soviet approach, which involves reliance on the "classics of Marxism-Leninism" and almost exclusive concern with the formal institutions of government. Burlatskii advocated a kind of behavioralism: he hoped to investigate real political processes involving the entire range of political actors, i.e., individuals, the party, the state apparatus, and public organizations such as the Komsomol and the trade unions.

Burlatskii's article precipitated a lively debate among Soviet scholars on the merits of political science. His supporters, despite their differences, are united in urging a shift from dogma to science.[20] His opponents, without specifically addressing themselves to Burlatskii's criticisms, have dismissed his proposals as superfluous.

Resistance to the suggestions of the Burlatskii group has come from two sources. One is comprised of doctrinaire ideologists, those for whom the "sciences" of Marxism-Leninism and Scientific Communism provide the answers to all political questions. This group, whose members include E. V. Tadevosian, former President of the Soviet Political Science Association, argues that Marxism-Leninism is *the* political science.[21] They have put Burlatskii and his allies in the awkward position of appearing to challenge the authority of Marxism-Leninism. The other group resisting political science consists of those legal scholars—including many members of the SPSA—who resent the intrusion of a new discipline into a field they consider properly their own. Academic discussion of political and governmental questions has been the responsibility of specialists in jurisprudence. Now, as one non-Soviet scholar has remarked, the proposal to establish political science as an independent field has evoked the greatest hostility from "precisely those jurists whose own discipline stood to be restricted by the new arrangement."[22] Some of them refuse to set off any science as "political," in contrast with other "non-political" social sciences.[23] Others complain about attempts to "politicize" or "sociologize" jurisprudence.[24] A third group is willing to extend the purview of the already existing "political sciences" (jurisprudence and the science of state and law) and "bring them up to date."[25] They agree only on one matter: the need to combat political science.

While the ideologists and jurists differ with one another and among themselves in many respects, they seem to share a common concern: to create an independent political science would be to create a rival. Beneath the intellectual arguments and rhetoric, it would seem, lie entrenched interests which want to retain control over scholarly inquiry into political matters. This conservative alliance of ideologists and legal specialists, whether tacit or formal, has been a powerful barrier to the establishment of political science. Plans to introduce a political science course in secondary schools in 1961–62 were canceled abruptly in the spring of 1961, and a course on the USSR Constitution was substituted.[26] Formal instruction in political science at the university level, too, has been discouraged.[27] Clearly, then, to find evidence of political science in the USSR, we will have to enlarge the scope of our inquiry.

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[20] S. S. Alekseyev and V. Ye. Chirkin, "O sisteme nauk, izuchayushchikh problemy politicheskoi organizatsii obshchestva, gosudarstva i prava [On the System of Sciences Concerned with Problems of the Political Organization of Society, the State and Law]," *SGP*, No. 5, 1965, 48–50; N. M. Keizerov, "O sootnoshenii ponyatii 'sotsial'naya' i 'politicheskaya' vlast" [On the Relation Between the Concepts 'Social' and 'Political' Power]," *Vestnik Leningradskogo Universiteta* (hereafter *VLU*), Seriya Ekonomiki, Filosofii i Prava, No. 5, 1966, 45; Ostroumov (1965), *op. cit.*, 150; D. I. Chesnokov, "Vzaimootnosheniye obshchestvennykh nauk i mesto nauchnogo kommunizma sredi nikh [Interrelations Among the Social Sciences and the Place of Scientific Communism Among Them]," *VF*, No. 3, 1965, 24; "O razrabotke problem politicheskikh nauk [On Working Out Problems of the Political Sciences]," *Pravda*, June 13, 1965, 4.

[21] E. V. Tadevosian, "Diskussiya o politicheskoi nauke [A Discussion of Political Science]," *VF*, No. 10, 1965, 165; "O razrabotke problem politicheskikh nauk," *op. cit.*, 4; Ostroumov (1965), *op. cit.*, 148.

[22] Laszlo Revesz, "Political Science in Eastern Europe: Discussion and Initial Steps," *Studies in Soviet Thought*, VII, No. 3, 194. See also Joseph Frankel, "Theory of State, Cybernetics and Political Science in the Soviet Union," *Political Studies*, 15, No. 4 (February, 1967), 59–60; and L. G. Churchward, "Towards a Soviet Political Science," *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 12, No. 1 (May, 1966), 66–75.

[23] Ostroumov (1968), *op. cit.*, 24.

[24] According to P. N. Galanza, jurists ought to deal with political science only if "the legitimacy of the latter should ultimately be proved." See Ostroumov (1965), *op. cit.*, 149, and Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Post-Stalin 'Thaw' and Soviet Political Science," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXX, No. 1 (February, 1964), 33.

[25] Ostroumov (1965), *op. cit.*, 149.

Soviet scholars in a variety of other social sciences, from history to computer science, have been engaged in research which can properly be termed political science. Their efforts are as yet very uneven: some mix official dogma with scientific inquiry, while others focus their attention on matters of only marginal concern. But important questions are being asked, and the rough outlines of a Soviet political science are clearly visible. Certain fields within Soviet "political science" are more advanced than others. Non-polemical writings in political theory, comparative government and international relations, for example, seldom appear. These fields are still the domain of ideologists and politicians; scholars are called upon merely to provide support for officially prescribed interpretations and conclusions. The fields of local government and public administration, on the other hand, have received considerable scholarly attention and show promise of achieving professional, scientific standards.

The operation of local government has been the subject of several scholarly inquiries in recent years. The most important of these are studies of local soviets in the Siberian city of Irkutsk and in the republic of Estonia. Both investigations make use of survey research techniques, sampling the opinions of representative groups of deputies and—in the Siberian study—the deputies' constituents as well. The Siberian research team has focused its attention on three questions: (1) relations between deputies and their constituents, (2) work patterns of deputies, and (3) ways to improve the work of deputies. Among their more interesting findings was the fact that fewer than 10% of the citizens they polled knew the names of the local deputies for whom they had voted. At the same time, the investigators discovered, 13% of the population had contacted their deputies at least once within the past year. Of these, almost half (44%) raised questions of importance only to their families, while only about 8% were interested in matters of broad social significance, i.e., concerning the entire city or their own borough.[28]

The Estonian researchers have looked into related questions. A poll of almost 1,000 deputies indicated that, while there are significant differences among individual deputies, few devote an appreciable amount of time to their work. It appears, moreover, that deputies spend less time performing political services in their districts than they do in official meetings. And, when asked how well they performed their tasks, a large majority (77.6%) expressed reservations. They pointed to two major factors: (1) their lack of experience and (2) inadequate working conditions, i.e., lack of assistance from local agencies, lack of funds, and the indifference of higher bodies, particularly Party officials.[29]

The beginnings of a scientific approach can also be seen in the field of public administration. Soviet representatives have participated in meetings of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences since 1956. They have adopted a number of "bourgeois" suggestions in such areas as planning and budgeting.[30] More recently, scholars have pointed to the irrationality of Nikita Khrushchev's frequent reorganizations and have called instead for more systematic measures. As one writer urged: "not one reorganization or restructuring of the administration without science; the first word in organizing the administrative apparatus belongs to science."[31]

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[26] "On Teaching the USSR Constitution in Graduating Classes of Secondary Schools in the 1961–1962 School Year," *Uchitelskaya Gazeta,* April 4, 1961, 3; translated in *CDSP,* XIII, No. 18 (May 31, 1961), 26.

[27] Ostroumov (1965), *op. cit.,* 151.

[28] V. A. Perttsik, "Puti sovershenstvovaniya deyatel'nosti deputatov mestnykh Sovetov [Ways of Improving the Work of Deputies of Local Soviets]," *SGP,* No. 7, 1967, 16–21.

[29] I. Kalits *et al.,* "Izucheniye deyatel'nosti deputatov c pomoshch'yu konkretno-sotsiologicheskogo metoda [Studying the Work of Deputies With the Aid of Concrete Sociological Methods]," *SGP,* No. 9, 1965, 65–70. A more recent study of deputies of local soviets in the Armenian SSR tends to confirm the conclusions of the Estonian researchers. "Effektivnost' deputatskoi deyatel'nosti [The Effectiveness of the Deputy's Work]," *SGP,* No. 1, 1969, 110–115.

[30] "Varshavskaya konferentsiya Mezhdunarodnogo instituta administrativnykh nauk [Warsaw Conference of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences]," *SGP,* No. 10, 1964, 138–140; Ts. S., "XIII Mezhdunarodnyi kongress po problemam administrativnykh nauk [XIII International Congress on Problems of Administrative Sciences]," *SGP,* No. 11, 1965, 146–149.

[31] V. M. Manokhin, "O predmete i zadachakh

Soviet scholars are trying to create a science of administration. There have been numerous proposals to channel thinking in this area, including suggestions for a science of organization, a science of administration, a science of "social administration," and a science of "Soviet construction."[32] Several scholars have been exploring a systems approach to administrative questions. The philosopher V. G. Afanasiev, for example, has developed a theory of society as a complex administrative system—an "integral self-regulating system," as he terms it.[33] A legal scholar, Ts. Yampolskaya, has carried out the most imaginative research in the field of administration, using a systems approach. She and others from the Institute of State and Law have investigated the workings of the Kazahkstan Ministry of Culture, examining the correspondence reaching, leaving and circulating within the Ministry. According to Yampolskaya, "the routes and rates of document circulation . . . are . . . significant indices of the correctness or incorrectness of the internal structure of the system." By studying the administrative system and its subsystems, she has been able to work out, at least in a preliminary way, measures of responsiveness, initiative, leadership and control.[34]

Soviet social scientists are exploring a number of other questions which are clearly within the purview of political science. In addition, they have identified a broad array of important political matters which they would like to investigate, including many that traditionally have been regarded as too sensitive or controversial for scientific inquiry. Prospects for a thorough investigation of all these subjects is problematical, and here we can only outline recent efforts and proposals.

Small group behavior is a subject of increasing scholarly interest. Several investigators presently are working in this area, and a conference at Moscow State University in late 1967 indicated that important "political science" questions are being explored. Among the more imaginative investigators is I. V. Sergeyeva, who has been examining patterns of leadership in small groups. She has isolated distinctive leadership types, e.g., "planners," "arbiters," "experts" and "ideologists."[35] Other researchers have focused on communications patterns regulating small group behavior, changes in individual and group values, and the dynamics of socialization.[36]

Investigators in other areas, too, have been examining "political science" questions. In the field of international relations, several social scientists have begun to work with game theory, simulation and modelling, as an aid in analyzing international conflicts.[37] In addition, A. V. Bara-

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nauki upravleniya v sovremennyi period [On the Scope and Tasks of the Science of Administration in the Current Period]," *SGP*, No. 2, 1965, 87–88. See also D. A. Kerimov, "O perspektivakh razvitiya obshchestvennykh nauk v universitete [Perspectives on the Development of the Social Sciences in the University]," *VLU, Seriya Ekonomiki, Filosofii i Prava*, No. 23, 1965, 18–19; "Revolyutsionnaya teoriya osveshchaet nash put' [Revolutionary Theory Illuminates Our Path]," *Pravda*, November 5, 1964, 2.

[32] Z. M. Bor, Upravleniye proizvodstvom i organizatsiya truda [The Administration of Production and the Organization of Labor], 1967, 17; G. I. Petrov, "Predmet nauki sotsial'nogo upravleniya [The Subject Matter of the Science of Social Administration]," *SGP*, No. 6, 1968, 75–82; Ya. N. Umanskii, "O predmete i nauke sovetskogo stroitel'stva [The Subject Matter and the Science of Soviet Construction]," *SGP*, No. 10, 1968, 73–79. See also K. I. Baldina and N. G. Salishcheva, "Koordinatsionnoye soveshchaniye po voprosam nauki upravleniya [Coordinating Conference on Questions of Administrative Science]," *SGP*, No. 2, 1969, 137–138; Yu. A. Tikhomirov, "Teoriya sotisalisticheskogo upravleniye [The Theory of Socalist Administration], *SGP*, No. 7, 1969, 77–85. The proposed science of "soviet construction" would focus exclusively on government bodies (the soviets). The broader sciences of "social administration" and "socialist administration" would deal with government bodies and with such non-government bodies as the trade unions and the Komsomol.

[33] V. G. Afanasiev, Nauchnoye upravleniye obshchestvom [The Scientific Administration of Society], 1968, 22–51. See also two earlier works by Afanasiev: "Nauchnoye rukovodstvo sotsial'nymi protsessami [Scientific Direction of Social Processes]," *Kommunist*, No. 12, 1965, 58–73, and *V. I. Lenin o nauchnom upravlenii obshchestvom* [*V. I. Lenin on the Scientific Administration of Society*], 1966.

[34] Ts. A. Yampolskaya, "K metodologii nauki upravleniya [Toward a Methodology for the Science of Administration]," *SGP*, No. 8, 1965, 12–21. Quotation on 12.

[35] Selyukov, *op. cit.*, 143.

[36] Ye. A. Yablokova, "Problema malykh grupp v burzhuaznoi i marksistskoi sotsiologii [The Problem of Small Groups in Bourgeois and Marxist Sociology]," *VMU*, Seriya VIII, Filosofiya, No. 4, 1968, 101–103.

[37] D. Yermolenko, "Sociology and International Relations," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No.

nov has been studying changes in the values of the Soviet leadership by performing a content analysis of the newspaper *Izvestia* during the period 1919–1964.[38] A. I. Verkhovskaya has begun to analyze letters to the editors of newspapers.[39] A team of researchers at Tartu University in Estonia is investigating, *inter alia,* the political views of 1,000 university students, a project whose followup interviews will continue into the early 1970's.[40] Even the extremely sensitive subject of the attitudes of various nationality groups toward one another and toward certain social and political questions is now being examined.[41]

Perhaps most significantly, Soviet social scientists have begun to treat the work of Western political scientists with greater respect. The American literature on mass communications, for example, has aroused considerable interest and enthusiasm.[42] Moreover, Soviet scholars have published a number of relatively non-polemical works on "bourgeois" government, relying almost exclusively on Western sources and explicitly adopting the findings of Western scholars. Studies of American federalism and of federal efforts to regulate campaign spending are good examples of this genre; while they do not demonstrate original scholarship, they treat their subject in a detached and unemotional manner.[43] Almost inevitably, however, even the best of these works are marred by the sudden insertion of gratuitous propaganda slogans.[44]

1, 1967, 14–19; D. Yermolenko, "Sociology and Problems of International Conflict," *International Affairs,* No. 8, 1968, 47–53; N. Ustinov, "Mathematical Methods in the Analysis of International Relations," *International Affairs,* No. 12, 1968, 74–82. See also G. Gerasimov, "Teoriya igr i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya [Game Theory and International Relations]," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya,* No. 7, 1966, 101–108; N. N. Vorobiev, "Nekotoryye metodologicheskiye problemy teorii igr [Several Methodological Problems of Game Theory]," *VF,* No. 1, 1966, 93–103; L. A. Petrovskaya and S. A. Petrovskii, "Teoriya igr i sotsiologiya [Game Theory and Sociology]," *VMU,* Seriya VIII, Filosofiya, No. 4, 1968, 49–59. A comprehensive treatment of the Soviet literature on international relations may be found in William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations* (1969).

[38] Selyukov, *op. cit.,* 143.

[39] A. I. Verkhovskaya, "Pis'mo v gazetu i yego avtor kak ob"ekt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya [The Letter to the Editor and Its Author as an Object of Sociological Research]," *VMU,* Seriya XI, Zhurnalistika, No. 4, 1968, 49–59.

[40] S. Murashov and V. Orel. "The Student and the Social Sciences," *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* April 20, 1966; 1–2; translated in *CDSP,* 18, No. 17 (May 18, 1966), 5.

[41] Yu. V. Arutyunian, "Opyt sotsial'no-etnicheskogo issledovaniya [An Experiment in Social-Ethnographic Research]," *Sovetskaya Etnografiya,* No. 4, 1968, 3–13; L. N. Lentsman, "Konkretnyye sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya partiino-ideologicheskoi raboty v Estonskoi SSR" [Concrete Sociological Research into Party-Ideological Work in the Estonian SSR], in V. I. Mudragei *et al., Problemy nauchnogo kommunizma* [*Problems of Scientific Communism*], 1968, volume 2, 76–78.

[42] Yu. A. Sherkovin, "O prirode i funktsiyakh massovoi kommunikatskii [The Nature and Functions of Mass Communications]," *VMU,* Seriya XI, Zhurnalistika, No. 6, 1967, 41–58; V. S. Korobeinikov, "Analiz soderzhaniya massovoi kommunikatsii" [Content Analysis of Mass Communications], *VF,* No. 4, 1969, 100–110; Ye. A. Nozhin, "Teoriya kommunikatsii i yeyo znacheniye dlya propagandy" [The Significance of Communications Theory for Propaganda], in Mudragei *et al., op. cit.,* 149–172; Yu. A. Sherkovin, "O vzaimodestvii reklamy i propagandy" [The Interaction Between Advertising and Propaganda], in Mudragei *et al., op. cit.,* 186–200; and L. N. Fedotova, "Analiz soderzhaniya—sotsiologicheskii sposob izucheniya pechati, radio, televideniya" [Content Analysis—Sociological Means for Studying the Press, Radio and Television], *VMU,* Seriya XI, Zhurnalistika, No. 4, 1969, 57–65.

[43] B. S. Krylov, "K probleme suvereniteta federatsii i shtatov v SShA [The Problem of Federal and State Sovereignty in the USA]," *SGP,* No. 9, 1964, 74–85; A. V. Dmitriyev, "O federal'nom kontrole assignovanii na vybory presidenta SShA [Federal Control of Spending in Presidential Elections in the USA]," *VLU,* Seriya *Ekonomika,* Filosofiya, Pravo, No. 17, 1968, 114–116; V. M. Abarshalin, "Parlament Efiopii" [The Parliament of Ethiopia], *VMU,* Seriya XII, Pravo, No. 3, 1969, 49–58; N. V. Sivachev, "Vmeshatel'stva organov ispolnitel'noi vlasti SShA v trudovyye konflikty v gody vtoroi mirovoi voiny" [Interference by Executive Organs of the USA in Labor Conflcts During the Second World War], *VMU,* Seriya XII, Pravo, No. 4, 1969, 20–30; and V. V. Smirnov, "Munitsipal'naya Sistema N'yu-iorka" [New York's Municipal System], *VMU,* Seriya XII, Pravo, No. 6, 1969, 44–52.

[44] For example, in his study of American campaign spending, Dmitriyev argues that only the American working class, struggling "to create a broad anti-monopoly front and to democratize the country's political life," can prevent abuses. Dmitriyev, *op. cit.,* 116. See also R. Kh. Vil'danov, *Konstitutsii v politicheskoi sisteme burzhuaznogo*

This need not be a disabling problem; even works marred by the presence of unwarranted or polemical remarks can contribute to the growth of a more scientific study of politics. Thus, while the Soviet social scientist Yermolenko has attacked Herman Kahn for allegedly advocating nuclear war, he has also acknowledged that "Kahn's reasoning could be of some positive value."[45] The implications of such an attitude are vast indeed.

Proposals for future research provide additional momentum in the direction of political science. Many of these suggestions reveal an increasing impatience with traditional descriptive-institutional studies and favor a behavioral approach. "For many years," a leading Soviet jurist has written, "Soviet public law specialists confined themselves . . . primarily to commentaries upon various decisions and provisions of the USSR Constitution." He has called instead for survey research into such matters as reasons for the recall of deputies, and the opinions of deputies and officials of soviets.[46] Another member of the legal profession has urged research into other significant questions, e.g., relations between individual Party committees and soviets, relations between local soviets and their executive committees, and even the "effectiveness" of the existing election system, *i.e.,* its capacity to provide adequate representation for the citizenry).[47]

The most dramatic and far-reaching suggestions for scientific study of political affairs have come from R. A. Safarov of the Institute of State and Law.[48] He has proposed that an Institute of Public Opinion be established under the Academy's auspices. It would conduct regular samplings of public opinion, using rigorous scientific procedures, and explore basic political questions. To be sure, an Institute of Public Opinion has been operating in the USSR since 1960, under the auspices of the youth newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda.* Its activities, however, often have deviated from acceptable scientific practice, and it has avoided matters of direct political concern.[49] Safarov's Institute would be policy-oriented: it would take samplings both before and after official policies were adopted. His purpose is to bring public policy into line with public opinion—a dramatic change from today's practice of asserting that the Party's policies *are* public opinion. Safarov would poll the citizenry on major questions of domestic and foreign policy, including reforms in the administrative structure, the activity of public officials, and even questions of labor law, pensions, collective farm law, and civil and criminal law. Effective government, he argues, requires responsiveness to true public opinion. At the same time, he emphasizes that empirical social science can be an effective aid to the Party; it can remove existing sources of dissatisfaction and improve the direction and administration of society.

In the near future, we can expect continuing challenges to Party ideologists by social scientists anxious to expand their field of research. If they continue to circumvent or even ignore the Party's demands for a "class viewpoint" in the study of politics, adherents of a scientific approach may make further progress. The Party, because it finds the promise of political science inviting as well as threatening, seems willing at this time to permit some measure of independent research.[50] But the regime's pervasive concern with *partiinost* (party-mindedness) and increasing emphasis on proper Marxist-Leninist indoctrination[51] suggest that it will be difficult indeed to transform this greater measure of independence into a value-free political science.

II. EASTERN EUROPE

The growth of political science in Eastern Europe has not been uniform. Political science associations exist in four East European countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia

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obshchestva [*Constitutions in the Political System of Bougeois Society*], 1968.

[45] Yermolenko (1967), *op. cit.,* 17.

[46] A. I. Lepeshkin, "Nazrevshiye voprosy razvitiya nauki sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo prava [Urgent Questions in Developing the Science of Soviet Public Law]," *SGP,* No. 2, 1965, 5–15. Quotation on 6–7

[47] Perttsik, *op. cit.,* 21

[48] R. A. Safarov, "Vyyavleniye obshchestvennogo mneniya v gosudarstvenno-pravovoi praktike [The Expression of Public Opinion in State and Legal Practices]," *SGP,* No. 10, 1967, 46–54.

[49] See Paul Hollander, "The Dilemmas of Soviet Sociology," *Problems of Communism,* 14, No. 6 (November-December, 1965), 43–45.

[50] The present contradictory approach to the social sciences was stated explicitly and succinctly by S. Kovalev: "Our social science must combine consistent Marxist-Leninist party-mindedness with a strictly scientific approach." "Trebovaniya zhizni i obshchestvennyye nauki [Life's Demands and the Social Sciences]," *Pravda,* May 6, 1966, 3.

[51] P. Demichev, "Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i zadachi obshchestvennykh nauk [The Construction of Communism and Tasks of the Social Sciences], *Kommunist,* No. 10, 1968, 14–35; Rumyantsev and Osipov, *op. cit.,* 7.

and Rumania.[52] Of these four, however, only Poland and Yugoslavia have advanced to the point where the study of the discipline has had an impact on teaching and research in the social sciences. Even in these two countries, there are important differences in respect to the achievements of and prospects for the profession.

In Poland, an Association of Political Science was established in 1957 as a loose federation of learned societies concerned with the subject matter of political science.[53] In 1960 the association was reorganized to permit membership on the part of individuals; since that time the group has been active in holding conferences of its members and sending delegations to congresses of the IPSA. On occasion the Party has attempted to utilize the association to control political science in Poland, but this effort has not met with great success. The Polish Association, in contrast to its counterpart in the USSR, has a record of defending the rights of its members, and supporting the growth of an independent political science discipline in Poland.

While many institutions have been engaged in research in political science in Poland over the past decade, resistance to the new discipline on the part of traditionally oriented faculties for many years limited the teaching of political science in the universities to a chair in political sociology at Warsaw University. In 1963 political science was included in the curriculum of a limited number of institutions of higher learning in the form of a course entitled "The Fundamentals of Political Science," and in 1965 the Institute for the Political Sciences was established with the objective of training persons to teach the "Fundamentals" course. While the formation of the Institute, with a five year program in political science, was a victory for the advocates of the profession, the "Fundamentals" course has been primarily a means of political education and indoctrination and only secondarily concerned with imparting a knowledge of the discipline. With the extension of the course to all institutions of higher education in the fall of 1969, political science teaching in Poland became even more closely identified with the ideological and political interests of the regime.

In Yugoslavia a political science association was formed in 1951.[54] In 1957–58 the Law Faculty of Belgrade University introduced changes in its curriculum designed to encourage the study of political science within the faculty, and in 1962 a faculty of the political sciences was founded at the University of Zagreb. Since 1964 the faculty has published a journal, *Politička Misao* (*Political Thought*), devoted to research and discussion of the field of political science. Currently, the four "High" (Advanced) Schools for the Political Sciences, which in the past have been responsible for training party cadres, are being reorganized into faculties with open enrollment. This step has already been taken at Sarajevo, where a faculty of political science—which includes in its curriculum the study of sociology—has been in operation for several years.

Instruction in political science in Yugoslavia is less concerned with indoctrination and more directed toward political education in the broadest sense. The faculties of political science specialize in training for careers in public service; many of their graduates can be found in positions, such as radio and television, which require a general familiarity with politics. Presumably these faculties will become an even more important training ground for persons filling politically sensitive positions as the party schools are closed and all or part of their student body transfers to the political science faculties.

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[52] For the official attitude toward the social sciences in East Germany, see the October, 1968 resolution of the SED Politburo, *Einheit,* December, 1968, 1455–1470. In Hungary, a recent article by the Director of the Sociological Research Group of the Academy of Sciences, Kalman Kulcsar, gave support to the idea of political science. Other articles have described empirical research on village councils, and on certain aspects of the legal system, being carried out by the Sociological Research Group and Legal Sciences Institute in Hungary. See *Partelet,* July, 1969, 36–41 and *Nepszabadsag,* May 31, 1969, 4–5.

[53] For the development of Polish political science, see Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Les Sciences Politiques en Pologne," *International Social Science Council Bulletin,* March, 1966, 66–77; Marian Zychowski, "Nauki polityczne [The Political Sciences]," *Nowe Drogi,* 20, No. 12 (1966), 20–27; Uniwersytet Warszawski, Osrodek Metodyczny Nauk Politycznych, *Studia Nauk Politycznych: Biuletyn Informacyjno-Naukowy* [*Studies in the Political Sciences: Scientific Information Journal*], No. 1, 1966.

[54] Nerkez Smailagić, "Problemi nastavnog plana Fakulteta političkih nauka [Problems of the Curriculum of the Faculty of Political Sciences] *Politička Misao,* 1, No. 1 (1964), 114–50; Radoslav Ratković, "O predmetu i mestu političkih nauka [On the Subject and Role of Political Sciences] *Naša Stvarnost* 14, No. 2 (February, 1960), 156–68; Leon Gešković, "O stanju i problemima studija političkih nauka u visokoškolskoj nastavi [On the Situation and Problems of the Study of Political Sciences in the Higher School Curriculums]," *Arhiv za Pravne i Društvene Nauke,* 49, No. 4 (October-December, 1963), 489–501.

The establishment of special faculties for political science in Yugoslavia has not been free of problems. At the University of Zagreb existing faculties resisted the change, while over-zealous proselytising for the new political science—"politologija"[55]—led to controversy with political scientists from other institutions. Friction also developed between political scientists and the Party, which had insisted on approving the courses which the Zagreb faculty originally planned to offer its students.[56] In 1965 the faculty succeeded in reforming its curriculum in such a way as to reduce party influence over the teaching of political science. More recently the faculty incurred the enmity of the Party when its Party organization (made up of both faculty and students) sided with the liberally minded philosophy faculty in support of student demands during the June, 1968 demonstrations at the University of Zagreb.[57] One consequence of this incident has been new demands from the party for reorganization of the faculty's curriculum.

In Czechoslovakia, criticisms of the Stalinist method of studying politics and suggestions for the development of political sociology appeared as early as 1963.[58] A Czech political science association was formed and joined the IPSA in 1965. Following the publication of Burlatskii's views in the Soviet Union, articles were published urging the development of political science in Czechoslovakia.[59] While the Novotny regime never acted on these proposals, steps were taken to enlist social scientists in the search for new approaches to the country's many political and economic problems. An Institute for the Political Sciences was established under the Party Central Committee to carry out research on the operation of the Czech political system. At the same time an interdisciplinary research team was formed under the Academy of Sciences to make recommendations concerning the future development of the political system in Czechoslovakia.[60]

Prospects for the rapid development of political science, which looked bright after the removal of Novotny,[61] suffered a severe setback as a result of the August, 1968 invasion. It need hardly be added that the prospects for future development of the discipline in Czechoslovakia now appear uncertain in the extreme.

In Rumania, a political science association was formed in the spring of 1968. Insufficient time has elapsed to permit evaluation of its activities. The wording of the charter of the organization suggests that it is to have a dual role, encouraging research and at the same time acting as an instrument for disseminating regime propaganda.[62] The fact that the first chairman of the association is a politician,[63] rather than a political scientist, indicates that the Rumanian government is primarily concerned with the propaganda value of the organization. At the same time, articles in the press and scholarly journals have supported the study of political science in Rumania.[64] Conditions now seem favorable for at least limited moves toward initiating research and teaching in the discipline.

In the course of a decade, Polish and Yugoslav political scientists have produced a sizeable literature in practically all sub-fields of the discipline. This material can be broken down into two types: studies in political behavior, and work in more traditional areas such as comparative government, international relations, or political theory. While Polish political science has made its major contribution in the realm of political behavior, Yugoslav scholars tend to favor the more classical fields of the discipline. This difference is reflected in the political science journals of the two countries. The Yugoslav *Politička Misao* seldom publishes empirical studies of political behavior; *Studia Socjologiczo Polityczne* (*Studies in Political Sociology*), during the period of its publication the only Polish journal devoted exclusively to political science, was oriented toward political sociology.

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[55] The meaning of "politologija" is not entirely clear in Yugoslav literature. One position is that politologija is an approach to the study of politics designed to integrate existing fields of political science through the development of a comprehensive theory of politics. See Professor Gršković's views in *Politička Misao,* 2, No. 1 (1965), 145. The term often is used by Yugoslav political scientists simply to refer to the study of politics generally.

[56] *Politička Misao,* 2, No. 1 (1965), 119.

[57] *Vjesnik,* June 28, 1968, 1.

[58] František Šamalik, "Význam sociologie pro vědu o státu a právu [The Meaning of Sociology for the Science of the State and Law]," *Právník,* 102, No. 3 (1963), 177–85; "Překonání důdledků kultu osobnosti a dogmatismu ve vědě o státu a právu [Overcoming the Consequences of the Cult of Personality and Dogmatism in the Science of the State and Law]," *ibid.,* 102, No. 8, (1963), 621–33.

[59] For contributions to the discussion by Alexandr Ort, Karel Ondris, František Kratochvíl, Miroslav Soukup and others, see *Nová Mýsl,* No. 5, 1965, 684–93 and 1966, No. 8, 12–14; No. 18, 13–15; No. 20, 16–18 and No. 25, 24–28.

[60] *Rudé Právo,* July 6, 1967, 3.

[61] The interdisciplinary research team referred to above, originally part of the Institute of State and Law, was made part of a new Institute for the Political Sciences. The period between January and August was also marked by a rapid increase in the number of public opinion polls on political and other subjects. Ninety per cent of those responding to a *Rudé Právo* questionnaire indicated that they preferred a multi-party system to a one-party system. *Rudé Právo,* June 27, 1968.

[62] *Analele Institutului de Studii Istorice si Social-Politice de pe Lînga CC al PCR,* May, 1968, 249–50.

[63] The Chairman of the Rumanian Political Science Association, George Macovesco, is First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[64] See Ovidiu Trăsnea, "Probleme actuale ale ştiinţei politice [Current Problems of Political Science]," *Lupta de Clasă,* 48, No. 3 (March, 1968), 84–93.

Studies in political behavior date from the early 1960's when Western concepts and research methods penetrated into Poland and Yugoslavia. The result was a wave of interest and enthusiasm for political science. The latest techniques in interviewing, and in the assembling and interpreting of data were tried out. While the results were not always up to expectations, empirical research on Communist systems began to appear for the first time, while the political scientists themselves, many self-trained, gained experience and professional skill.

In Poland, much of the research in the field of political behavior was initially focused on the study of community power structure.[65] Studies carried out in cooperation with the Party identified key decision-makers in Polish localities and gathered data on changes in the composition of the Party and the attitudes of Party members brought about by the post-war industrialization of Poland.[66]

Polish political scientists have also been engaged in research on electoral behavior, utilizing data on the number of registered voters that participate in elections, the percentage voting for the government list, and the order in which the Polish voter ranks candidates on the ballot.[67] The operation of local government has been approached through the study of political attitudes and values; in this work, Polish political scientists have cooperated with Yugoslav, American and Indian political scientists in a comparative approach to the study of political behavior at the local level.[68] Polish political scientists and sociologists have also conducted numerous public opinion polls, and sample surveys carried out by Polish social scientists have supplied extensive data on social stratification, modernization and related problems which have been utilized by political scientists.[69]

The findings of these studies in political behavior have not always corresponded to official views and have at times underscored the problems facing Poland in a period of rapid social and economic change. Research into community power structure has confirmed the importance of small groups in the conduct of local affairs. Thus, Winicjusz Narojek, on the basis of data gathered in 1962, identified thirty-seven key persons in the power structure of a town of 30,000, thirty-one in another locality, and so on.[70] Public opinion polls have on occasion indicated that non-Communist attitudes persist in Poland; for example, research conducted by Josef Koszek on the socio-political attitudes of the peasants pointed to the continuing importance of the middle-aged, better-off peasants as opinion leaders, and the political preferences of this group for the United Peasant Party over the United Workers' (Communist) Party.[71] The analysis of elections, although obviously more limited in scope than similar studies conducted in the West, has suggested the existence of variations in attitudes toward the regime both on a regional and class basis. Jerzy Wiatr's studies of the 1957 election, moreover, showed the widespread popularity of non-Party over Party candidates, when a choice between the two was possible.

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[65] This research is summarized by Winicjusz Narojek, *Studies in the Polish Political System* (Warsaw, 1967), 179–200 and *Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne*, No. 23, 1967, 29–43.

[66] Zygmunt Bauman in *Studies in the Polish Political System*, *op. cit.*, 13–32; see also his "Economic Growth, Social Structure, Elite Formation: The Case of Poland," *ISSJ*, 16 (1964), 203–16.

[67] Jerzy Wiatr, "Niektore zagadnienia opinii publicznej w świetle wyborów 1957 i 1958 [Several Problems of Public Opinion in the Light of the Elections of 1957 and 1958], *Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne*, No. 4, 1959, entire issue; Stanislaw Bereza, "Wybory do Dzielnicowej rady narodowej Warzawa-Ochata w roku 1958 [Elections to the People's Councils of Warsaw Ochata During 1958]," *ibid.*, No. 2, 1959, 161–64; Institut Nauk Prawnych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, *Problemi Rad Narodowych: Studia i materialy* [*Problems of the People's Councils: Studies and Materials*], No. 7, 1966, entire issue.

[68] See *Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne*, No. 25, 1968.

[69] See Wladyslaw Markiewicz, "Sociological Research in People's Poland," in Stanislaw Ehrlich (ed.), *Social and Political Transformations in Poland* (1964), 221–54.

[70] Winicjusz Narojek, *loc. cit.*

[71] "Postawy społeczno-polityczne chtopow [Socio-Political Attitudes of the Peasants]," *Studia Socjologiczno Polityczne*, No. 16, 1964, 207–49.

Research in political behavior has developed more slowly in Yugoslavia than Poland. As a consequence it sometimes lacks the professionalism of Polish works. Nevertheless, valuable studies have been produced by Yugoslav political scientists and sociologists. This applies in particular to the work of the Institute for Sociology and Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana. Pioneering research has been conducted by members of the Institute in the field of informal decision making.[72] The results of this work parallel the findings of Polish political scientists on community power structure in Poland, pointing to the existence of informal centers of power at the local level. Public participation in local government and in meetings held for the purpose of choosing candidates for elections has been studied extensively;[73] information gathered by the Slovenian group has pointed to public distrust of the bureaucracy and Party as a factor limiting the democratic character of these institutions.

With the exceptions just cited, Yugoslav research on political behavior has not provided an accurate picture of the Yugoslav power structure or the actual manner of operation of self-management and self-government organs. The functioning of the Party is rarely studied from an empirical viewpoint.[74] Studies of workers, councils and local governments, and also of public opinion and electoral behavior, have tended to be vague and less revealing than analogous Polish research.[75] Pressure groups have not been studied to any great degree, although their existence in Yugoslavia is recognized.[76] Public opinion polls, while they demonstrate familiarity with sample survey techniques, have often suffered from respondent bias.[77]

Polls do, however, touch on political questions and from time to time reveal sources of discontent that exist within the Yugoslav political system. In a special study of student opinion carried out by the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade, "lack of self-criticism and modesty in life" were identified as the chief defects of socialist relations in Yugoslavia.[78] One of the annual polls conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences on current issues, asked, "What do you like least in Yugoslav society?" The majority chose "connections and familiarity," an allusion to the importance of political connections and influence in getting ahead.[79] In another poll, which asked whether the status of the Party had risen or fallen since the war, the 19.1% who answered that it had fallen gave as their explanation the "lack of moral character" of Party members, and the belief that anyone could become a Party member.[80]

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[72] Janez Jerovšek, "Neformalne strukture odlučanje na nivoju općine [The Informal Structure of Decision Making at the Level of the Opstina]," *Sodobnost,* 12, No. 12 (1964), 1183–94. See also his "Distribucija moči na nivoju občine [The Distribution of Power at the Level of the Opstina]," *Teorija in Praksa,* 2, No. 4 (1965), 652–64, and "Uticaj socijalne diferencijacije na strukturu moći na lokalnom nivou [The Influence of Social Differentiation on the Structure of Power at the Local Level]," in *Zbornik promene klasne strukture savremenog jugoslovenskog društva* (1967).

[73] Zdravko Mlinar, "Kje se zaustavljate pobuda in kritika [Who Prevents Initiative and Criticism]," *Teorija in Praksa,* 3, No. 11 (November, 1966), 1514–27; "Sociološki aspekti samoupravljanje u komuni [Sociological Aspects of Self-Government in the Communes]," *Gledište,* 6, No. 2 (February, 1965), 195–210.

[74] One pioneering work which provides selected data from a sample survey on the role of the Party in institutions of self-government carried out in the district of Kraljevo (Serbia) is Krsto Š. Kilibarda, *Samoupravljanje i Savez Komunista: Resultati sociološkog istraživanja u srezu Kraljevo* [*Self Government and the League of Communists: Results of a Sociological Investigation in the District of Kraljevo*] (1966).

[75] The vast literature which has appeared in these areas cannot be cited here in detail. Some of the best empirical data on workers' councils have appeared in *Sociologija,* No. 1, 1961, and in the work by Jože Dergane and Ana Cukova, *Delovna skupina v sistemu delavskego samoupravljanja* [*Workers' Councils in the System of Self-Management*], Institut za sociologijo in filizofijo, Ljubljana (mimeographed) (1966). The Institute for Social Sciences in Belgrade has published many studies in this area as well. An excellent monograph on the Yugoslav commune, which may well be the best empirical piece yet produced by a Yugoslav political scientist, is Eugene Pusić, "Area and Administration in Yugoslav Development," *ISSJ,* 21, No. 1 (1969), 68–82. For a solid discussion of the problems of public administration arising from the operation of the Yugoslav federal system utilizing concrete examples from Yugoslav practice, see Institut za uporedno pravo, *Podela normativne funkcije izmedju organa različitih političkih jedinica* [*The Division of Normative Functions Among Organs of Different Political Units*] (1966).

[76] See Zdravko Mlinar, "Družbena struktura komune in problem oblasti [The Social Structure of the Commune and the Problem of Authority]," *Problemi,* 2, No. 13 (1964), 69–79; Milan Knežević, "Neformalne grupe [Informal Groups]," *Oslobodjenje,* February 8, 1967, 5; Miodraga Dj. Zečević, *Društvene organizacije i udruženja gradjana u komuni* [*Social Organizations and Associations of Citizens in the Commune*] (1965).

[77] See for example, the poll taken in 1964 on national attitudes in Yugoslavia: "O aktuelnim političkim i društvenim pitanjima [On Immediate Political and Social Problems]," *Jugoslovensko Javno Mnenje,* Series A-3, 1964, 83–108.

In Poland and Yugoslavia the study of the traditional fields of political science has also undergone significant change. Western authorities are now regarded as the single most important source of ideas in most sub-fields of the discipline. Although dogmatic works on government and politics continue to be published in great numbers, there has been a modest but steady flow of more serious studies aimed at incorporating the insights of Western political science into the study of Communist political systems.

Certain areas have received special emphasis. In Poland, local government institutions have been the focus of research since the late 1950's, when the Institute for Legal Sciences began a long-term project on the study of local government organs. The Institute's publication, *Problemy Rad Narodowych* (*Problems of the People's Councils*) has made a significant contribution to our knowledge of local government in Poland.[81] In both Yugoslavia and Poland, the early 1960's were marked by an emphasis on the comparative study of Western political systems. These studies permitted Yugoslav and Polish political scientists to investigate pressure groups, political parties, and other political phenomena at a time when research on domestic political institutions was just getting underway.[82] Both Yugoslav and Polish political scientists have engaged in the comparative study of Communist political systems, although efforts in this field have slackened in recent years. Yugoslav interest in the subject was perhaps most evident in 1964, when a project on the comparative analysis of socialist systems was under consideration.[83] At the same time, Polish constitutional lawyers were looking at comparative problems of Communist systems from a more traditional point of view. The focus of their research was the role of the presidium of the national assembly and the constitutional position of the head of state.[84]

The study of international relations has also been stimulated by the influence of Western political science. This is particularly evident in discussions of the theory of international relations, which now make considerable use of Western models.[85] At the same time, the increased interest of Eastern European governments in Africa, the middle East and Asia has led to rapid growth of research on the problems of developing countries.[86] Eastern European scholars are nevertheless seriously hampered in their work by the virtual impossibility of publishing views not in accord with official policy. Although carefully researched and well-documented studies in the field of international relations have been published in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the analysis of foreign policy problems by Eastern European political scientists offers relatively little that is new or original.

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[78] Miloslav Janicijević *et al., Jugoslovenski studenti i socijalizam* [*Yugoslav Students and Socialism*] (1966).

[79] "O aktuelnim političkim i društvenim pitanjima 1965 [On Actual Political and Social Questions 1965]," *Jugoslovensko Javno Mnenje,* Series A-3, 1965, 78–79.

[80] Institut društvenih nauka, *Godišnjak 1965* [*Yearbook 1965*], 126.

[81] See also *Komisije Rady narodowej m. Lodz: podstawy prawne struktura, sklad i dzialalnosc* [*The Commission of the People's Council of Lodz: The Foundation of its Legal Structure and Activity*] (1960); Wojciech Sokolowicz, *Rzad a prezydia rad narodowych* [*The Work of the Presidia of the National Councils*] (1964).

[82] Dan Gjanković, "Dvostranački sistem u SAD [The Two Party System in the USA]," *Politička Misao,* 1, No. 3 (1964), 11–63; Kosara Pavlović, "Organizaciona struktura političkih partija Zapadne Evrope [The Organizational Structure of Political Parties in Western Europe]," *Gledišta,* 4, No. 8 (1963), 46–56; Maria Hirszowicz, "Problemy panstawa Brytyjskego [Problems of the British State]," *Studia socjologiczno polityczne,* No. 7, 1960, entire issue; Albert Meszorer, *Brytyjski System parlamentarny w zarysie* [*The British Parliamentary System in Outline*] (1962); Sylwester Zawadski, *Panstwo dobrobytu* [*The Welfare State*] (1964); Stanisław Ehrlich, *Wlada i interesy. Studium Struktury Politycznej Kapitalizmu* [*Power and Interests. A Study of the Political Structure of Capitalism*] (1967); Jerzy Wiatr, *Amerykańskie wybory* [*American Elections*] (1961).

[83] Institut za izučavanje radničkog pokreta, *Društveno-politički sistemi socijalističkih zemalja* [*Social-Political Systems of Socialist Countries*] (1964); *Pregled,* 54, No. 4 (April, 1964), 404.

[84] Tadeusz Szymczak, *Instytucja prezydenta w socjalistycznym prawie panstwowym* [*The Institution of the President in Socialist State Law*] (1963); Ludwig Gelberg, "Problem kolegialnege prezydenta w panstwach socjalistycznych [Problems of the Collegial President in Socialist States]," *Panstwo i Prawo,* 22, No. 4–5 (April-May, 1967), 749-53.

[85] Djure Ninčić, "Metodologija proučavanja medjunarodnih odnosa [The Methodology of Studying International Relations]," *Arhiv za Pravne i Društvene Nauke,* 46, No. 3–4, 1960, 238–55; Institute of International Politics and Economics (Prague), *International Relations: A Czech Foreign Policy Review, Selections of Studies from Volume II,* 1967, 55–81; Antonín Šnej-

It is clear that political scientists in Poland and Yugoslavia have had considerable success in introducing Western concepts into the study of politics. At the same time the results have often been disappointing to those involved. In Yugoslavia, political scientists are still experiencing great difficulties in carrying out research. Expectations that the study of political behavior would develop into a new field of major importance have not yet been realized, despite repeated efforts to remove obstacles to work in this field.[87] Political scientists representing a traditional point of view have raised questions concerning the wisdom of quantitative methods and the utility of polling techniques; even Leo Strauss has been brought into the controversy in defense of the traditional approach.[88]

Yugoslav political scientists are nevertheless individualistic, deeply concerned with gaining recognition for the discipline, and receptive to a wide variety of ideas. The young Belgrade political scientist Stevan Vračar aroused widespread interest in Yugoslavia and abroad in 1967 by proposing a modified type of two party system for Yugoslavia.[89] Professor Leon Gešković has championed the cause of "politologija" as a new approach to political science, although now in less strident terms than in the past.[90] The late Dan Gjanković was a sharp and knowledgeable critic of the federal system in Yugoslavia,[91] and Professor Eugen Pusić of the University of Zagreb has made significant contributions in the field of public administration.[92] Jovan Djordjević, one of the country's leading constitutional lawyers and now a member of the Yugoslav constitutional court, has for many years been an advocate of self-management and a greater role for parliament as a check against the abuses of concentrated power in Communist systems.[93] Younger political scientists and political sociologists such as Janez Jerovsek have been stressing the importance of changes brought about as the result of modernization and industrialization in Yugoslavia, and the need to bring political practices into harmony with these new conditions.[94]

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dárek, "The Development of Research in Czechoslovakia on International Relations," *ibid., Selection of Studies from Volume I, 1966,* 5–18; Jerzy Wiatr, "Les Sciences Politique en Pologne," *op. cit.,* 76–77.

[86] Some of the vast literature appearing in Poland on underdeveloped areas is described in Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych, *Bibliografia polskich publicacji na temat Afryki* [*Bibliography of Polish Publications on Africa*] (1965). For Czech works, *International Relations* (Prague), *loc. cit.,* Evidence of Yugoslav interest is found in Institut za izučavanje radničkog pokreta, *Politički sistemi i pokreti u nerazvijenim zemljama: Metodološko-teorijski okviri izučavanje* [*Political Systems and Movements in Underdeveloped Nations: Methodological-Theoretical Frameworks for Research*] (1964).

[87] One approach to the gathering of empirical data which has been tried on several occasions in Yugoslavia is the organization of joint research projects with foreign social scientists. While this enables the outside researcher to gather much valuable material, the impact on Yugoslav political science, measured in terms of published data, has not been significant. Differences have also arisen over the interpretation of the data gathered by international research teams of this type; an early and well known case is the research of the French sociologist, Albert Meister, on workers' councils. See his *Socialisme et Autogestion: L'Experience Yougoslave* (1964).

[88] Mihailo Djurić, "Stara i nova nauka o politici [The Old and the New In Politics]," *Gledišta,* 8, No. 6–7 (June-July, 1967), 846.

[89] "Partijski monopolizam i politička moć društvenih grupa [The Party Monopoly and the Political Power of Social Groups]," *Gledišta,* 8, No. 8–9 (August-September, 1967), 1053–1066.

[90] See "Politički sistem Jugoslavije u nastavi [The Political System of Yugoslavia in the Curriculum]," *Arhiv za Pravne i Društvene Nauke,* 52, No. 2, 1966, 175–88.

[91] "O federativnom karateru naše države [On the Federal Character of Our State]," *Zbornike Pravnog Fakulteta u Zagrebu,* No. 4, 1964, 230–34.

[92] See his work, "Area and Administration in Yugoslav Development," *supra.*

[93] See especially his debate with Gešković, "Neka pitanja ostvarivanja i razvitka socijalističke demokratije [Some Questions of the Creation and Development of Socialist Democracy]," *Politička Misao,* 1, No. 2 (1964), 153–82.

[94] "Socijalna diferencijacija i struktura moći [Social Differentiation and the Question of Power]," *Socijalizam,* 9, No. 3 (1966), 378–81.

The problem facing Yugoslav political science is to translate its enthusiasm for the discipline into research results of lasting value. Many of the leading figures in the profession have produced impressive theoretical works grounded in Titoist political theory.[95] but as yet no major work has been produced on the actual functioning of Yugoslav political institutions. It has proven impossible to discuss contemplated reforms of the political system—at least in print—until action has been taken by the Party. Even then, most political scientists feel constrained to speak in guarded terms, and very seldom in opposition to official views.

The failure to produce critical studies of the Yugoslav political system is a source of concern to Yugoslav political scientists. Speaking in 1964, Professor Djordjević complained that

> we still don't know the real value and real role of all these Yugoslav institutions; we still don't have one solid study of a scientific character concerning even one of the fundamental institutions on which we base not only the program but also the actual process of socialism.[96]

Djordjević's criticisms gained major support several years later when Leon Gersković spoke out forcefully on the same problem, urging political science to develop a more critical approach to the study of the Yugoslav political system, examining its actual operation rather than dwelling on its theoretical principles.[97] This critical analysis of the state of Yugoslav political science, coming from the originator of the plan to create a new science in the form of politologija, is a sign of the growing maturity of Yugoslav political scientists as well as an admission of the problems the discipline must overcome in the course of its further development.

Polish political science has made important contributions to the discipline in the realm of empirical research and has also produced a number of valuable theoretical works in the realm of political sociology. In contrast to Yugoslavia, Polish research has been free, until recently, to describe the realities of Party rule with surprising frankness. Polish political science also gained an advantage from the comparative orientation which political sociologists such as Zygmunt Bauman and Jerzy Wiatr brought to the study of political behavior. Zygmunt Bauman in particular deserves special recognition; his attempt to create a synthesis between Marxist and Western elite theories, and his critique of the modernization process in Poland, were significant contributions to the field.[98]

At the same time the theoretical and empirical boldness of Polish political science has created difficulties for the discipline. The use of quantitative methods in studies of political behavior has been exposed to professional criticism and ideologically motivated attacks. Since the 13th plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party in 1963, the social sciences have been strongly castigated by Party spokesmen for their "value free" approach, and sociologists and political scientists have been accused of advocating the control of society by a managerial elite. The campaign against the social scientists reached its height in the fall of 1967 and the spring of 1968 when Polish liberals were everywhere under attack. A serious blow was struck against the political science profession at this time when Zygmunt Bauman was deprived of his chair in political sociology at the University of Warsaw[99] and several members of the editorial board of *Studia Socjologiczne Polityczne* were dismissed.[100] Over the protests of Polish political scientists, publication of *Studia Socjologiczne Polityczne* was then suspended.

These developments have been paralleled by the emergence of what might be called a "non-Western" research approach to the social sciences in Poland. In writings espousing such a view, criticism of Western research methods is coupled with a stress on the role of the nation and the state in shaping society, and preference is given to an historical approach to the social sciences in place of comparative techniques.[101] Responding to the growth of nationalist elements in Polish political life, this view has given priority to nationalism over Marxism in its efforts to inject a new orthodoxy into the study of the social sciences. Political scientists were exposed to these ideas at the first congress of the

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[95] Examples of this type of work are the immense and erudite work of Professor Jovan Djordjević, *Politički sistem* [*Political System*] (1967); Leon Gersković, *Problemi i perspektive razvoja skupštinskog sistema Jugoslavije* [*Problems and Perspectives of the Development of the System of Assemblies in Yugoslavia*] (1967); Radomir Lukić, *Ustavnost i zakonitost* [*Constitutionalism and Legality*] (1966).

[96] *Arhiv za Pravne i Društvene Nauke,* 50, No. 1-2 (1964), 84.

[97] "Politički sistem Jugoslavije u nastavi," *loc. cit.*

[98] See earlier references to Bauman's works.

[99] See *Trybuna Ludu,* March 22, 1968, 4-5.

[100] Those involved were Bauman, Maria Herszowicz and Julian Hochfeld.

[101] Krzysztof Ostrowski, "Uwagi o perspektywach badań socjologicznych w Polsce [Remarks on the Perspectives for Sociological Research in Poland], *Nowe Drogi,* 21, No. 4 (April, 1967), 129-36.

Polish Association of Political Sciences in December, 1967.[102] Jerzy Wiatr, in his capacity as president of the Association, set the note for the meeting by emphasizing the importance of national values in the development of the Polish political system, while at the same time stressing the positive role of the state in the task of constructing a socialist society.[103]

The ultimate effect of such efforts to create a distinctive Polish political science is uncertain. A number of the papers presented at the 1967 congress reflected the continuing concern of Polish political scientists with the comparative analysis of contemporary issues, especially the effects of modernization on Polish society and the democratization of politics.[104] In any case, the discipline may find it difficult to regain its former momentum. A new publication, *Studia Nauk Politycznych* (*Studies in Political Science*) has been founded under the editorship of Marian Zychowski, known for his lack of sympathy toward liberal elements in the political science profession.[105] Even more disturbing is the decline of empirical studies in Polish political science. Except for articles appearing in the publication *Problemy Rad Narodowych,* the bulk of the data published today was gathered prior to 1964. If it is to maintain its position as leader and pioneer in the study of political science in Eastern Europe, Polish political science must open up new areas of research and tap new sources of information. This, however, will be no easy task under the conditions which now prevail.

CONCLUSIONS

The major accomplishment of Communist political science has been to raise the issue of an alternative approach to the study of politics, in which ideological and dogmatic attitudes are replaced by the objective and scientific study of political events. A number of Polish, Yugoslav and Soviet scholars have adopted as their own the standards and literature of the discipline; their published writings often do not include even perfunctory references to Marxist-Leninist sources. Although this writing is not in most cases characterized by great originality—and indeed may be highly imitative of existing Western works—there are persons who have sought, within their own field of specialization, to deal with questions "whose answers are not known beforehand." Given the nature and magnitude of the constraints they face, their achievement is all the more impressive.

Moreover, in several countries of the area (Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union), the level of discussion and original research among political scientists is much higher than a reading of published sources would indicate. In papers meant for limited circulation within research institutes, in references to debates taking place at meetings of political scientists, and even in research topics assigned to graduate students, there is evidence of a much more vital discipline than the often cautious published materials reveal.

Recently, however, the ruling parties have become increasingly concerned about manifestations of revisionist thinking and of works which might be construed as critical of the regime. Although not always successful, attempts have been made to curb the development of political science. The conduct of research in Poland and Yugoslavia, always beset with difficulties, seems on balance to be suffering from greater restrictions now than in the early and mid-1960's. The CPSU, too, after its earlier interest in political science, now emphatically calls for "partiinost" in social science. Given these circumstances, the immediate prospects for the discipline are not encouraging.

There are, nevertheless, forces which continue to favor the growth of political science. Communist regimes remain sensitive to the need for expert advice and may seek out the assistance of political scientists in areas where they have special skills. At the same time, continued exposure to Western literature and association with Western scholars at international conferences may promote the acceptance of Western methods and concepts in the social sciences. Finally, it may be that the advocates of political science will be successful in persuading the Communist regimes that it is to their advantage to encourage the growth of a value free political science. The persistence and enthusiasm of those who have supported political science in the past have kept the discipline alive even in its most difficult moments; given favorable circumstances, they may yet prevail.

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[102] *Trybuna Ludu,* December 19, 1967, 6.

[103] *Trybuna Ludu,* December 21, 1967, 4.

[104] *Zycie Gospodarcze,* February 4, 1968.

[105] The first issue of the journal, which became available in 1969, provided a broad range of articles on such subjects as international relations, political theory and local government. Current publications and professional activities in the field outside Poland were well reported. At the same time, the journal was more ideologically oriented than its Yugoslav counterpart, *Politička Misao.* Zychowski, in his account of Polish political science, focused mainly on the contribution the discipline was expected to make to the "Fundamentals" course.

COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

Below is a copy of a telegram sent on May 14, 1970 to President Nixon. The eight signatures on the telegram are those of the current President of the American Political Science Association, the President Elect and all past Presidents from 1964 on. In that year the Johnson Administration began the term of office during which the war in Vietnam clearly emerged as the deepest domestic crisis of this century. Those signing the telegram feel that as professional students of politics their special knowledge permits them to offer sound and objective advice for easing this crisis. The signers might be contacted individually for comment, and a number of them could be gathered on short notice for a press conference in New York City.

THE PRESIDENT — TELEGRAM
THE WHITE HOUSE — MAY 14, 1970
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Acting in our individual capacities as political scientists who are devoting their lives to the study of politics we are impelled by the present crisis to offer our considered professional advice for the quickest, most effective way of saving lives in Indochina and reducing strife at home. One course alone remains: an immediate and clear commitment to a rapid and orderly withdrawal of all American Armed Forces from Indochina to be substantially underway by December, 1970 and to be completed by July, 1971.

Karl W. Deutsch
Professor, Harvard University*
President, American Political Science Association
Robert E. Lane
Professor, Yale University
President Elect, American Political Science Association
All past presidents of the American Political Science Association from 1964 to the present, listed alphabetically:
Gabriel A. Almond
Professor, Stanford University
Robert A. Dahl
Professor, Yale University
David Easton
Professor, University of Chicago
Merle Fainsod
Professor, Harvard University
C. Herman Pritchett
Professor, University of California, Santa Barbara
David B. Truman
President, Mt. Holyoke College

* (NOTE: INSTITUTIONAL NAMES ARE FOR IDENTIFICATION ONLY)

To the Editor:

As a service in time of national crisis we undertook to conduct during mid-May a sample survey of opinion among American college and university teachers of political science. The preliminary results of the survey indicate that three-fourths of the respondents polled disapprove of the Administration's action in Cambodia, over four-fifths now think that it was a mistake to have sent combat troops into Vietnam, and two-thirds anticipate a constitutional crisis in the United States if the war continues at its present pace. There was also strong apprehension about the domestic repercussions of the war. Results in more detail follow below.

Drs. Allen H. Barton, James Guyot, Charles Kadushin, and Donald Puchala of Columbia University designed the survey and were responsible for the analysis. Questions were prepared in consultation with James David Barber, Yale; Richard Brody, Stanford; Seymour Martin Lipset, Harvard; Ithiel de Sola Pool, M.I.T.; and Sidney Verba, Chicago. Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia, acted as overall coordinator. The poll was carried out by telephone on May 14 and 15, two weeks after President Nixon's announcement of the dispatch of American combat troops to Cambodia. Costs of the survey were underwritten in part by the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, and in part from a grant by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education to Professor Lipset for the study of "the politics of academe." Graduate students and faculty of the Columbia Department of Political Science acted as interviewers. Duplicates of the survey punched cards will be available at cost for further scholarly uses after full processing at Columbia and Harvard.

The random sample of 394 was drawn from the approximately 5,000 individuals listed in the Biographical Directory of the American Political Science Association (1968 edition) as full-time teachers or administrators at colleges and universities in the continental United States. Since all of them had attained their academic positions by mid-1967, when the questionnaires for the directory were filled out, they are at this point in time likely to represent overwhelmingly a senior and experienced group of scholars. Of the 394 persons in the sample, 286 were reached, and 265 agreed to respond.

The largest group of respondents (66 percent) identified themselves as specialists in American government, but some of this group as well as others in the sample (totalling 55 percent) specified added expertise in comparative politics and international relations. Sixteen percent of the respondents polled reported Asian politics as one of their areas of professional interest. Most respondents were Democrats (66 percent) and Humphrey voters in 1968 (71 percent), while a considerably smaller group were Republicans (9 percent) and Nixon voters (12 percent).

Respondents polled were highly critical of the Nixon Administration's policies in Southeast Asia. Not only did three-quarters of the political scientists feel that U.S. troops should not have been dispatched to Cambodia, but an even larger group (84 percent) now consider that it was a mistake to have sent American combat troops to Vietnam in the first place. Among respondents who voted for Nixon in 1968 only a minority agreed with the move into Cambodia (44 percent in favor, 28 percent against, and 24 percent undecided). As many as 78 percent of the Nixon voters thought in retrospect that we should not have gone into Vietnam. A majority of the whole sample polled expressed skepticism that "the Nixon Administration's policies are likely to lead to a negotiated peace settlement"; at the same time, a similar proportion (71 percent) clearly rejected the Nixon Administration's assumption that immediate withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to American involvement in "a bigger war later." Sixty-four percent, or over, favored complete U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam during the next eighteen months. Only a minority (22 percent) of respondents felt that "the United States has a moral obligation to ensure South Vietnamese the right to choose their next government in a free election."

Other results of questioning regarding the Southeast Asian situation were more mixed. There was a division of judgment as to whether immediate withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to "large-scale slaughter of South Vietnamese"—31 percent agreed, 43 percent disagreed, and 25 percent were undecided. Neither was there any clear consensus as to whether a viable Vietnamese government could be obtained via the Administration's formula of troop withdrawal, Vietnamization of the war, and continued U.S. aid. Here 35 percent saw a viable South Vietnamese government emerging, but 40 percent did not, and another 25 percent were undecided.

The survey further revealed widely-felt concern about the impact of the war at home. Feeling on the domestic costs of the war was clearly evident in the avowal by 85 percent of the political scientists that the military conflict is preempting funds that should be devoted to dealing with pressing problems in race relations, the cities, and the environment. In addition, a large group of respondents (66 percent, with only 19 percent disagreeing) believed that a constitutional crisis may develop in the United States in the event that the war in Vietnam continues at levels of intensity recently reached. An even larger group (86 percent) saw increased violence and polarization in our society as a likely result of the continuing war. Seventy-nine percent of the scholars interviewed feared that a continuation of the war will make it "increasingly difficult for educational institutions to carry out their function of education."

For reasons of moral and political responsibility, the undersigned are transmitting the results of this survey to the political science profession and the American public in the belief that the views of a professional group of experts on American and international politics ought to be widely known at this time (May 16, 1970).

GABRIEL ALMOND
ROBERT A. DAHL
KARL W. DEUTSCH
DAVID EASTON
MERLE FAINSOD
ROBERT E. LANE
DANKWART A. RUSTOW
DAVID B. TRUMAN

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Sheldon Wolin's assault on the nature and consequences of "methodism" in contemporary approaches to politics and political theory (this REVIEW, December, 1969, 1062-1082) was a welcome and on first reading a potentially valuable corrective to political studies which have, in their efforts to achieve a "value-free" stance, merely become bloodless.

I say "on first reading," because pondering Professor Wolin's recommendations for the civilizing of political education via the study of traditional political philosophy, I sense not only what I think are some serious mistakes in his view of political theory, but some positively distasteful implications.

The route of his argument seems roughly to be as follows:

(1) Political education in the United States, to the degree that it is tied to formal education, has become "impoverished." "Methodism" in political science has deprived students of politics of the capacity to make theoretical discriminations which are of genuine political significance. Thus, we talk of "inputs," "system maintenance," "decision making," ignoring the textures of passion, justice, and anguish. The overall result is a political science myopically unable to provide attention to the more dire and threatening aspects of contemporary social-political developments in the United States.

(2) What is needed is a wider pervasion of the ability to make "appropriate" theoretical discriminations. We need, in a word, the restoration of civic vision, the ability to concentrate

our focus politically on what is "politically appropriate," rather than the merely "theoretically operational."

(3) A political education rooted significantly in the study of the tradition of political theory (Plato to Marx) will provide the antidote to the toxin of methodism. "Magnitude," the "public concern," and the willingness of traditional theorists to confront real problems in the real world, rather than to look for mistakes in theory when anomalies arise, all will help in the development of a "lore" of politics, in the achieving of that bedrock of "tacit political knowledge" so necessary to the making of sensitive political judgments.

Having finished reading Professor Wolin's essay I was left with a good feeling. I felt that a meaningful erosion of the sterility of much of modern political science had thus begun, that here indeed, was a calm and unhysterical voice arguing for a return to sanity in the study of politics. But, as if I had first only viewed the path of his argument from the air, my mood changed when I got closer to it, when I tried to traverse the same distances by the same route. What was a happy mood turned sourly to disappointment. At the very center of his argument he had built upon not merely a serious error, but an almost deliberate piece of obscurantism. As I tried to retrace his journey I discovered that a crucial bridge over the abyss had been destroyed by the corrosion of "tacit knowledge." The pivotal point in Professor Wolin's notion of how political theory can educate us is here in the accretion of our grasp of politics' supporting lore, tacit knowledge. "Political life," he writes, "does not yield its significance to terse hypotheses, but is elusive and hence meaningful statements about it often have to be allusive and intimative." (1070)

The argument is subtle. But the upshot is an almost occult sense of the mysteries of politics, the magic of insight and sensitivity, the alchemy of special, unarticulated wisdom. Consider the vocabulary of "tacit knowledge" that Professor Wolin employs—"elusive, allusive, intimative, sensibilities, civilized, connotative, appropriate richness, intellectually curious and broadly educated, intuitions, feelings, initiation, discriminating, cultivation, that sense of significance."

But this is a great deal more than merely cabalistic, it is also aristocratically snobbish. He is saying tacit knowledge, but it sounds strangely like that nineteenth century literary and artistic mask of Taste! I cannot dispel images of sensitive, melancholy young men, pensively poised, pen-in-mouth, seeking inspiration from delicate gardens and lacy virgins. It is the same sort of facile solution to the same kind of difficult problem. And what makes Professor Wolin's piece finally so disappointing is that it is exactly at the hardest, most crucial point that he retreats behind this Victorian screen. How *really* could the study of Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau foster in the twentieth century the political skills and refinements of judgment that he thinks are so necessary to innoculate students to the bacteria of systems theory and data gatering? That everybody doesn't read these theorists in quite the same way as Professor Wolin does could raise considerable difficulty. I could imagine a perfectly defensible reading of classical theory which would yield an awareness of the need for obedience to authority, a deep fear of disorder and a willingness to make serious sacrifices in the name of order, a belief in the justifiability of illusion and myth in the spreading of political lies, and an acceptance of the naturalness and frequent necessity of war and militarism. Certainly this is not the tacit political knowledge that Professor Wolin is seeking. And certainly these are not the things which are needed by the class of people likely to be reached by formal education. In the face of corruption, waste, desecration, war, international adventurism, etc. we need something else, something more. Although Machiavelli said he loved his native city more than his soul, he said that privately, in a letter. What he often said publically, in his writings, was something much less consoling. Professor Wolin has mistaken his own particular perception of the teachings of traditional theory for what others might learn. He has, moreover, taken it for granted that it is really clear not only what we should learn from the study of traditional theory, but also just what of this "tradition" we ought to study.

Some of the truly difficult problems of the study of political theory—the existence of and the nature of any tradition we might describe or posit, the problem of interpretation (what there is significant and why?) the *processes* of political education, the distortions inherent in beginning with the conclusion that there really is a history of the "working out of an inherited form, which is what a tradition is all about"—these things are all slighted by Professor Wolin. Perhaps some of these shortcomings can be attributed to his admirable sense of the seriousness of our political problems and the urgency with which we need to offset them. But, some of it has, finally, to be attributed to the implicit sense of aristocratic complacency and a kind of over-extended intellectual assuredness which hide from Professor Wolin just those very knotty problems which complicate the study of political theory in particular and literature in general.

CHARLES D. TARLTON
State University of New York at Albany

TO THE EDITOR:

Before taking up some of the problems mentioned in Professor Tarlton's letter, I should like to enter one point of clarification regarding my exchange with Professor Dahl and a word of explanation concerning Professor Pool's communication.

In his original letter Professor Dahl had kindly included a reproduction of the specific passages from *A Preface to Democratic Theory* which were at issue in our discussion. I had assumed that the *Review* would include them along with his letter, but, unfortunately, it did not. May I suggest, therefore, that readers who may be mystified by my allusions consult pages 50–51 of Professor Dahl's work?

Professor Pool had communicated his objections in a letter to me (January 23, 1970). I replied to him at some length.

Professor Tarlton characterizes my essay as "an almost deliberate piece of obscurantism" whose "upshot is an almost occult sense of the mysteries of politics . . ." and an aristocratic snobbishness. It is not easy to reply to a charge of being "almost." If Professor Tarlton believes that the language which I used to describe tacit knowledge is evidence of a position which is "almost" like alchemy, magic, and cabalism, then he probably believes that most great creations of scientific theory, philosophy, literature, music, and art are rooted in occultism.

Professor Tarlton also charges me with arguing that the study of the major political theorists of the past will "inoculate students" against certain contemporary trends. If I had argued this, I would have been undercutting the point of my critique of "methodism." My basic position was stated in this form: "Appropriateness of judgment cannot be encapsulated into a formula." (p. 1077)

I would agree with Professor Tarlton's commonplace that "everybody doesn't read" the major theorists in the way that I might and that many of the assertions advanced by past theorists are objectionable or false. My position in these matters is not very startling: in reading past theories, students are not being asked to suspend their critical faculties but to extend them by scrutinizing the arguments and assumptions being systematically worked out by serious thinkers. The value of the activity lies in the awareness which is cultivated, an awareness of what sorts of problems have been regarded as political and of what is occurring when a theorist proceeds to develop a theory. As my essay tried to suggest, most of the major theories have been designed to destroy and to innovate (p. 1079) and hence the student has the opportunity of observing minds in disagreement and of deciding for himself.

I would also agree with Professor Tarlton that the notion of tradition presents difficult problems for the study of political theory. Most of my work has been concerned with these problems. It remains unfinished

SHELDON S. WOLIN
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences

TO THE EDITOR:

In the December issue of APSR, Sheldon Wolin in his article "Political Theory As A Vocation" talked about the "embarrassments" that are recognized "when it is asserted that a supposedly democratic system requires a certain measure of indifferences or apathy, especially on the part of the poor and uneducated." As an illustration of that viewpoint, he cites a quotation from me in which I point out that "in the Congo, in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic" the restoration of order does require imposing a measure of passivity and defeatism on newly mobilized strata.

It is hard to understand how the list, the Congo, Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, could have been interpreted by Prof. Wolin as examples of democratic systems. Clearly, what they represent, on the contrary, is countries undergoing the turmoil of civil war. Indeed, in two of those countries, the Congo and Vietnam, neither side could properly be called democratic. To me, it seems fairly obvious that what I was trying to say was that where people have become so aroused politically as to be openly killing each other, order depends upon somehow demobilizing these participants in the turmoil and inevitably involves a certain measure of defeatism for those who find that their apocalyptic goals failed to be achieved. Had I been talking about democracy rather than about civil war, what I might have said was that "order depends on somehow stimulating newly mobilized strata to acquire a measure of political participation and a sense of efficacy to which they have not been adequately aroused by the ordinary processes of modernization." In short, a sentence about democracy would have said almost exactly the opposite of the sentence that Professor Wolin quotes.

ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

TO THE EDITOR:

Alex Inkeles' article, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries" raises some distressing questions about the comparative study of development and modernity. The avowed purpose of his study is to obtain a cross-culturally valid concept of modern man. Despite his apparent wish to avoid the stigma of being "culture bound" in his approach, I wish to emphatically point out that the conception and execution of Prof. Inkeles' study is just that.

It is curious that Prof. Inkeles offers no justification for selecting an exclusively male interview sample—cannot women be modern? Why is the study interested only in the male as a participant citizen?

The totally indefensible assumption that only men are relevant in the modernization process belies an incredible blindness to the crucial fact that in those countries in which there is an all-out drive towards modernization: i.e., bringing individuals into political participation, the emancipation of women is regarded as a key to changing the social, economic, and political, consciousness of both men and women. It is hardly a coincidence that the status of women has altered most drastically in those countries which have and are exerting the most effort to develop and change individual consciousness. May I cite China, Russia, Cuba, and Israel?

Unless American political scientists—who are predominantly men—cease regarding women as "persona non politica," the comparative study of modernization will continue to produce results which are less than fully valid.

Shelah G. Leader

State University of New York at Buffalo

To the Editor:

Dependent as she was on the limited account I could give in a journal article, Mrs. Leader misconstrued my purpose and mistakenly projected on to me views I do not hold.

Our main purpose was to test the effect of a limited number of independent variables, particularly education and factory experience, on the process of individual modernization. We designed our samples to have maximum variability on these dimensions. Given limited sample size this restriction meant we could afford only minimum variability on all other dimensions. We therefore excluded not only women, but all men over 32; all ethnic and linguistic groups except the predominant one in any region; all people working in factories with less than 50 employees; all individuals having higher education or holding managerial jobs. What theory of prejudice will encompass this array? It is true, of course, being obliged to limit ourselves to one sex did not require us to exclude women. Why not exclude the men? The reason was that in the developing countries we studied there were very few women working in the factories. In short, the exclusion of women from our sample was dictated by our sampling frame, and reflected no judgement about the importance of their participation in politics.

In fact, our views are quite the opposite of those projected on us by Mrs. Leader. The Harvard Project on the Social and Cultural Aspects of Development has defined individual modernity precisely in accord with Mrs. Leader's conviction that the emancipation of women is a key to modernization. In our scoring system the interviewee gains points toward a higher score on our measure of individual modernity (OM) if he affirms that for equal work women should be paid wages equal to those for men; that women should be able to speak for their families with a voice equal to that of men; that women should, if qualified, be freely elected to the highest office of the land; and so on through numerous other issues. This hardly suggests that we believe that "only men are relevant in the modernization process."

Alex Inkeles

Harvard University

To the Editor:

In the December 1969 issue of the Review, Professor Donald Hindley's discussion of my book, *The Broken Triangle,* raises an epistemological issue which I mistakenly had hoped had finally been laid to rest in the discipline: the place of systematic, replicable analytical techniques in handling limited—and hence manageable—research problems. One of the major purposes of *The Broken Triangle* is to provide historically trained area specialists, like Professor Hindley, with a demonstration that social science theories and techniques can provide new ways of ordering and analyzing the material which has been heretofore virtually the exclusive province of intuitive analysis. Hindley appears to reject the enterprise out-of-hand.

He begins by questioning the meaning of "national perception" and suggesting that the difference between *real* and *politically calculated* perceptions in dealing with data generated from authoritarian states render it a fruitless concept. He ignores completely, however, the fact that I have quite explicitly operationalized my definitions of national perceptions in terms of theme, media level, frequency, and intensity in dealing with Chinese sources (the study's primary concern) in a number of places in the manuscript, including pages 5-12 and 125-130. At the same time the specific utility of documentary content analysis is explained for handling the statements of totalitarian regimes. Professor Hindley dismisses the latter as mere "translation clippings," ignoring the criteria by which they were selected. (Incidentally, to be logically consistent, he would equally have to reject much of the documentary source material—other than interviews—for his own solid, earlier studies of the PKI).

Throughout his review Hindley rejects the position that social science propositions developed from other data bases can be applied to the Indonesian milieu. I suppose the logical extension of this stance is that Indonesian behavior is not a subcategory of human behavior! For example, he dismisses the symbolic proposition on group behavior adapted from the careful studies of Mancur Olson on American and British group dynamics as an "appalling . . . simple mathematical equation." The truly appalling element, however, is not the attempt to see whether Olson's proposition may be of explanatory value in other group contexts but rather Professor Hindley's obvious and indeed prideful ignorance of empirical theory and technique in political science.

Hindley raises specific questions about the interpretation of events. This would be perfectly legitimate if he would offer alternative explanations to those presented in *The Broken Triangle.* In fact, he does not do so—merely asserting *ex cathedra* that the author's are in error. His objection to the lack of causal analysis in the discussion of the relationship between the PKI, Peking, and Sukarno escapes me completely unless it is a further product of Hindley's ignorance of causal theory. That is, the chapters on NEFO and the PKI could *not* show a *causal* relationship between Chinese intentions and PKI and Sukarno's behavior both because of data inadequacies and because the conceptual framework was not designed to develop such relationships. These chapters do demonstrate, however, the evolving complementarity of goals and values among these actors; for purposes of demonstrating conditions conductive to alliance formation, this should be all that is required.

I could go on to refute Hindley's specific interpretive objections point-by-point, but unfortunately this communication is not the appropriate place. (Should any of the REVIEW's readers so desire, I should be happy to provide individual responses.) Some of these objections hardly merit rebuttal when, for example, Hindley enigmatically asserts that my depiction of Peking as xenophobic is based on personal prejudice. It is hard to believe that the evidence of Peking's international behavior in the course of the Cultural Revolution marshalled in the last chapter is merely a product of my "personal prejudice." Suffice it say that Professor Hindley's objections to *The Broken Triangle* have considerably reduced my optimism about the growing propinquity between the Asian area specialist and general political science theory.

SHELDON W. SIMON
University of Kentucky

TO THE EDITOR:

Herewith my reply to Professor Simon's letter.

My review was of a particular book, not of the analytical utility for regional studies of advances in social science theory and methodology. Professor Simon's *The Broken Triangle* is as unencumbered with originality in theory-building as it is unembarrassed by knowledge in breadth and depth of its purported subject matter. As for innovative technique, Professor Simon employs the simple quantification of translation clippings. What I question at this point, however, is not the relatively low level of methodological sophistication being displayed, but the woeful inadequacy, in extent and reliability, of the resource base to which the quantification is applied.

One may, of course, borrow theoretical propositions developed in one context and apply them usefully to another. Professor Simon does not. He refers to my unflattering reference to his application to an Indonesian situation of a mathematically-expressed proposition loaned from Mancur Olson. My objection is not to the borrowing as such, but to Professor Simon's failure to use it as the springboard for a tenable, explanatory hypothesis. His shallow and often incorrect information on the politics of China and Indonesia, combined with a paucity of imaginative creativity, lead inexorably to hypotheses that range from the risible to the aggravating. In the instance cited above, it is sufficient here to note that Simon does not present, nor can he from the limited sources at his command, any evidence that the PKI members did in fact withdraw their support from the party. That is, he presents an hypothesis of dubious value to explain a development whose occurrence is, to say the least, in doubt.

Professor Simon courts disaster from the start by failing to establish ("operationalize") an analytically serviceable definition of "national perceptions," the central focus of his study. Perception has a common usage, even if translation clippings from dictatorial regimes are inadequate data with which to distinguish true perceptions from those that are publicly stated but politically contrived. But what constitutes the nation? Even if it is defined as the topmost political elite, *The Broken Triangle* fails signally to expose, let alone explain, the diversity of the Indonesian nation during the period of Guided Democracy. Professor Simon and his uninformed readers are thereby left unprepared for the post-1965 leaders, whose perceptions are very different from those he attributes to Sukarno's nation, and yet who were part of the Sukarno elite. Perhaps they should be condemned as unnational.

Both Professor Simon's letter and a second reading of *The Broken Triangle* confirm a degree of ideologically-based prejudice that damages even further the value of his interpretive guesses. It is prejudice and not scholarship, for example, that evokes the conclusion that China's leaders are xenophobic. No persuasive evidence is presented. The incompatability of Maoism and xenophobia remains unexplored. But Professor Simon is not overly concerned with fact when characterizing those who oppose the policies of the United States: most notably Sukarno, the PKI and the Dullesite version of the Yellow Peril.

Prejudice, a pitiably inadequate resource base, pedestrianism in theoretical and methodological application, and a failure to establish analytically viable definitions of fundamental concepts do not lead to interpretive hypotheses that are plausible. Nor do they lead to hypotheses that are implausible but stimulating.

In short, Professor Simon has failed to achieve what he set out to do: to discover the *real* values and perceptions of the actors; the *real* goals and the techniques applied to achieve them; the sources of those values, perceptions, goals and techniques; and the interaction between Indonesians and Chinese.

As a reviewer I am required to criticize fairly but severely an endeavor of this caliber.

DONALD HINDLEY
Brandeis University

TO THE EDITOR:

Numerous grave errors mar the article by Richard Ashcraft ["Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?"] in the September 1968 issue of this REVIEW, but for the sake of brevity I will limit my comments to the two most serious of them:

1. Ashcraft uses as the basis of his central thesis a word—moral—that Locke never used in *Two Treatises of Government.*

2. Ashcraft never uses a word—self-preservation—that Locke used frequently and emphatically and described as "fundamental."

The result, as I will show, is a distortion instead of a clarification of what Locke meant by the state of nature.

1. Ashcraft's main thesis is that Locke's state of nature must be understood to have a moral aspect, and to buttress that thesis Ashcraft quotes extensively from Locke's writings. But any reader can detect the weakness of Ashcraft's evidence by a very simple test (I mean *any* reader; no prior study of Locke is required): Examine all of the passages from Locke and their source as given in Ashcraft's footnotes; you will discover that *every* use of the phrase "state of nature" occurs in *Two Treatises of Government* and *every* use of the word "moral" occurs in some other writing of Locke, published or unpublished. Ashcraft does not provide even one passage in which Locke spoke of morality and the state of nature together. In speaking of them together, Ashcraft has joined together what Locke scrupulously kept asunder.

2. The second major error is a mirror image of the first. Ashcraft, in a lengthy discussion of the transition from the state of nature to civil society, never speaks of self-preservation. Locke, on the other hand, spoke of the "Fundamental, Sacred, and unalterable law of *Self-Preservation* for which they [men] enter'd into Society."[1] Ashcraft purports to explain Locke's account of the foundations of political society without discussing or even mentioning what Locke himself tells us is the fundamental basis of civil society.

From this shaky foundation, Ashcraft proceeds to assert (and he merely asserts; there is not even an attempt at demonstration) that the state of nature is, at least in part, a "moral fiction." (I pass over the astonishing fact that Ashcraft does not tell us what he means by "fiction.") Having "established" by mere assertion that the state of nature partakes of morality, he proceeds to assure us that the state of nature is not a state of war: "the fact is, for Locke, the natural condition of man is one of uncertain peace."[2] Now, the fact is that nowhere did Locke say that the state of nature is a state of peace, certain or uncertain. On the contrary, Locke described only civil society, the opposite of the state of nature, as a state of peace.[3] What makes the state of war is the use of force (without authority) and, as Ashcraft rightly says, the use of such force may very well occur in the state of nature. Thus, by insisting on calling the state of nature a state of uncertain peace, but acknowledging the occurrence of force, Ashcraft is reduced to this scholarly nonsense: the state of nature is a state of peace except when it is a state of war. Ashcraft would be more consistent with his own argument, and Locke's, if he would say, simply, for Locke, the state of nature is a state of uncertainty, period. And the uncertainty of the state of nature is surely linked with Locke's silence about morality and his emphasis on self-preservation.

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[1] *Two Treatises of Government,* II, sec. 149.

[2] P. 902, column 1.

[3] *Two Treatises,* II, sec. 212.

If we ask ourselves, then, why Locke did not mention morality in his major political book, whereas he spoke of it very frequently in much of his other writing, many interesting possible answers present themselves. One is that Locke did not equate the law of nature and morality (as Ashcraft does); instead, Locke equated the law of nature and self-preservation. He thus replaced a politics of morality with what might be called a "politics of self-interest." Locke did not go so far as to say that morality has nothing whatever to do with politics, but, even so, a comprehensive account of the origins and purposes of civil society that makes no reference to morality transforms our understanding of politics and of the rights and obligations of citizens.

The purpose of this communication cannot be to present a full interpretation of Locke's political teaching. I intend only to point out how Ashcraft's elementary errors of reading totally obscure the core of Locke's political teaching. Ashcraft used a vast collection of Locke's books and papers and drafts and correspondence, but he misread the one book before him.

Robert A. Goldwin
St. John's College

To the Editor:

I am fortunate that Mr. Goldwin's ability to misread has resulted in a short communication; Locke, unfortunately, has suffered more elaborately from this non-scholarship.

Goldwin says Locke does not use the word 'moral'; hence, it cannot be applied to the state of nature. Later, he even suggests that the Law of Nature and morality are not conjoined. In the simplistic fashion in which all this is gravely stated, one might also note that Locke did not apply the phrase, 'political theory' to his work. Should we therefore cease to regard the *Two Treatises* as embodying a 'political theory'? If the reader must take such nonsense seriously, let him consider, as Goldwin did not, what Locke means when he denies that men in the state of nature 'have an uncontrollable liberty' because 'the State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone' not to harm another.[1] It is the rule 'of reason and common equity' which 'God has set to the actions of men' and those who transgress it are to be regarded as 'evil' or 'noxious.'[2] If Locke is not talking about a *moral* standard, what is he talking about?

Goldwin's second point is even more obscurantist. I shall not try to imagine why *he* refers to the principle of self-preservation, but the reason Locke refers to it in the passage Goldwin cites is that he is speaking of 'the preservation of the Community.' He refers to men *collectively,* as having entered society for self-preservation, and on this ground, Locke justifies the sovereignty of the community in the sentence immediately following the one Goldwin cites. "And thus the *Community* may be said in this respect to be *always the Supreme Power* . . ."[3], i.e., the community always retains the right of self-preservation. Indeed, as Goldwin says, this point is 'a mirror image of the first;' it is precisely because the Law of Nature 'willeth the peace and *preservation of all mankind*' that the *community* does retain the right of self-preservation.[4]

Goldwin 'passes over the astonishing fact' that I did not tell him what I meant by 'fiction.' It is the second time he has 'passed it over.' Obviously, he did not read F.N. 14 (p. 900) in which I not only explain what I mean by 'fiction,' I also explain what Locke means by it. With a reader who will not read, what is one to do?

But it is not only that Goldwin does not read the text, Locke's or mine; a more serious difficulty lies in his methodological treatment of political theory. He imagines that when, *on the same day* that Locke is writing passages of the *Second Treatise,* he records in his *Journal* that it is 'every man's duty to be just, whether there be any such thing as a just man in the world or not,' (p. 906, n. 52) Locke neatly compartmentalizes his thought: 'morality' goes into the *Journal,* and amorality or immorality into the *Second Treatise.* If Goldwin has any specific evidence for believing that Locke consistently or inconsistently operated in this fashion—apart from his own imagination—we would all be interested in seeing it. For one so willing to pose 'simple tests,' this one should be easy to meet.

Perhaps when we refuse the name of scholarship to the kind of word play engaged in by Goldwin and others, political theory will cease to be the captive of those who would turn it into a new form of scholasticism. What we need to understand is the 'structure of intentions' of a political theorist, how his thought develops over time, and its relationship to the social and historical setting in which it arises. Only then can we begin to determine the relevance of 'traditional' political theory to our own lives and problems.

By the way, how is it that Goldwin purports to interpret my 'central thesis'? I never used that term in my article.

Richard Ashcraft
University of California, Los Angeles

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[1] *Second Treatise,* par. 6.

[2] *Ibid,* par. 8.

[3] *Ibid,* par. 149 (italics in original).

[4] *Ibid,* par. 7 (italics in original); cf. pars. 6, 8, 135, 159.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Political Thinking and Consciousness: The Private Life of the Political Mind. By Robert E. Lane. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. 348. $6.95.)

Robert Lane's new book provides an interesting addition and counterpart to his earlier *Political Ideology*. The basic objective has remained the same—the discovery and explanation of regularities in the associations of life experience, personality needs, and political ideas—but there are major differences in method of data collection, type of respondents, and focus of inquiry. The data for the earlier analysis were obtained through interviews of fifteen adult members of the working- and lower-middle-class, the primary focus of conversation being the institutions and events that constituted the respondents' social and political environment. The data for *Political Thinking and Consciousness* come from essays of "ideological self-analysis," written by twenty-four college undergraduates, most of whom had middle- or upper-middle-class backgrounds.

Ideological self-analysis is an

> . . . analysis of one's own political values, opinions, and beliefs, and the functions they serve in one's personality and life situation. It is an extended response to the questions "Of what use to me are my political ideas?" and "How did I come to have these political ideas?" (p. 16).

Self-analysis demands more of the respondent than interviewing, and while it provides better data for a study of intrapersonal dynamics than most interviews, the population with which this technique can be used probably is quite small. Lane's students, who, at least comparatively, ranked high in self-awareness and analytic skills, were given considerable coaching before they were thought to be ready to write the essays (cf. pp. 16–17).

From the parts of the essays that have been transcribed, it appears that most of the twenty-four students succeeded to a very substantial degree in their attempts to discover the developmental history and current functioning of their political ideas and to lay bare facets of the self normally shielded by complex defenses. The essays are frank in tone and richly textured in substance; they allow Lane to consider a great variety of propositions about the linkage of personality and politics.

Lane starts his analysis with an assumption: in ambiguous situations, that is, in situations where alternative cognitions about some matter are available, *unrewarding* ideas will not be adopted, or retained, or utilized (p. 2). The status of this assumption is not altogether clear. Under a maximal interpretation of "rewarding" it can be taken as true by definition and hence empirically empty. More restrictive interpretations give the assumption empirical standing, but make it controversial. There is considerable evidence to show that not all human thought and action is reward oriented, whether one speaks of psychic gratification or of cognitive gain. In any case, once the assumption is stated it becomes clear what is to be taken as problematic, and the questions for Lane's inquiry reveal themselves: In what way is the idea rewarding? What needs influenced the adoption of the idea? What needs or motives does the idea satisfy presently?

For Lane, needs and motives are part of the personality system and constitute the "energizing sources" of political thought: ". . . human needs are the parents of social thought; the effort to gratify these needs or to reduce their urgency stimulates and shapes thinking" (p. 24). Lane's emphasis is on learned needs and motivations rather than on physiological needs. Informed in part by the thinking of Henry Murray and Abraham Maslow, Lane lists ten need syndromes particularly cogent for studies of political thought (pp. 31–46). The data permitted a treatment of the following of these: the need to be liked, the need to express and control aggression, the need to appear moral to the self and others, the need for social esteem and status, the need for identity continuity, and the need for autonomy.

The political ideas found in the twenty-four essays are the dependent variables in Lane's analysis schema. Arranged by Lane as "liberal" and "conservative" alternatives, the most important of these ideas concern: opportunity for all versus opportunity for the able; inclusive versus exclusive personal and social orientation toward minority groups; equality among nations versus emphasis of American interests and rights; belief in positive government versus suspicion of government; Capitalism as neutral versus positive symbol; greater acceptance of social change versus greater faith in the status quo; no identification versus positive identification with business (p. 52).

The connection between needs and ideas is forged by the dynamics of Lane's "model of a political 'idea machine.'" Briefly, a message or cue engages or arouses a need, stimulating need-reducing efforts, which are shaped by a person's habitual modes of conflict resolution and strategies of defense, and which express themselves as a search for ideas to satisfy the need. This search is guided by various personality features, elements of belief systems, learning strategies, relation to reference groups and persons, definitions of the situation, and similar such matters (pp. 48–49).

Lane's model can be identified as belonging to a cluster of conceptual constructs, predicated upon the proposition that human thinking and action follow tension-reduction dynamics. Cross-pressure theory, balance theory, and cognitive dissonance theory are a few of the better known members of this cluster. Tension-reduction theories have dominated psychology and large portions of the social sciences for several decades. Their influence, however, has begun to wane. Critics have noted many unresolved conceptual difficulties and empirical work has produced important disconfirmations. There are weighty reasons to think that tension-reduction propositions are appropriate and useful only in the analysis of primitive stages or pathological forms of human development. It is doubtful that Lane's model provided the most advantageous orientation for his inquiry.

Lane's findings are many and cover a large substantive range; a comprehensive summary cannot be given here. Some of the findings add support to propositions that have become well accepted in political psychology, e.g., that personal insecurities and uncertainties can produce an intense need to be liked by others and/or to have power over them (p. 124); that hatred of one's father can give political thought an exceptionally aggressive quality (p. 163); and that the adoption of ideas and strategies of an "outsider" often is a consequence of damages to the self-image caused by bodily handicaps or other early deficiencies or disappointments (p. 228). Other findings are new or, in any case, throw light on propositions that have not yet gained general acceptance, e.g., that there is a causal link between fear of intimacy and bids for the affection of underdogs and outcasts (p. 117); or that "politically conscious upper- middle-class people whose aggression is inhibited solely by fear of consequences are more likely than others to be reactionary" (p. 173), whereas "those who are restrained in their aggression because of an other-embracing aggression anxiety, empathy with the intended victims, or guilt will tend to be moderate liberals or apolitical" (p. 179).

Lane, of course, does not take at face value all the facts asserted and beliefs and sentiments expressed in the essays. The students might not only wish to deceive the prospective readers of their essays, consciously or not, but they also tend to "deceive themselves and often are out of touch with their own deepest needs" (p. 17). The analytic quest is for the hidden meaning and for the clues below the surface. But while the attempt to go to the hidden and refracted message is appropriate and necessary to the task, Lane leaves the reader severely frustrated by failing to specify the rules and standards that guided his non-face-value interpretations (for one of a very few exceptions see p. 262). The reader is given almost no opportunity to judge the validity of the interpretation criteria (the rules of evidence) or to inquire into the consistency of their application.

The feeling of frustration is increased by the fact that the essays are not reproduced in full, and that the selections from any given essay are scattered widely throughout the volume. This makes it impossible for the reader to gain the comprehensive and integrated perspective on each student which must have provided important contextual clues for Lane's interpretations of specific passages. When trying to assess the validity of Lane's inferences, the reader mostly is limited to asking whether the interpretations "make sense"—in terms of the selections that have been reproduced, or in terms of the concordance of Lane's conclusions with accepted theories.

If *Political Thinking and Consciousness* frustrates the reader, it also gives him much that is stimulating and challenging. Lane displays an uncommon understanding of the adolescent's struggle to come into his own; the findings and suggestions of the new book will be of interest to students of the socialization progress as well as to students of political ideology.

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African Armies and Civil Order. BY J. M. LEE. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969, Pp. 200. $6.00.)

In the last few years, Africa has displaced South America as the continent on which takeover bids by military forces occur most frequently. Attempted coups d'etat there have now become a monthly event. Their incidence defies prediction. Arab and Bantu nations have proved equally vulnerable. East and West Africa have both had to contend with the problem. Military uprisings have become common in both francophonic and anglophonic areas. One-party states have proved no more resistant than more pluralistic regimes. Coups have occurred because the rank and file desire higher pay, or because officers tire of "corrupt" politicians; because ethnic minorities resent the dominance of government by other groups, or because previously excluded minorities are now being recruited at the officer level; because military men are dismayed by the chaos of civilian rule, or because they wish to retain some measure of autonomy within an increasingly totalitarian order. Many mutinous units have sought no more than the redress of limited grievances within a continuing framework of civilian government; on other occasions, uprisings express the determination of the armed forces—or a critical segment thereof—to assert the primacy of military values in political life. Almost the only constant is the increasingly demonstrated fragility of civilian regimes amid such pressures.

Africanists have recently begun to take account of these developments. J. M. Lee's *African Armies and Civil Order* is only the most comprehensive and ambitious of a recent stream of articles, bibliographies, and books on the subject. Yet there were few indications of this outpouring a mere five years ago. Until, in late November of 1965, General Mobutu's decisive takeover of the Congo sent a spreading shock wave of coups through francophonic Africa, climaxed some two months later by the overturning of seemingly well entrenched civilian governments in anglophonic Nigeria and Ghana, political scientists tended to treat the intervention of African military units in civilian politics as the transient irruptions of aberrant bands of mutineers. Mesmerized by the dramatic efforts of political leaders to transmute primordial attachments into populist nationalism, they continued to focus their attention on the seemingly successful processes by which "integration" and "nation-building" were being achieved through transference of "charismatic" authority to constitutional regimes. A rather slight volume by William Gutteridge, together with a half dozen cursory survey articles in widely scattered French and English language publications, comprised the contributions of scholarship to the question of civil-military relations in Africa.

One might infer from this record that African soldiers played a negligible role in the life of their nations before 1966. The inference would be hard to sustain. African troops were serving under colonial commanders before World War I. The first modern nationalist army coup in Africa took place in Egypt in 1952. Five bloody years of almost unparalleled disintegration in the formerly Belgian Congo were triggered off by a mutiny of the armed forces on July 4, 1960. Between 1957, when Ghana became the first tropical African nation to obtain its independence from a colonial power, and January 1, 1966, military units in various parts of the continent rose up against the newly constituted civilian authorities no less than sixteen times. Even when these uprisings were suppressed, they usually traumatized the regime and fundamentally reordered its priorities. Yet it is also true that the role of the armed forces in modern Africa has had few parallels in other parts of the world. The relatively peaceful and almost total division of the African continent among the European colonial powers obviated the emergence of large traditional sovereign armies. Throughout the colonial period, the primary function of the relatively small-scale indigenous armed forces consisted not of protecting the colonial borders against external aggression, but of maintenance of internal order. Their visibility on the world scene remained correspondingly low.

One of the anomalies of contemporary Africa is that the balkanization of the continent at the time of independence has hardly altered this role. Attempts to interpret the recent wave of coups in Africa as the working out of certain allegedly universal propensities of "the military mind" are thus misleading. African soldiers have only rarely confronted, even prospectively, the conventional battlefield. Nor is it particularly helpful to view the armed forces, by analogies derived from other continents, as the representatives and/or protectors of determinate class interests. In countries where over ninety percent of the inhabitants are independent cultivators of small-scale plots, the apparatus of government is still the almost exclusive allocator of class status. African military leaders have indeed been interested in the pattern of their governments' distribution of scarce resources. But to say this is to redirect attention from the isolated compositional properties of the armed forces in Africa to the nature of the political regimes with which they are currently seeking to define their relations. It is the special merit of Lee's work to have pursued unstintingly the implications of this perspective.

The important questions about African armies today are ultimately, according to Lee, questions about the extent to which civil disorders on the continent spill over into the armed forces and involve them in the political conflicts of the larger society. One illustration of this perspective arises from the British colonial policy of recruiting indigenous army personnel from the less westernized, less well educated tribes on the dubious supposition that such troops would at once retain a more martial spirit and prove tractable to military discipline. This created, in Kenya, a predominantly Kamba officers corps that could be relied upon after independence to disassociate itself from the tense maneuverings of the larger Kikuyu and Luo tribes for ascendancy within the government; in Uganda, a dependable ally for the Nilotic Prime Minister Milton Obote during his desperate struggle with Bantu cabinet ministers and royalty; in Nigeria, a complex stratification of the armed forces by generation and region that brought about a succession of coups and counter-coups within the army as ethnic hatreds surged to the surface elsewhere. When a single policy can have three such different outcomes, it follows that the composition and internal dynamics of the military structures in question become significant primarily in relation to the civilian sector's ability to cope with the ethnic tensions of the nation. A practical corollary is that, as Lee observes, the more an African government seeks to make its officer corps representative of the new nation, the more it makes its army vulnerable to complete collapse if the coalition of interests in the civilian order also breaks down.

Lee's book is consequently more than a monograph on African armies; it is, in fact, an interpretive essay on the politics of tropical Africa as the unifying drama of independence begins to fade. The central characteristic of this politics, as Lee sees it, is one of intense competition for the scarce material and status rewards of public employment—a competition unregulated or only weakly regulated by any common normative conception of legitimate public authority. This "competition for jobs may often transform old conflicts between the different social groupings which claim access to the new state, and adds a new dimension of rivalry between generations" (p. 180). Although African armies have frequently sought to perpetuate their colonial tradition of standing somewhat apart from the overtly political branches of the government, they seldom succeed because not only the coercive resources at their disposal but even quite simply the stable employment they offer appears too tempting a prize to the contending factions within the new states. Since military officers themselves were conditioned to obedience to an external colonial sovereign in the era preceding independence, they have rarely exhibited any deeply rooted loyalties to the generally fragile successor regimes, and have proved correspondingly more accessible to the importunities of particularist groups. Hence despite the contentions of certain scholars that armies in the new nations are the natural conservators of a unified civic order, in tropical Africa "it looks as if the army is more likely to succumb to the influence of the values expressed by the political community, than to create and diffuse new concepts of national identity" (p. 113).

The exposition offered here can only hint at the important issues canvassed in Lee's densely argued and richly suggestive work. Multi-faceted in its analysis, it is equally impressive for the scope of its coverage. Lee ranges freely and authoritatively throughout anglophonic and francophonic Africa, repeatedly drawing pertinent illustrations from opposite ends of the continent. Generalizations are derived not only from the inevitable cases of Senegal, Ghana, and Tanzania but also from Togo, Somalia, and the Central African Republic.

This synoptic approach predictably has its price. The familiar but critically significant efforts of Tanzania to forestall a second mutiny deserve more than the brief remarks Lee allots to this deviant case. The references to Gabon could well have been sacrificed to an analysis of the lines of continuing cohesion and cross-cutting cleavage within the Nigerian army that would have revealed the excessive ethnic reductionism involved in talking of "Ibo officers" vs. "Northerners." A seductive but methodologically indefensible aspect of Lee's procedure is that exotic illustrations often serve as a surrogate for a systematic survey of confirming and disconfirming instances. Readers familiar with conditions in Africa will sympathize with Lee's reference to the "fragmentary nature" of the available statistical evidence, but are likely to feel that a more ambitious effort could have been made to relate the data he presents to the patterns he elaborates.

It must be said, moreover, that Lee's style of presentation makes needlessly unmerciful demands on the reader. It reflects too well the chaos he describes. Topical sentences too rarely provide an organic clue to the concluding sentence of a paragraph. The logical intension of concepts frequently shifts within a page; suggestive analytic propositions and classifications are devised and as promptly abandoned, only to reappear several chapters later. Repeatedly, Lee accounts for a variance with an explanation that is either incomplete or apparently contradicted by something previously written; one then encounters the critical missing premise several paragraphs later. The result is that a 185 page book reads like one approximately twice that length—one is forever rereading a paragraph or shifting from page to page in pursuit of a tantalizingly permuting argument. Both author and editor have much to answer for.

Much allowance will be made, however, for the artificially foreshortened gestation period of such intensely topical themes. For all its evidence of hasty composition, Lee's study suggests important new questions, sharpens several that have been asked before, and explores them at length from a consistent and fruitful perspective. Given the almost daily flux of the subject matter, one could hardly have asked for so much so soon.

George Von der Muhll
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Power in Committees: An Experiment in the Governmental Process. By James David Barber. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966. Pp. 185. $6.25.)

This book is unusual in at least two respects. As a systematic, empirical investigation of the process of committee decision-making, it is a welcome addition to an area of the discipline much in need of such research. As a piece of laboratory research, utilizing small-group concepts and methods, it is a distinctive and innovative work which is bound to receive critical scrutiny from a discipline largely unaccustomed to this type of research. From either standpoint, the book is a provocative and insightful piece of highly original scholarship.

It is Barber's concern with group processes and his perception of the difficulties involved in researching them in the natural setting which leads him to the laboratory. However, he is extremely skeptical concerning the value of trying to generalize from the findings of conventional small-group studies which typically involve naive subjects working on unfamiliar problems in an artificial setting. Barber perhaps states the case against such research too strongly, failing, for instance, to take account of the conventional defense of small-group research which asserts that *theory* is both the rationale behind apparent artificiality and the bridge between small-group findings and real-world phenomena. Nonetheless, his position leads him to attempt the fruitful innovation of bringing existing political decision-making bodies (Connecticut Boards of Finance), virtually intact, into the laboratory for observation.

Barber invited twelve Boards to the Yale small-groups laboratory to engage in two simulated decision-making tasks, which were designed to approximate the kinds of problems commonly encountered by such groups. The groups' behaviors were observed and scored according to the Bales Interaction Process Analysis system, and verbatim transcripts of the proceedings were also kept. Afterward, the participants completed a set of questionnaires and each group engaged in an evaluation session, which was also recorded. Barber did not attempt to conduct an experiment in the strict sense—the Boards performed identical tasks under identical circumstances. This fact points to a possible limitation in the general utility of his method, since groups lifted intact from their natural setting inevitably bring to the laboratory their own particular internal structures and assumptions, which have an independent and unique effect upon each group's behavior. This introduces a source of uncontrolled variation in the groups' performance which could make it difficult to determine precisely the effects of an experimental "treatment" in the context of a controlled experiment. However, this presents no problem in Barber's design, and Barber has a plausible case when he argues that the gain in relevance from using "real" groups out-weighs any loss in experimental precision.

Barber's central theoretical concern is with power, both the power of the committee to perform its tasks and operate successfully within its environment and the exercise of power within the committee by individual members. In examining the first problem, Barber relies primarily upon verbatim transcripts, and his analysis, although not methodologically rigorous, is sensitive and insightful. In his discussion of the criteria employed by the Boards to sort their way through the complexities and uncertainties of budgeting, Barber makes an excellent contribution to the literature on incrementalism. His criticisms and suggestions for the "incremental improvement" of incrementalism are reasonable, if modest. Similarly, Barber's discussion of the power of the Board, in which he analyzes the contexts in which perceived power develops, strategies for enhancing power, and the relationship between contexts and strategies, is interesting and suggestive. These chapters may be best regarded as useful sets of hypotheses which warrant further testing.

In the succeeding chapters, Barber relies primarily upon the interaction process and questionnaire data. After showing that individual Board members' perceptions of the "power structure" in which the Boards operate are explainable primarily in terms of the individuals' self-images (certainly an interesting finding), Barber turns to the problem of power within the committee. His findings on the role of the chairman are substantially what one would expect on the basis of small group theory, but in a chapter entitled "Integration and Interaction" he produces some evidence which is not only important but sometimes surprising. For instance, he discovers that "there is apparently no relationship whatsoever between participation (frequency) and satisfaction" in the committees (p. 104), and that "there is apparently no relationship between rewarding experiences and integration" (p. 109). He finds norms of non-partisanship, impersonality, and unanimity important to the functioning of the Boards, and he finds evidence of substantial internal stratification and role specialization. While these and other important propositions are not really integrated into a general theoretical framework, they are significant in themselves and should provide a good basis for further exploration in other contexts.

In his final analytical chapter, Barber factor analyzes 45 measures of interpersonal power. Each of the five major factors which results is composed mainly of slightly different measures of a single type of behavior or attribute. In operating inductively, Barber, perhaps unfortunately, declines the guidance of any formal theory of power. Nevertheless, the procedure does provide plausible evidence for Barber's contention that "power" is not a unitary phenomenon, but rather a set of phenomena which are substantially independent of one another or, in some cases, negatively related. Barber's attempt to explain his factors in terms of the possession of power resources produces numerous significant correlations but no very strong relationships. Interpretation of the findings in this chapter is difficult, but these data still seem well worth the attention of scholars concerned with the concept of power.

This book has some problems, including a lack of overall theoretical integration, despite conceptual linkages between the chapters. The presentation of data is not always as clear as it might be, and Barber's failure to perform significance tests on some of his data is puzzling. On the whole, however, as a basically exploratory effort, the book is a success. Barber clearly demonstrates the importance of paying attention to the internal structures and processes of political decision-making, especially at the small group level, and he shows the utility of laboratory research as one method of approaching this field. Hopefully this work will stimulate further investigations of its kind, both in laboratories and in field settings, and will not be disregarded as simply a curious, albeit interesting, piece of methodological heresy.

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The Political Economy of Change. BY WARREN F. ILCHMAN AND NORMAN THOMAS UPHOFF. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 316. $8.50.)

This book might be described as an almost flagrantly successful expedition in what has been called "economics imperialism," that is, the attempt on the part of economics to take over all the other social sciences. Its success is the more remarkable because neither of the authors are professional economists but rather political scientists. Nevertheless, they have taken the trouble to master what economics has to offer, which is not always done in these cases, and the economist can find very little to complain about in the concepts and the theories which they have borrowed from him.

The success of economics imperialism depends on the fact that exchange, which is the central concept of economics, is a concept which can easily be generalized into virtually all other aspects of the social system, especially in its most general form of a transformation function, in which a certain quantity of A is given up and a certain quantity of B is gained. A and B in this case do not have to be commodities in the narrow sense of the word; they can be such things as the support of a particular sector for a politician, a sense of legitimacy which a regime creates, the capacity to do damage and to influence people by threats, and so on. It is, furthermore, easy to extend the concept of the transformation function into its limiting case of the one-way transfer, or grant, in which A is zero and B is positive or negative. It can also be extended to the concept of the threat, explicit or implicit, which may not, of course, be carried out, but remains as a potential transformation. If I do not pay my income tax (− A), I will go to jail (− B). One can argue very convincingly, therefore, that transformation functions and their more particular form of transformation coefficients (prices and shadow prices) underly all of social life, and indeed all systems of any kind, and as economics has specialized in the study of transformation functions of a particular kind in society (ratios of exchange), it is not surprising that the concepts and theories of economics have broad applicability.

We can see this in another form perhaps if we reflect that transformation functions which imply scarcity, in which A and B are of opposite signs, so that the more of A, the less of B, which are peculiarly the province of economics, extend over the whole field of social life, and it is again not surprising, therefore, to find that the principles of economics have very wide applicability. This reflection may also provide a clue, however, to the limits of economics imperialism, for transformation functions do exist which do not exhibit scarcity or conservation, in which for instance the more of A, the more of B. Teaching increases knowledge both of the teacher and of the student. An act of goodwill may increase the benevolence of both parties, as an act of illwill may increase the malevolence of both parties. With these kinds of transformations, economics is not at home, and the general theoretical structure which is based purely on economics is likely to miss them and their significance. It is not really a criticism of this book that its authors did not build the non-scarce transformation functions into their theory, for the object of the book is quite explicitly to apply the concepts of economic theory to political reality as far as it will go, and it goes a very long way. Nevertheless, the reader should be warned that economics cannot do everything, even though what it can do may be a large part of the field.

The book is so dense in content that it is difficult to summarize and though it is clearly written it is not always easy to read. Undergraduates, I think, would find it difficult, though graduate students in any field of social science would find it most rewarding. It begins with a justification for "political economy," as a new, or perhaps one should say, a resurrected science, and it ends with a plea for a new and a better Machiavellism for giving good advice not only to the sovereign or "statesman," as they call him, but also to the "anti-statesman," who may be more ethically desirable than the incumbent. The central chapters of the book deal with such problems as political resources, political exchange, political inflation and deflation, where incidentally the economic analogy often tends to break down, political resource management, political resource accumulation, and political administrative infrastructure. The political organization is seen as a kind of "firm" with the statesman making decisions in the light of his political exchange environment and also his political production environment. We see the statesman operating by inputs and outputs of both economic goods, threats, persuasions, charisma and what not. The authors are well aware of the great importance of legitimacy and legitimation and aware also that this is a quasi-economic good which can be produced and exchanged. They recognize in many places the limitations of the economic framework, especially as a result of the fact that in political life there is no single medium of exchange, like money. Hence, we have something which looks much like a complex barter economy which is much harder to reduce to simple terms and to measurement. This leads to some real confusions in the concepts of political inflation and deflation which clearly correspond to some sort of reality, but where the economic analogy is not very close because of the absence of any political equivalent of the price level. Nevertheless, the contrast which is drawn between regimes which have a deficiency of political demand, hence are lethargic and traditional, and those regimes where political demand is in excess and hence are unstable and chaotic, is a valid and powerful insight. The book is full of brilliant little "asides," like the comparison in the footnote on page 261 of the four Parsonian functions with the four "humors" of medieval medicine. The attack on "general" theories of social change and development, like those of McClelland and Hagen, by comparison with the more particular and short-run theories, like those of Hirschman and Papenek, is very cogent.

This work is an important landmark in the development of an integrated social science, and everyone who reads it seriously will profit by it. It is perhaps a little unfortunate, in its illustrative material at least, that it concentrates so heavily on the problems of the poor countries and of development, because the principles which it expounds are of complete generality and indeed the applications to the rich countries may be of even greater interest. Perhaps the authors will consider this in the future. Whether the book fulfills its avowed intention, however, of developing a body of doctrine which will be useful to the "statesman," such as Colonel Gowan of Nigeria, may be doubted. The basic problem here is not so much the body of concepts and theory, but the problem of collecting and processing information in a form which is accessible to the "statesman." The authors recognized the problem, but also recognized that in the present state of knowledge they cannot do very much about it. Economics has been successful in influencing policy, not so much because it has developed an elegant body of theory, as because it has developed a technique—one might almost say a ritual—of information collection and processing which presents information to the "statesman" about the economy in a form which he can appreciate and act upon. Until political economy can do the same, one suspects that its actual impact on political behavior will be small. It is no great criticism of this book, however, to say that it does not go all the way. It has laid down the beginnings of a high road over very difficult country and its authors are much to be commended.

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Integration and Disintegration in NATO: Processes of Alliance Cohesion and Prospects for Atlantic Community. BY FRANCIS A. BEER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969. Pp. 330. $10.00.)

Francis Beer attempts to analyze the processes of alliance cohesion in NATO in terms of a theory of integration. This approach provides an interesting addition to the great majority of literature on alliances in which theoretical considerations often are overlooked altogether. Even in the more theoretical work on alliances, the applicability of integration theory has largely been disregarded. Through an examination of NATO institutions the author seeks to investigate the extent to which NATO has passed beyond a traditional alliance to become a political community. This transition is treated in terms of integration, defined as "the process whereby political actors in several discrete national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states." (p. 3)

In his theoretical introduction Beer suggests that movement toward an integrated political community will be indicated by an increase in institutional autonomy, the growth of authority, and increased legitimacy of the central institutions. He also suggests the hypotheses that integration will be more likely as: 1) alliance leadership combines ideological clarity in specific programs with ambiguity in abstract goals; 2) allied decisions are made jointly by independent experts and instructed national delegates; 3) coalitional support varies according to the issue in question; and 4) functional sectors tend to be technical rather than political in nature, so that spillover is more likely to result. Each of these relationships is then examined in great detail for five functional areas. The author chooses for this purpose political consultation, military forces, armaments, infrastructure, and science.

It is unfortunate that the author often loses sight in these detailed sections of his theoretical propositions, so that the theory serves more as an organizing scheme than as a set of hypotheses to be tested rigorously. The result is that the relationship between the detailed middle sections and the theoretical introduction is often drawn rather sketchily. As a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the development of NATO institutions, these interior sections are excellent; as a contribution to a theory of alliance cohesion, however, they fall somewhat short of the expectations generated in the introduction.

The author's general conclusion is that little integration has taken place in NATO in the 20 years since its formation. He finds that, while NATO has performed many useful tasks in all five functional areas, there has been little integrative spillover. This has been indicated by the lack of binding institutional procedures, limited task expansion, predominantly indirect authority, the lack of authoritative centers of decision-making, and the politicization of even technical functions, making spillover unlikely. Indeed, the only two factors contributing to alliance cohesion, Beer finds, were the ideological proclamations of NATO's leadership and the presence of external crisis. While all of these conclusions are quite reasonable and well documented, from a theoretical perspective the author's historical/narrative methodology makes it difficult to generalize these findings systematically beyond this specific case study.

In his introduction the author raises three criticisms of previous studies of integration, all of which tend to be contradicted somewhat by his own research. First, he argues that integration has been treated too often as a condition rather than as a process. Yet, in treating integration as a process, Beer fails to realize that process models are not necessarily uni-dimensional and one-directional. Spillover does not necessarily contribute solely to integration; indeed, *disintegrative* spillover may also occur. This point, which has been emphasized only recently by theorists of political development, needs also to be taken into account by theorists of international relations. Indeed, Beer's own analysis would seem to suggest that political disputes continually tend to be injected into technical areas of NATO organization. For example, French resentment of American domination of NATO, a political dispute, has undoubtedly contributed to French rejection of integrated NATO military forces and infrastructure, nominally technical issues.

In applying a functionalist model, Beer has failed to confront explicitly one of the fundamental paradoxes of functionalist theory. Functionalism assumes that integration is possible in technical areas because they are insulated from political conflicts; it then assumes that integrative habits learned in performing technical functions may spill over into political ones. But this then implies that the two spheres are not totally insulated or spillover would not occur. And if they are not entirely insulated, then political conflicts may even spill over to destroy co-operation in the performance of nominally technical functions. In short, there may be a reverse process of *disintegrative* spillover, and this seems to be what is appearing in NATO. A crucial task then, not dealt with in this book, may entail the identification of those conditions which may account for the direction of the spillover process.

Second, Beer charges that the importance of institutions has been de-emphasized, obscuring a great deal of the integrative process. While this is probably true to a degree, this may not have obscured as much as Beer assumes. Indeed, one conclusion that seems to stand out in his analysis is that somehow, in spite of the existence of a plethora of autonomous and differentiated institutions, NATO cohesion has declined substantially. Certainly this should suggest that a good deal more than institutions are relevant to alliance cohesion.

Third, the author contends that "there has been a concentration on environmental configurations as causal factors and a neglect of the immediate motives and expectations of key political actors." (p. 3) Once again, several of his own findings seem to contradict this assertion. The one crucial factor which seems to account for the greatest change in NATO cohesion, according to Beer, is the degree of external crisis, an environmental factor. In his conclusion the author traces at some length the changes in NATO integration in relation to the degree of East-West conflict, and he finds that institutional advancement consistently tailed off during the periods of East-West détente in 1953–55, 1958–59, and 1963–65. Clearly perceptions of environmental conflict and the resulting tension appeared to have an integrative effect on NATO.

In addition, Beer finds that the ideology of NATO's leadership also tended to favor integration strongly. However, the minimal influence of these key political actors on the actual outcome tends to indicate their relative lack of importance. From this reviewer's perspective, one of the strongest points about the author's narrative was that it did *not* attribute all changes in NATO cohesion to one or a few key political actors, like de Gaulle, as so many other studies of NATO have done. In fact, he often seems to be quite aware that there are more basic factors, often environmental ones, at work. Thus, it appears to be essential to analyze the actors' environment and their perceptions of it as well as their own unique and idiosyncratic personalities.

In summary, Beer's book is certainly one of the most comprehensive and up-to-date analyses of changes in NATO cohesion during the past 20 years. It exhibits considerable substantive research effort and is organized in an interesting framework based on an analysis of the integrative process. Unfortunately, it has several theoretical shortcomings which illustrate rather clearly how far we are from a systematic, potentially generalizable, and empirically gounded theory of alliance cohesion.

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Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence. BY ERIK H. ERIKSON. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969. Pp. 474. $10.00.)

When Erikson's *Young Man Luther* was published in 1958, it was little noticed by historians and social scientists, even by those who had special interests in the Protestant Reformation and rise of modern Europe (if memory serves, the book was not reviewed by This Journal or any other political science publication). By now *Luther* has achieved almost classic status as a work of psychobiography, and indeed serves as a model to those attempting to apply psychoanalytic insights to history and biography. But Erikson's eminence goes far beyond the confines of academic departments in universities and the pages of *Daedalus*. Unlike many of his psychoanalytic colleagues who write for outside audiences, he is a prophet honored in his own country. His *Childhood and Society*, with its skilled delineation of the stages of child and adolescent development in different cultures, is among the most widely used books in psychiatric residency training programs. No wonder that for his contributions to the study of ego identity and identity 'crisis' Erikson was recently named by a large number of his fellow practitioners as among the three most outstanding living analysts and psychiatrists.

Gandhi's Truth is unlikely to lower these estimates; in fact, a case can be made that this latest book is superior in depth and relevance to the one on Luther. The focus of the work is a 1918 textile worker's strike—referred to by Erikson as "The Event"—in the Indian city of Ahmedabad. At the time of the strike Gandhi was almost fifty years old, and while he was already well known in India and abroad as a leader in the Indian civil rights movement in South Africa and in India itself, he was not yet the revered Bapu of the Indian masses he was later to become—or, from another point of view, not yet the "naked Fakir," as Winston Churchill, in his kindlier moments, used to refer to him. Gandhi was asked to mediate the strike by Ahmedabad's leading mill owner, Ambalal Sarabhai, whose sister was a social worker sympathetic to the striking textile employees. In the course of the strike, which was eventually settled by a compromise favorable to the workers, Gandhi converted a number of those on both sides to the principles of *Satyagraha,* a non-violent method of persuasion, according to Erikson, by which one's opponents are won over to the versions of truth, justice, and peace that are being put forward. By the end of the strike the techniques of *Satyagraha,* including for the first time fasting, had been more or less successfully tested, and a year later they were to reach and affect the stage of world history when Gandhi led the first nationwide civil disobedience campaign.

It was another thirty years before India saw the last of the British Raj, and perhaps India's achievement of independence in the late Nineteen Forties owed more to Britain's exhaustion following World War II and forces moving toward the dissolution of empires everywhere than to Gandhi's *Satyagraha*. To take this direction further, it is possible to argue, as Arthur Koestler has recently done, that Gandhi's influence in India has been almost wholly reactionary and so backward, in terms of India's need for economic and political modernization, as to suggest that Churchill's "naked Fakir" designation was not far wrong. Erikson's interest, however, is less in modern Indian history or even in Gandhi's relation to Indian independence than in the possibility that *Satyagraha* may have momentous application to the increasing violent controversies of our own time. In promulgating and perfecting *Satyagraha,* Erikson asks in effect, did Gandhi know something that we in the West don't know?

Before turning to this question Erikson as psychoanalyst is concerned to explicate some important themes and occurrences in Gandhi's life prior to the 1918 strike. Gandhi's early years appear to have been more than usually complicated by oedipal relationships. Up to a point it is the familiar story of the male child's closeness to the mother and his rivalous ambivalent and guilty feelings about the father. Even granting the point that these relationships should not be approached as if they had been lived out in Vienna or New York, it is reasonable to suggest that Gandhi throughout this life was more comfortable with the feminine side of his nature than with the masculine component. Erikson touches on this when he remarks that the "total image" of Gandhi's home in childhood "is one in which it is difficult to allocate masculine and feminine identifications"; "Father Time," he observes suggestively, is in India a Mother. Clearly in India the attributes of masculinity and femininity are not as sharply differentiated, and sexual role definitions as sharply marked, as in western culture. If I understand Erikson correctly, he wants to emphasize that Gandhi's acceptance of his own femininity and associated maternal instincts partly explains not only his success as a mass leader but also clarifies some of the necessary conditions for a world order based upon *Satyagraha* principles.

Gandhi himself, of course, is associated with a variety of bizarre sexual anecdotes, much used against him by his enemies. It is well known that he suffered life-long guilt as a result of having intercourse with his pregnant wife at the very moment his father was dying; some years later, after fathering several children and not wanting additional offspring (he was opposed to contraception), he renounced sex altogether. Or did he? Those opposed to Gandhi have always smirked about his habit in old age of sleeping with naked women and girls, allegedly to keep warm and to test his self-control. Whatever the reasons, it cannot be denied that Gandhi throughout life suffered a good deal from demands made upon him as a husband, lover, and father. For his treatment of his sons, in particular, there is nothing to be said by way of justification. Perhaps it is a fair question whether, in this respect as in his failure to recognize the "mutuality" of sexual relations, Gandhi ever succeeded in practicing in private some of the principles of *Satyagraha* that he espoused in public. While Erikson does not raise such a question directly, it is with reference to Gandhi's treatment of his family that he abandons his customary affectionate regard for his subject, rightly scolding Gandhi for rationalizing his own behavior "with ambivalent phrases and principles."

Not that Erikson interprets Gandhi solely in terms of his complex psychosexual development. Indeed those who seek in the book a simple monocausal deterministic explanation for Gandhi's career will be disappointed to find that Gandhi's life as depicted by Erikson was not that simple. Erikson is content to demonstrate how certain themes from Gandhi's early years were played out in Durban, London, and, finally, Ahmedabad; beyond this, neither Erikson nor any other psychobiographer is really entitled to go unless he eschews the limitations imposed by the known available facts of Gandhi's life. Since Erikson is familiar with clinical realities, he knows that even these facts, like the manifest content of dreams, are subject to distortion, and he therefore is cautious in interpreting the 'facts' set forth in Gandhi's autobiography.

Some readers, no doubt, will think he is too cautious here and there, and perhaps it can be argued that certain interpretations evidence a considerable transference relationship between the analyst and his subject (Erikson admits to such a relationship with his 1962 host in India, the mill owner of 1918, Ambalal Sarabhai). The India experts among us will not be happy with his total ignorance of the social science literature pertaining to India, a literature that might have modified certain of his conclusions about the basis of Gandhi's charisma, and given greater depth to some other conclusions about the political and social significance of the 1918 strike. (Unfortunately, *Gandhi's Truth* illustrates rather than solves the problems presented when analysts with social science interests work in isolation from social scientists with psychoanalytic sophistication.) Erikson's writing style, which has always suffered from a conspicuous density and vagueness of expression, has not improved with this latest book, many paragraphs of which suggest that subtlety of thought and phrasing if carried too far becomes merely another form of ambiguity. After much pondering I still cannot fathom the meaning of "Gandhi's actualism, then, first of all consisted in his knowledge of, and his ability to gain strength from, the fact that nothing is more powerful in the world than conscious nothingness if it is paired with the gift of giving and accepting actuality." One is tempted to wonder whether this sentence was intended to be understood. At other times, one suspects that a point made facetiously is designed to be taken somewhat seriously, and a point made seriously designed to be taken somewhat facetiously. Perhaps the author unlike the reader wishes to have it both ways.

These faults do not make *Gandhi's Truth* easy reading, but neither do they render its central themes so obfuscated as to elude meaning. Gandhi like Freud, Erikson suggests, understood the difference between ethics and moralism, and between what is instinctive and what is instinctual. Arguing an affinity between Gandhi's truth or *Satyagraha* and the insights of modern psychology, Erikson credits Gandhi with an awareness that man's propensity for destruction is an "unfunctional drive" that, because it is without preserving role, could be transcended or gotten rid of. Unlike most of us, Gandhi "prided himself on being half-man and half-woman," and Erikson is right to observe that wars owe something to the "age-old male propensity for considering the renunciation of armament an abandonment of malehood." Thus Gandhi, to whom the usual masculine-feminine dichotomies did not apply, was far more hopeful than Freud about the human condition, but like Freud understood the need for "mutual activism with others" in a non-violent context, and the achievement of "more inclusive identities." 'Reality testing,' Erikson seems to be saying, enables psychoanalytic man to think more clearly about himself and his problems, and may lead social man to the Gandhian solution of non-violent *Satyagraha* as a way of bridging the gap between personal and family ethics and the ethics of communities and nations. To choose any other direction is to choose certain death and the destruction of civilized life.

Would that it were so, that is, would that we were able to learn better from Gandhi than from Moses, Jesus, Freud, or, in our own time, Martin Luther King (to whom *Gandhi's Truth* is dedicated). But it seems that even the Indian followers of Gandhi have as little commitment to *Satyagraha* as the followers of Jesus have to the Sermon on the Mount. As this is being written there are reports of continuing communal strife between Hindus and Moslems in—one can guess—Ahmedabad where the death toll may yet reach into the thousands. It is a sad commentary on the 100th anniversary of Gandhi's birth, and a pathetic footnote to *Gandhi's Truth*.

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Nationalism and Its Alternatives. BY KARL W. DEUTSCH. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. Pp. 200. $5.95)

Among modern governments only nation states can—at their best—satisfy the needs and win the support of their inhabitants; but modern warfare makes those same states into "potential death-traps for their citizens." This "paradox" is the theme of Karl Deutsch's extended essay on *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*. He offers no panacea and preaches no sermon. Rather he seeks to contribute to a "political meteorology" that can provide timely "storm warnings."

The first three chapters trace parts of the global weather chart. In the West nations grew slowly along routes of transport and around administrative "core areas"; hence assimilation outpaced social mobilization. In Eastern Europe that ratio was reversed. Autocratic empires broke up into ethnic polka-dots. Internecine strife among nationalities led to expropriation, expulsion, and massacre—a wholesale disregard for human rights that cleared the way for communist repression. In the developing countries the nationalist and militarist rulers have shown themselves "spectacularly inept at economic, industrial, and educational development," and are venting their frustrations on the West.

Deutsch has only moderate hopes for federal integration among existing states (Chapter Four). Even in Europe, trade in the Common Market since 1957 increased no more than might be expected among any given group of growing economies. A more promising avenue is the formation of "pluralistic security communities"—groups of states that forswear war and hence can multiply their contacts through the flow of goods, news, and persons. Above all, Deutsch hopes for a concerted development of behavioral science (Chapter Five). Politics is like a game "with moderately loaded dice," a mixture of law and of chance. Hence it is amenable to techniques of analysis derived from probability, the theory of games, theories of imperfect communication, learning psychology, and other fields. And as understanding deepens, so do the opportunities for rational control expand.

Deutsch concludes that for the next eighty years or so there will be no substitute for the nation-state. Accustomed as we have grown to its services we are not likely to settle for anything smaller—or for anything much larger. For with our present knowledge and habits, any substantial increase in size is likely to blunt a state's sensitivity to domestic needs and foreign dangers. Already the largest states resemble "irritable giants wearing blinders and defective hearing aids." We must therefore be prepared to give the nation-states "a larger part than ever of our material possessions and affairs . . . But we need not, and we ought not, give the nation-state our souls." Defense expenditures could be shifted toward indirect military assets such as transport, education, and foreign aid. International law could be developed not just as a moralizing law *for* international behavior but also as a pragmatic law *of* international behavior.

Deutsch's brevity and informal tone have their drawbacks. Future editions will no doubt eliminate some inadvertent inaccuracies or misprints. For example, Henry of Saxony was not a king who became emperor but a duke who became king; Greece became sovereign in 1830 not 1930, Germany federal in 1871 not 1918; Mustafa Kemal attained power in 1919–22, not 1918; and at the tenth step of a random walk the chances of being one step or less from the center are 672, not 712, out of 1024. (pp. 12, 49f., 118, 152.) Occasionally, too, a link in the argument appears to be missing. Would the Common Market economies have grown as much without the five year impetus toward unity provided by the Treaty of Rome? If boundaries once drawn turn people inward, is it still true that existing boundaries reflect (rather than restrict) present flows of communication? The analogy between international law and the rules of the road is less than convincing. Before the advent of unified government over long stretches of road, one might argue, there were no right and left lanes and no stop signs, and it was lurking highwaymen rather than "passing trucks" that were ready "to mete out the death penalty."

But the lucidity and succinctness of Deutsch's book more than compensate for such blemishes. For the political scientist, it draws together the major themes of his earlier works, such as *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1953), *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (with Richard W. Van Wagenen and others, 1957), and *The Nerves of Government* (1963). For the general reader it provides a convenient introduction to the body of thought that has made Karl Deutsch the leading political scientist of his generation.

Where others have escaped from the real political world into quantified trivia or abstruse verbiage, Deutsch has chosen for his life's theme the patterns of communication that lead to political conflict—or cooperation. He attains relevance (that ideal loudly proclaimed these days, but rarely specified) in the two ways in which a scholar must pursue it: relevance to large human concerns and relevance to his own life history. Growing up in Prague in the period between the world wars within the small circle that was working for German-Czech understanding, Deutsch experienced the problems of nationality and communication as a daily reality. From Europe, too, he brought that rich knowledge of history which saves him from the pedantry and shallowness of much of American "behavioral" science. But it was his adoptive country that furnished the intellectual tools, such as cybernetics and the theory of games, with which to master his chosen problem.

Deutsch does not pursue the will-o'-the-wisp of a "value-free social science." He is aware that the realms of fact and of value are (in W. G. Runciman's phrase) "distinct but inseparable." His technological enthusiasm is pervaded by a deep humanism. His hopes for a better future are strengthened by an unflattering appraisal of the perplexities of the present. Inventiveness, he assumes, will do more good than high sentiment. He is keenly conscious of the ambiguity of all political situations. In particular, he knows that "Throughout the history of nationalism . . . we find the noblest aspects of life mingled with the most terrible." His most telling weapon against inhumanity and barbarism is the rationalist's gentle irony.

The central question of politics to Deutsch is not one of power but of the satisfaction of human needs. Mankind, he suggests, resembles "a tipsy, but reasonably rational," person "staggering along . . . the edge of a cliff." The social scientist cannot make us sober. But by examining both drunkard and mountain, he can lessen the chances of our stumbling into the abyss.

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Community Conflict, Public Opinion and the Law: The Amish Dispute in Iowa. BY HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR. (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. 154. $1.95, paper.)

This is a neat, tight little case study of an extended dispute over the schooling of Amish children. It is an interesting, sometimes absorbing account accomplished with considerable sophistication in data analysis. Although rough in spots, it is a useful contribution to professional understanding of relationships between local elites' attitudes and behavior and both local and general public attitudes, of the uses of legal machinery for conflict resolution, and of the role of state officials in structuring local action. It could be useful in undergraduate courses in community politics or research design and methodology, as well as in some sociology of law contexts.

The dispute involved a community school board's efforts to force a handful of Amish children to attend local public school, or receive instruction in their two private schools exclusively from state-certified teachers paid for by the Amish community. The Amish sought to gain state support or local funds to pay uncertified teachers of their selection who would continue to instruct children according to Amish beliefs. Various means of enforcement were tried, and the dispute escalated to the point where the Governor of Iowa intervened to prevent physical coercion of the children. Ultimately, state requirements were amended to provide exceptions for the Amish, who emerged with substantially all their goals achieved.

Rodgers takes as his central questions (1) What type of circumstances lead responsible officials to refuse to enforce the law through the use of established legal machinery? and (2) What effect does such a refusal have on popular support for the law and the political system? Data collected for the purposes of the study included responses to similar structured questionnaires from twelve local "decisionmakers" (school board members and school officials), seventeen local "opinion leaders" (those named by decisionmakers as people they consulted), and a random sample of 289 local citizens (conducted by a professional survey organization). Some comparative data are also employed, the most useful of which are responses to a statewide survey which included some of the author's questions regarding the dispute and responses to standard attitudinal questions administered to another statewide sample by other researchers.

Rodgers finds that all segments of the generally conservative local community were agreed that the Amish should be obliged to obey the state school law requirements that they either attend public school or hire and pay for certified teachers in their own schools. The statewide general public, however, perhaps influenced by a dramatic photograph showing Amish children fleeing through cornfields from the pursuit of authorities who sought to force them into buses for transportation to public schools, favored exception to the law for the Amish. In what constitutes one of the most interesting findings of the study, Rodgers shows that the nature of the dispute was understood quite differently by different publics: local decisionmakers and opinion leaders saw it as a financial issue in which the Amish were simply unwilling to pay for their own teachers; the local public saw it as an Amish attempt to avoid contaminating contact with the outside world; and the statewide public saw it as an issue of religious freedom for the Amish.

Decisionmakers felt strongly that the law should have been enforced as it stood, and they were aware of support for their position on the part of local opinion leaders and the local public. But they were reluctant to take the harsh final steps that the dogged Amish resistance made necessary, such as confiscation of Amish property, extended jailing of parents, or daily physical coercion of the children. All three local publics resented "outside interference" and continued to feel that the law should have been enforced, even though the Governor's intrusion took them off an uncomfortable hook and resulted in provision of special (non-local) funds to pay the Amish teachers' salaries. Only the two groups of local elites felt afterwards that respect for law had been undermined, however, while the local citizens' respect for law and the political system remained high.

The author deserves credit for tackling the difficult task of exploring the complex bases for noninvocation of legal machinery and the consequences thereof for future respect for the law on the part of various publics. On the whole, he does well in extracting hypotheses for future research. The scope of the problem, however, in contrast with the limitations of the data available, make the reader somewhat uneasy at points. The small size of the elite publics and the narrow focus on the process of a single rather unique dispute in this small community make for an uncertain base, and too often the author is forced to depend on answers to a single question to support broad characterizations.

To some extent, these are problems inherent in any small-scale research project which seeks to grapple with important problems. But the author has contributed to the difficulty here in some minor ways. Seeking efficient portrayal of comparisons between publics, for example, he employs bar graph presentations of group means to such an extent that the substance of responses are slighted, seriously so in one chapter (5). Nor does the conceptual armory of systems analysis seem well suited to the explication of the single chain of events and reactions involved in such a case study. The strengths of systems analysis are perhaps more visible in the design of research, or in interpretation of patterns of repeated behavior or recurring similar events. Here, the tale might have been told more clearly and directly if the author had not presented his findings in such an elaborate framework. And he might have avoided such minor annoyances as translating theoretical assumptions into "conclusions" for which his evidence offers little support

(e.g., p. 118.)

It is not inconsistent to add now that the author might also have sought to draw some implications of a different order out of his research; his central questions do not appear to wholly encompass the data developed. Part of the strength of this book lies in the multiple applications of the data, particularly those on the segmentation of attitudes within the community. In other words, this is more than a study of why the school board failed to go all the way with law enforcement and how various publics reacted in terms of support for the law. There are suggestive data permitting comparison of local elites and publics as to their relative propensity to make policy-preference-oriented exceptions to the neutral and consistent application of the law. In important ways, it appears, law is merely an extension of values, rather than an embodiment of a generally shared community desire for order and predictability. Support comes from those people whose preferences are served, and to the extent that they are; others, recognizing that the law embodies somebody else's preferences, prefer exceptions to allow them to do as they wish. There are interesting data comparing local elites and public attitudes on civil liberties questions which seem to show much smaller disparities than most other studies. And there is a series of implications for such policy questions as decentralization of decision-making: the data grant small encouragement to those who would see decentralization as a means of promoting local democracy, if democracy be defined to include the tolerance of strongly-felt minority preferences by local majorities.

These minor rough spots do not really detract from what is a decided professional contribution to the community politics and law-as-social-process literature. In addition, the book may offer a potentially useful classroom tool for teachers who want undergraduate students to learn research skills and concepts through field research in community contexts. It is well written, and the inclusion of timely anecdotes and revealing quotations enhances the impact. A description of the citizen sample, copies of the questionnaires, and descriptions of scale construction and computer programs and statistical techniques appear in appendices. All in all, it is an engaging and promising piece of work.

KENNETH M. DOLBEARE
University of Wisconsin

Men And Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory. BY JUDITH N. SHKLAR. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 245. $8.50.)

Rousseau is truly the sphinx of modern social philosophy. Any student of the human condition eventually encounters this sensitive and agonized genius, but the product of this encounter more often than not is a sense of paradox. One could say that he has been given a complex riddle to interpret. Many have been the interpretations proffered, and we now seem to have come full circle, in a way. Not long ago a prominent view of Rousseau was that he adored the noble savage, undefiled by exotic and corrupting arts and science and by any sort of government. Soon, however, scholars like Lovejoy perceived that Rousseau specifically denied that men could return to that condition, or even that it would be desirable. Before long our attention was being called to the profound rationalism and moral responsibility, revolutionary in character, of Rousseau's democratic political theory, and we were reminded of how highly Kant thought of him. We were then treated to a debate, whether he was totalitarian or democratic. What we now have from Mrs. Shklar is a denial of the significance of most of this argument through a sophisticated reversion to the negative aspects of the earlier thesis. To Rousseau, it is now said, there is no return to that happy past, but there is little happiness for men in the future, either. Man is indeed "born free" and "by nature good," but he is incurably fallen. Her argument is as fascinating as it is unexpected.

Robert Derathé warned us about twenty years ago that Rousseau could be understood only if all of his writings, including his letters, are considered, insisting with Rousseau that his thought would then show a consistency not otherwise discernible. Dr. Shklar has taken this advice to heart, but the consistent meaning she finds is not at all that found by Derathé. Whereas the French scholar, like Cassirer, concluded that Rousseau was basically a rationalist, and with elaborate documentation situated his thought in the context of the political science of the age, Dr. Shklar thinks that the outraged condemnation of rationalism and all its products with which Rousseau launched his literary career expressed his constant perspective and remained the foundation of his later writings. She insists that Rousseau can be understood only as a critic of society, informing men of their disease, and not as a constructive social thinker, suggesting remedies. He expressed, as she nicely puts it, "the individualism of the weak," as Locke had expressed that of the strong. He hated human suffering, which he portrayed in many passages with unexampled power, but finding its cause not in ignorance, which might be dispelled as Locke and the utilitarians hoped, but in weakness of will, be concluded that there is no remedy. His apparent remedies—*Emile, La Nouvelle Héloïse, The Social Contract*—all not only contain the seeds of their own destruction, but do not provide, separately or together, an adequate world for the human soul. Man cannot live without society, society is impossible without inequality, and inequality is another name for human suffering. Rousseau is not only pessimistic, as has often been recognized; the very "perfectibility" of man, his distinguishing characteristic, is the source of his woes. This Rousseau is surely a prophet without hope.

Mrs. Shklar seems aware that her thesis is extraordinary, reducing a man who has been considered a great and important social philosopher, despite his unsystematic mind, to little more than an anguished cry of frustration, anger, and impotence. She deliberately ignores the historical influence of Rousseau's thought, and for the most part other scholarly interpretations, apparently considering that Rousseau cannot be held responsible for what others have made of his work. She would let Rousseau speak for himself. One cannot deny that she has been largely successful in permitting one Rousseau to emerge, the Rousseau who speaks to the modern, agonized, existentialist temperament, and this reader is grateful, since he now understands an appeal he had previously found inexplicable. Still, there are other voices of Rousseau: the protohistoricism of the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, the careful legal phrases and political demands of the *Social Contract*, the practical and evolutionary conservatism of his later writings, which impressed a Vaughn, a Cassirer, a Derathé, leading them to discern a quite fundamental development in Rousseau's thought and learning during the decade following his first discourse, and these are not given adequate consideration. For example, Mrs. Shklar's treatment of sovereignty and the general will seems to void them of all substance; they become inspired, critical metaphors, to be understood almost in reverse of what they seem to say. It is hardly certain that Rousseau considered them so. Nevertheless, Dr. Shklar has given us a distinguished book, ensuring that the debate over the meaning of Rousseau will continue, and contributing greatly to it.

WILLIAM H. HARBOLD

Whitman College

Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956–1967. BY WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 336. $9.50.)

The past several years have witnessed a spate of articles clamoring for more political science—greater methodological consciousness and rigor—in the study of Communist systems. Responses to these appeals, even when the injunction is taken seriously, have been disappointing. The work under review is a happy exception to this generalization. Zimmerman displays a broad familiarity with contemporary IR literature and, better still, an ability to apply relevant concepts in a sensible manner.

As the title suggests, the book treats recent developments in the intellectual climate of Soviet foreign policy decision-making. By examining the growing Soviet literature on the theory and practice of international relations the author finds considerable evidence of movement towards a more empirical appraisal of the international system. Indeed, he notes a significant convergence with western concepts and perceptions. According to Zimmerman, the new appreciation of the complexities of international reality has entailed a progressive discarding of heretofore sacrosanct Marxist-Leninist principles with their simplistic zero-sum-game assumptions.

The book is organized topically, rather than chronologically. This strategy involves a certain cost in repetition and discontinuity, but the cost is generally balanced by analytical benefits. In Chapter Two, which provides a general integrative background, Zimmerman presents an extensive account of the development of IR as an autonomous discipline in the USSR. Particularly important was the re-emergence of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in the wake of criticism of Soviet scholarship by Khrushchev and Mikoyan at the Twentieth Party Congress. Much of the impetus proceeded from the new line on peaceful economic competition, which presumably required a more profound understanding of the nature of contemporary capitalism. Not surprisingly, economists and economic questions dominated the early scholarly output of the Institute. As representatives of other disciplines became involved, the range of interests accordingly expanded, as did the level of analytical sophistication.

This developmental process was not unilinear. The dead hand of traditional views and the unwillingness of conservative forces to envision IR studies as anything more than an aid to propagandists posed serious obstacles to growth during the 1956–1962 "foundation period." During the last two years of Khrushchev's rule there occurred a notable breakthrough. The author extends this period of "new respectability" up to the time of writing—1967. However, there is good reason to designate the post-Khrushchev period as a separate stage, in my opinion, even on Zimmerman's own evidence, exclusive, that is, of the Czechoslovak crisis.

Among the reasons for the new receptivity the author mentions Soviet impressions of the salutary influence of political and strategic scholarship on American foreign policy! After the Cuban missile debacle the grass may well have looked greener on the other side of the fence.

The chapter on Soviet perceptions of the international "actors" is particularly well handled. Zimmerman traces the complex process whereby Khrushchev and the specialists came to view the nation-state as the primary actor. To be overcome were ideological proclivities for viewing IR in class-conspiratorial and cosmic world-historical terms. He notes important semantic changes in Soviet terminology as the centrifugal effects of nationalism created problems for both major power blocs in a period of détente.

In a chapter on perceptions of U.S. foreign policy the author cogently describes the overcoming of "contradictions" between the hoary conception of governments as mere executive committees of the capitalist ruling classes and the obvious importance of governments as relatively autonomous determiners of national policy. Indeed, he notes, towards the end of the Khrushchev era, a tendency to go beyond "power elite" or "military-industrial complex" explanations, which have so preoccupied Western critics. Zimmerman argues that during his final years Khrushchev found it expedient for his own purposes to "prettify American imperialism"—a tendency rejected by his successors. To Zimmerman this reversal offers greater promise for a stable U.S.-Soviet relationship than did Khrushchev's lily-gilding approach.

The book is not without faults. The style, although generally lively and interesting, is sometimes strained as the author reaches for the *bon mot*. It is one thing to "bracket" Mao between the K(h)(a)n boys—Genghis and Herman (p. 95); but it seems a bit inappropriate (even if hilarious) to refer to Khrushchev as "the Everett Dirksen of the world communist movement" (p. 225).

Some of the substantive problems are more serious. It may not be quite fair to mention the Czechoslovak crisis, but Zimmerman's analysis of trends, despite occasional caveats, is much too unilinear and leaves little room for such lapses into past "irrationalities." The predictive potential of the analysis is restricted to the most general level.

A more fundamental weakness is the failure to deal seriously and systematically with internal political factors. The excesses of Kremlinology notwithstanding, one cannot comprehensively treat Soviet foreign policy-making without serious consideration of leadership conflict. Zimmerman does not give sufficient attention to this crucial problem or to the related question of personal leadership style.

Finally, the basic issue of the erosion of ideology as a major determinant of Soviet foreign policy is not handled as subtly as the general quality of the book would lead one to expect. What Zimmerman appears to see "eroding" is the petrified formulations and *pronunciamentos* of the Stalin era. It is certainly true that many of the hallowed doctrines of the past, including even some of Lenin's basic perspectives, have become inoperative in this "post-imperialist" age. Nevertheless, ideology has always been most important as a methodology, a way of ordering data. Its doctrines and even its categories have often been modified and "enriched." Lenin's *Imperialism* was nothing if not a major revision of Marxism. If the Soviet handling of the Czechoslovak crisis was "non-ideological," then so was Lenin's handling of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and Stalin's of the 1939 pact with Hitler. But a counter-explanation in ideological terms can also be made in each case and ought at least to be considered. What Zimmerman has done brilliantly is to trace the erosion of old doctrines and analytical categories and the emergence of new ones. This is not the same thing as demonstrating the inevitable end of ideology. What he has done is no mean achievement, however, and his book is an important contribution to scholarship on Soviet foreign policy.

Robert F. Miller

University of Illinois

Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns. By Abner Cohen. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 252. $5.50.)

Black political scientists and members of the Caucus for a New Political Science will find Professor Cohen's book loaded with implications for their work. Africanists and political scientists generally will find the book a stimulating tonic.

Drawing on his fifteen months of field work in 1962–1963, supplemented by colonial records and earlier studies of Nigeria, Cohen describes and analyzes the social structure and behavior of the Hausa minority in the Yoruba city of Ibadan during the period 1906–1963. This tiny minority of less than one percent of the city's population adroitly exploited their own strengths, the anxieties of the Yoruba chiefs, and the British system of Indirect Rule to achieve 1) their own semi-autonomous residential and business quarter (Sabo) under the authority of a Hausa Chief of the Quarter, 2) a monopoly over the trade in cattle brought to Ibadan from the North, 3) a monopoly over the trade in kola nuts shipped to the North, and 4) for a while a monopoly over the butcher trade in Ibadan. Cohen maintains that the technical requirements of long-distance trade in perishable commodities are best met, in a pre-industrial society, under the conditions of ethnic monopoly, and the book's primary focus is on the relationship between Hausa ethnicity and their political and economic fortunes.

Cohen's treatment of this relationship utilizes two key analytic concepts. The first, "retribalization," makes the book revisionary of earlier studies which associated African urbanism with "detribalization." Migrant Hausa have not been integrated in the course of time into the general life of the city. Nor have they merely replicated in Sabo the Hausa culture of their homelands in the North. Instead they have developed a locally distinct ethnicity, participation in which (i.e., "citizenship" in Sabo) is not acquired as a simple function of Hausa identity brought from the North but is achieved by a migrant's taking up roles that make him progressively more settled in Sabo. As he becomes more settled, he takes on a new, and exclusive, ethnicity; he becomes "retribalized."

Secondly, Cohen treats ethnicity as "essentially a political and not a cultural phenomenon." Throughout the history of Sabo, ethnic exclusivity has been a mechanism for fostering and protecting Hausa interests in trade and property. Even the mystic Tijaniyya order of Islam that became dominant in Sabo in the 1950's, leading to the "ritualization of authority" as malams became integrated into the decision-making process and to the intensification and increased pervasiveness of religious ritual, can be seen as a response to the threatened subversion of Sabo's autonomy by the collapse of Indirect Rule and the rise of nationalist parties. Thus, Cohen demonstrates that, contrary to certain notions, "tribalism" is not necessarily conservative and traditional but may be a dynamic and rational mechanism for solving problems. Moreoever, "tribalism" is not the explanatory factor it might seem for analyzing African politics, for ethnic identity and exclusiveness are often more a function of vested economic interests than of particularly strong tribal sentiments. Cohen's work here supports that of Richard Sklar, among others, who has suggested that attention to class rather than tribal factors may advance the cogency of African studies.

From the methodological point of view, Cohen's use of the "Micro-historical" procedure will be especially interesting to students of political development. Implying neither the history of small units nor the kind of brief narrative background we are accustomed to finding at the beginning of community power studies, Micro-history is an attempt to isolate and analyze the varying interrelationship of several factors through a series of historically related case studies set in a common and limited field and focussing at each point in time on a different sociological or political problem.

The Black Caucus at last year's meeting of the African Studies Association called for increased scholarly attention to the relationship between African and Afro-American phenomena. Here is one splendid point of departure. Cohen's concluding chapter contains a lengthy discussion of his findings within a comparative framework. In suggesting directions for future research and theoretical development, he recognizes that the study of political ethnicity and specifically "retribalization" should not be restricted to pre-industrial societies, and he even refers briefly to possible links between his work and that of C. Eric Lincoln, Essien-Udom, and Glazer and Moynihan. The parallels between the behavioral dynamics of Sabo Hausa and Afro-Americans are many and Black scholar-activists may find Cohen's discussion of "Cultural Strategies in Politics" very suggestive for political as well as scholarly matters. Whites, on the other hand, and especially those of us who are prone to treat Black Nationalism as a "fantasy" or a dangerous departure from liberal pluralism *cum* integration, may well wish to reevaluate the phenomenon and our reaction to it in light of Cohen's concept of the utility of ethnicity.

Just as Lipset demonstrated the possibilities for reinterpreting early American history in light of developmental theory based on research in the Third World, so now Cohen offers a promising basis for the reinterpretation of contemporary American life. The new nations, indeed, have much to teach us.

Evert Makinen

Colby College

The Ideology of Fascism: The Rationale of Totalitarianism. By A. James Gregor. (New York: The Free Press, 1969. Pp. 493. $11.95.)

The Nature of Fascism. Edited by S. J. Woolf. (New York: Random House, 1969. Pp. 261. $7.95.)

After several attempts to penetrate the dense and convoluted prose of Professor Gregor, I am reluctantly led to the conclusion that he has produced a bad book. Gregor's volume exhibits thorough scholarship; it industriously "covers" a great deal of ground. Some of the analyses of individual thinkers (Gentile, Spirito, the early Mussolini) contain much that is of merit. Unfortunately, however, Gregor's principal theses, judgements and implicit evaluations are so sweeping and questionable as seriously to detract from the value of the book considered as a whole.

Gregor sets out to provide an "accurate and objective account of Fascist commitment." This would be all to the good, except that he dispenses with the entire thorny question of what constitutes objectivity in the social sciences in a few apodictic pronouncements. The familiar distinctions between objective and "empirical" political "science" on the one hand, and subjective and "normative" political "theory" or "philosophy" on the other, are dutifully trotted out, but they are introduced without any attempt to deal with the severe critiques to which these very distinctions have been and are being subjected in our discipline. Had Gregor seriously considered these critiques, perhaps he would have avoided the perils of what I have elsewhere termed "pseudo-objective descriptivism." Instead, in the pursuit of a misconceived "objectivity," he is led to take literally some patently riduculous and self-serving statements made by fascist propagandists and to offer up a portrait of Italian fascism which is unrecognizable because of the deep scars which have been omitted. Thus, in Gregor's interpretation, Italian fascism turns out to be committed to the "humanism of labor" and the "presumptive equality of all men" as members of the "Kantian kingdom of ends." According to this interpretation it is not valid to distinguish, as benighted "Anglo-American analysts" have been wont to do, between "fascism, Marxism, and democracy on the basis of fascism's putative 'anti-humanism' and 'anti-egalitarianism.' "

Gregor is intent in this volume not only upon demonstrating the objectivity of his political science but also its *relevance*. The relevance of authentic political science is held to consist in its explanatory and predictive capacity. By understanding the nature of Italian fascism and the conditions to which it responded, we are supposedly enabled to understand the nature of contemporary regimes in the "underdeveloped" and "developing" world. Gregor tells us that an "objective" analysis leads us to regard fascism as "a developmental dictatorship appropriate [*appropriate!*] to partially developed or underdeveloped . . . national communities in a period of intense international competition for place and status." (p. xiii) "One of the central theses of this book," the author informs us, is that Italian fascism "was the first, and remains perhaps the only, fully matured rationale for the totalitarian systems of the twentieth century." (p. 7) Thus, the ideological arguments of Italian fascism are seen to be "paradigmatic" for a host of recent and contemporary regimes, ranging from Lenin's Russia and Mao's China [!] to numerous smaller societies of the Third World. In the strange alchemy of Gregor's political science, "African Socialism," for example, is held to possess "all the species traits of paradigmatic fascism." (pp. 364, 370)

Had Gregor stuck to his last and confined himself to an analysis of Italian fascist ideology, a subject on which he is most certainly knowledgeable and upon which he has intelligent things to say, it would have been possible for this reviewer to restrict his comments largely to difference of interpretation of the available evidence. I could then have focused on such matters as the relationship of Mussolini and Marxism, the relative weighting of Gentile's importance in the shaping of fascist ideology, whether Gregor has not neglected the "universalist" side of Italian fascist ideology via the Roman myth, whether in his overall characterization of fascist ideology, he should not have taken into account the positions of party militants such as Farinacci and Starace, whether the "corporativism" of Spirito and Bottai is worthy of the extensive attention he gives it, and whether his treatment of Italian fascist "racism" is not altogether too generous.

As it is, however, what is one to make of such a hopelessly amorphous concept of fascism as is that employed by Gregor in this volume? How can one even take seriously the "wave of the future" speculation which characterizes the author's attempt to be "relevant" and to fulfill his stated mission as a "predictive" social scientist? (See, for example, the sweeping generalizations about present "totalitarian" trends in world politics on pp. 3, 329, and 381–382.) Essentially Gregor has done little more than abstract elements of fascist thought (nationalism, elitism, voluntarism, racialism, anti-parliamentarianism, ethnocentricism, etc.) and mechanically to discover some of the same elements in the pronouncements of Marx, Mao Tse-tung, Nkrumah, and Leopold Senghor. The latter then, in effect, turn into fascists. A similar game has been played for some time in the history of political thought, so that, for example, we have had Plato, Hegel, and Nietzsche reinterpreted as fascists (although few indeed have ventured to muddy the waters even further by suggesting that Marx and Mao were). This approach simply will not work, either for thinkers or for regimes. The detailed and specific features of each teaching and/or regime will have to be considered in the appropriate historical and cultural context. This is what real "empiricism" in political and social studies is about.

I find the style of this book to be lamentably lacking in grace, wit, or pungency and cannot but express the hope that in his next book Professor Gregor will devote more care to the art of writing and in particular will stifle his penchant for infelicitous neologisms and endless, convoluted sentences. We have too much of this kind of writing around in the social sciences as it is.

The volume edited by Woolf contains the proceedings of a symposium on fascism sponsored by the Reading University Graduate School of Contemporary European Studies in the spring of 1967. The papers—ten in number—are grouped under four headings, dealing with the political, economic, social, and intellectual aspects of fascism. Overall, the conference appears to have been a useful one, having brought together historians, political scientists, sociologists, and economists in an attempt to offer fresh interdisciplinary perspectives.

Woolf, in his Introduction, stresses the "contemporary relevance of fascism." However, this relevance stems primarily from the fact that fascism constitutes a "negative heritage" for those countries which had the "misfortune to experience a fascist regime," and secondarily from the insights it offers into such contemporary phenomena as "the processes of political modernization, the relationships between political and economic power," the problem of economic planning, and the "appeal of the irrational" to alienated intellectuals in the West. This is to pose the question of relevance far more adequately than did Gregor, for it is one thing to say that numerous contemporary movements and regimes have taken and will increasingly take on the features of "paradigmatic"—i.e., Italian—fascism, and another to conclude as Woolf does that an understanding of fascism may provide "insight" into some problems of contemporary societies, especially those searching for national identity and rapid economic development.

One could object, to be sure, to the failure of the participants more systematically and coherently to address themselves to the question of what constitutes the "essence" of fascism. However, this objection would not be entirely fair because it is quite possible that in the strict sense fascism as such has no essence but must principally be studied in the context of specific movements and regimes. One can perhaps more accurately speak of "fascisms," some of which are much closer to the totalitarian end of the spectrum than others.

Norman Kogan's opening paper is helpful in at least setting us on the way to considering the problem of "defining" fascism. For Kogan, the key characteristics of fascism are that it (1) depends on a "mass base" which supports a charismatic leader, (2) is a modernizing and revolutionary rather than a traditionalist and conservative movement, (3) rejects the egalitarian ethos and extols hierarchy and discipline, typically enforced by the single party, (4) systematically embarks on a program to create a psychologically conditioned "new man," (5) glorifies terror and violence on principle, and (6) embraces a distinctive kind of nationalism which we may call "integral nationalism." These traits, however, must *all* be present and interrelated if a political system is to be categorized as fascist. It is refreshing, after emerging from Gregor's pages, to find Kogan asserting what one had rather suspected all along, *viz,* that "fascism and Marxism contrast in a number of respects," including in particular the fact that the latter entertains humanist aspirations while the former does not. (p. 18) All the same, it is surprising to see Kogan, after drawing many of his examples of fascist thought and practice from the Italian regime, conclude that in actual practice "Italy under fascism was not a fascist state"! (p. 16) This reviewer prefers to think that Kogan has not said quite what he intended here. If he had said that "Italy under fascism was not a *fully* fascist state," this would have been more consistent with his effort to articulate a model which, while not precisely faithful to any given fascist regime, could help to illumine the nature of all of them. As it is, if we take him literally, we must conclude that there were no fascist regimes (Nazi Germany being excluded on the grounds of its uniquely monstrous biological racism). In that event, what are we studying?

Space limitations do not permit detailed comments on the other essays, which are by A. F. K. Organski, J. Solé-Ture, Gino Germani, S. L. Andreski, S. J. Woolf, S. Lombardini, T. W. Mason, George L. Mosse, and P. Vita-Finzi. Students of fascism will find something of interest in all of them. Organski and Germani have contributed provocative essays on the *conditions* which facilitate the emergence of a fascist system. Woolf has contributed a substantial paper dealing with the question "Did a Fascist Economic System Exist?" (His answer is in the affirmative with reference to Italy, Germany, and Japan.) Mason's paper on "Economics in National Socialist Germany" and Mosse's essay on "Fascism and the Intellectuals" also deserve careful consideration.

Despite its accomplishments, the symposium does more to indicate problems than to provide "definitive" resolutions. In any event, it may well be too early for the latter. If there is a common mood to these studies (except for the paper by Kogan) it may be described as revisionist. The authors are particularly eager to move beyond "polemics" regarding fascist regimes. But one wonders whether at least some of the earlier studies of fascism—while needing to be supplemented and revised in the light of new material and further opportunity for reflection—did not come closer to portraying the raw and oppressive features of what were, after all, unjust and intolerable regimes than do some of these more clinical recent studies. For if a critical study of politics cannot unequivocally reject fascism, what can it reject?

DANTE GERMINO

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Debtors in Court: The Consumption of Government Services. BY HERBERT JACOB. Rand McNally, 1969. Pp. 260. $6.00.)

The fact that most voters participate only minimally in government decision making has been well documented by political scientists during the past decade. However, the citizen's participation in politics through the consumption of government outputs has not been extensively explored. In this short, but suggestive book, Herbert Jacob addresses himself to the political behavior of people as they use government services, receive government grants and are objects of government regulation. Consumption has important influences upon the level of support for the regime, the distribution of symbolic values, and new demands upon the system. By extending his definition of politics to this linkage between government and the citizen as consumer, the author studied the use of bankruptcy and garnishment services in four Wisconsin cities.

Debtors in Wisconsin may have their wages garnished or avail themselves of bankruptcy or Chapter 13 proceedings. The latter, described as "bankruptcy on the installment plan," allows debtors to pay off their debts over an extended time period through payments made to an officer of the court. Each of these services has developed over time in response to political pressures from various sectors of the community. Garnishment laws resulted from creditor demands, while bankruptcy has been a response by government to the debtor. Wisconsin's political history may be partially understood by the differential treatment accorded these groups as they have attempted to structure the law towards their own needs. Of current interest is the fact that as the extension of credit has become widespread, the consumption of these debt-related judicial services has risen among all levels of society. This, in turn, has had an impact upon norms regarding credit and the use of government services to collect delinquent debts.

Various groups in the cities studied made use of garnishment and bankruptcy services. One might expect wage garnishment to be a tool used against the poor, while bankruptcy to be a service extended to the more affluent. Jacob found that socio-economic variables such as income, race, education, and location, explained only a small portion of the decisions to go into bankruptcy. As the author notes, the effect of these correlates are not linear, but interact with one another with a variety of complex results. Especially important to the debtor is access to an attorney and a communications network of people who have had experience with bankruptcy. An attorney will probably steer his client towards bankruptcy or Chapter 13 proceedings rather than risk the imposition of garnishment. An equally important factor is the debt level and resources of the delinquent. Those with a high debt and low income are most likely to go into bankruptcy.

Creditors seeking to recover assets through wage garnishment also vary. The law is written so that creditors using this service must be well organized and willing to divert manpower towards this goal. In addition, Jacob found that many companies are unwilling to alienate customers through the use of formal proceedings and use other means to recover debts owed them. Thus businessmen resort to wage garnishment only after other alternatives have failed.

The impact of political culture on the rates of debt litigation is an especially intriguing aspect of this study. Using Alford and Scoble's typology which rates the cities on a four point scale from traditional conservatism to modern liberalism, Jacob found marked differences existing in the propensity of citizens to use bankruptcy and garnishment services. These differences parallel other aspects of political participation so that the modern liberalism of Madison supports the consumption of a high level of court services. The linkage between the political culture and the actors within the judicial bureaucracy needs to be further explored. The author notes, for instance, that the judicial personnel and procedures in some cities were more receptive to the use of their services than in others. What political influences bear upon the extension of these services to the citizen?

Professor Jacob has broken fresh ground. His conception of the politics of consumption has implications far beyond this study of the judicial process. Every day citizens use a multitude of public services which, as the author suggests, have a wide variety of political consequences. The political impact of usage patterns warrants additional study. This book will be an important guide to that work.

GEORGE F. COLE

University of Connecticut

BOOK NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT AND METHODOLOGY

Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development. BY ROBERT A. NISBET. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 335. $6.75.)

The thesis of this book is that change in society is mostly in the eye of the beholder. The argument for the thesis commences with the ancient Greeks and their overworked word physis. Among other things it means essence, nature, and growth. The argument ends with an assessment of the inutility of 20th-century theories of development and such assertions as these: "change is, however, *not* natural, *not* normal, much less ubiquitous and constant. Fixity is." (p. 270); "continuity of change lies in our constructions; not in history" (p. 294).

Nisbet does not deny change as a phenomenon but objects to assertions that one stage of development does not simply follow but is also the consequence of its predecessor. He asserts that there is no genetic change. Like David Hume, he finds cause to be the result of man's desire to say post hoc, ergo propter hoc. From the Greeks with their cyclical view of growth through the ever-repeated steps of birth, growth, and decay down to Oswald Spengler and Walt Whitman Rostow—all such theorists are only Platonic realists who fail to tell it as it really was.

It is a bit odd that a writer could make such assertions about change and fixity in a century that continues to observe and participate in such widespread change and seems to experience so little fixity. One is reminded of myopic Mr. Magoo crossing a busy street with cantankerous unconcern and reaching the other side unaware of the cars that have honked and crashed into each other to avoid hitting him. And so one is tempted to say it's obvious that civilizations, including polities, are born, grow, and die and the only question is how. To both the Magoo and the growth analogies, Nisbet would reply that the trouble with social theorists is precisely that tendency to analogize and to compre the physical body to the body politic. And there the reviewer did it again.

The author is quite right about this tendency to analogize. In an early (perhaps the first) edition of *Leviathan,* Thomas Hobbes' publisher pictured a giant man composed of hundreds of homunculi. Thomas Jefferson called cities festering sores on the body politic. And Abraham Lincoln intoned that our forefathers brought forth a new nation conceived in liberty. Nisbet with careful scholarship demonstrates how Platonists and anti-Platonists have analogized, in both the style and substance of their theorizing about cyclical and evolutionary change. As he says, "the power to conceptualize is also the power to hypostasize, to reify."

Indeed it is, and Nisbet does it himself. In criticizing Marion Levy's study of family change in China, Nisbet asserts that "the Chinese family was indeed freighted with stresses and strains. . . ." And functionalism, a rather ill-defined concept, an approach, becomes for the author "the most significant body of theory in the social sciences . . . [seeking] a unified theory of order *and* change." And he reifies history, so vividly that one looks for the man with hourglass and scythe. And he is evidently persuaded by an argument against cause in history that is based on the analogy of a baseball pennant race.

In short, the trouble with the book is that it throws out its own baby and every baby with the bath. Processes in civilization and society and in nature have been conceptualized by various writers both badly and well, but rarely without analogy and metaphor. It is hard to imagine how in social science we can do without such sometimes sharp symbolic instruments if what we are left with are such undefined, unedged reifications as functionalism and history.

The conceptualizations in natural science have been very metaphorical. The human ear contains these parts, among others: concha (meaning shell), the drum, the malleus (hammer), the stapes (stirrup), and semi-circular canals. The brain has its cortex (bark) or pallium (mantle) at one end and the spinal cord at the other, with such important parts as the hypothalamus (underchamber) and hippocampus (seamonster) in between. And the principle of parity in physics has to do with whether particles are arranged in a mirrored or a left- and right-handed relationship to each other. No scientist has been troubled by the fact that molecules really don't have a pair of hands. Two scientists get a Nobel prize for discovering in genetics what they called the double helix, the pair of springs coiled oppositely around each other. It is hard to imagine natural scientists theorizing and experimenting without the use of analogy and metaphor.

The tools of functionalism and history suggest the source of the author's problem, which is, as I see it, the inability to realize his own necessity to conceptualize and to abstract. If we must, as he mostly argues, stick to the concrete, the palpable, we would of course have no use for such dull tools as even functionalism. We might be better off without such amorphous terms, but if we must indeed abandon conceptualization that is sometimes metaphoric, then we must abandon thought and generalization.

It is all reminiscent of the lack of introspection which Hume evinced when he said that man invented the concept cause because man tended to associate things that occurred one after the other. Hume did not understand that he himself could not explain cause without himself establishing what he thought was *the* cause for cause. Similarly, Nisbet, in conceptualizing, himself seems to reify.

The solution for the problem is to find analogies and terms, however metaphorical, that do help explain satisfactorily the phenomena of change. The author comes close to saying this when he says we can look for "the assertedly timeless, continuous, and uniform sources of change"—with the help of functionalism. Just what these sources (causes?) of change might be, we do not here learn. The author cites Comte for his assertion that change results from the human desires for knowledge, status, and power. He cites Teggart for the idea that change in any larger sphere (from cosmos to society to family) affects the individual. But he does not relate the Comtean assertion, which implies that sources (causes?) of change emerge from within the individual, who is therefore an originator of change, to the Teggart notion that the individual is only an object of change. There is no indication, in short, that the author has any awareness of any contemporary social or natural science other than sociology. Until sociologists and other social scientists become as familiar with psychology and neurology as biologists are with chemistry and physics, Nisbet will be right. We won't understand either stasis or change or development. But not because we use metaphors to describe reality. That has gone on since the first word was spoken. We won't understand because we have reified and refuse to change our own segmental analysis of social phenomena.

What is left open by the author's argument is the confirmation or disconfirmation of his thesis. He might call the gradual acquisition of political power of successive social groups (bourgeoisie, peasants, manual laborers, and black people) over the past four to five hundred years a mere change and not growth toward the realization of man's need for equality. But the author's critique of Platonic realism leaves such modern events unexamined. One is inclined to think historians and functional or systems theorists, restive in the boxes they have built for themselves, are responsible for this very realism which they so appropriately oppose.—James C. Davies, *University of Oregon.*

The Foundations of Human Society. By Donald McIntosh. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. 341. $10.50.)

Several decades ago the British sociologist Morris Ginsberg wrote a warning to ambitious political theorists: ". . . what is general in common action is not will, and what is will is not general." Although a generation of political theorists heeded Ginsberg's warning and others like it, with the result that the idealist tradition in political thought went into eclipse, at least one contemporary political theorist is ready to present a novel and serious interpretation of the general will. The tenor of Donald McIntosh's *The Foundations of Human Society* is revealed by his remark that one must choose between the position that the State has a purpose and the standpoint that only subunits in the State have purposes ". . . before one can begin to grapple with the main problems of political theory in a coherent way." When he failed to make this choice Max Weber "defined himself as a sociologist rather than as a political theorist." McIntosh argues that the State does have a purpose and his book is devoted to exploring the questions of whose purpose it is and how this purpose is translated into action.

The Foundations of Human Society is the first part of a projected three-volume "systematic political theory," that constitutes an attempt to synthesize such diverse tendencies in political thought as the mathematical theory of games, Freudian psychoanalytic theory and the classical tradition as exemplified by Plato, Aristotle and Rousseau. Influences from Marxism, symbolic interactionism, Bentleyan group process analysis and even phenomenological views of zones of human activity are also evident. The result, at least in the first volume, resembles greatly twentieth century idealist thought as expressed by writers like Bosanquet and Hocking. If this string of references confuses the reader, he should not conclude that the book is hopelessly eclectic and contradictory. Instead, he should appreciate the effort that must have gone into relating together this wide range of perspectives. Unfortunately, McIntosh's restatement of the general will is not commensurate to the range of thought that he has brought to bear in creating it.

In the short space allotted to this review it is impossible to do justice to the many lines of argument that McIntosh opens up. *The Foundations of Human Society* repays careful reading for its many suggestive passages, as well as for the subtleties of its major argument. However, at the risk of oversimplification it is necessary to justify the conclusion that McIntosh's treatment of the general will is unconvincing. In an involved argument, McIntosh derives the general will from a ground in the process of psychological identification. Identification begins as introjection, or "the incorporation into one's self or something from the outside." Such introjection is a primary process and it includes the idea of "adopting a utility scale of another person as our own." Given this basis one can define the private will of an actor as his utility scale apart from the influence of the utilities of others and the particular will of an actor as his "actual utility scale" when the influence on his preferences of the utilities of others is taken into account. The formation of this particular will describes with McIntosh calls "simple identification."

The general will, however, is formed by two further processes of identification. In primary identification an actor forms an idealized conception of the utility scale of a significant other, takes it over as the utility scale of his superego and partially integrates it with the ego's scale through the process of simple identification. Primary identification is with a parent or parent substitute. Secondary identification involves a transferal of identification from the original object to a new object. Here, the superego image created by the process of primary identification becomes detached from its original object and displaced onto another individual or an institution. This is the ground of political leadership and authority. At the same time a process of "ego identification" goes on between followers in a social group. As a result of these two processes of secondary identification, a general will of a social group is formed. The dynamics of the general will can be described in four propositions. Superego utility scales of group members will normally be closely similar; these utility scales do not necessarily closely resemble the actual will of any actor; these utility scales may be visualized as representations of the actual will of an ideal group member; the utility scale of the ideal group member is the general will of the group. Since members of the group do not have exactly the same interpretation of what constitutes the general will, the real general will is defined as the area of agreement on the ideal group member between all of the members of the group. Thus, the general will must not be understood as a sum or aggregate or average of particular wills, but as a discrete utility scale, "a component of the psyche" of each group member. Freud has solved Rousseau's problem, and we can conclude that a State is an association organized for the purpose of putting the general will of a community into action.

McIntosh's restatement of the general will is unconvincing for several reasons. First, although he does not violate Ginsberg's rule that contents cannot be regarded as having an independent existence prior to the act of apprehension or comprehension of particular persons (contents are universals, states of mind are temporal processes), he saves the general will from dependence upon a universal mind at the cost of introducing an argument with important gaps. There is a gap between the formation of a superego utility scale and the formation of an image of an idealized group member. Is McIntosh describing anything more profound than reference group behavior? There is a gap between the processes of identification in primary groups and their supposed parallels in secondary groups. Second, since every group has a general will, it is unlikely that the general will of the entire community will be a meaningful and significant variable for political analysis in complex societies. Despite these comments, *The Foundations of Human Society* remains an impressive effort.—Michael A. Weinstein, *Purdue University*.

The Political Thought of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. By Alan Ritter. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 222. $6.75.)

With the possible exception of Rousseau, Pierrre-Joseph Proudhon is the most enigmatic of all modern political philosophers. Twisting and turning his way from one level of cognition to the next, his writings are a maze of paradox and irony which the reader enters at his own peril. This undoubtedly explains why Proudhon, obviously one of the most brilliant of all modern intellectuals, is not better known to political theorists in America. Alan Ritter's attempt to interpret Proudhon's political thought through a careful analysis of his writings, therefore, is highly commendable.

Rejecting the often expressed opinion that Proudhon's political thought is so hopelessly contradictory and confused that it cannot possibly be subjected to careful analytic treatment, Ritter prudently avoids existing secondary sources and gees right to the original writings, including some, like the *Notebooks,* which have just been published for the first time. In a further effort to achieve objectivity, Ritter views Proudhon's political ideas without reference to his colorful personality or his involvement in the social and political movements of his day. The author's object here is to be fair, for Proudhon's dazzling verbal exchanges with Marx and other outstanding nineteenth century intellectuals have created ideological backwaters that remain turbulent to this day. Proudhon's tremendous influence upon leading American anarchists, such as William B. Greene and Benjamin R. Tucker, moreover, has given rise to a virtual mountain of additional interpretation, and Ritter was indeed wise in deciding not to undertake the scaling of these forbidding heights.

The thesis Ritter sets out to defend in this book is that Proudhon, "though a radical, was a realist and a moralist as well." Proudhon's most brilliant contribution to moral theory, according to Ritter, is that he ultimately draws a careful distinction between autonomy and conformity, thereby saving himself from the mistaken romantic notion that self-direction is only possible where all conventional norms are totally rejected as guide lines of social action. Ritter points out that it may well be true, as modern sociology insists, that no individual can altogether escape the pressures exerted upon him by the institutions of society. But this does not mean that the individual is destined to remain in moral limbo forever, the helpless victim of the pulls and tugs exerted upon him from without. To be considered autonomous it is not necessary that the individual reject all volitional directives urged upon him but only those which conflict with his own reasoned idea of what is correct and proper. Proudhon made this clear, Ritter maintains, when he argued that the man who obeys an edict not because it has been commanded by authority but because it equates with his own conception of what is right has not given away any part of his personal freedom at all. "Making dependence on self-validated norms the sign of autonomous choice," Ritter concludes, "reopens the door to liberation which is closed by the sociologists," and thus Proudhon is seen as one of the most reliable of all libertarian writers. Had Ritter stopped here, he would have furnished us with a helpful insight into the complex mind of one of the nineteenth century's most brilliant luminaries.

Unfortunately there are several glaring areas of confusion in Ritter's analysis that detract from its usefulness as a guide to an intelligent understanding of Proudhon's thought. One of these has to do with the excessive weight which Ritter gives to Proudhon's mutualist ideas. Proudhon, it is true, viewed the pressure exerted on the individual by the social group as much less socially harmful than the formal control directed at him by government. But this does not mean, as Ritter suggests, that Proudhon was blind to the enslaving characteristics of the social group. (p. 80) To the contrary, Association, or fraternity, as he sometimes calls it, was in his mind merely another step along the way toward authoritarian control over the individual. Even when proposed by radicals as a revolutionary expedient, Association, according to Proudhon, is essentially dogmatic in character and cannot end up in anything less than the "SYSTEM" which he so much dreaded. As G. D. H. Cole once observed, the only social group in which Proudhon placed much trust was the family. But even here, Proudhon insisted that the individual had to be constantly on guard least he be corrupted by the filial pressures he was surrounded by. In view of this it is difficult to understand why Ritter spends so much effort in chiding Proudhon for his failure to see that social pressure does in fact hinder free moral choice by the individual.

Ritter's analysis of Proudhon's political throught is further weakened by the shallowness of his understanding of the basic design of libertarian theory. In the last pages of the book he makes the perplexing assertion that Proudhon was in error when he objected to law on the grounds that it interferes with the growth of libertarian currents within society (p. 21). Ritter defends law as a regulating mechanism on the grounds that not only does it "encourage people to think critically about their norms of choice" but it also "offers valuable support to freedom of decision by guaranteeing the individual a kind of immunity from social pressure that he could not otherwise enjoy." The basic flaw in Ritter's analysis here is that he does not recognize that Proudhon's objection to legal system was not peripheral to his libertarianism but the very heart of it. Under no circumstance, according to Proudhon, can social regulation be imposed upon the individual by the authority of any group, social or political. Had Ritter read *The General Idea of the Revolution of the Nineteenth Century* more carefully, he would have discovered that Proudhon adamantly refused to admit that justice and authority can ever be reconciled. The most destructive of all social crimes takes place, according to Proudhon, when society attempts to sit in judgment of the individual and his actions. Only the individual has the right to judge himself, Proudhon consistently held, for "justice is an act of conscience, essentially voluntary," which owes nothing whatever to authority in any of its forms. Any attempt whatever to coerce or punish the individual for his personal actions is a species of force and hence utterly inadmissable in a libertarian society.

Ritter's inability to understand Proudhon stems from his own commitment to the liberal notion of force and authority as legitimate means of effecting social change. His bias in this regard is revealed when he writes that: "Proudhon's tactical stance, and its dilemma, anticipate those of contemporary libertarian radicals. Like him, they are uncompromising advocates of radical change. Like him, they are unwilling to use coercive means to achieve it." (pp. 193–4) Ritter seems to imply that it is the worst kind of intellectual confusion to believe, as Proudhon does, that society can function efficiently without its law courts, prisons, and other institutional means of compelling the individual to do what he should. Apparently Ritter, like so many other social scientists of the day, is unaware that it is the liberal idea of the state itself which has brought us to the troubled times we labor to escape. If several centuries of experimentation with systematic force and compulsion have not led us out of the wilderness, is there any point in praying at the feet of that god any longer? Proudhon has much to say on that subject. Unfortunately, the real import of his argument has passed completely over Ritter's head.—WILLIAM O. REICHERT, *Bowling Green State University.*

Simulation and Society: An Exploration of Scientific Gaming. BY JOHN R. RASER. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1969. Pp. 180. $2.95, paper.)

Simulation and Society is not a research report. Rather, it is a handbook of simulation and gaming lore which acquaints the reader with the kind of talk which is often overheard (and occasionally written in the fugitive monographs of) simulation and gaming subcultures of the social sciences. A simulation is viewed by the author as a "complete and accurate representation of a referent," while a game is considered to be "an initial postulation providing the framework for further building." The wide ranging discussion of these two research and teaching strategies is largely descriptive, punctuated with a generous number of excerpts from the writings of simulation and gaming practitioners, a style which is presumably responsive to the author's stated intention of writing a book about models and the men who construct them (although biographical data are quite sparse). The analytic or interpretive portions of the discussion are directed toward the author's additional avowed intention to consider the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of simulation and gaming, focusing primarily upon the process of discovery, criteria for evaluation, and questions of validity.

Generally the book is well put together. It is engagingly and imaginatively written, relating simulation and gaming as a research and teaching strategy to both images of man and models of man. With respect to the former, the author concerns himself with the implications of viewing man from a variety of perspectives. The discussion of models addresses itself both to the logic of modeling in general and to modeling in simulation and gaming modes more specifically.

The descriptive portions of the book are well executed. Taken as a whole they represent the best account of the breadth of activities associated with simulation and gaming of which I am aware. A comprehensive intellectual history of the social scientific roots of simulation and gaming is sketched and an enthusiastic account (complete with exclamation points!!!) of the successes of computer simulation, man-machine or complex environment games, games for teaching in schools and games for instructing policy makers is provided.

In addition to its descriptive function, the book is designed to relate simulation and gaming to the metatheoretical or epistemological concerns which are the basis upon which all scientific activity is assessed. The portions of the book addressed to this function are very uneven. On the positive side, the general treatment of modeling as a research strategy is well executed. The author makes clever use of analogy to explain analogizing as a cognitive strategy which promotes scientific discovery. Moving from the process of discovery to the logic of justification, he, with the help of generous quotations from Donald Campbell, presents a competent account of the process of inductive inference from experiments.

The most serious shortcoming of the book is in its treatment of simulation and gaming as strategies for theory building and scientific explanation. The fact that a model (and hence the theory which it models) is an argument or explanation about some aspect of reality is hardly touched upon. When the discussion does turn to the nature of theories, some rather serious confusions are manifest. Theories are equated with theorems (p. 6), laws are contrasted with probability statements (p. 6), and variables are confused with parameters (p. 26). Generally, theories are identified in several different incompatible ways, the most frequent confusion being that of identifying a theory with one of the components (e.g., a law or a prediction) of a theory.

One of the weakest parts of the interpretive portion of the book is the last chapter on the validity of simulation and gaming. Here, the question of validity, which might be legitimately conceived in terms of the logic of justification, is treated more on the basis of biographical reports of how gratifying various experimenters have found their simulation and gaming experience to be. This unwittingly subjectivist position on meta-theory is maintained throughout the discussion which consistently confuses the problems of discovery with those of justification.

In sum, the contribution of *Simulation and Society* will not be one of giving the reader intellectual control over simulation and gaming as theory building strategies. It should, however, help to give both students and professionals in the social sciences a good perspective on what is happening in the laboratories and heads of those involved in these strategies.—MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO, *University of California, Berkeley.*

The Mind of Jeremy Bentham. BY D. J. MANNING. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968. Pp. 118. $4.50.)

It hardly seems that almost twenty years have passed since Michael Oakeshott, in *Political Education,* his celebrated innaugural address at the London School of Economics, exhorted us to regard legitimate political activity as the "pursuit of intimations," to recognize that the main task of "political education" is to train people to understand and participate in their concrete political traditions, and to eschew the "cookery book" approach to politics. Precisely how this conception applied to historical political philosophy—and especially to the leading thinkers of the "tradition"—has never been clear to those of us who were not privileged to attend Oakeshott's classes—and brilliant they were too, judging from the reports! But now D. J. Manning has provided some of the details in his *The Mind of Jeremy Bentham,* which is as much a study in the application of a specific method as it is an analysis of the political doctrines of philosophic radicalism. Indeed, it is more method than substance; as Manning acknowledges, his book "is an attempt to explore certain possibilities and suggestions in Bentham's work, leading, it is hoped, to a new appreciation of his thought" (p. 2). Not, mind you, what Bentham "said" or even "intended" but what can be inferred from his writings! Not what is there but what is suggested! "Suggested to whom and in what terms?" are the central questions, for inferring from the thoughts of others—pursuing their intimations, if you will—is a tricky business, and we must know what standards are being applied before we can begin to understand and evaluate the effort. Manning has been extraordinarily helpful in letting us know that his categories are Michael Oakeshott's.

In that incrementalist, romantic, and almost mystical world of Professor Oakeshott, the hero is the man of talent, insight, and action—the successful cook and stateman who is able to explore and extend the accumulated wisdoms of his art without going beyond them or attempting to condense them to a set of abstract principles that can be used as a "preface to political activity." The Oskeshottian villian, correspondingly, is the "rationalist," the thinker rather than the doer, the man who speculates, deduces political prescriptions from "premediated" ideals, pretends to universality, and shows a disregard for (or ignorance of) the concrete political arrangements of his own society; for it is in those arrangements, according to Oakeshott, that ideals are inevitably imbedded.

This, then, is the intellectual context for a book that is engagingly and concisely written, well organized, carefully and thoroughly researched, and exceedingly clever. To write interestingly and intelligibly about Bentham is no small feat, for "the hermit of Queens Square Place" did all he could to render interpretation difficult if not impossible. Neologisms piled upon archaic phrases, a crabbed and often witless style, and literally thousands of manuscripts stored in University College, London —the eleven volumes of small print in Bowring's edition of the *Collected Works* are but the top of a monstrous iceberg—are enough to drive off all but the most stalwart of scholars. Dr. Manning has persisted, and we are to be grateful for those morsels he has rescued from the manuscripts. But precisely because the volume of Bentham manuscripts is so great and so relatively unexplored, it is almost impossible to evaluate the author's (substantive) findings. Undoubtedly what Manning has produced is there, and we must, as it were, take his work that it truly represents the still submerged portions of the iceberg. Fortunately, Manning's Bentham, in his essentials, is not strikingly different from the hedonistic curmudgeon with whom we are already familiar; that is, if we discount the excesses of the Oakeshottian sieve through which he is filtered.

The Benthamite system is sufficiently well known to make a summary superfluous. The point of Manning's book is that there is something seriously wrong with the pleasure/pain calculus—not just that it is silly and pretentious, which we already know—with the "greatest happiness" maxim and especially with the political doctrine Bentham extracted from them. With only a slight shift in emphasis that does no great violence to his thought, Bentham becomes the rationalist villian par excellence: he believed unyieldingly in the majesty and power of reason, attempted to formulate a universal system of social and political norms that would have permitted the deduction of rules governing specific conduct from general and abstract principles, and—most importantly—was downright hostile toward both the traditions and political institutions of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century England. Bentham's individualist conception of human nature, Manning says, leads to a "society of stranger," the members of which must be organically reunited into a political community.

There is something fresh and exciting about the suggestion that Bentham faced a world of alienated men and sought to devise a political order that could accommodate them; it is quite the most intriguing argument in the book. Unfortunately, Manning sees this as a defect to be overcome rather than as a means of understanding Bentham more clearly, and the thesis is never developed. (The promise to analyze Bentham as a product of and response to his own times—repeated several times—remains unfulfilled.) Manning sees politics as not simply the technique for regulating competition; it is the art by which the forces that create alienation and conflict can be overcome; politics, in short, is the master skill through which the traditions, identities, and bonds of each unique community can be discovered and nurtured. Contrary to Bentham's fondest hopes, there can be no universal political ethic, for human life is infinitely complex and filled with singular experiences that transcend rational understanding. Tending to these complexities is, in the Oakeshottian scheme, the job of the politician and statesman, men who are wise in the care and pursuit of intimations. But Bentham, Manning contends, despaired of politicians and their ways; he would have replaced them with rational administrators and substituted for their art and decisions the conflict of interests and the resolution of these conflicts in accord with the sterile principle of utility. Thus, enactment of Bentham's ideals would make it impossible ever to reestablish organic, social bonds among men; each member of the "society of strangers" would continue to pursue his own interests without regard for the good of others, and certainly not caring about the good of the virtually inconceivable whole. In Bentham's "rational society," we are told, "every subject intimidates, and is in turn intimidated by, his fellows" (p. 84). Manning seems to believe that we are now living in a Benthamite world and that an awareness of the shortcomings in Bentham's thought will make our own foibles more apparent, a series of claims I cannot begin to deal with here beyond observing that they rely upon a naive and far-fetched view of historical causation that need not be attributed to Oakeshott.

How one reacts to this reading of Bentham will depend, in the final analysis, upon his attitudes toward both classical utilitarianism and the anti-rationalism of Michael Oakeshott (if it is not improper, at this point, to visit the sins of the student upon the master). There are always dangers in imposing upon a body of doctrine a ready-made scheme of analysis, especially if the scheme is hostile to the doctrine in question and contains an ideology (in the best sense) of its own that is neither clearly articulated nor fully acceptable. In the present case, the dangers are exaggerated, for, as Manning recognizes (p. 15), Bentham's system was neither consistent nor fully coherent. The only way to read Bentham from an Oakeshottian perspective, then, is to *make* him logical and to *force* him into a model he undoubtedly would have rejected. It is noteworthy in this context that Manning does not date or otherwise indicate the chronological sequence of the passages he quotes. This is a most serious failing, for Manning himself acknowledges that Bentham altered and expanded his doctrines from year to year. Thus, it is not Bentham who is presented to us but some "might have been" who never quite was, not—despite the title—the "mind" of Jeremy Bentham that is explored but some higher meaning that is obtained only by ignoring shifts within the several texts and by imposing an alien framework upon the whole. This method of interpretation is questionable at best. While I am not convinced that it is necessary to go the whole way with those who insist that all works can only be explicated within their own (historical) contexts, I am persuaded of the necessity of at least sticking to the actual texts and not making them (artificially) consistent so that they can be "understood" in terms of the commentator's own categories. Once we sew seed in this garden, we had best be prepared for the appearance of all sorts of hybrid and curiously anachronistic growths that now seem to be vestiges of an outdated way of doing the history of political thought, such as Plato the fascist, Machiavelli the scientist, Locke the democrat, Rousseau the totalitarian, and Bentham the rationalist. In the end, Manning can do no more than castigate Bentham for not conforming to an *a priori* model that was actually designed as a counter-doctrine. It is not just that Bentham was not Oakeshott, for only a moment's reflection suggests that very few political philosophers who were worthwhile have satisfied the rigid demands of intimation pursuit. Politics itself may be largely a matter of pushing beyond the fringes of present institutions ever so slightly, but this is certainly not an accurate description of political philosophy. It simply will not do to contend, as Manning does —and without any attempt to explain or justify his assertions—that the aim of "theory" is essentially to make experience "meaningful" and that political "philosophers" *per se* "do not make any" political prescriptions (pp. 111–112) and then to condemn Bentham for having failed the former and attempted the latter.

Before it retreated into the university sometime within the past century, political philosophy was self-consciously devoted to the justification of political systems and recommendations. And the act of political justification cannot help but commit at least one of the Oakeshottian cardinal sins of "abridging" a tradition, relying steadfastly upon the powers of reason, and calling for the overthrow of the whole of a way of life. The advocate of incrementalism must be either satisfied with the world in which he finds himself or fearful of the prospects of change; he believes that the "good" and "just" society has indeed arrived or is afraid that any but the most cautious of steps toward justice will bring greater misery than the conditions they seek to eliminate. Such a view is characteristic of the contented (and neutral) academician and successful politician; it can never be the vantage of the intellectual partisan or the political malcontent who has been denied power or access to it. So much the worse, then, for political philosophy once it entered the academy and became converted into "value free" analysis, explanation, and political "theory." And what happens when our "just" and "good" society begins to crumble, or is exposed as a facade that hides manifest injustice, or when we learn that our politicians have been pursuing the wrong intimations all along

The Benthamite conception of interest conflict is undoubtedly an inadequate normative model of politics, but the elitism implicit in the anti-rationalist "pursuit of intimations" is probably even more defective. That Jeremy Bentham may have been among those who delivered us into our present bondage is an interesting suggestion that is undoubtedly open to question; that we are there and must be rescued is now beyond dispute. But Michael Oakeshott—for all his brilliance and insight—is not leading the way to a promised land. —Gordon J Schochet, *Livingston College, Rutgers University.*

Politik als Interessenkonflikt. By Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber. (Stuttgart: Friedrich Enke Verlag, 1969, Pp., 288.)

This book is a new and most interesting contribution to the Arthur Fisher Bentley discussion. Written by a German social scientist, the study seizes upon an analysis of *The Process of Government* as an opportunity to provide for a foreign audience a comprehensive, excellently informed and critical account of the "American Science of Politics" since Bentley but without the ironic harping of a Bernard Crick. To view behaviorism, functionalism and group theory as it were from the outside allows for some novel perspectives which by themselves make the book valuable.

That this can be done by a fresh investigation of the concepts, assumptions and methods of Bentley's *Process,* shows not only the (in the strict sense) epochal importance of the 1908-product. The new study also makes quite clear why in certain respects Bentley's book has become, at least for some of its admirers, the "conceptual and theoretical trap" of which La Palombara has spoken (in *Interest Groups in Italian Politics,* p. 13). The rather loose structure of Dr. Hirsch-Weber's treatise is at times slightly confusing. But it helps the author to achieve his various objectives. Time and again he takes off uninhibitedly for interesting excursuses covering in depth less well known aspects of Bentley's and of group theory. (He reserves for an appendix, perhaps more useful for a European than for an American audience, sharply focussed critical appraisals of the books by E. P. Herring, P. Odegard, E. E. Schattschneider, F. W. Riggs, and E. Latham.)

Instead of the usual general reference to Bentley's exposure to German social science at the turn of the century, Hirsch-Weber traces very concretely the fascination which such complicated thinkers as Georg Simmel, Gustav Ratzenhofer and the legal philosopher Rudolf von Ihering held for the young Mid-Westerner. However great the intellectual impact of these scholars on Bentley's concepts, it is probably just as characteristic for them as for the author of the *Process* that his work completely ignores the "governmental process" in continental Europe. Just as his pragmatism is most of the time singularly unpragmatic, Bentley's functionalism is non-comparative to the point of making its assumptions largely useless for the analysis of any but the American system.

Dr. Hirsch-Weber is unable to explain why there is no trace of either Dilthey or Max Weber in any of Bentley's works. He had studied under Dilthey and Weber was rapidly rising to prominence when Bentley wrote. Was this a case of "selective attention?" Especially where Bentley speaks about the importance of "underlying conditions" and activities, he comes very close to Max Weber's insights. But Weber avoided the very pitfalls of Bentley's insistence that there is nothing but a "seamless web" between group politics and the governmental process. Could Bentley's failure to ever mention James Madison and the tenth Federalist Paper be due to a similar self-suggestion or originality?

Dr. Hirsch-Weber's discussion of Bentley's seldom highlighted treatment of the judicial process shows very well the merits and shortcomings of the *Process*: there are here, again partly inspired by Ihering, valuable building blocks for legal realism, but also the errors flowing from his conviction that Supreme Court decisions are "group activity" like everything else.

The most valuable and most original excursus of the book explores the concept of "interest" from the Corpus Juris to Planenatz, via Rousseau and, of course, Bentley. Here a linguistic analysis drawing especially on the later Wittgenstein adds important dimensions to the discussion of the *Allgemeininteresse,* of the public interest in both its descriptive and normative content. Whether there might not be a connection between the ontology of the *early* Wittgenstein (at least as interpreted by the Vienna circle) and Bentley's thinking remains an open question not touched upon by Dr. Hirsch-Weber. But there is much valid criticism of the notion of latent and potential interests. David Truman's use of the term "attitude" evokes for the author certain highly problematic hypotheses of German experimental psychology, especially of the pre-behavioral structualists.

Quite correctly the book points to and explains the empirical and logical weakness of Bentley's defiance as "mental terms" of all statements suggesting causality or motivation. The author might have been even more critical of Bentley's concept of "transaction," defined by Bentley (and Dewey) as "man-in process-with environment." Even though the term appears only in Bentley's later works, especially in the *Knowing and the Known* (1949), its substance is very much around in the *Process.* Arnold Brecht has contributed a short but appropriately savage criticism of the entire notion (in *Political Theory,* pp. 512 f.) where he concludes: . . . "concentration on the transactional as distinct from the inter-actional (causal) aspects of events in social life is as yet a vague program rather than an achievement.")

Of course on many points Bentley can be defended (and Hirsch-Weber does a good job of it) by pointing to his own often repeated claim that he did not wish to offer more than a "vague program," that he was merely proposing provisional methods for empirical research he himself had not undertaken. Disciple of Charles Peirce he was, he followed the command of his master "not to block the road to inquiry" so faithfully that he shunned all definitions which might have proven premature even though they might also have lent concreteness to his propositions. There is, however, one seemingly extravagant dictum of Bentley's which is often quoted to show that he was not just the pioneer of modern behaviorism but also an uncritical hankerer after quantitative data. To be sure he has written (*Process,* p. 201): "The statement that takes us farthest along the road toward quantitative estimates will inevitably be the best statement." But this is preceded by a never quoted (here even Dr. Hirsch-Weber fails Bentley) and in present-day research often ignored caveat that it must first be ascertained whether such a quantitative statement "does not otherwise distort the social facts."

The excellent study concludes with a discussion of Bentley's legacy. This has been done before and most recently in the contributions by David Truman and by Richard W. Taylor to the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* Just because the author looks at the *Process* from the outside, it would have been interesting to have him discuss the place of Bentley, the curious social philosopher and muckraker, in the tradition of American political thought. Described by some as a cynical conservative, Bentley was in fact (moderately) active in Mid-Western progressive movements. His assumptions of an eventually unfailing equilibrium emerging from the conflict between "activities" might appear naive. They are, however, in line with Bentley's acceptance of the democratic idealism and basic optimism that was prevalent at the time he wrote the *Process.* It might be worthwhile to investigate further (as Mancur Olsen has done very tentatively in *The Logic of Collective Action,* pp. 130 f.) the affinity between the populist strand of American pluralism and an antistatism of which corporatism is the conservative and mutualism or anarchism are the progressive manifestations.—HENRY W. EHRMANN, *Dartmouth College.*

Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. BY ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE. Edited by Alan Bloom, translated by James Nicholls. (New York: Basic Books, 1969. Pp. 287. $8.50.)

Studies on Marx and Hegel. BY JEAN HYPPOLITE. Edited and translated by John O'Neil. (New York: Basic Books, 1969. Pp. 202. $6.50.)

Idealism Politics and History: Sources of Hegelian Thought. BY GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 387. $13.50.)

The first two books are translations of very prominent French-language commentators on Hegel's work. Kojève, a Russian by origin who finished his life as a civil servant of the European community, taught in Paris during the thirties at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. This book is based on those lectures, but Kojève did not publish it himself; rather the book was put together from Kojève's lectures for a number of different sessions, and published together with an introduction by Kojève shortly after the war by Raymond Queneau. This translation includes about half the material of the original.

This book is a fascinating one in more than one way. Kojève remains a mysterious figure, who published very little, but had an extraordinary influence. In fact it was through these lectures at the Ecole Pratique in the 'thirties that Hegel really entered the French philosophical scene. In fact up to the thirties France remained strongly impervious to post-Kantian German thought—strangely, that is, in view of what has happened since. Even Marxism was not a serious force intellectually. Then Hegel suddenly gained intellectual naturalization, in the company of Marx and Heidegger.

Thus the Hegel who is an important reference point of post-war French thinkers of the so-called "existentialist" left, of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, is first introduced in these lectures which are important documents in the history of thought. Those familiar with the work of the later authors will recognize the link at once. We are looking here at a Hegel who is being read in the light of Marx, but is not seen as a simple "fore-runner," but rather as a way of rediscovering in Marx the full philosophical depth of a dialectical notion of history; rescuing Marx as one might put it from the mechanical interpretation according to which the "base" determines the "superstructure," an interpretation which always has to be balanced later by an admission that the "superstructure" also affects the "base" to some degree. Whether this has been a correct interpretation of Marx is certainly open to question (the reaction to it has come in France with Althusser and his associates); but no one can deny that, aided by the rediscovery of the early Marx manuscripts, it has been an immensely influential one.

One might also question the interpretation of Hegel. The central text for this contemporary reinterpretation is the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* and this is the work on which Kojève lectured, and which he studied minutely; the most discussed passage is the dialectic of the Master and the Slave, to which Kejève gives a central place. And this is understandable in an approach which is interested in understanding what Hegel had to say about man and human history. On this subject there are few more fascinating works in the history of Western philosophy. But the danger, from which Kojève doesn't fully escape, is an "Anthropologizing" distortion of Hegel's thought. Hegel's Spirit is not simply that of man, even it it is not equivalent to the orthodox idea of God. It was the young Hegelians who centered the dialectic on man; much of Hegel's thought becomes incomprehensible if one does this. It would be impossible to read the *Logic* or the philosophies of nature, or religion, for instance, with the same eyes that Kojève has read the *Phenomenology*.

In a sense we should think of Kojève more as an original philosopher who thought out his ideas through a meditation on the *Phenomenology*. Hyppolite, on the other hand, is a genuine commentator, the dean of Hegel scholars on the French scene. He too is best known for his admirable translation of, and commentary on the *Phenomenology;* but his interpretations are well grounded in the whole of Hegel's work (he has also published a commentary on the *Logic*).

The book of Hyppolite's translated here is a collection of essays which touch on one of the central issues which arises from the contemporary concern with Hegel, his relation to Marx. Precisely because Hyppolite doesn't share the "anthropologized" interpretation of Hegel, but sees that Hegel is talking about an absolute subject who is not simply human but cosmic, he can appreciate the extent of Marx's break with Hegel: it involves in fact a declaration of independence of man and human purpose within the cosmos. For this point of view the monism which Engels re-established supposedly on a materialist basis, and which has become the orthodoxy of official communism, seems to run counter to the spirit of Marx's work. As Hyppolite says of these "East European commentators" in the preface written specially for the English edition, "they preserve in Hegel what Marx felt obliged to reject" (p. viii).

The essays, which are arranged in four sections, range fairly widely. The first and fourth sections contain papers dealing strictly with aspects of Hegel's philosophy. The middle two sections are, however, of particular interest to political theorists. Part II contains an essay on "the significance of the French Revolution in Hegel's *Phenomenology*" which is well worth reading. Hegel's attitude to the French Revolution is one of the keys to understanding the genesis and purpose of his political thought. One of the crucial passages for understanding this is the short, ten-page section of the *Phenomenology* on "Absolute Freedom and the Terror," in which Hegel tries to draw out the contradiction which he sees in the goals of the Revolution, Hyppolite gives a very useful background and commentary to this passage and the preceding one.

Part II also contains a commentary on Lukacs' *Young Hegel*, while Part III, devoted to Marxism and Philosophy, has papers on Marx's critique of Hegel's concept of the state, and on the structure and philosophical presuppositions of *Capital.*

Professor Kelly's book is an attempt to trace the development of idealist thought in modern politics through its formative period in four connected essays, devoted respectively to Rousseau, Kant, Fichte and Hegel. Idealism is seen here as the doctrine that reality must be understood in relation to mind, spirit and reason, which means ultimately in relation to an underlying ideal form. Hegel stressed how much his idealism was in continuity with that of the followers of Socrates, with the theory of Ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and not with the epistemologically-based views of a Berkeley, for instance. But the crucially new dimension, unknown to the Greeks, was that of 'historicism,' the notion that history could be seen as polarized by the Idea towards higher and higher forms of its realization, culminating in a state founded on reason.

Although Rousseau, and even in some respects Kant, were not idealists in this sense, we cannot understand the background to this extraordinary current of thought which arose in Germany at this time, and which has had such a fateful influence on modern history, without returning to them. We have been familiarized with this filiation by the polemics of some modern authors against "totalitarian democracy."

But Professor Kelly's work most emphatically does not belong to this class of put-downs. "Although an empiricist by conviction" (p. 6), he has attempted to understand the views on politics and history of his authors against the background of their deeper philosophical ideas. In particular, for instance, he attempts to cast light on the differences between the four authors by relating them to their different notions of time. This book is a really valuable and timely contribution to our understanding of this important tradition of thought.
—CHARLES TAYLOR, *McGill University*

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Congressional Committees. By William L. Morrow. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969. Pp. 261. $6.95.)

In the exploratory work on congressional committees advanced during the past several years, most studies have dealt with a particular committee, or a particular congress, and considered a limited number of explanatory variables. Such specialization is understandable given the importance of "field" research, the value of interviews with congressmen and staff, and the number and complexity of relevant factors even for such limited designs. But students of the field now urge testing of some of these particular findings across a range of committees or a range of congresses—to see the varying impact of subject matter, external environment, changes in membership and in chairmen. Work on comparative committee studies is beginning. The more elaborate designs which will test one set of findings against a range of possible influences still remain a goal for future research. It is an emergent, challenging field—with much of the task of comparative analysis and empirical generalization remaining to be accomplished.

In this field at this time, William Morrow has written *Congressional Committees.* The book offers a macro-view of the place of committees in the American political system (pp. 1, 2). It traces the formal and informal committee structure in relation to such systemic variables as the separation of powers, federalism, patterns of conflict and decentralized decision-making in the national government. Chapter 2 outlines the formal committee structure, discusses the impact of the seniority system and the committee assignment process on that structure and concludes that "the formal organization of committees represents a response to those social forces which have been able to exploit constitutional features and the decentralized character of American politics to their best advantage." (p. 57). Chapter 3 examines the informal structure. It traces the possible role relationships members may adopt with participants in the external environment, such as interest groups, the public, executive department personnel; discusses the role of committee hearings; and points out "how informal organization . . . nourishes and extends formal organization in a mutually reinforcing, cyclical pattern which helps to institutionalize the patterns of conflict in the American system and within Congress" (pp. 143, 144). Chapter 4 examines the relationship between committees and the Executive; discusses the procedures and possibilities for congressional oversight; and concludes that "the same factors which encourage committee reinforcement of the decentralized character of the American political system . . . also profoundly affect the character of committee-executive relationships" especially as regards the exercise of the oversight function (pp. 220, 221). While the author draws on some interviews conducted as a Congressional Fellow in 1965-66 and some research in committee hearings and other documents, the main basis for generalization is the existing literature on Congress and its committees. The ambitious scope of the enterprise deserves notice, offers a useful overview of the subject, but invokes certain obvious difficulties.

At the present stage of knowledge, some of the generalizations offered cannot be substantiated. For example, Morrow discusses the "group influence" on the assignment process and points out how this influence contributes to intra-committee conflict: "Such a procedure usually guarantees that committees will be structured so as to promote conflict between groups' spokesmen, each seeking to advance the cause of the dominant group or groups in his district" (p. 85). He cites the House Education and Labor Committee as example. But we do not know the extent of group influence on the assignment process, nor its relative influence compared to that of the party leadership or the chairmen of the committees concerned, nor the extent to which that influence may vary from one committee to another. The House leadership keeps an eye on selection for the three prestigious committees of Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means—partly to ensure that conflict will not dominate committee decision-making. And from time to time the leadership may influence other appointments. Nor do we know the range or variation in committee conflict. The group conflict that fractionalizes Education and Labor is not found on Armed Services, particularly notable under Chairman Carl Vinson for producing unanimous committee votes on controversial legislation. Some pioneering work by Richard Fenno suggests conditions under which committee cohesiveness may vary. Indeed, according to Fenno's analyses, Education and Labor—cited by Morrow to illustrate his point—may be, rather, the limiting case of extreme committee conflict. Other such statements recur through the work—on the impact of the seniority system, on patterns of substantive committee oversight—which require just that specification of degree of impact and committee variation that is only beginning to be available in the literature.

Morrow admits the difficulty in the preface and urges that the conclusions be taken as "hypotheses" rather than "principles." (He continues: "To the author, there is little doubt that the generalizations to appear in the following pages are for the most part valid, but few attempts will be made to explain the extent of their validity.") However, in the vocabulary and phrasing of conclusions, the absence of questions raised for future research, and the lack of admission of areas where no firm information exists, the text does not follow the spirit of the preface on this point.

And yet in providing a macro-view of committee structure and functioning, *Congressional Committees* makes certain definite contributions. Morrow's outlining in Chapter 3 of the possible dimensions and impact of the committee role system and its basis in six spheres of external influence deserves attention and may prove helpful as a base for typologies in future work. His application of committee structure to the problems of oversight in Chapter 4 is particularly thorough and thoughtful. Most importantly, he manages to bring together in one volume an impressive amount of literature on the subject. And throughout the work, the author succeeds in conveying a sense of the complexity of pressures brought to bear on the committee system and the way that system may function as a "vital . . . part of the nerve center of the American political process" (v). These descriptions make useful reading not only for political scientists, but for undergraduate students of Congress as well. There will be other, more analytical books on congressional committees. But this is a first—which, by itself, is no mean achievent.—BARBARA HINCKLEY, *University of Massachusetts.*

The Corporation in American Politics. BY EDWIN M. EPSTEIN. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. Pp. 365. $8.50; paper, $4.95.)

Epstein establishes seven goals for his book: he intends to be descriptive and prescriptive regarding corporate political activity, and he hopes to offer a framework for the analysis of this activity that will reveal its significance for the American social order and corporate system. In addition he offers, for changing legal constraints on this activity and for further research, recommendations which are consistent with his text and argument. Epstein is neither a social theorist nor a political philosopher. He is a scholar who tries to be careful, thorough, and unbiased. His references are extensive, his prose is concise and always clear, he avoids concealed value judgements on small matters. Within his value system he is neither friend nor enemy of corporations. He maintains a distinction between electoral and governmental politics and is never deflected from his chosen focus of corporations. This is not a book about any other kind of pressure group. It is, then, modest, thoughtful, and easy to read. The book should be manageable in undergraduate courses (although the paperback price is singularly inflationary), for it contributes to the rational discussion of a complex issue. For the modern political scientist the book is less fruitful and for the political activist it can be maddening, for reasons I shall try to state.

Chapters 1 and 2 are introductory. Chapters 3 and 4 contain an historical review of corporate political activity. Epstein traces the growth of corporations, the abuses of the robber barons, and the failure of early regulatory efforts. Detailing the growth of trade associations and corporate public relations, he outlines the changing nature of corporate political involvement in the 20th century. For the Post-World War Two period he subordinates his historical review to a discussion of the reasons for federal expansion and its consequences for the distinction between private and public enterprise. His historical outline is untheoretical however. The development of corporate political activity has been influenced by the changing nature and scale of economic organization, technological innovation, political invention, ideological changes, the need for socializing risk, and the dynamics of the bureaucratization of the activity itself. Epstein leaves the modeling of these factors to the reader. The absence of formal thinking at this stage allows an unsophisticated justification of corporate political activity. He can view it as a response to increasing public-private interdependence without analyzing its extent, loci, or causes in more than a superficial manner.

Chapter 5, detailing the extent of corporate political activity, contains many items that normally escape the attention of political scientists yet could be informed by Drew Pearson's columns or the pages of *Hard Times.* In general, the less savory aspects of corporate involvement are neglected and involvement in administrative processes and regulatory proceedings is treated weakly and naively.

The next three chapters consider arguments for and against corporate political involvement. His analyses are usually crisp and telling. Chapter 8 contains a first-rate, imaginative, 40-page discussion of the political resources of corporations. It is one of the highlights of the book. But it, is followed by a weak, biased and irrelevant discussion of community power structure. He accepts the caricature of the elite theorists offered by Polsby's *Community Power and Political Theory.* Chapter 9 discusses the legitimacy of corporate political involvement in a vacuous manner. The question posed is whether such activity is or is not legitimate, and I do not see that this is an empirically or normatively useful way of posing the question. Chapter 10, the last one, contains a thoughtful discussion of the laws surrounding corporate political activity. Epstein never gets around to defending the major premise of his book: that corporate political activity is legitimate because of public-private interdependence and the pluralist nature of American politics.

Epstein's writing is marred by occasional statements and jargon that betray an uncritical acceptence of contemporary consensus politics. The FTC is viewed as a leading defender of the public against corporations; the Vietnam War is "our commitment." Regardless of what one thinks of such a value system, the fact is that this is a political position in a book that needs either to scrupulously avoid one or advance a blatent one. It is the value position of much of the white, "liberal," upper-middle-class, and thus too often a political position that is greeted as the hallmark of objectivity.

Such a matter might be a minor annoyance were it not symptomatic of the major flaw of the book: a permeating, uncritical acceptence of pluralist dogma. Three components of this dogma which Epstein accpts are: (1) insensitivity to what Schattschneider has called "the scope and bias of the pressure system;" (2) evaluation of the political system on the basis of limited attributes of the input side of the policy-making process; and (3) inattention to policy outputs in operation. Like all pluralists, Epstein is also unaware there is something called analysis that enters the policy process as well as bargaining. Any evaluation of corporate political activity must confront Schattschneider's arguments and works complementary to them such as Mancur Olson's theories of interest group mobilization in *The Logic of Collective Action.* Adherence to pluralist dogma allows Epstein to avoid corporate involvement in regulatory proceedings and administrative agencies where serious issues of the capture of public power by private groups are involved. Finally, if one concentrates on policy outputs in operation, one gets a very different view of the consequences of corporate political activity. Pluralist dogma allows Epstein to avoid attention to such matters as the symbiotic relationships between defense contractors and the military services, the role of food corporations in surpressing the production and distribution of fortified foods to the poor at potentially negligible cost, or the industry-dominated Coal Mine Safety Review Board.

Pluralist dogma—on the one hand an ideology in the service of a limited set of social interests and on the other a seriously incomplete model of American politics—is not an adequate model for the study and evalutaion of corporate political involvement in the U.S. Because this dogma suffuses Epstein's argument, his book is far less than the sum of its often admirable parts.—MICHAEL J. WHITE, *University of Kentucky.*

Power in the Senate. BY RANDALL B. RIPLEY. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969. Pp. 246. $6.50.)

Professor Ripley purports to discuss the distribution of "power" in the Senate from two complementary points of view. In part I the history of the Senate since the Civil War is sketched in terms of three modes of power distribution—centralization (preponderance of power in party leadership), decentralization (committee-centered), and individualism (power dispersed to subcommittees and individuals). Parts II and III then set out "to explore the present Senate in depth," relying mainly on Round Table sessions with senators and aides held at the Brookings Institution in 1965. The intention is to examine the dimensions and consequences of the current phase of "individualism," which Ripley claims had its beginnings in the mid-fifties. Though he eschews any attempt to devise a precise definition or measure of "power," it becomes clear in the course of the book that what he has in mind is the ability to effect or influence policy outcomes. He thus contributes to the growing literature on the erosion of the Senate's so-called "inner club" and the increasing dispersal of lawmaking roles and opportunities within the upper chamber.

Though Ripley acknowledges that power has both "personal" and "institutional" bases, his historical chapters generally focus on the latter; he thus presents a brief organizational history of the Senate together with an assessment of the relative importance of party and committee leadership posts in successive periods. Ripley's criteria of "importance" are not always clear; relying mainly on biographical and historical studies the refers sometimes to a person's or a position's reputation for powerfulness, sometimes to more concrete legislative achievements. His dependence on David J. Rothman's *Politics and Power: The United States Senate, 1869–1901* is particularly heavy, and he is able to reinforce Rothman's observations with some interesting data on the late-nineteenth-century "institutionalization" of the Senate. His treatment of other periods, however, is often less impressive. He does not seem to be aware, for example, of Joel Silbey's demonstration of the strength of party identification in determining congressional voting alignments in the 1840's and even into the fifties; Ripley rather assumes (p. 25) the James Sterling Young's generalizations with respect to the pre-1828 Senate can be applied to the entire pre-war period. Nor does he take adequate account (pp. 15, 31) of the inroads the emerging "conservative coalition" made upon the "centralized" 74th and 75th Congresses. The labeling of various other problematic periods is likewise left unqualified and unexplained.

The most recent historical transition, that of the post-World War II Senate from "decentralization" to "individualism," poses particular difficulties. Even if one acknowledges that it is possible meaningfully to speak of overall distributions of power-in-general, serious questions as to the mechanisms of transition and the relationships among Ripley's three modes of power distribution remain —difficulties attested to by Ripley's inability to pin a single label on the years 1955-1961. What these years demonstrate in particular is the inaccuracy of conceiving of "individualism" and "centralization" as opposing modes of organization; this period in fact displayed *both* trends, and there is considerable evidence that exercise of certain prerogatives by the majority leadership, rather than diminishing the "power in the hands of individual senators" (p. 106) in many instances did very nearly the opposite. And problems of explanation loom large. While Ripley's main concern is with the gradual erosion of the "institutional" power of southern conservatives, he acknowledges (pp. 66, 76) that subcommittee proliferation and a general dispersal of "personal" power antedated the decisive weakening of "the hold of southern Democrats on the Senate" by several years. Yet neither here nor in the earlier historical sketches is there any sustained attempt at explanation, even in terms of such obvious "external" variables as the character of executive leadership, the context of policy needs and demands, and changes in the nature of electoral politics.

In Parts II and III Ripley turns from historical analysis to a fuller description of the "dispersion of power in the contemporary Senate," dutifully reporting the views of Round Table participants on the character and strength of various party and committee posts. Of particular interest is the generally positive assessment among the senators as to their own potential as legislators and the opportunities afforded by committee structures and resources, though Ripley makes little attempt to analyze the variations and conditions of this sense of efficacy or to test it against performance. Ripley accepts at face value his respondents' portrayal of "segmented, sporadic" processes of legislative initiative and increasingly permissive norms which exclude only "six to ten" senators from some sort of "legislative effectiveness" (pp. 160, 168), but he makes no attempt to discriminate among the various facets of legislative initiative or between different policy areas and committees.

While one can appreciate the service Professor Ripley has performed in pointing to significant general changes in Senate norms and in the distributions of legislative roles and resources since the fifties, the study's usefulness is considerably reduced by this failure to discriminate and differentiate. Various observers have noted that a certain type of senator has become more conspicuous of late—activistic in his legislative orientation, generally liberal, often low in seniority and representing a large or urban state, oriented toward the media and national issues—and Ripley in fact hints that his sample may be disporportionately composed of such men (p. 236). What we need to know is not simply that senators-in-general are enjoying a new-found "legislative effectiveness;" we need to be much more precise about the types of legislative roles that are emerging, their distribution and their viability. To what extent is this new activism a matter of publicizing and investigating issues? How much actual policy innovation and formulation is going on? Most importantly, is the capacity to *mobilize* the chamber becoming more widely shared as well? Rarely can the answers to such questions be given in broad general terms; nor is the matter of explanation any less complex. The roles a senator assumes, the initiatives he undertakes, and the degree of success he enjoys may well be dependent, for example, on such diverse factors as the character of his constituency and his electoral situation, the nature of his committees' leadership and organization, patterns of agency activity and group access in various areas, and so forth. This is not to say that general trends cannot be discerned. But any overall picture we gain of dispersals of "power" in the Senate will remain undifferentiated and vague, and our efforts to isolate and order the relevant causal factors will be frustrated, until we pay considerably more attention to patterns of empirical detail and to the necessity for analytical precision in approaching them.—DAVID E. PRICE, *Yale University.*

Congress and the New Politics. BY JOHN S. SALOMA, III. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969. Pp. 293).

John Saloma's study of Congress is an ambitious and thoughtful effort. It seeks to establish guidelines for evaluating present-day congressional performance, to suggest ways in which Congress will adapt to the new computer technology and the concomitant "information revolution," and both to outline the basic challenges that Congress will have to confront in the future and to presage the possible adjustments it will make in response to these challenges. The author accomplishes these tasks with varying degrees of success.

Much of the book focuses on the difficulties of evaluating so complex and multi-functional a political institution. Professor Saloma maintains that those who are critical of Congress and wish to reform it are not always sufficiently concerned with the possibility that the prescriptions they offer are a product of their own normative predilections, and that the alterations they advocate will diminish the institutions capacity to undertake responsibilities which other students of American politics happen to think are important.

He discusses six significant functions which Congress is expected to perform (the representative, legislative, investigative, informative, administration control, and the constituent service functions) within a context of alternative "models" or "conceptual frameworks" (the latter is a more appropriate description of his constructs) of legislative-executive relations, on the one hand, and the distribution of power within Congress on the other. Four perspectives of legislative-executive relations are delineated: the presidential-responsible party perspective, where "the President is assigned the primary leadership role supported by powerful party leadership in Congress;" the presidential pluralist or pluralist perspective, which views government as a "bargaining system with varying veto powers available to the participants;" the constitutional balance perspective, which stresses the constitutional or legal "balance in the roles of the President and Congress;" and the Whig or congressional supremacy perspective, which insists that Congress, not the President, "should be the locus of policy leadership." His four formal models of the legislature's internal organization are defined as "control by the presidential party, control by congressional party, control by congressional majority, and decentralized control with accomodations reached through the bargaining of all participants, the President included."

Saloma concludes that Congress has fulfilled its functions more responsibly and has been more agile in adapting to changing demands than most of its' critics have suggested. His is obliged to note, however, that its' performance in many respects still leaves much to be desired. The chief merit of this portion of the book is that it brings together in a reasonably systematic fashion the varieties of vantage points from which Congress has been assessed and the normative concerns that have influenced thinking about the role of Congress within the American political system. Saloma marshalls his evidence and arguments well. He adds little to the discussion that is new, however. This is true primarily because, as the author himself observes, the conceptions of American government inherent in the frameworks within which congressional performance is gauged are inadequate. They are static and stereotypical, for the most part, and neither contain nor permit particularly rewarding generalization. This weakness is partially an indictment of the literature on Congress, since other specialists have not given Saloma the comprehensive models his analysis requires. On the other hand, if the book does develop *new* guidelines for a more realistic and sophisticated evaluation of congressional performance, the author fails to make them sufficiently explicit.

The final two chapters look ahead to the challenges that are likely to face Congress in the 1970's and beyond, with particular emphasis on how the institution is likely to adapt to the changes that computers hold in store for the aggregation, retrieval, and application of information. Saloma rightly asserts that Congress has been at the mercy of the Executive branch for much of the information that informs its' deliberations. He suggests that independent access to greater amounts of data will provide Congress with far more information than it is now able to compile and that electronic data processing will permit Congress to use this information more efficiently. If congressmen will only seize the opportunity to exploit the new technology, he argues, they will improve their capacities to review legislative measures proposed by the administration, to initiate appropriate measures of their own, and to exercise greater control over the manner in which the bureaucracy administers ongoing programs.

His discussion about the ways in which Congress is likely to apply the new technology is interesting and wide-ranging, but it is also less disciplined than his earlier chapters. Some of the possible consequences of computer use forecast by Saloma are difficult to accept. He suggests, for example, that computers will "introduce a bias entirely consistent with democratic theory—toward the free exchange of information and ideas." Yet, it is not entirely evident why swift, easy access to reams of information by future congressmen will necessarily facilitate the exchange of facts and arguments. Much will continue to depend upon which members of Congress avail themselves of the information, the uses to which the information is put, and the rules of relevance individual members and the Congress as a whole apply to the law-making process. Nor is it entirely clear why new information systems "should also afford democratization of committee power," or why congressmen will not have to rely upon "middlemen" for their information, as members do now.

Saloma's final chapter deals with the legislature's capacity to adapt to future challenges, and is the least rewarding section of the book. He catalogs some significant, but obvious, changes currently taking place in the United States (*e.g.*, "increased nationalization of politics and the decline of southern power, the growth of a sophisticated electorate and corresponding new forms of political organizations, metropolitan growth and the rise of a new urban cleavage"), although some may take exception to his assertion that there has been and will continue to be a "decline in southern power" in national politics. Unfortunately, his efforts to link these changes with the adjustments the institution is likely to make to them is not terribly convincing. He generates more speculation than he can handle well in a single chapter, and the relationship between Congress and the "New Politics" which is promised in the book title is given short shrift, indeed. The "New Politics" is defined so broadly that the term's usefulness for analysis is severely circumscribed.—IRWIN N. GERTZOG, *Yale University.*

Cooperative Lobbying—The Power of Pressure. BY DONALD R. HALL. (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1969. Pp. 347, $8.50.)

Donald Hall's *Cooperative Lobbying* must have been a terribly frustrating book to research and write. Hall set out to examine in depth the lobbying activities of "peak" associations—organized interest groups whose primary members are other, narrower voluntary associations—and of ad hoc alliances among interest groups to achieve specific legislative goals. In order to make his research manageable, he chose to concentrate on business associations, particularly the national Chamber of Commerce.

At every turn, the author had doors slammed in his face. First, the Chamber of Commerce refused to discuss intergroup activities in which it engaged, and charmingly dislcaimed that it ever did any such thing. At the time the research was being conducted, the Chamber was undergoing a three year-long audit by the Internal Revenue Service, and Chamber officicals stated that the IRS might misuse such information to harass the organization.

As a result, Professor Hall had to rely on data of questionable objectivity: on interviews with former Chamber employees, on comments from leaders of interest groups which admitted that they cooperated with the chamber, on the self-serving publications of the group he was studying, and on exposĕ-type articles in popular magazines and newspapers. Furthermore, most of the people who did talk to Hall demanded anonymity and requested that their comments be sufficiently doctored to prevent any possible identification of their source.

Inevitably, one wonders whether all interest groups which engage in cooperative tactics are equally secretive about their activities, or whether groups which are highly defensive, such as business associations tended to be throughout the 1960's, are perhpas extreme in this regard. A hypothesis testing this relationship could be formulated in operational terms. Yet, because Professor Hall chose to focus on business associations, the book does not raise questions of this nature.

Given the research limitations imposed by the cloak and dagger nature of his investigation, Hall has done a creditable job. The reader comes away from *Cooperative Lobbying,* however, with the feeling that much remains to be done in this field. The author mines the data available to him skillfully but, to put it simply, the data is not very rich.

It is important to add that Professor Hall does not generalize beyond the limits of his data and consciously avoids constructing theories about cooperative lobbying. His approach is straightforward. He spins no gossamer webs. As a result, this book will be most useful to undergraduates and others who are yet amateur explorers of interest group politics; it has much less of value for political scientists familiar with books like Truman's *The Governmental Process;* Bauer, Pool and Dexter's *American Business and Public Policy;* Milbrath's *The Washington Lobbyists.*

Let me illustrate the above point: *Cooperative Lobbying* begins with a chapter about lobbyists in Washington. The author admits that the ore from this particular vein has been pretty well extracted already, but he justifies his work on the ground that "a few non-scientific comments by newspaper reporters and lobbyists are still needed to fully describe current lobbying recruitment." He proceeds to rehash a number of recent popular magazine articles and, disturbingly repeats their jargon and some of their inanities. The chapter reads easily, but it detracts from the focus of the book.

The following two chapters concentrate on motives for and against interest group cooperation. Essentially, these chapters develop—in depth and with illustrations drawn from contemporary business interest groups—the reasons for and against cooperative action outlined in Truman's *The Governmental Process.* After 90 pages of analysis, the author concludes that "only a few generalizations can be drawn" and that these generalizations are "simple in nature." Two such conclusions are "Groups often cooperate to exchange information about issues and problems common to their perceived interests" and "Economic self-interest is one of the most compelling motives that activates interest groups."

The second half of the book offers the knowledgeable reader more substance. Professor Hall is clearly more adept at analyzing and writing about actual examples of cooperation among voluntary associations than he is at speculating about such vague phenomena as the "motives" of multi-member organizations. His chapter entitled "Methods of Intergroup Cooperation" makes worthwhile reading, especially for those interested in studying the Washington activities of associations in the food industries.

Hall focuses on the Food Group, a twenty year-old informal conference group whose members include representatives of over sixty business associations. Officers of the Food Group tend to be men from associations like the National Institute of Fisheries, the National Canners Association, or the International Association of Ice Cream Manufacturers, but peak associations like the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce, and the American Farm Bureau Federation also belong to the conference.

The Food Group claims to be simply an informal group which holds frequent lunches to discuss what is going on in Washington and to exchange information relevant to the interests of its members. Nevertheless, Hall found that the Food Group appeared to be the parent of a more formalized ad hoc interest group, the Information Committee on Federal Food Regulations, formed specifically to fight Senator Hart's "Truth in Packaging" legislation.

For example, the Chairman of the Information Committee, who had major responsibility for planning and executing the response of food industry members to the threat of Federal regulation, was simultaneously program chairman of the Food Group, a top-level executive in the National Canners Association, and a member of the National Association of Manufacturers.

Besides studying 1) informal groups which avoid structure, rules, organization, etc., and claim that they serve purely an informational rather than a pressure function and, 2) ad hoc industry groups, the author concentrates on what he calls the "conference association." He explores the Greenbrier Conference, an annual "summit meeting" of representatives of the major business associations and other generally conservative groups like the AMA and the AFBF, and the Conference of National Organizations, a somewhat broader organization which meets three-times yearly. Both of these Conferences exclude reporters, do not take minutes, nor make public the substance of their discussions. The Greenbrier Conference, in particular, tends to be highly influenced by the National Association of Manufacturers.

Given the secrecy of these Conferences, the author was unable to attend any of their meetings or to get wholly reliable information on their significance. He concludes, logically and I think correctly, that these secret summit meetings are not as nefarious as might be assumed, since they have built-in limitations; the groups which attend sometimes have conflicting interests and frequently disagree over priorities; frequently second and third-rank employees who have little or no responsibility for policy-making within their organizations are detailed to "represent" their respective associations; the very secrecy which encourgages free discussion and consensus-building prevents effective use of the results of the discussions in the political process. Strategy and tactics cannot be planned and carried out through the mechanism of broad summit conferences.

The final chapters provide brief case studies of "Intergroup Cooperation in Action." The conflicts over "Truth in Lending," "Truth in Packaging," and the Dirksen Reapportionment Resolution are examined by the author. About his last case Professor Hall concludes that the activities of the various groups can be observed and cooperation inferred but only the participants—none of whom is willing to discuss such cooperation—could actually document the existence of an alliance and the methods employed by alliance members.

Professor Hall would perform a valuable service for political science if he builds upon his present book and concentrates in his next work on attempting to research and write one or more in-depth case studies of group alliances in action. Furthermore, such studies should not be limited to business-oriented groups; an analysis, for example, of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights might prove especially rewarding. A break-through is needed here, and Professor Hall may well be the one to achieve it.—Alan H. Schechter, *Wellesley College*.

Congress and Urban Problems: A Casebook on the Legislative Process. Edited by Frederic N. Cleaveland. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969. Pp. 450. Cloth, $7.50; paper, $2.95.)

It is generally acknowledged that America has become a nation of cities. But although the extensive growth of large metropolitan areas on a national scale is a relatively recent phenomenon, urbanization and many of its attendant problems certainly are not without long standing precedent. It is rather surprising and a matter of no small interest that this fine collection of case studies edited by Professor Cleaveland represents the first major attempt to analyze the challenge which urbanization as a field of public policy has posed for Congress. Why has a volume dealing with this important topic been so long in coming? The answer to that question reflects more upon the nature of American politics than it does upon the inclinations of American political science.

What emerges as the central theme of these studies (and particularly of Professor Cleveland's masterful concluding essay) is the delineation of a political system which is not yet structured at the national level to treat the problems associated with urban life as problems of urban life *per se*. It is one thing to recognize that the United States is *confronted with an urban crisis on a national scale* and quite another to conclude that there ought to be a national urban policy which somehow addresses itself to that crisis. Institutionally, the recent establishment of both a cabinet level department and a White House staff for urban affairs may move the Executive branch in that direction. But as Professor Cleaveland points out, "there is little evidence that Congress has developed regular patterns of decision making where urban problems are concerned. To put it another way, Congress has not yet developed stable issue contexts organized around the notion of 'urban affairs policy.'" (pp. 358–59)

In addressing themselves to the problem so stated, Professor Cleaveland and his associates have made a major contribution to a growing body of literature which seeks to explain systematically the formation of public policies at the national level. Seven cases exhibiting varying degrees of "urban-relatedness" (Prof. Cleaveland's term) are presented—air and water pollution control, assistance for airports and mass transit, the establishment of programs to control juvenile delinquency and to feed the urban poor, and the creation of a department of urban affairs. Although a number of relevant and important legislative fields are not included (e.g., housing, urban renewal, and anti-poverty), students of Congress will find that the case studies describe well the extraordinary spectrum of legislative committees, executive agencies, professional staffs, and interest groups involved in urban policy making. More than that, however, these essays show how this complex structure of decision making tends to treat urban problems as non-urban issues.

In fact, the authors find urban policy making to be an almost capricious enterprise in Congress: thus legislation to abate air and water pollution bogged down in controversy over state enforcement powers and resource conservation; a proposed urban affairs department was defeated in 1962 when the House became enbroiled in a racial controversy over the appointement of a Secretary; airport assistance was conceived primarily to promote the interests of commercial carriers, without reference to urban development; similarly, mass transit was not regarded as fundamentally urban legislation until the indifference of the Senate Commerce Committee virtually compelled supporters to turn to the more urban oriented Housing subcommittee on Banking and Currency; and the food stamp program, long regarded as a general welfare measure and as a means of reducing agricultural surpluses, became an "urban" issue almost gratuitously in 1964 when non-urban Congressmen used it as a means of bargaining for the urban support needed to save an unpopular farm subsidy. Because Congress lacks a perspective on *urban life and development as a whole, the urban* element is often ignored, sidetracked, or treated as an incidental by-product of other concerns.

The judgment that there ought to be a reasonably explicit urban orientation or field of public policy at the national level provides the authors with a concept for ordering their analyses of decision making and serves as a standard for evaluating both the process and the policies produced. Of course it can be argued that as the nation has become increasingly metropolitan most public policies have acquired important "urban" implications. A field of urban policy would encompass so much of the legislative process as to become virtually synonymous with domestic affairs. Moreover, given the great and widely recognized influence which local governments and interests have in Congress, and the consequent tendency to make what the late Professor Morton Grodzins referred to as "decentralizing decisions" at the national level, it can be argued that the complex interests of urban America are powerfully represented in Congress. In fact, contrary to the widely held theses that effective legislative leadership has become an executive function, Professor Cleaveland observes that "these seven studies [demonstrate] the vitality of Congress itself as a source of initiative in legislating on urban problems." (p. 354) The real question, as the authors imply, is whether urban interests have been adequately or properly represented and legislated upon. Given the diffuse nature of metropolitan politics and the heterogeneous character of urban interests and group life, such a judgment is difficult to make. But complexity as such is not really the heart of the problem.

What is involved here is the impact of institutional or structural constraints upon the substance of public policy. In Congress the organization of authority systematically discourages the development of an urban field of legislation. It is not surprising that these studies are compelled to focus upon the character of the committee system, which almost invariably divides legislative responsibility on a functional basis that cuts across an areal phenomenon like metropolitanism. Such a system not only discourages the development of a comprehensive urban perspective, but distorts or conceals the urban dimension in individual legislative proposals. The seniority system exacerbates the problem by elevating to positions of authority many legislators from rural or small town constituencies which are unlikely to sensitize them to urban problems or interests. Under these conditions the principle or mechanism of representation, which is inherently divisive, cannot be relied upon to produce resonably responsive urban policies. Even big city congressmen rarely represent constituencies which are likely to encourage a comprehensive perspective on metropolitan problems. This is especially true of House districts, which usually divide urban areas ethnically, racially, economically, and politically.

The necessity of attracting the support of non-urban representatives further complicates the process since urban leaders must often compromize their legislative proposals and avoid defining issues in explicitly urban terms. Since it is the structure of authority which makes it virtually impossible to see or to treat urbanism as a complex whole, some reorganization fostering a broader perspective will have to be undertaken if Congress is to respond to the urban crisis in an enlightened manner. Professor Cleaveland suggests that at a minimum this would require creating House and Senate committees with legislative jurisdictions roughly equivalent to that of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. It might also entail the creation of a non-legislative joint committee with authority to review the urban implications of all relevant legislation—a function similar to that of the Urban Affairs Council in the White House.

The impact of institutional reform is always problematic. Even with the recent changes in executive organization and those proposed for Congress, certain fundamental features of American politics mitigate against the emergence of urban affairs as a stable, broadly conceived, and reasonably well defined field of national policy. Such a field would cut into the decentralized structures of political power associated with federalism, the party system, and the urbanized areas themselves. But the most important obstacle is the absence of an identifiable (let alone self-conscious) urbanized constituency in the welter of metropolitan interests, organizations, and political jurisdictions which make it difficult to mobilize support for urban policies at any level of government. The recently formed Urban Coalition may make some contribution in organizing such a support structure. Professor Cleaveland argues that urban based interests are so diffuse and difficult to organize that only the party system can supply the energy needed for defining, articulating, and supporting national urban policies. And he believes that "time is fast approaching, perhaps is now here, when the parties will base their appeal to [urban] voters on proposed national solutions to urban problems. . . ." (p. 389). But this is precisely what the parties have been unable to do well because they, too, are diffuse, disorganized and rooted in the very conflicts which obscure the perspective and obstruct the support needed for creating a national urban policy.

It may be an irony of the American system that if an urban constituency and support structure emerge, they will do so primarily within the context of institutional developments at the national level. Although the structure of American politics makes this particularly difficult, a national government organized to legislate broadly conceived urban policies can provide the perspective and incentive needed to foster such support. But should this be surprising? Executive agencies and congressional committees typically contribute to the development of their own clientele groups. One must not underestimate the impact of institutional devices. That, after all, is the lesson which this book teaches.—Leo M. Snowiss, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

The Contemporary Presidency. By Dorothy Buckton James. (New York: Pegasus, 1969. Pp. 187. $6.95.)

This is a relatively short study that claims to examine "the structure, uses and expansion of presidential power from the Roosevelt era to the present." (jacket) For the most part, it does. The author focuses on the demands and expectations of the modern institution, those forces that shape the character of the office and the roles of its incumbent. Routinization and institutionalization are described within the context of changing presidential responsibilities. The quagmire of personalized leadership in an increasingly bureaucratic system is presented.

It is a fruitful focus, one that breaks away from the traditional chieftain approach that still characterizes so much of the textual literature. The reader is presented with a systematic framework for understanding and evaluating executive policy-making. He is also presented with a concise summary of many scholarly writings. For these reasons *The Contemporary Presidency* should constitute a valuable introduction for most political science students.

It may not, however. It is very succinct; it summarizes a significant amount of published research; it provides insightful commentary. And it does all this in a body of a little over 150 pages. For a Ph.D. candidate intent on reviewing for his comprehensive examinations, such a compliation might prove extremely useful and should be easily comprehensible. But for a student with only an elementary knowledge of the American political system, it is probably too compact and undoubtedly too advanced. It makes for difficult reading. On the other hand and to the author's credit, underliners would certainly be kept busy.

Perhaps the place for this book is alongside the Wildavsky collection of readings (*The Presidency*). Together they constitute a good anthology and synthesis of much of the Presidency literature. But used alone or with a less complete book of readings, *The Contemporary Presidency* may be too brief and too sophisticated an introduction for most beginning students.

James concentrates the bulk of her analysis on the institutionalized aspects of the American Presidency. There is a chapter on the selection process, but it is not a very complete account. Similarly, the discussion on leadership is suggestive rather than informative. Personality theory is not explored in any detail. There are even some omissions in the institutional discussion, two of them serious. The author discusses the President's legislative role yet fails to explain the structure and function of the Office of Legislative Reference of the Bureau of the Budget. This is the office that is responsible for coordinating the clearance functions. She notes the need for strong executive leadership on the Hill yet does not describe the operation of the President's congressional liason staff.

With these exceptions, however, the institutionalized Presidency is outlined in fairly complete detail. This is the book's chief merit. It examines structural-functional relationships within the framework of evolving responsibilities. James suggests that these evolving responsibilities set the parameters of presidential action and constituency reaction. She argues that the President is the prime mover in this process although the process itself is continual.

What is presented is a very mechanical model, updated from the Montesquieuian prototype. It has its checks and balances which the author suggests are operative. Others do act to moderate presidential initiatives but the extent of their moderation and the moderators themselves may differ.

In the domestic sphere Congress and the bureaucracy do the moderating. While they appear to exercise considerable power, James argues that the President can limit their impact by maximizing his own political power. Here she resorts to the familiar argument that a President must utilize his bargaining position to assume a role of leadership.

This argument, however, may obscure more than it reveals. Leadership itself is very complex. It does not necessarily follow from bargaining, although it can. The President's position can be persuasive, especially to those who have been socialized into believing that a chain of command exists, or more simply and to the point, that the President's wishes should be satisfied and his interests considered. It is the job of the White House staff to make these wishes and these interests known.

In the area of foreign and military policy James argues that the President is less restricted or at least, he seems to be. His constitutional prerogatives combine with his public position to create the impression that he is limitless. The constitutional prerogatives that the author is referring to are those powers that provide for the Common Defense, powers as interpreted by modern Presidents rather than the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. James is of the opinion that the presidential interpretation will continue to prevail.

Nonetheless, the author does not conclude that Prometheus is, in fact, unbound. She hedges, suggesting restrictions of money, information and advice. In the final analysis, she adds, " . . . the greatest limitation upon Presidential initiative in foreign policy and defense is a personal one—his judgment and sensitivity to the strengths and weaknesses of the advice he is given." (p. 170) Vietnam indicates that this last limitation may not be too great. Besides, to say that the greatest limitation on presidential power is the President himself is to acknowledge that the external checks are not working, that there is no effective balance, that Prometheus can prevail under most circumstances.

This is one of the most critical problems—how to effectively check the President without at the same time preventing the efficient and often decisive formulation of foreign policy. The domestic Presidency faces somewhat the reverse situation—how to overcome internal constraints to meet an increasing number of institutional demands. For a President to succeed under these conditions, the author concludes, his sense of direction and style must be appropriate to the times. Unfortunately, she offers no guide as to how Presidents can develop these atrributes or how the electorate can determine who has them.

But this is probably asking too much. The author has given us a good book, substantial in content, fairly perceptive in analysis. Despite its difficulties for the beginning student, it is a useful addition to our textual literature.—Stephen J. Wayne, *The George Washington University*.

The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780–1840. By Richard Hofstadter. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 280. $6.95.)

Political scientists, historians, and sociologists in the last two decades have studied anew the phenomenon of the rise of open political parties. On this topic there are the writings of William N. Chambers, Noble E. Cunningham, Joseph Charles, Seymour Lipset and a number of others including myself. There also are a number of specialized works on the impact of parties in particular states. Various aspects have been emphasized by these writers and by earlier ones such as James Bryce, Marucie Duverger, M. Ostrogorskii and Charles A. Beard. Much attention has been given by the above authors to matters such as party structure, some aspects of ideology and theory, and to the socio-economic base of politics.

Now we have Richard Hofsadter's book, also focusing on the rise of American parties. Hofstadter's approach is that of emphasizing intellectual history in the comparative setting of English and American ideas on parties. But he also focuses on the importance of *the acceptance* of parties in practice. For this purpose he stresses the significance of the struggle in the presidency of John Adams, 1797-1801, for the establishment of the right of an opposition party to exist. While he feels that the peaceful transition of power to the opposition in the election of 1800 is indeed an important land-mark, yet the central struggle about the opposition party's right to exist was won in the Adams period. Too much attention, he believes, has been given to Jefferson in power, not enough to the significance of the rise of the opposition.

This is the more important when we consider his carefully chosen material on the original ideas of our founding fathers. Their use of the term political party is carefully traced, both as to British and American usage in the eighteenth century. The terms "party" and "faction," as used by virtually all writers, were derogatory. Edmund Burke was a leading exception. His definition was: "Party is a body of men united for promoting, by, their joint endeavors the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed." This definition while deficient in certain aspects, did show recognition of the necessity of parties in a representative system of government. But the predominant view of the founding fathers was rather in agreement with Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke regarded factions as natural, but as being harmful. He, in his *Idea of a Patriot King,* wrote that statesmen and leaders must rise above party, even as they functioned. True leadership could not consist of just moulding the parties to support a program. This was the outlook of our own founding fathers in their writings. James Madison, in the famous tenth number of the *Federalist Essays* foresaw the rise of local and state parties but believed they should be neutralized and localized, not used as a structure for nationwide political programs. The Constitution itself reflected this point of view. It was intended to be, as Hofstadter puts it, "A Constitution against Parties." This same point of view was held by President Washington. In his presidency he sought to ignore parties. His first cabinet, in which both Jefferson and Hamilton served, was an attempt to establish a ministry of all the talents. But before long the proposals for programs and policies created divisions. Moreover to support his program, Hamilton organized support in what became the Federalist Party.

At this point Madison in Congress abandoned his support of the administration and Jefferson soon left it. But neither the administration nor the opposition clearly saw what was transpiring. It was not apparent that new institutions were developing. Rather there was the belief (by the opposition) that administrative errors needed to be corrected. In the administration Washington felt hurt. Hamilton ultimately felt that the opposition should be supressed. As many of the Federalist Congressional leaders shared this point of view, it was in this spirit that in the Adams administration the Alien and Sedition laws were enacted.

After the election of Jefferson the role of parties was still not clear. Jefferson, most of the time hoped still to eliminate parties, to harmonize, to reunite. He saw the forces for development of some political opposition but was reluctant to institutionalize it, even in concept. He hoped to unify support. Untimately Monroe came closer to achieving a momentary appearance of such unity, but the social, economic and personal forces for realignment and change immediately caused the rise of a new set of parties. Here Hofstadter finds the model for this in the work of Dewitt Clinton, and of the Albany regency. These forces in New York were typical of forces which produced the rise of a new set of parties. The new system of parties was analyzed in the writings of Martin Van Buren, especially his writings after leaving the presidency. To Hofstadter, the termination of his book is justified with the institutionalization of parties under Van Buren in 1840. By that date the concept, role, organization and activities of parties were clearly developed. The operation of the Constitution had been modified. The role of political parties was fairly clear and acceptance of parties was becoming general. Thus the writing about parties caught up to the actuality. The contribution of political parties to self government was no longer one of suffrance.

In summary, Hofstadter has confirmed some concepts, modified others, clarified many and developed some new departures, as outlined above. His book is a definite contribution and one which students of parties as well as students of theory will find quite important. Yet, the approach through intellectual history does have certain limitations. Both in this work as in earlier ones Hofstadter finds Madison more satisfying as an intellectual leader than Jefferson. I believe a change in perspective as to the political actions and leadership of each should reverse this judgment (p. 212). A reading of the newspapers in addition to the reading of the writings of the leaders would change some other points of emphasis. Also on the development of the Clintons and some other points on New York politics there is confusion, as between George Clinton who was still Governor in the early 1800's and then United States Vice President, and Dewitt Clinton, with the result that Dewitt Clinton's career is telescoped with the later career of his uncle (pp. 221-222). This is chiefly of importance as indicating the necessity for a grasp both of ideas and also of practical politics to reach a balanced evaluation of leaders. Hofstadter is less at home in attempting such synthesis although he rightly sees the importance of such materials.

Finally there are theoretical questions beyond the scope of this book. Is there such a matter as the national interest? If so how does it evolve from the party struggle? Also for self government to function in an old or new nation, a basic concensus is probably necessary on the existence of the state and on what the British call "the rules of the game" as to how elections, the right of opposition, and the yielding of office are to take place. But all this cannot be done in a single book. Meantime, Hofstadter has made a valuable contribution, and has written an interesting and readable book with many new perspectives.—MANNING J. DAUER, *University of Florida.*

The Negro in Maryland Politics 1870–1912. BY MARGARET LAW CALLCOTT. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. Pp. 199. $7.95.)

Dr. Margaret Law Callcott has delved beneath the surface and exposed in a most glaring manner, a fallacy, "Negroes do not vote." She dispelled this notion and this oft-times used or misused statement by tracing the history of the Negro in Maryland politics from 1870 to 1912, and finding that Negroes *did vote* and *still do* in the Free State. With meticulous care and consummate skill she examined the voting records of the counties and Baltimore City in election after election during the period under review to lay bare the facts. The book is replete with charts and is well documented. But, above all, it is written in a pleasing style. By any measuring rod it is sound scholarship at its best.

The book is not only a significant contribution to courses in political parties and the electoral process, political behavior, and political dynamism, but to Negro history. It should be required reading for leaders of both political parties in the Free State, but particularly for Negroes themselves. It certainly provides Negroes an opportunity to review the past, reassess the present, and chart the future. Negroes can well say—"Stormy the path we've trod, bitter the chastening rod. Let us march on till victory is won."

The historic position of the Negro in Maryland politics is a rather strange phenomenon, full of paradox and irony, simplicity and complexity, mystery and meaning, public injustice and poetic justice. His influence on Maryland's political systems, structures, events, and public policies have been profound, central, and universal. In a very real sense, the Negro has been the key to Maryland politics since 1870. Since the political system determines who gets *what, when,* and *how* the fruits of political power are many and varied. Conflict is the heart of politics. A political system is creative or destructive in accordance with pattern and quality or response to basic problems and dimensions of human conflict.

It is safe to say that the Negro was wedded to the Republican party in Maryland from 1870 to 1936. His enfranchisement heralded a new era for the Republican party in Maryland, changing a seemingly hopeless minority party into an organization of real power. Negro membership in the party freed it from the confines of sectionalism and provided it with a constituency of varying size and steady loyalty in virtually every county in Maryland. The The Negro was led to believe that the Republican party was his chief benefactor and only protector. For while the Negro was underrepresented and undervalued in proportion to his electoral strengths, he was at least accorded a place and recognition of sorts in the Republican hierarchy, which was more than he was offered by the Democratic party of Maryland.

Negroes were also slighted in the distribution of party patronage. Likewise, they were denied real influence in party councils. They had little to say about the jobs at the party's disposal. Yet, patronage is the life blood of political parties. Therefore, the oppressed status of the Negro in Maryland political life represented his victimization and exploitation of something precious and sacred to white Marylanders. The raping of Negroes by the Maryland political process was, therefore, born of and nurtured by the search for meaning as well as the will-to-power. There was, in fact, a marriage of the will-to-meaning and the will-to-power.

Laboring-class Negro Republicans could count some tangible rewards for having their party in power, but the middle class and upper class Negroes were slighted by Republican patronage policies. They still are in 1969. The Maryland delegation is split down the middle as far as party alignment is concerned and yet no Negro Republican has ever received a top level federal or state appointment. During the 1950's Maryland had a Republican governor, two United States Senators, and three members of Congress flying the Republican banner—all elected by Negro votes. The Maryland Republican leadership has not learned a thing in one hundred years with respect to significant patronage federal or statewise. Apparently it has lost one of its national commitments. This certainly is no way to win friends and influence others.

On the other hand, *racism* was the major weapon in the Maryland Democratic party's arsenal. Race, in its many manifestations was the chief source and expression of conflict and tension in the life of this party during the period under review. *Gormanism* then was what *Agnewsticism* is now. Exclusion, oppression, suppression, and victimization of Negroes were the chief methods and techniques of the party in dealing with racial conflict and tension. Regulation, adjustment, accomodation, and resolution of conflicting interest were accomplished by the mobilization and application of "White Power." The system not only fostered but celebrated and glorified collective hypocrisy, conceit, egoism, and dishonesty. It still does. Majestic principles were invoked to justify reduction of Negroes to the status of subject and victim of the political process. Lip service was dutifully paid to democracy even as Negroes were excluded from the experience of every element of citizenship.

Fortunately they did not prevail. The Republicans learned something about both the strengths and weaknesses of their racially mixed party. They learned they could achieve power with the Negro in their ranks. This, too, the Maryland Democratic party learned in later years. Due to numerous changes in the political landscape the Maryland Negro is much nearer the shore of political equality. A new day has dawned in the political and governmental life of the state. For the Negro, then, reading Margaret Law Callcott's *The Negro in Maryland Politics 1870-1912* should keep alive within him the memories of the past, the good experiences of the present, and the grand visions of the future.

Because of increased participation, Negroes are developing a reservoir of political experience and increasing their political confidence and skill. They can help redeem the past of the Maryland political process. They can be liberating and redemptive agents, just as the Negro was the key to the party's emancipation. Freed from the prison of racism, the Maryland political scene will be freed from the heavy yoke of deceit, hypocrisy, negativism, and obstructionism.—ROBERT LEWIS GILL, *Morgan State College.*

City Politics and Planning. BY FRANCINE F. RABINOVITZ. (New York: Atherton Press, 1969, Pp. 192. $6.95.)

The dependent variable being examined in this volume is "planning effectiveness." Initially, the design states that variance in effectiveness is to be explained in terms of organizational difference (independent or executive planning operations), variation in the role of the planner (technician, broker or mobilizer) and political system differences. The latter variable is conceived, with some qualifications, as a pluralist-elitist continunum. The exploration is ostensibly to take place using data from six New Jersey municipalities. However, something happened between the research proposal and the field. The ensuing problems are so severe that the usefulness of the volume is drastically impaired.

The first problem and the one which nearly wrecks the study is the lack of a dependent variable which can be satisfactorily operationalized. Evidently, the original plan was to measure effectiveness by contrasting city plans and subsequent realizations. When this strategy did not work out, a substitution was made of using informed judges to rate the six cities. This was done dichotomously, ending with a list of five effective cities and one one-effective city. After reading about the cities' experiences one wonders about the charitable proclivities of planners judging other planners. Aside from the crudeness of the ratings, the result creates a cell with one case, which in turn limits the ability to make statements. As the "effective five" turned out to have inconsistent characteristics with respect to role, organization and system, the original design was abandoned.

The study then shifts to constructing, in a rather ad hoc fashion, a typology of political systems based on the six cities. Three indices are employed to arrive at a "banded continuum" with designated stripes. These dimensions are power distribution, political culture and output, each hoary concepts indeed. There is no discussion of how they are to be measured and there is precious little indication of how the three dimensions are employed to come up with bands called cohesive, executive centered, competitive and fragmented systems. Given the number of cases and the procedures employed these are in fact tantamount to pseudonyms for the properly named cities. The classification is arrived at largely by impressionistically characterizing prominent attributes which came to the mind of the researcher. Based on the evidence presented the types are convincing, but there is no way to check on this.

The final section is devoted to a discussion of political strategies employed by the various planners and the fortune of these strategies in the various system contexts. This passage is informed by a kind of participant observer insight and judicious common sense. It furnishes highly recommended practical advice for those engaged in planning.—OLIVER P. WILLIAMS, *University of Pennsylvania.*

A Constitutional Faith. BY HUGO L. BLACK. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. Pp. 97. $3.95.)

In this compact little work, a compilation of lectures delivered in 1968, the aging Justice Black at last offers a book-length statement of his guiding judicial principles, which he calls his "constitutional faith." In characteristic style he wields his pen like a sword, cutting swiftly through massive constitutional subjects, always tough-minded and keenly devoted to his ideals. Brushing aside the now fashionable claims that he is a New Deal liberal, whose recent opinions show that he has turned sour and conservative with age, Black assures us that his basic tenets have never changed, only his application of those tenets to the circumstances—a claim over which Blackophile and Blackophobe writers are sure to do battle.

The Justice's principles of jurisprudence are presented in three lectures on (1) the constitutional role of the courts; (2) due process of law; and (3) the first amendment. He holds fast to his familiar positions on the incorporation of all Bill of Rights guarantees into the fourteenth amendment and on his "absolutist" interpretation of the first amendment, guarantees of liberty of expression. The unifying theme that laces together these and other arguments is that judges are obliged rigorously to adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution as seen in its plain words and in the historical conditions of its drafting. Accordingly, Black's repeated lament is that his brothers too often arrogate to themselves the power to change the Constitution by interpretation, while their true obligation is to "follow the true meaning of the Constitution and other laws as actually written . . . leaving the problem of adapting the Constitution to meet new needs to constitutional amendments approved by the people under constitutional procedures." (p. xvi). Contemporary legal scholars are likely to label this a quaint version of "strict constructionism," since long-accepted theories of judicial legislation emphasize the sense in which judges are independent agents who make law rather than merely find it, as Black seems to be saying. But quaint or not, Black's theoretical statement takes on new relevance today with the recent election of a President who campaigned heavily on the theme that courts ought not to legislate and who appointed a supposed "strict constructionist" as Chief Justice.

Unfortunately for Black, the conviction of his writing style is not matched by the substance of his arguments. He advocates a close following of the literal wordage and the historical context of the constitutional provisions; but, his interpretations of some provisions are faulty, it seems to me, on just these points. To take one of the most glaring linguistic problems, Black maintains that the first amendment accords unconditional protection to "speech," but adds that this does not include direct protection for civil rights demonstrations since they are not engaged in "speech," but are "conduct." He says it is "speech," not "conduct," that the amendment explicitly protects. But does this not cavalierly overlook the presence of the same provision of rights of "assembly" and the "exercise" of religion?

How can one make any sensible construction of these words without allowance for "conduct"? Some of Black's arguments about historical context are equally dubious. For example, not many reputable scholars have accepted his "incorporation" theory of the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment. And the Justice stands virtually alone in his absolutist interpretation of the first amendment (an interpretation which, he tells us, would strike down every defamation statute in the country). Indeed, Leonard Levy's thoroughgoing historical study, *Legacy of Suppression,* may put to rest once and for all the notion that the Framers had any idea of Black's absolutist first amendment.

Finally, it must be said that Black, for all his personal greatness and intellectual power, makes the fatal mistake of trying to resurrect dusty theories of mechanical jurisprudence which obscure the realities of judicial discretion. Even if the Justice's use of words and history were sound, his literal approach to adjudication would still be inadequate since it greatly overestimates the fixity and certitude of the meaning of legal documents, especially of the conveniently vague phrases of the Bill of Rights. The Justice is eloquent, but not persuasive in his attempt to get us to shelve Justice Holmes' maxim that courts "do and must make law."—PATRICK MCBRIDE, *Sacramento State College.*

New Jersey Reapportionment Politics, Strategies and Tactics in the Legislative Process. BY ALAN SHANK. (Rutherford, N.J., Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1969. Pp. 308. $10.00.)

"A specter is haunting the United States—the specter of reapportionment'" Alan Shank opens his book on this off-key note and ends it by reciting dreary details of the procedures for apportionment established in 1966. Along the way he presents much detailed information on legislative apportionment controversies in New Jersey, particularly in the twentieth century. He also makes an attempt to relate the strategies of the antagonists in these legislative struggles to the various models of coalition formation that have been developed in recent years. To that end Shank has painstakingly calculated the indices of likeness and of cohesion of various groups in the legislature, particularly county and party factions. Apparently Shank means to use all this to say something about New Jersey politics in general.

My impression is that the book rides off in all these directions. There is scant effort to bring the elements together in any meaningful whole. If, as sometimes appears to be the case, this is intended primarily as an attempt to show the applicability of theoretical models to real politics, the result is not impressive. For one thing little space is allocated to it. The potential application of the models of Schelling, Buchanan-Tullock, and Downs is summarily dismissed—one paragraph apiece. Riker's minimum winning coalition model is found more applicable, but the ten pages devoted to showing instances where Riker's model would apply do more to whet than to satisfy the appetite. If, however, none of these was Shank's prime goal, and his purpose was to say something significant about New Jersey politics by commenting on reapportionment as an illustrative case, then, alas, the case became the leading actor and the original objective was shunted aside.

As a dissertation it merits the Ph.D. degree that it helped to get for the author; as a book it illustrates once more that publishers are more anxious to produce books than they are to hold to appropriate standards of publication.—DUANE LOCKARD, *Princeton University.*

Governing the City: Challenges and Options for New York.—EDITED BY ROBERT H. CONNERY AND DEMETRIOS CARALEY. (New York: Frederick O. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 230. $7.00.)

Several of the papers in this book were written for a conference in May, 1969, which was jointly sponsored by the Academy of Political Science and the Urban Center of Columbia University. Professors Connery and Caraley have performed a difficult task well—editing a series of diverse papers by a group of diverse authors. The number of papers (eighteen) makes it impossible to examine all of them here, but those that are mentioned below and others make *Governing the City* a worthwhile addition to the literature of New York City politics.

Part of the volume deals with the city's governing process. Included are papers by Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, the co-authors of *Governing New York City,* a monumental book for which *Governing the City* is a timely supplement. Sayre's "City Hall Leadership" focuses on the mayor and his relationships (poorly developed, in Sayre's opinion) with the other main elements of the citys fragmented power structure. Sayre suggests that "the city is not likely to find a shorter or more satisfactory road to a more responsible City Hall leadership then rebuilding the party system" (p. 39). Arnold J. Bornfriend in his "Political Parties and Pressure Groups" indicates why rebuilding the city's now impotent parties will be difficult, although his perceptive description of the city's new pressure group system indirectly lends support to Sayre's position. Bornfriend suggests that the currently intense conflict between primarily black and Puerto Rican "newcomer" groups and emerging "backlash" groups will not ease until the city's benefit sector is expanded—an unlikely development in the absence of more inclusive hierarchies capable of extracting resources from larger governments and of increasing the quantity and quality of bureaucratic outputs.

Herbert Kaufman examines bureaucratic politics in "Bureaucrats and Organized Civil Servants" and focuses on municipal employee unions, among the most important of the many roadblocks to responsive government in New York City. There can be less disagreement than Kaufman seems to think with his suggestion that "the principle of joint management-labor administration attained and then abandoned in West German labor unions has been approached as normal practice in the government of New York City" (p. 43). On the basis of my own research on the city's labor relations it seems to me that Kaufman understates the influence of the organized bureaucrats and overstates the potential of emergent countervailing groups to restore public control over the bureaucratic process.

Governing the City also contains several good papers examining some of the broader systemic variables affecting the city's decision-making process and capabilities. The nature and implications of the city's complex and changing demography are discussed by Emanuel Tobier in "People and Jobs." David Bernstein's excellent "Financing the City Government" describes city expenses and revenues and along with Vernon M. Goetcheus' "State House and National Capitol" illustrates the city's reliance on and need for massive financial assistance from the state and national governments. The sheer magnitude of the city's functional responsibilities are concisely spelled out by Bruce Feld in "What the City Government Does."

The papers treating the city's major problems demonstrate that New York City's populace bears considerable hardships because of the city's governmental inadequacies. Separate papers treating recreation, education, crime, health, housing, poverty, and city planning all document the city's inability to focus enough resources and authority to resolve, even ameliorate, many of the conditions which make the city an undeserved burden for so many of its residents. As Roger Starr so aptly puts it at the conclusion of his excellent paper "Housing the City's People": "The challenge is there. Where is the power?'

That's a good question and one which the city's political leaders and chroniclers had better start confronting very soon. Co-editor Caraley in the concluding paper "Is the Large City Becoming Ungovernable?" deals with Starr's question from a national perspective. Caraley suggests that the power to govern large cities depends on the mobilization of national resources and that there is a potential "pro-urban" coalition capable of generating enough influence in Washington to assure requisite resources for urban development. After all, Caraley argues, a country which can win world wars, support worldwide alliances, develop nuclear weapons, and put men on the moon has the resources to accomplish a great deal. The rub, of course, is that the American people may not want to develop viable urban areas in which people of different races can live and work together. Furthermore, given the condition of New York City's fragmented governing process, one can question whether it is capable of converting substantially greater resources into consequential outcomes.

Caraley's optimism may be excessive, but his paper provides some balance to a book which is destined to send most of its readers into Spenglerian fits of doom about New York City's future. Actually, New York City's problems and prospects are more the same than different from those of most other large cities; if its problems are greater in magnitude and its options more limited, this is partly because New York City has made errors which other cities (and perhaps New York) still have time to correct. *Governing the City* documents a lot of these errors, but what it really does is to effectively underscore the first principle of most American urban political systems—urban governments are hardly the captains of their own ships. —Raymond D. Horton, *Grinnell College.*

The Quest for Regional Cooperation: A Study of the New York Metropolitan Regional Council. By Joan B. Aron. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 225. $7.00.)

The most recent innovation in metropolitan governmental organization is the voluntary association of local governments, usually a council of elected officials, established to study area-wide problems and to discuss proximate solutions. The first such council of governments (COG) was organized in 1954. By March, 1968, encouraged by Federal financial support, the number of COG's had grown to ninety, with twenty others in various stages of formation.

Joan Aron's study is a history and analysis of the effort to establish a workable COG in the nation's most complex metropolitan environment, which in 1961 included over 1400 distinct political units and was designated by Robert Wood as "one of the great unnatural wonders of the world."

Briefly stated, the New York Metropolitan Regional Council (MRC), established in 1956, moved to a plateau of limited regional activity in the early 1960s and declined in importance after 1964, when it abandoned its efforts to gain legal standing as an organization of *communities.* In 1966 an attempt at rejuvenation was begun. At that time MRC was incorporated as an organization of elected *officials* to secure Federal funds under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965. By March, 1968, when the research for this study was completed, MRC was attempting to establish itself as a viable regional organization.

Aron's comprehensive case study shows that during its formative years MRC suffered problems common to many COG's in the United States. There was no consensus among members as to what MRC's regional role should be. Shifts in membership occasioned by electoral outcomes, together with a general lack of money and professional staff, made leadership formation difficult. Because of goal confusion among local officials, MRC was often unable to communicate effectively with suburban governing boards and State legislatures. There was apparently no attempt to identify issues and personalities which could break the usual public apathy surrounding regional concerns. The Council was attacked from all sides: some critics charged it could never become a political unit of real force, while others claimed MRC was the harbinger of metropolitan "supergovernment."

In addition, MRC encountered a special obstacle in the particular governmental conditions of the New York region. Unlike many other States, the governments of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut have been urban-oriented for some time and have attempted to meet several problems on a regional basis. But these efforts have been concentrated upon *functional* arrangements (e.g., Authorities) rather than general-purpose structures. MRC was unsuccessful in its attempt to change this State practice.

Faced with internal dissension and external hostility, MRC's accomplishments were "more good intentions than anything else." The Council supported proposals concerning regional transportation, the preservation of open space and recreational lands, and an air-pollution warning system. The organization also served as an arena for informal negotiation of some regional problems requiring action by several local governments. Although MRC served over the years as a useful device for the exchange of knowledge among local officials, it lacked the political resources to deal with continuing regional issues. When a problem became pressing in the Region, governmental authority was needed. This power rested with the States and they were unwilling to share it with MRC.

What is the future of governmental cooperation in the New York area? Aron sees no "supergovernment" for the Region. The Authorities will continue to furnish the most critical area-wide services. Any initiatives for regional coordination must come from the States or the Federal government. If MRC is to develop as the representative of local units in the planning and governing of the Region, the author feels that it must develop leaders who can establish meaningful relationships with the principals in other regional organizations —Federal and State agencies, the Authorities, and private planning agencies such as the Regional Plan Association.

In the end, therefore, "cooperation" is still the watchword in the New York metropolitan area, just as it was when Wood examined its governments nine years ago. Any change must await future events. The author concludes:

> MRC is not an ultimate solution. But it may provide the metropolitan community in New York with its first demonstration that local governments *can* play an effective part in shaping their own destinies.

In the opinion of this reviewer, such a demonstration, if it develops, will rest upon new initiatives taken during the 1970s rather than the limited past achievements of MRC.

This case study is a significant contribution to the literature on metropolitan councils of governments. While it deals with a metropolitan region which is perhaps unique in its composition and complexity, the work provides valuable data for future comparative research in metropolitan governmental organization.—ROBERT E. MCARTHUR, *Vassar College.*

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Political and Administrative Development. EDITED BY RALPH BRAIBANTI. (Durham: Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center. 1969. Pp. 667. $15.00.)

There are fifteen essays here each specifically prepared for this volume. Three of the essays are critiques of selected sister contributions and one of them is a "conspectus" that summarizes and correlates the materials in the eleven primary pieces. Needless to say, any work of this range and variety of authorship (prepublication proseminar notwithstanding)—is inevitably uneven in quality. Moreover, the degree to which different pieces may strike responsive chords in the reader probably depends as much on the instrument being struck as on the intrinsic merit of the essays themselves. In my own case, for example, I have not been in a sympathetic mood concerning the entire area of this book for some time. Basically my pessimism stems from an uneasy suspicion that much of the recent wisdom of public administration in general, might best be characterized as reinventing the wheel. And in the case of *development* administration it is a reinvention preceded by an agonizing appraisal as to whether you really need wheels. The entire enterprise is then packaged in such scholasticism that it takes considerable courage to suggest that all too often the emperor is naked. But this is an indictment of the state of the discipline and of all of us who continue to live within its confines rather than a thrust against any of these authors in particular.

Indeed, a nunber of the authors themselves indulge in embarrassed asides. Palombara, for example, states his central theme: "that certain values, ends-in-view, or ideologies carry with them implications for an administrative organization that would not be relevant or necessary were the values and goals of ideologies different," before he notes that "Although this observation appears truistic, it seems to me apparent that like many other truisms about public administration that might be enumerated here, it is not fully understood by contemporary nation builders and by those who provide them with 'technical assistance.'"

Perhaps the reader might better evaluate for himself the strength of the volumes connective tissue, the interest level of the various themes and the prose style most typical of the essays from the following excerpt by the editor of the book and its lengthiest contributor, Ralph Braibanti: (This statement is from his "Conspecus" and is preceded by a demurrer concerning the volume's failure to present a unified model.)

> "Despite the foregoing remarks, there appear to have emerged the glimmerings of a common perspective with respect to the purposes of development, the configurative or ecological tissue in which administration is embedded, the indigenization of political institutions, and the insistence on typological schema, however obscure and complex they may be, by which subsequently comparative evaluation may be made. Apart from what appears to be a group of not greatly divergent points of view toward these problems, there are on some issues conflicting emphases, uneconomic variations in terminology and constructs and varying perceptions of the same problems of political and administrative development."

This, apparently, is where we all are.

I will not, however, further emphasize the negative, but instead call attention to a few pieces that are in and of themselves worth the price of the book. Ralph Bribanti's opening essay, for example, provides an excellent review of the literature of development administration as well as a most timely reminder of the pitfalls of our foreign aid program. His major thrust is to emphasize the central importance for development administration of ongoing political institutions in terms of their general ideology, spread of power, institutional regularity and innovative capacity. He provides classificatory handles to aid in evaluating such institutions and also expresses the hope that through a careful balancing of administrative activities in relation to the activities of other sectors in the polity, the satisfaction level as well as the performance ability of administrative organizations will be raised.

In his final "Conspectus," moreover, Braibanti performs the Herculean task of compressing the ideas of his colleagues into an accurate and thorough set of precis, followed by an overview of the general themes and interrelationships found in the volume. This virtuosity is particularly helpful since the reader is likely to approach the book piece by piece. If there are timelags between the reading of one essay and another, it is inevitable that possible relationships will slip past unobserved. Braibanti's review, therefore, presents us with exactly what we may have failed to do for ourselves.

Another particularly useful portion of the volume is the interchange between Fred Riggs and Martin Landau. Riggs sets forth a richly imaginative schema of polities and bureaucratic subsystems. He places these against a complex backdrop of ecological settings, and a threefold classification of what he calls "transformations" whose consequences he subsequently explores. In and of itself this is an interesting essay. Landau's brilliant criticism, however, actually illuminates it. He deals with Riggs's conceptualizations and with his special terminology. This portion of the book could well serve as a model for teachers and students alike on how to analyze political science contributions. It is intellectual surgery at its best.

The themes that run through the book are essentially a counterpoint among ways of looking at institutions, values and persons. The authors vary in the emphases they place on each of these modes, as well as in the constructs they provide for analyzing them. For example, Friedrich together with his critic, Sartori, explores the problems and rewards of studying the ends of government in our political and administrative development work. Palombara discriminates between the drives that led to the development of the Weberian type of continental bureaucracy in distinction to those that led to the British-American systems and draws analogies for the more complicated field of the developing countries. Lasswell and Holmberg provide an eight item classification of values (neatly arranged into a pneumonic device) and then add a six-fold set of implications that the model might suggest for developing states. Kariel's essay enumerates a stimulating array of literary allusions that entertain as they illuminate problems in the field through varying definitions of "man."

But attempts such as this to encapsulate the various authors does a disservice to most of them. In essence, all the authors are struggling toward those insights that might best provide *all* nations, not just those variously defined as "developing," with some sense of direction and order for their political systems. The book on the whole, is a fair representation of the thinking in the field and on this basis deserves the consideration of the profession and the neophytes.—BLANCHE DAVIS BLANK, *Hunter College.*

The Angolan Revolution. Vol. I: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950–1962). BY JOHN MARCUM. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969. Pp. 380. $12.50.)

In Angola the presence of Portugal and its imperial mystique has been challenged for centuries by the black African. The challenge has taken the form of sporadic outbreaks of resistance and rebellion, such as the uprising of Alvaro Tulante Buta during 1913 to 1915 in protest against labor conditions and the deportation of Africans to Cabinda, São Tomé, and Príncipe. Protest also took the form of nativisitic or messianic mass movements, especially in the Portuguese Congo after the colonial breakup of Bakongo territory in the late nineteenth century. It was manifested through *assimilado* protest writings, newspapers, and cultural journals as well as through official and semi-official African and European organizations. More recently, the opposition to Portuguese rule crystalized into tens of emphemeral nationalist movements among which a few represent a serious threat to Portugal's hold over the territory.

John Marcum has given us a detailed account of these movements, their origins and evolution from 1950 to 1962. A promised second volume will cover the period from 1962 to 1968. Marcum's account is based on personal experience and insight, interviews during the past ten years with nationalist leaders, and thousands of emphemeral and secondary sources.

The present volume is divided into three parts and concludes with four useful appendices of documents. The first part deals with the rise of Angolan nationalism during the decade preceding the revolt of early 1961. This period of nationalism is analyzed on geographical and ethnic lines focusing, first, on the Luanda-Mbundu sources represented by the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Marxist revolutionary movement which evolved from the earlier intellectual assimilado and mulatto protest. A second focus is on Bakongo sources of nationalism in northern Ongola where dissent in the Congo monarchy is led to the formation of several movements under the leadership of Holden Roberto. Third, there are the Ovimbundu, Chokwe, and related sources of nationalism in the southern half of Angola, from which a third force later evolved during the mid-sixties. In each case Marcum meticulously explores the roots and causes of nationalism, identifies the principal personalities, and analyzes the ideology, organization, and significance of the many movements in relation to the open rebellion of the sixties.

The second part of the book concerns the uprising of 1961, the year of rebellion and "sequential explosion." Citing both nationalist documents and Portuguese sources, Marcum reconstructs the series of events, commencing with the attacks in January by members of a sect known as Maria, the Luanda riots and vigilante reprisals of February, and the upheaval of March 15 which thrust Angola into a protracted state of rebellion. He also examines the American and Portuguese responses to the conflict as well as the impact of the rebellion on subsequent developments in Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique.

The third part examines in depth the period leading to the 1962 formation of a government in exile and the effort of nationalists to cement relations and gain support in independent Africa. The effort to form a broad national front from ideologically diverse movements is analyzed with particular attention given to Roberto and the MPLA. Marcum concludes with an assessment of the rebellion in terms of the Portuguese commitment, Portugal's links to Western allies through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the opposition to Portuguese colonialism in the United Nations, and the potential of pan-Africanism.

The appendices of documents concern the uprising of Tulante Alvaro Buta and biographical notes on Agostinho Neto, leader of the MPLA; two Portuguese documents on alleged Communist subversion; three documents on the relatively unknown struggle of African factions to control the old Congolese throne; and Roberto's forged letter published in *Reader's Digest* as the result of Portuguese public relations effort.

Marcum has gone to considerable trouble to give us a balanced account of these chaotic events and to clarify details which have been badly confused by the divergent positions of the nationalists and Portuguese and by an often inaccurate press. One is especially impressed with the descriptive detail and event by event analysis, depicting the intricacies of nationalist politics. Rather than providing the reader with startling new inerpretation and analysis, this book constitutes a necessary synthesis of contemporary political history with deep political insight.

This study is largely dependent on ephemeral nationalist documents which the author has had to weigh carefully. For example, he boldly documents the founding of the União das Populações do Norte de Angola, (the predecessor to Roberto's own movement) as late as in July 1957, some three years later than that officially documented by the nationalists themselves. Through interviews (with the participants involved in the founding of the movement) and inconsistencies in the nationalist documents, Marcum is able to revise the date and recast the historical perspective of Angolan nationalism in the Portuguese Congo. In certain instances, one senses the author's uncertainty and frustration in dealing with disputable facts. Marcum goes to great length to discuss obviously biased and distorted propaganda emanating from all sides of the struggle.

While this study might be viewed critically by some behavioralists concerned with systematic and quantitative field analysis, it should be emphasized that due to present political conditions such analysis probably could not be undertaken in Angola today. Marcum, it would appear, has ventured into a study of events which are still much too close for detached assessment. Yet his book remains a highly successful synthesis of events as they probably happened. This very necessary study fills a gap which should serve as a basis for systematic social science research once Angolan independence is attained. Thus this is an important book, the best yet available to scholars and students who are interested in the continuing Angolan nationalist struggle. We are grateful to Marcum, for his scholarly contribution and we look forward to the projected second volume.—RONALD H. CHILCOTE, *University of California, Riverside.*

Comparative Urban Research: The Administration and Politics of Cities. EDITED BY ROBERT T. DALAND. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1969. Pp. 368. $10.00.)

It is the urban revolution to which we, after all, owe our civilization, and it is certainly to the culmination of that revolution, which is happening to us now, that we can ascribe most of our contemporary ills. And so it is to an understanding of that culminating process that had its beginning in preheistory (and is thus more than history; it may indeed be psychology or anthropology, though more aptly ecology) to which we must address ourselves. If we are to understand that culminating revolution, we must surely go beyond our provincial preoccupation with our own Western culture and norms, and seek generalizations and valid grounds for prediction in that world which used to be known as outside the bounds of Christendom, and which now is simply known as developing. To approach that developing world, however, one must have more than scientific curiosity and adequate methodological tools; one must have fortitude and courage for above and beyond the ordinary call of duty. One must indeed, to resort to the vernacular, have more brass than a government mule.

Professor Daland and his colleagues have all of these qualities in abundance. Their analytic approach and statistical examination of the data are as sophisticated as their material will allow, and yet, though I suspect them often of perfect, private certainty, they are not willing to visit upon us their own inner perceptions of reality which we cannot possibly have, not having eaten with, drunk with, or gone to bed with the data. But they do not shrink from speculating about reality that cannot be empirically validated with the data at hand. Thus Miss Rabinovitz: "It seems intuitively that urban service levels are indicators of something other than the demographic level of urbanization. Could that something be the phenomena of 'urbanism' or the urban way of life?" If we are not ready to speculate intuitively, with Miss Rabinovitz, about what our data might show us at some time in the future, we shall surely be denied a scientific view of politics.

Much of this volume focuses on urban phenomena in the developing world. After an introductory essay by editor Robert T. Daland, which in itself constitutes a comprehensive statement of the problems as well as the goals of comparative urban research, Frank P. Sherwood looks theoretically at the position of the city as a subunit in the national system, and succinctly summarizes the possibilities for autonomous action by the local polity: "there is in fact a tremendous range of system-oriented behavior that occurs without reference to power and dominance"; and "power is highly variable. The addition of power at one level of the hierarchy does not at all mean the automatic withdrawal of power at another." Although Sherwood seems to be wanting to generalize for all time and every place, it is probably accurate to say that his principal points of reference are the American and Brazilian systems. Latin America at large, on the other hand, is the focus of Francine F. Rabinovitz; Malaysia of James F. Guyot; and two African cities of William John Hanna and Judith Lynne Hanna. Robert R. Alford, in a long concluding section, poses ways of viewing and interpreting the data shown from Latin America, Malaysia, and various African cities. Departing from this general pattern, Deil S. Wright and Daniel R. Grant examine American urban experience in separate essays on the city manager as development administrator and political access in the metropolitan governments of Nashville, Miami and Toronto.

Miss Rabinovitz, concerned with urban and political development in Latin America, uses her data well, while all the time admitting the uncertain nature of it. She is convincing, to my mind, when she argues that urbanization has affected economic development (there is a positive correlation between the two phenomena she insists), and that at the same time the city qua city affects little the politics of Latin America, except as a functioning subunit in a totally nation-centered political life. Equally dominated from the center are the urban villages being developed by the Federal Land Development Authority in Malaysia. This attempt to urbanize a portion of the rural population, as described by James F. Guyot, is a center-dominated endeavor which could easily contain the seeds of its own destruction. Already there are signs of conflict between an elitist bureaucracy and the dominant political party, and this conflict may be a signal that cohesion could "dissolve into localism." Alford's criticism of Guyot—that he produces two possibly contradictory schemes of explanation—is valid, but he misses the point, I think, that Guyot is attempting to make, and that Sherwood in particular assumes: that urbanization may well develop a leadership cadre that is capable of challenging the center from a local base.

While not overlooking the relations of city to center in national political systems, the comparative focus of the Hannas is upon transnational differences and similarities found in two widely separated cities, Umuahia in eastern Nigeria (now Biafra), and Mbale in Uganda. The Hannas were able tentatively to conclude that similarities could be found in the politics of the two cities. For one thing, in both cities the role of the community influentials in integrating each system is partly a communications process (they "transmit the perspectives of one subunit's culture to another"), and partly a manipulative one (they "manipulate the practices and perspectives of one subunit so that they are more compatible with those of another"). For another thing, there seems to be a cosmopolitan orientation "on the part of members of the two communities' elites."

Oddly enough, the Hannas' research into the politics of Umuahia and Mbale, though carried out in a non-Western cultural environment, is conceptually closer to the investigations of Grant and Wright than to other essays in this collection. In using the non-Western world as its predominant focus, this volume puts a healthful emphasis on the role of cities in national systems, an emphasis that has been lacking in the study of American city politics and administration perhaps because of the smokescreen raised by the conceptually inadequate intergovernmental-relations approach. But is this focus too nation-centered? While exploring the importance of the relation of cities to national systems, the authors (except for Grant and the Hannas) tend largely to ignore the transnational character of larger cities (note the instances in which the metropolis physically spans national boundaries; note also that ecologically and organically there is a tendency for the city to become a Weltstadt, literally to reach out and encompass the world). Is it invalid to compare cities of 20,000 and 2,000,000 in the same national system, except as a means of understanding the particular national system? Does the city—at least the metropolis—so transcend the national system that comparative *urban* analysis (in contrast to *na-*

tional analysis) must emphasize the transnational over the national? To put the question another way, is the urbanist concerned primarily with the city qua city, or is his primary interest centered, to use that unfortunate coinage, in nation-building?

If the urbanist is interested primarily in the city qua city, then one of the opening statements by editor Daland very cogently identifies perhaps the only major difficulty with this otherwise excellent volume: "It has been noted that urban politics frequently varies more within nations than among categories of cities in different nations." This is a good working hypothesis, which I think most of us would perceive intuitively as valid. Acting upon this hypothesis, we would then divide this volume in two, and arrive at a more homogeneous mix in each one. In each case, the better mix would make a better book.—WILLIAM O. WINTER, *University of Colorado.*

Modernizing Peasant Societies: A Comparative Study in Asia and Africa. By GUY HUNTER. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 324. $6.50.)

Perhaps the most common—yet the most irrelevant—argument in support of aid to the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa in the second decade after World War II was the success of the Marshall Plan in contributing to the economic revival of Europe in the first such decade. Programs, on the other hand, which did not implicitly confuse the preconditions of non-Western development with the quite different requirements of European reconstruction, tended, as in the case of President Truman's "Point Four" formulation, to invoke a strategy of assistance that would "greatly increase the industrial activity in other nations and [hence] raise substantially their standards of living." It is significant that the primary emphasis in *Modernizing Peasant Societies* is on the need for change in the agricultural sector as a precondition of economic advance for most countries of Asia and tropical Africa, and that the author makes only a half-dozen (almost cursory) references to the contribution that foreign aid, on a government-to-government basis, might be able to make to such a process. While the reader's immediate reaction is to regret that this volume was not available as "required reading" for developmental specialists in years past, it is perhaps only with benefit of hindsight that it can fully be appreciated as embodying the "common sense" of a highly complex matter.

The author states in his preface that the book is "the outcome of two and a half years' work on a project sponsored jointly by the Institute of Race Relations and the Overseas Development Institute (both in London)," the purpose of which was to inquire more deeply into the effect of 'the transfer of institutions from developed to developing countries.' "

> But as the work proceeded, it became increasingly clear that to concentrate wholly on 'transfer' did not provide an adequate basis for explanation of the problems and performance of developing countries. These problems arise . . . because developing countries are seeking rapid economic growth in a wholly different total environment from that in which the main thrust of growth took place in the West. They can neither recapitulate the sequences of growth in Europe between 1700 and 1900 nor take the full modern equipment of institutions and technology of the 20th century. Their paths of development must be, in many senses, unique. This constituted a challenge to adopt a wider framework which I was forced to accept.

Hunter's "wider framework" will disappoint those seeking a tightly-reasoned "theory of development." It yields instead a series of remarkably acute insights into the variety of factors influencing acceptance or rejection, success or failure, of change at the local level of peasant society. While the policy planner will lament the dearth of sweeping prescriptions, the thoughtful Peace Corps returnee will nod in agreement at virtually every page. Consider, for example, the simple matter of the introduction of fertilizer: "surely this is not surrounded by a host of complications and consequences? Yet indeed it is" (p. 115). And Hunter proceeds to tell us why. Or the fact that

> there is a great temptation to jump the steps from hand-cultivation to tractor, because it seems uneconomic to have both forms of capital—animals and machines—when farming capital is so short (p. 117).

followed by a discussion of the varied consequences of the substitution of the machine for the animal, some of which may be distinctly counterproductive in developmental terms.

It should not be assumed from the foregoing that Hunter is either pessimistic regarding the potential for change in peasant society or skeptical as to the possible contribution of Western technology. He argues, rather, for *measured* change as dictated by a capacity for acceptance at the local level, rather than for change arbitrarily imposed by central government fiat. As Hunter himself succinctly puts it, the most fruitful approach, in many cases, may well be "the marrige of 17th century scale with 20th century technology" (p. 271). And insofar as central planning is concerned, he quotes with approval, Hans Singer's observation that "a plan must start from resources rather than needs" (p. 274). His definition of modernization is keyed to both notions:

> Modernization can in fact only mean following a path which is possible for each nation in its current circumstances, using to best advantage the common stock of scientific knowledge which is available simultaneously to every country in the world (p. 296).

Arguing that "a second-rate engineer has at least some skills to give to society [while] a second-rate Arts graduate has very few indeed," Hunter's treatment of the role of education as a modernizing influence is in full accord with that of other developmental analysts, save, perhaps, for specific emphasis, in keeping with the overall thrust of the book itself, on the need for "qualitative improvement of Primary schools in their full capacity as socializing agents . . . and available not in the city but in the rural areas" (p. 253).

Equally central to the books thrust is the argument that developmental financing for most Asian and African nations must, in the main, be internally generated, with the primary contribution, for the foreseeable future, stemming from the rural sector. There are many, however, who would challenge the author's optimism that agricultural productivity will sufficiently outstrip population growth for the remainder of the century as to make this possible.

The sub-title of *Modernizing Peasant Societies* is somewhat misleading. The book is by no means a rigorous comparative analysis, but rather the distillation of a large number of case studies coupled with the author's extensive field observations in both Asia and Africa. As such, however, it is a well-integrated and uniquely informative effort.—ARTHUR S. BANKS, *State University of New York at Binghamton.*

Les Groupes Communistes Aux Assemblées Parlementaires Italiennes (1958–1963) Et Francaises (1962–1967). BY PIERRE FERRARI AND HERBERT MAISL. (Paris: Presses Universitaires De France, 1969. Pp. 214. 20F.)

In this interesting and valuable study of the Communist parliamentary groups in the lower houses of the French and Italian parliaments, Maisl and Ferrari have treated the two Communist groups separately in a work that really comprises two distinct monographs in juxtaposition. However, we gather from Duverger's remarks in the preface, as well as from the content of the work itself, that the authors compared notes at the outset regarding their respective plans of attack and also engaged in frequent consultation from time to time in the course of their research. There is, therefore, considerable similarity between the approaches employed by the two authors.

Although the French and Italian Communist parties are fairly similar in their electoral strength, there were some sharp differences between the two parliamentary groups under investigation, with regard to such questions as relative parliamentary strength and legislative role. After all, the Italian Communists entered the 1958–63 Chamber of Deputies with 140 out of 596 seats, whereas the French Communists had only 41 out of 482 seats in the National Assembly during the 1962–67 period. The Italian Communists, as the second largest group in their chamber, had far more influence and leverage than did their French counterparts. Moreover, they confronted a shaky center coalition cabinet, whereas the French Communist Party was faced in 1962–67 by a strong Gaullist party with largely subservient allies—a party which, thanks to its virtual majority in the National Assembly and to a constitution which protected the executive branch against legislative recalcitrance, could afford to treat Parliament with some disdain.

Both authors begin by examining the official attitudes of the respective Communist parties with regard to the other parties in the system and to the parliamentary regime itself. They then proceed to analyze briefly the nominating process in the two parties in France and Italy, the campaign programs and techniques, and the social and occupational composition of the two parliamentary groups. The internal organization of both parliamentary groups is outlined in some detail; and the external relations of the groups are also given some attention, with Ferrari placing more emphasis on the relationship between the Italian Communist Party and various political forces outside of Parliament (such as pressure groups, local governments, etc.), whereas Maisl tends to dwell to a greater degree on the relations between French Communist Deputies and their parliamentary colleagues. In both countries there are close ties between the Communist party in Parliament and the extra-parliamentary party organization, with a considerable over-lapping of membership. And in Italy, of course, there was until recently a tendency for Communists and Socialists to collaborate closely on policy issues. The Ferrari study reveals that traces of this collaboration were still present in the 1958–63 Parliament.

Finally—and this is the core of the research—there are detailed statistical analyses of Communist participation in the work of the two chambers. The analyses cover private-member bills, private-member amendments to government bills, participation in debates, and questions addressed to the ministers. It becomes evident, as a result of these studies, that the Communist role in the French and Italian parliaments is by no means as important as one might superficially assume. Communist proposals are occasionally adopted by passing private—member bills or, more frequently, by passing private-member amendments to government bills. And Communist criticisms occasionally compel the government to modify its course somewhat. This is more often true in Italy than in France; for the Italian Communist Deputies are far more numerous and have enough votes to prevent Italian parliamentary standing committees from exercising their peculiar power to pass laws *in sede deliberante*. In short, the Communist role cannot be cavalierly dismissed as being mere *a priori* anti-system opposition. For in both countries the Communist groups have made numerous constructive proposals, and have generally tried to project a moderate and democratic image.

The methods employed in the study are dictated to some degree by the nature of the phenomena under investigation. For instance, the analysis of roll-call votes would have been of limited usefulness in dealing with a party whose members invariably vote as a solid bloc in Parliament. Or, to cite another difficulty, the submission of a structured questionnaire to Communist Deputies might have aroused much suspicion in a highly centralized and disciplined party. And it is questionable, in any event, how willing busy national legislators would be to participate in such a time-consuming venture. For this reason perhaps, the authors have had to forego the more sophisticated findings which an opinion survey might have gleaned regarding the recruitment experiences and role perceptions of Communist Deputies. It might have been even more worthwhile to inquire as to how non-Communist Deputies perceive the role and effectiveness of the Communist parliamentary groups. But here again, of course, certain techniques might be rendered ineffective by lack of cooperation on the part of the politicians under scrutiny. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that Italian Communist Deputies appeared to be much more willing to grant informal interviews than were their French fellow-partisans.

In concluding, one must confess to a certain disappointment at the authors' failure to include a final chapter synthesizing their findings, comparing the behavior of the two Communist parliamentary groups, and suggesting certain hypotheses to be derived from their data. As it stands, their work contains much valuable material and many interesting insights; but one might have wished for a more truly *comparative* effort. However, first-class descriptive analyses and experiments with behavioral techniques are not so embarrassingly abundant in the field of Western European politics as to justify us in "crying over fat broth."—Raphael Zariski, *University of Nebraska.*

The Power of Parliament. By Ronald Butt. (New York: Walker and Company, 1968. Pp. 446. $8.50.)

From time to time it is valuable to examine phenomena from a different perspective in order to question the conclusions of a currently accepted perspective. This is what the British journalist and scholar, Ronald Butt, has attempted to do in his book, *The Power of Parliament.* Butt's purpose is to show that the concern of parliamentary critics about the decline of the British Parliament is in a number of respects exaggerated. In the first place, many of the Parliament's critics explicitly or implicitly compare the influence of backbench MPs today to their influence in the mid-19th century, as if this period was both typical and desirable. Secondly, most critics contend that the impact of Government backbenchers and the Opposition on legislation today has practically disappeared, whereas Butt finds that this is not the case.

After conveying these purposes in his introduction, Butt enters into an examination of the functions of Parliament as they developed to 1945. This examination leads him to conclude that the influence of mid-19th century Parliament was both highly exceptional in its degree and undesirable in its effects. Whereas during the mid-19th century the Private Member unceasingly made and unmade governments, Butt contends that neither before nor after this short period did parliamentary predominance prevail. Instead, the function of Parliament has typically been to support government by an executive, whose broad policies it approved. Butt also produces evidence to indicate that the unusual influence of mid-19th century Parliaments was not thought to be desirable. "It seemed at the time an irresponsibility, which was the despair, not the pride of contemporaries" (p. 408).

Butt does not pretend to discover much about the pre-1945 period which historians had not already uncovered. His conclusions gain their thrust in part because they are set along side contemporary criticisms of the decline of parliamentary influence. Moreover, he complements his historical examination with an original analysis of the role played by Government backbenchers and the Opposition since 1945. This analysis is intended to demonstrate that the influence of backbenchers and the Opposition on Governmental policy and the public is not substantially different today from the influence Parliament has traditionally exerted.

Butt repeatedly points out that the influence of the contemporary Parliament remains within the traditional parameters of maintaining executive government. Within these limits, however, Government backbenchers and the Opposition still exercise effective influence and he forwards numerous instances to support this contention. Over twenty examples of backbench influence on Government policy are presented. His case study of Resale Price Maintenance, for instance, shows that the Conservative Government did not introduce legislation to abolish R.P.M. for almost a decade in part because of its anticipation of the reaction of a sizable section of its backbenchers. When the Government finally did introduce legislation in 1964, it did so in part because of pressure forthcoming from others among its backbenchers. Or, to select another example, Butt contends that the reservations Macmillan was required to put on the British application for membership in the Common Market in order to avoid widespread backbench rebellion (as well as interest group disaffection) were sufficiently fundamental so as eventually to lead to the French veto. Butt also shows that even when Government backbenchers were unsuccessful in their efforts to influence legislation, their revolts often ended at least in focusing public attention on the issue.

The contemporary influence of the Opposition on Government policies was also shown to have been effective in several cases, especially those in which a group of Government backbenchers was aligned with the Opposition. The Government's Common Market policy can again serve as an illustration. Macmillan's compromises were in part induced by the opposition of the PLP to Common Market membership. The impact on the public of attacks made in the Commons by the Opposition was also in evidence in a number of cases such as Suez and the Rents Act. Butt is careful to stress, as well, that the Opposition still controls approximately 30 percent of all parliamentary time.

Butt's emphasis on the influence that Government backbenchers and the Opposition can and do have both on Governmental policy and the public makes a substantial contribution to the literature on the House of Commons. Few will be able to look upon backbenchers as nothing but "lobby fodder" or as totally ineffective actors after reading this book.

It is true that Butt leaves a number of questions unanswered. For example, how often are efforts made to influence policy? One suspects the possibility that Government backbenchers (whose action is usually a necessary condition for influencing the Government), while making more successful attempts to influence the Government than the previous literature anticipated, do not make nearly the number of attempts that backbenchers did in earlier Parliaments or that governmental legislators do in other systems. Answers to questions such as this one would have considerable bearing on Butt's conclusions and deserve additional research. The significance of Butt's contribution is that he presents a case which advances knowledge sufficiently beyond that provided by the critics so as to be suitable as a focus for new discussion and research on the House of Commons.—JOHN E. SCHWARZ, *University of Minnesota.*

An Ideology in Power: Reflections on the Russian Revolution. BY BERTRAM D. WOLFE. (New York, Stein and Day, 1969. Pp. 394. $10.00.)

At first glance this book appears to be a "scissors and paste" job. It is a collection of miscellaneous articles and addresses composed by the author from the early forties to the present. Only one chapter, "The Forced Labor Reform after Stalin's Death," seems not to have been published previously. The subject matter of these chapters is extremely diverse, covering such topics as: "Marxism and the Russian Revolution," "Backwardness and Industrialization in Russian History and Though," and chapters on Lenin as a totalitarian, succession struggles, the secret police, Soviet elections, Soviet histories, Soviet science and culture, ideology, and foreign policy, and a final chapter on the theory of convergence.

Nevertheless, the book does form a coherent whole; there is unity in diversity. As Dr. Leonard Shapiro says in the Foreword, ". . . it becomes a kind of hand-book of totalitarian behavior in its various aspects, both internal and external." (p. VIII). Let us try to paraphrase the underlying unity of Dr. Wolfe's study.

First, take the chapter, "The Durability of Despotism in the Soviet System," which the author states is probably the most frequently anthologized of his essays. Here he makes a distinction between "changes so clearly of a secondary order that they may be designated *within-system changes* and those so clearly fundamental that they involve *changes in the system* or basic societal structure." (pp. 181–2). He characterizes modern totalitarianism as a society "calculated to assimilate the changes which it intends and those which are forced upon it, in such fashion that —barring explosion from within or battering down from without—the changes tend to be either inhibited or shaped and assimilated as within-system changes in a *persistent system with built-in staying powers.*" (p. 185. My italics). Thus does Dr. Wolfe stress the durability of despotic systems.

Furthermore, the author does not see collective leadership as either a permanent change in the nature of the system or as a basic change involving dispersal of power. It is essentially transitional, because there is no legitimacy to provide a successor. There are no *"socially organized* checks" to restrain the flow of power to the top. A crisis of succession is almost guaranteed until the rise of a new dictator (Brezhnev and/or Kosygin and/or somebody else, watch out!):

> "The whole dynamics of dictatorship calls for a personal dictator; authoritarianism for an authority; infallible doctrine for an infallible applier and interpreter; totally militarized life for a supreme commander; centralized, undivided, all-embracing, and 'messianic' power for a 'charismatic' symbol and tenant of authority." (p. 191).

Other "changes" since the death of Stalin that other writers have pointed to include the elimination of purges and relaxation of terror, law reform, and a "thaw" in the arts. Again, none of these are really basic.

Dr. Wolfe points out that the blood purge has not been forgotten, but is being held in reserve. He points to the facts that in preparation for the Twentieth Congress *all* the regional secretaries and leading committees were renewed; thirty-seven per cent of those present at the Nineteenth Congress disappeared, and forty-four per cent of the Central Committee failed to be elected as delegates. Also he recalls the execution of Beria and about twenty-five of his friends. It is true that terror in society as a whole has been diminished. but one reason for this is the now more deeply ingrained habit of obedience. Another is that concentration camps are a wasteful method of production. The camps are gentler now, yet they are there. Consider constant references in the Soviet press to people being "dispatched" or "allocated" to this or that construction project or industrial enterprise. The situation today has been referred to as one of "terror on ice."

The discussion on the codification and regularization of the laws Dr. Wolfe dismisses as "much fuss." He points out that in fact public prosecutors have been given much more control of trials and pre-trial inquisitions. Harold J. Berman, who does see some trends toward liberalization, nevertheless has pointed out that in 1961 and 1962 there was a return of harsher criminal and administrative penalties. In at least one case the death penalty was applied retroactively, and in this period he estimates that probably over 250 Soviet citizens were executed for economic and other crimes. (In 1961 forty-three persons were executed in the United States.)

As for "thaw" in literature and the arts one can easily perceive Dr. Wolfe's reaction to such incidents as the Pasternak affair, the imprisonment of Daniel and Sinyavsky along with others, the defection of Anatoly Kuznetsov, and the current agony to which Alexander Solzhenitzyn is being subjected.

This image of a state still basically totalitarian brings us to the theory of convergence, popular in some quarters, but hotly disputed in others—among them Dr. Wolfe. He attacks the arguments of John Kenneth Galbraith, James Burnham, Pitirim Sorokin, and others that, as the USSR approaches the USA as a "mature" industrial society, and managers, engineers, and technologists gain increasing influence, then the differences in the two societies will have become minor and may be ignored. Essentially this "simplification" borrows from the Marxist concept that economics determines politics and culture. As an ally in refuting this Dr. Wolfe calls on—Karl Marx! Although Marx himself was a "terrible simplifier," further study taught him that he had learned more than the content of the product he was trying to sell. He knew that the history of peoples was infinitely more complicated than the simple formulae of "economic determinism" and "inevitable social progression." Hence many of his writings purposely left unpublished and appeared only after his death. For the same reason *Das Kapital* was never finished and remained a "torso." Technology like money is neutral. As Germany reached England's level of economic development between 1870 and 1914, for example, the two countries became less like each other politically, culturally, and institutionally. Beyond technology—the Russian heritage is very different from the American heritage.

Dr. Wolfe shows a keen appreciation of history, as chapters on Tsardom, World War I, and Poland testify. His reputation and credentials are well known. His prognosis is gloomy. (I am sure he wishes it could be otherwise.) It seems to this reviewer to be realistic and arrived at in a scholarly manner—years of study in the field and first-hand acquaintance with many of the major actors. He staunchly stands up to his critics, and his case is well made. If the patient is unhealthy, it is no use to say he is well because you want him to be. Dr. Wolfe's erudite and well-balanced observations can be of great benefit to Western students of the Soviet Union.—BENJAMIN M. MAY, JR., *Lafayette College.*

Fiji Goes to the Polls. BY NORMAN MELLER AND JAMES ANTHONY. (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1969. Pp. 184, $5.50.)

The South Pacific remains the last major area of European colonialism, with the bulk of its people still living under British, French, American, Australian or New Zealand rule. But even there modern democratic institutions are being adopted whether the outcome is independence as in Western Samoa, autonomy as in the Cook Islands, or colonially controlled internal self-government as in New Guinea and Fiji. Professor Meller's book reminds us how slowly and cautiously the British have been moving in their largest remaining Pacific dependency, Fiji. He describes the 1963 Fiji Legislative Council elections, with a postscript bringing the story up to date. In 1963 Fiji still had the classic Crown Colony political structure abandoned in Ceylon as long ago as 1931. In 1963 it elected unofficial members to its Legislative Council in the first election in which the Fijians had been asked to vote by modern methods rather than be represented through their chiefs. Even so, the vote was granted only on the basis of literacy while candidates had to possess fairly high property qualifications. It was only a year later that the illiterate and virtually propertyless natives of Australian New Guinea voted for their own Legislative Council by universal suffrage.

The caution with which Fiji moved towards universal suffrage epitomizes the British colonial attitude. It is a pity that the authors have made very few comparative references. For the devices of literacy qualification and communal representation used in Fiji in 1963 had been tried out elsewhere in the British Empire over the preceding years. In all cases these conservative measures had to be abandoned under popular pressure. As the postscript reveals the same fate befell the Fijian system only two years after its introduction. While the main argument used for caution in Fiji has always been that the British had a contractual obligation to protect the rights of the indigenous Fijians, a comparative analysis might have suggested that the devices used in 1963 were by no means peculiar to the local situation.

While this book is a very valuable addition to the comparative study of elections it suffers by comparison, for example with Professor Colin Hughes' study of the New Guinea elections of 1964 and even with the much older *Five Elections in Africa* edited by Professors MacKenzie and Robinson as long ago as 1960. In part this is because the book is too short, in part because the authors did not actually witness the election and in part because it lacks the historical dimension which a comparison with the post-1963 situation might have given it. Unfortunately for the authors the entire basis of election was changed almost immediately. They might have been better advised to have contrasted the 1963 and 1966 situations, rather than simply adding their "Postscript."

The shortness of the book has meant that much of the fascinating detail of electioneering is overlooked. The candidates all appear as shadowy figures with no reality. As there were only thirty of them the reader at least deserves more detail than is given in Chapter Four—"Profile of the Candidates." We learn very little about any of them except that nearly all of them were lawyers or professional men, which is hardly surprising in view of the property and literacy qualifications, in particular the stipulation that candidates must be able to speak and read English. One also misses an account of the social forces at work. The authors note that the Indians returned were all from minority communities, but tell us nothing about the operation of caste, language or ethnic groupings amongst the Indian voters. Are these less important than in India itself? We do get a fleeting picture of the clash between traditional and modern deference patterns among the Fijians but it is scarcely full enough. The pressure groups and economic interests concerned with Fiji politics are scarcely mentioned. Most markedly the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. is only mentioned in a footnote. Are they not interested in what happens to one of their most profitable properties?

Had the 1963 and 1966 situations been compared then much more would have been said about parties. The 1963 election appears to have been fought largely between individuals. Yet three years later there were flourishing and well organised parties, stemming partly from the already existing trade union movement. The authors seem to lend support to the British Conservative politician Nigel Fisher's rather old remark that "parties in Fiji will be racial if true political parties are not developed." What makes a party "true" rather than false is not stated. The authors seem to feel that only cross-ethnic parties on a policy basis are really parties. Yet the record of many underdeveloped countries suggests that parties are very often on an ethnic base and quite reasonably so, where, as in Fiji, the interest of one ethnic group is deliberately preserved against the interest of the other (which happens also to be the numerical majority). This was the case in the very similar situation of now independent Mauritius where the warring communal parties have developed, not as "true" parties, but as coalition partners in a dominant-party system.

Although Fiji moved much more rapidly towards self-government under the newly elected British Labour government it is still dependent and still faced with the sort of dilemma which the British have found almost unanswerable in other territories. It is—shall the numerically dominant and politically aware Indian community be allowed to capture power through the ballot box or will it be crushed between the dominant European business interests and their allies the conservative Fijian landowners? *Fiji Goes to the Polls* while an interesting and worthwhile study cannot, within its narrow scope, give us more than an inkling of the possible outcome.—JAMES JUPP, *University of York, England.*

Léopold Sédar Senghor and the Politics of Negritude. By IRVING LEONARD MARKOVITZ. (New York: Atheneum, 1969. Pp. 300. $10.00.)

Professor Markovitz's book is a very valuable contribution to the already existing literature on Negritude. Considering the attacks on the concept of Negritude during last summer's symposium on African culture held concurrently with the First Festival of Pan African Culture in Algeria (*West Africa,* August 9, 1969; pp. 913–914), Professor Markovitz could have picked no better time to publish the book.

The Politics of Negritude, though focused primarily on Senegal, deals with the crucial problem confronting African states as they undertake the task of nation building—how to translate abstract ideas into pragmatic actions. The concept of Negritude which provided a sort of myth or an ideological foundation for the pre-independence African cultural and political nationalism is presently losing its initial appeal. Senghor, one of its chief advocates, has modified his ideas "from the kind of abstraction which appealed to a humanistically educated intelligentsia to a new pragmatic reliance on science and technology" (p. 35).

Professor Markovitz treats Senghor's concept of Negritude under three periods—the pre-second world war, the post-second world war till independence and the post-independence. The first period witnessed the emergence of Negritude in France among the *évolues noirés* who, in anticipation of better economic and social status, had alienated themselves from their indigenous culture in favor of European culture. They realized that they were "caught between [two] cultures, and belong wholly to neither" (p. 46). Frustrated by alienation, prejudice and loss of dignity, they started a quest for the "holy grail," their "collective soul." Professor Markovitz describes Negritude at this stage as a protest ideology which "served the psychological needs of [black] intellectuals in the Paris . . ." (p. 28).

At the second period, Negritude is presented as an ideology designed to facilitate "dialogue and accommodation with the colonial power" (p. 61). Its advocates emphasized those elements which "bound together France and Africa" (p. 61). Professor Markovitz notes the functional change of Negritude at this period. "From a basic weapon of conflict, the radical aspects of Negritude had evolved into a theory of synthesis and unity" (p. 61).

Two main aspects of Senghor's thought are emphasized at the third period of Negritude. One of them is the concept of the "Civilization of the Universal." Here Senghor advocates a sort of Utopia based on the synthesis of unique elements of various civilizations. Professor Markovitz, like many critics of Senghor, tends to emphasize only the international ramifications of the idea, thus ignoring its possible contribution to the problem of nation building in Senegal and other African states. The idea of the "Civilization of the Universal," if properly directed and structured on the national level, could well be the answer to the problem of national unity presently confronting the African states. The existing ethnic and linguistic groups, or what Senghor describes as the "fatherlands" could become the units for the nation-states or "communities." Broadening the areas of shared interests among the "fatherlands" to the extent that each has to relate its own actions to those of others as well as regard the actions of others as giving point and direction to its own, could promote a sense of interdependence and unity as well as instill democratic attitudes.

Professor Markovitz tends to view the formation of "class cleavages" as the panacea to the problem of national unity because "class cleavages can override other parochial loyalties . . ." (p. 149). Although this observation is plausible, it tends to be the least realistic to African experience when the following points are taken into consideration. First, considering the experience of the Western states, the formation of "class cleavages" based on economic interests out of the present poor economic situations in the African states, would take a long time, and could not, therefore, provide an immediate answer to the pressing problem of national consciousness and unity.

Secondly, even if it were possible to form "class cleavages" within a reasonable time, the experiences of the African states, have shown that the African bougeoisie, irrespective of their class interests, tend to remain loyal to their ethnic and linguistic groups. Thus, despite "class cleavages" loyalty to "fatherlands" could still exist. Finally, since ethnic consciousness is an established fact in the African states, an attempt to ignore it by simply superimposing class systems could exacerbate further problems. A system which first recognizes the interests of the existing groups and then broadens these interests into national perspective is most likely to provide the most practical solution to the problem of national unity.—Moses Akpan, *Southern University*.

The Police and Political Development in India. By David H. Bayley. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 482. $15.00.)

This book reports the analysis of an intensive study of civilian-police relationships in India as they affect both the efficiency of the Indian police and the development of a democratic polity. The data analyzed are of two types. First, aggregate statistics of crime and police effectiveness are presented with a detailed discussion of police organization. Second, a very ambitious survey research project was carried out on thirty-six hundred Indian respondents. Included in the sample are urban-rural, north-south, and student-non-student sub-samples. The data are presented clearly and with relevance to the points made in the text. Statistical analysis of the survey data included correlational analysis, factor analysis of selected variables, and chi-square and t-tests for differences between samples on parametric and dichotomous variables. The author has excellent sense in his choice of statistical applications. For these reasons alone, the book represents a significant improvement in the use of sophisticated research methodologies in political research in India.

The value of the book for scholars interested in political development from different perspectives hinges on the validity of the author's major premise, which is that favorable public attitudes toward the police are conducive to a higher order of political development. Unfortunately the relationship between police and public on the one hand, and the prerequisites for a "developed" system are not clearly stated. Bayley does not define what he means by political development. One interpolates from his discussion, however, that he is concerned with the effect of police behavior on the development of a stable democratic political order. The purpose of the book, then, is to analyze data which would and does result in a series of recommendations which would improve police-citizen relationships. The assumption is that such an improvement will also benefit the democratic political order.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the Indian police, Bayley directs his research in answer to a set of questions about what, how, and under what conditions the Indian police affect political life. In answer to these questions, Bayley suggests that police forces everywhere perform the following activities: maintenance of law and order, establishment of the boundaries of permissible political action, regulation of mobility and economic patterns through administration, and determination of the scope of police law and order activities. Related to these functions or activities are "styles" of performance. Police may be passive or active in their concern with crime prevention. They may be secret or open in their dealings with the public and other structures of government. They may be rude and insensitive or polite and informal, and partial or impartial in handling cases. All of these patterns affect the public perception of the police. Their corporate image in the eyes of the public may be an example of an integrated, national organization. They may, according to Bayley, "serve a symbolic role, representing a nation yet to be, developing national heroes, and giving a sense of pride in country by means of parades, reviews, and athletic competitions." Finally, the police through organization and socialization patterns mold future policemen to appropriate roles of the police in a society. The police, like the military, may become either an avenue for social mobility, or an important basis of political power.

From this basic model, obviously over-simplified from Bayley's discussion, we turn to his findings. The first part of the book is based upon an analysis of police organization and how well they perform their missions of crime control and the control of massive civil disorder. From this analysis, Bayley concludes that given their resources, the rigidity of the personnel advancement system, the rather low ratio of police to citizens, and the poor pay and education of the lower constabulary ranks, the Indian police are a remarkably effective organization.

Turning to citizen attitudes and perceptions of the Indian police, Bayley's survey research data points to low regard for the police by Indian citizens. Related to low regard is real doubt about the sincerity, probity, and motivation of the Indian police. Public hostility towards the police is reciprocated by the police in their own attitudes towards the public. Police complain that people protect criminals, lie when giving testimony, and generally obstruct police work.

For Bayley, the consequences of this mutually hostile set of perceptions is to lower the quality of law enforcement, weaken the general capacity of government to gain diffuse support and compliance, and, perhaps, to erode citizen acceptance of democratic values and institutions.

Thus we have two potentially contradictory conclusions. An effective police force operates in an environment that is passive at best, hostile and uncooperative at worst. The liberal assumptions behind the analysis are that the democracy is better served if the public has active and positive orientations toward the police, and this end would be achieved by improving the "cutting edge" of police-public relationships, the constabularly. These conclusions raise at least four critical questions for this reviewer. First, might there be a positive relationship between police effectiveness and public hostility? Second, might public hostility toward police be a kind of check serving to maximize individual freedom by limiting police activity? Third, is it not possible that the Indian reluctance to involve the police in conflict situations is in part a consequence of other conflict-resolution mechanisms in the society? Fourth, are the problems which India has with the police so serious that their solution should demand a higher share of public resources than they now receive? The real problem for those who would like to see police reform in India is that the system as presently constituted works surprisingly well.—RICHARD N. BLUE, *University of Minnesota.*

The Politics of Defection: A Study of State Politics in India. BY SUBHASH C. KASHYAP. (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1969. Pp. 442. $11.25.)

Shri Kashyap has attempted to study the politics of defection in seven Indian states: Rajasthan, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal. His major thesis is that political defection of state legislators in India has not resulted in political polarization. While admitting the impreciseness of the term "defection" and without a defensible analysis of the concept, the major portion of this volume is devoted to a chronological summary of the defection of state legislators and the breakdown of legislative government in the states. The results of this analysis is a detailed step by step description of each state government crisis. The reader may well become confused by the myriad defections and counter-defections he encounters. It becomes apparent that the immediate causes and consequences of defection vary from state to state.

In Rajasthan the cause of defection was the ambitions of legislators for a portfolio in the state government while the Congress party required their limited participation in order to achieve a slender majority necessary to form the Government. In Haryana, by contrast, where the Congress had a comfortable majority after the Fourth General Election, it lost the control of the government under the pressure of the age-old caste rivalries as well as the drive of individual politicians for power. While Rajasthan defectors were rewarded, by contrast Haryana defectors were severely punished by being derived a place on the election rolls. In UP Congress formed its legislative majority by rewarding defectors who joined, only to have the rivalry of Congress leaders destroy their slender majority. Shri Charan Singh, a Congress leader, defected with his faction to join with opposition leaders to form a coalition government with its consequent instability leading to Presidential Rule. In Bihar, instability of coalition state government was characteristic after twenty years of unchallenged Congress control. Defection and re-defection were rampant, running as high as four times. Once again the result was Presidential Rule. A somewhat similar pattern existed in the Punjab where Congress coalition with the opposition toppled the coalition government with resultant instability and threats of Presidential Rule. By contrast in Madhya Pradesh a faction ridden Congress party could not form a stable coalition with opposition political parties to constitute a majority sufficient to form a state government. In West Bengal, Congress defectors joined with other groups to form an unstable coalition government which ultimately led to Presidential Rule.

The price for such instability is too obvious to catalogue. Shri Kashyap's solutions are not defensible in light of the twenty years of relatively successful experience with western model democratic government. While he believes that it "seems most advisable to look forward to and work for the emergence of programme-oriented parties and a two-party system based on a broad national consensus," he simultaneously believes "it may be ideal to grant a holiday to party politics." For him the issue is whether India is irrevocably committed to accepting western political models or whether "we would like to build our polity on the basis of our own genius and social ethos." His conclusion in support of Shri Jaya Prakash Narayen's "partyless democracy" is based upon the ideal of cooperation and harmony for the general good.

The Politics of Defection which has provided the details of defection and counter-defection, ends in a trial of confusion. For the modern political scientist it has left unanswered such basic inquiries: What variables move the legislator to defect and re-defect? What political models may be extrapolated from the chronology of events? How could such models aid in stabilizing Indian state governments in order to attack important Indian political problems? How can the models developed be used to stabilize caste and community rivalries in order to prevent governmental dislocation? What hypotheses may be developed explaining the absence of polarization amid rampant defection? What models of national party intervention or non-intervention into state legislative conflict resolution can be developed from the evidence assembled?

Answers to these significant questions could provide us with sound theoretical assumptions by which to evaluate similar movements occurring in other states, including Kerala. They would provide valuable insights in dealing with other politically developing institutions in Ceylon and Pakistan.

It is well to consider whether Shri Kashyap's suggestions for importing the partyless government system is defensible in light of the history of the Sarvodaya movement in India. Jayaprakash Narayan's experience with party politics in India left him convinced of the barrenness of the political arena and the need to develop a political structure which reflected indigenous Indian values rather than an adaptation of western political institutions and their inherent values. His withdrawal from party politics may alternatively be evaluated as the results of idealistic disillusionment or the tactics of a sulking Agamemnon awaiting the call to national leadership. Whichever interpretation may be preferable, partyless democracy in modern India is an idealized nostalgia for the mythical past age of tranquility which rarely, if ever, existed. Indian economic and political development has engrafted western models and has managed them with varying degrees of success. None of the evidence offered by Kashyap can possibly justify the relevance and operational capability of a partyless system to modern India.

There is one sense in which the concept has validity within the framework which the author presents. Accepting the provisional validity of his conclusion that no polarization is resulting from defections, and that candidates and the issues rather than the party, are increasingly significant, the thesis which needs testing is whether India is now approaching a phase in which all but the extreme left and right parties are recrystallizing and re-aligning with the resultant emergence of coalition or "national front" governments which tend to blur programmatic and policy differences. If partyless government then comes to India it may be within the framework of the consensus of party of which Shri Kashyap speaks. One immediately then asks whether this is in fact only a variant of the multi-party (weak type) model of western Europe. Under such circumstance the era of partyless democracy would refer to "partyless" in the programmatic sense rather than the constitutional.

Shri Kashyap has by his presentation opened the door to many possibilities for research and analysis. In providing us with the chronology of events in seven critical areas he has performed a useful and needed service. He has also thoughtfully included an Appendix which includes texts of the important governmental proclamations and orders dealing with the crises studied. These texts are of great value to the student of Indian politics who would otherwise have difficulty of access to them.—BENJAMIN N. SCHOENFELD, *Temple University*.

The Arabs in Israel: A Political Study. BY JOSEPH M. LANDAU. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 300. $9.95.)

It is almost too much to hope that so slim a volume as Jacob Landau's new study, *The Arabs in Israel,* could deal effectively with a topic so broad and controversial. Yet, Professor Landau, who is a Jewish scholar at the Hebrew University, is an unusually well-informed and perceptive authority on the domestic minority problems of the Israeli State. This is the first fairly objective and somewhat detailed study of the internal developments of the Arab community living as a minority in Israel (in 1966, Arabs made up 12 percent of the total Israeli population). This study is a highly sophisticated presentation representing a successful blending of accurate historical description, political insight and contemporary survey techniques. Landau's book, which includes an evenly balanced mixture of Hebrew, Arab and Western sources, should be a welcome addition to the bibliography of students in Middle Eastern Affairs. Although Professor Landau seeks with great determination to write objectively, fairly, and in an impeccably scholarly fashion about issues which all too often become shrouded in emotionalism, Arab writers and Pro-Arab scholars will find Landau's judgment on the assimilation policies of Israel controversial and somewhat sterile. The obvious divergence of interpretation of Arab conditions in Israel is singularly outlined in Landau's discussion on education. Arab writers have tended to chastise Israeli policy-makers for deliberately blocking attempts to increase the quality and quantity of education. Professor Landau argues that the State of Israel has "invested considerable effort in broadening and improving Arab education" and Israel, like the British before, have found this a formidable task. Recognizing the problems of increasing educational opportunities, whether because of Israeli dereliction or Arab indolence, it must be admitted that Israel has little to gain from encouraging an educational experience which tends to broaden young minds to the world of conflicting nationalisms and competing ideologies.

One regrettable aspect of Professor Landau's book is his complete willingness to delineate the Arab grievances without fully probing the ramifications of these issues. Thus such problems as the military administration, discrimination, freedom of expression, expropriation of land, Arab education, and superior attitudes of some Jews are all properly listed, yet the analysis of these issues is, generally, limited to a paragraph or two.

While one may quarrel with the salient optimism of this study, and the tendency to white wash significant issues, few will fail to recognize that the number of questions raised, the complexity of the factors analyzed, the wealth of evidence adduced, and the astuteness of the hypotheses advance are remarkable for a work of this size. In a study so rich and variegated, readers will probably differ as to what aspects are the most significant. Since the major emphasis of the book is on the political behavior of the Israeli Arabs, Professor Landau, in a series of chapters that cover two-thirds of the book, does seek to focus on: (1) the Arab minority's relations with Israeli parties and other political groups and organizations, (2) Arab participation in local, trade union and national Parliamentrary election, and (3) The trends and pressures that presently influence Arab leadership patterns.

Several factors graphically analyzed by Professor Landau explain the present lot of the Israeli Arab minority. In 1948 the vast majority of those Arabs (some 160,000) who had not left Palestine (now Israel) were simple village peasants since most of the Arab leaders and intellectuals had departed prior to the 1947 Arab-Israeli War. Professor Landau carefully analyses the attempts by all Israeli political parties to control and monopolize this amorphous Arab vote. In a country where coalition government is the norm, extraneous minority groups can play a key role and all major parties have presented Arab lists which hopefully would attract Arab voters. In evaluating the dominant position of the Mapai Party (this major party in Israel has consistently obtained over fifty percent of the Arab voters), Professor Landau defines their strength among the Arab voters as largely a function of "opportunistic Arab notables" who, as their predecessors, have always cooperated with the occupying military forces, i.e., Ottoman, British and now Israeli. Far more significant as a harbinger of future political trends is the consistent ability of the Maqi (communist) party to attract over 20 percent (except in 1959) of the Arab vote. The Israeli Communist Party has the obvious advantage of being the only Israeli party willing to repudiate Zionist aspirations. More recently the Communist Party has sought to identify with the more radical forms of Arab nationalism now supported by the Soviet Union. Supporting and encouraging every sign of dissatisfaction among the Arab youth, the Communist Party through a continuous barrage of propaganda, has presented itself as the natural ally of the young Israeli Arab who now seeks to break the influence of the traditional family (hamula) leaders.

While admitting that Landau's study does not include the dramatic shifts in Arab opinion since the June War, one has the feeling that Landau, in his desire to present a somewhat optimistic view of Arab-Israeli relations has actually failed to capture the egregious theme of the Zionist-Arab nationalist confrontation. One recurring *leitmotiv* acknowledged, but seldom pursued to its logical conclusion, is the inevitable and explosive conflict of Zionism and Arab nationalism which has produced not only violent outbreaks between Israel and the surrounding Arab states, but has also made smooth relations between Jews and Arabs inside Israel extremely volatile. It is this reviewer's guarded opinion that this endemic and infectious pattern of violent nationalism so prevalent among the young Arab intellectuals in Israel will recalcitrate against any majority-imposed form of "cooperation" and will, (unless present trends are reversed), eventually denote the total "bankruptcy" of the Israeli Arab-Zionist relations.
—JAMES B. MAYFIELD, *The University of Utah.*

Chiefs, Council and Commissioner: Some Problems of Government in Rhodesia. BY J. F. HOLLEMAN. (Assen, the Netherlands: Published on behalf of the Afrika-Studiecentrum by Royal VanGorcum Ltd., 1969. Pp. 391. Hfl. 29.)

Social anthropologist and urban administrative officer in Rhodesia (1945-1957), frequent visitor since then, and present Director of the Netherlands Universities' Afrika-Studiecentrum in Leiden, Professor Holleman has made a most valuable contribution to the understanding of the "Rhodesian situation" in its widest sense of black majority-white minority confrontation.

Core of the three-part work is the some 170-page case study of a chieftainship and its local Council based on the Report of the Mangwende Reserve Commission of Inquiry of 1961 of which the author was a member, preceded by a short account of the late nineteenth century British colonization of Rhodesia, and followed by an analysis of administrative and government policies leading up to the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965. Thematically, the study is concerned with the confrontation between the "theoretically superior external control" (the Rhodesian white administration) and the "limited local autonomy" (the African chieftainships) in the midst of which stands the traditional chief with his conflicting loyalties to both.

The study sheds light on the role of the chief in the expansion of white domination from the initial so-called "Treaty of Friendship" of 1888 with the Matabela King Lobengula through the "*unanimous support* from the tribal authorities for the government's efforts to achieve independence on the basis of the Constitution of 1961, that is, under a white government," some seventy-five years later. (p. 348) The analysis focuses on the interaction between opposing group interests and on the conflict of value systems which, though derived from different cultures (African and European), were forced together into a single socio-political context on the local level: the council. There the traditional African chief—supposed to be both tribal representative and administrative spokesman—finds that if he tries to initiate programs or reforms, new schools for example, he changes from the white commissioner's subordinate to a threat to the system. "Tragic" conflict replaces communication and cooperation between the two individuals.

This conflict on the local level is the reflection of the cleavage on the national level; the source of both is misunderstanding. "For a quarter century and more, the indigenous population had been subjected in progressive degrees to measures based upon the premises that a sound economic basis was essential for a stable society;" the white administration did not realize that "equal weight should be given to the premises that no sound economy could possibly exist on an unstable social foundation." (p. 212) For example, legislation involving sweeping changes in agriculture was promulgated and implemented on the basis of modern agronomical principles with little or no knowledge of or regard for customary land usage.

During the sixties administrative policies changed: Aimed at stimulating responsible African local self-government, the "new nonauthoritarian and non-paternalistic philosophy of 'community development' was being advanced as the unitary purpose to which all service departments should as far as possible direct their efforts." (p. 258) This meant changing fundamental attitudes, both of the civil servants and of the great majority of Africans who had "through force of historical circumstances and the lifelong habit of submitting to the superior power of white government, accepted white authoritarianism and paternalistic initiative as part of the established order of their existence." (p. 269) But political circumstances discouraged the working relationship between officialdom and the African public needed to adjust attitudes.

Professor Holleman points out that the new policy of community development was "the product of the *administrative* mind, conceived to be carried out as a measure of administrative practice not to be associated with the diverse currents of party-politics in the country." (p. 274) But it *did* become a political issue and was "naturally but unjustly . . . interpreted by white liberals and African nationalists as an insincere and poorly disguised plan to arrest further racial integration and to reinforce the existing segregation . . . by stimulating a process of *separate* development." (p. 276)

The same political pressure led the white government to "rediscover" the chiefs and by recasting them from a subordinate position in the administrative hierarchy into a nationally organized political force to enlist their aid against the common enemy, the African nationalist. Evidence of the cooperation were a conference of some 500 chiefs with government representatives in 1961 and another of some 600 tribal chiefs and headmen in 1964. From the latter emerged their unanimous support (Holleman's explanation of the meaning of traditional unanimity (p. 349) sheds an interesting light on Africa's one-party states.) of the government's proposals; this decision of the chiefs, claims Holleman, "was a major factor which contributed to the government's decision, a year later, to drive the principal issue between London and Salisbury beyond the point of no return with its unilateral declaration of Rhodesia's independence." (p. 356) After U.D.I and by mid-1968 it seemed that "Government's policy would be to increase the power of the tribal authorities sufficiently to strengthen its own powers of control over the majority of black citizens" (p. 362)

The author has "deliberately tried to avoid passing judgement or expressing outright condemnation" of conflicting views about present-day Rhodesia. (p. xvi) The book is not and most explicitly is not intended to be an analysis of the problem of the Rhodesian declaration of independence, nor of the black-white confrontation in its entirety. These topics are touched upon to the extent that they are relevant to the central theme of the book: the changing and conflicting roles of the traditional chiefs.

As a sociologist and a scientist Holleman concentrates on the *sociological* reality of confrontation between two cultures (races), and in this capacity he foresees the possibilities of accommodation between the two. At fault has been insufficient understanding between blacks and whites due in part to an administration that just "disseminated instructions" instead of communicating. As a study of conflict between two cultures the book's relevance is wider than the context in which the study was carried out. But, within the context of the Rhodesian situation—the *political* reality of minority rule which is unacceptable to the African nationalists—the work might be judged by them to be irrelevant.

This book is written by an involved and concerned individual, a fact which bears not so much on his objectivity, as he himself fears (p. xxi), as on his venturing into sidetracks which a personally detached reader (a political scientist interested in political development in general) may not find absolutely necessary. With this minor reservation, I highly recommend the book not only to specialists on Rhodesia but to social scientists studying community development and the intricacies of local government in developing countries.—Dov Ronen, *Purdue University*.

Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion. By Amos Perlmutter. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 161. $6.50.)

The proliferation of military regimes in the Third World and growing concern regarding the strength and influence of military establishments elsewhere have spawned a significant increase in the number of studies of the role of the military in domestic politics. The socio-economic tensions and fissures that precipitate the demise of civilian authority, and the political context that propels military elites into the center of the political arena are endemic in many parts of the world. With the apparent trend toward greater politicization and political involvement on the part of military structures, it would be safe to assume that there will be increasing attention in the discipline to conditions favoring or inhibiting such developments. As comparative research accumulates (and it is a sad testimony to the state of this sub-field that most current studies are still single-country monographs or collections of essays), the nature of civil-military relations in Israel may well prove to be an effective control-case for the testing of the resulting hypotheses and models.

The Israeli Defence Forces (Zahal) have remained subordinate to civilian authority (though not without considerable say in defence and foreign policy) despite a variety of circumstances amenable to the ascendancy of military power and influence at the expense of civilian elites. Among these factors are: three highly successful campaigns that have enhanced the popularity and prestige of the military; the constant state of military vigil and preparedness so conducive to garrison-state mentality; huge military budgets and the development of a defence industry complex dominating sectors of the civilian economy; military administration into the sixties in minority areas harboring a possible fifth column; a fragmented multi-party system continuously engaged in political haggling; and strong personalities at the helm of the armed forces.

To what extent does Zahal play a role in the decision-making process in Israel and why have the above factors not brought about the ascendancy of the military? Noting some 300 interviews with Israeli officers and officials, and citing an impressive bibliography of English and Hebrew sources, Perlmutter sets out to trace civil-military relations in Israel and to challenge three general hypotheses advanced by Huntington, Andreski and Von der Goltz. Unfortunately, due to the author's over-ambitiousness and the study's brevity (135 pages of text, one third of which is devoted to the pre-1948 era) the result is interesting but very spotty coverage of the topic.

Perlmutter traces the stability of civil-military relations in Israel to several factors, two of which are the absence of a social gap between the military and the rest of society, and the close co-ordination at the highest level of civil and military elites. Zahal is very much a cross-section of Israeli society by virtue of universal conscription, the small size of the permanent force and the periodic promotion, rotation and retirement of its top officers. Retired officers are snapped up by private and public corporations or are integrated in the bureaucracy, all of which provide alternate channels for personal advancement. Moreover, being deeply involved in the nation-building process, there is relative harmony between the values and ideals of military and civilian elites in Israel.

While the absence of a civil-military social gap tends to inhibit the growth of a case mentality or militarism (though Perlmutter presents no hard data on the latter), the character of the civilian Defence Minister and his administrative concepts and skills determine the degree of cooperation or tension that will exist at the authority apex.

One of the first tasks of the nascent state in 1948 was the unification, depoliticization and nationalization of the existing semi-autonomous military formations. With Ben Gurion as Minister of Defence as well as Premier, general spheres of responsibility were drawn between the Ministry and the military itself, though there was no attempt at a strict separation of the civil and military functions as is more common abroad. Entrenched by the passage of time and by Ben Gurion's charismatic and personalist style, these lines of demarcation persisted during Ben Gurion's absences from power to plague reform-minded Ministers. And Ben Gurion's practice of favoring the High Command, "his boys," over the Ministry, also opened the door to possible Ministry-Command tensions.

Perlmutter chooses not to deal in any detail with either the structural or dynamic features of the civil-military interplay of influence, or the precise manner in which Zahal participates in decision-making relating to defence or foreign policy—curious omissions insofar as these would be central to his inquiry. Instead, in his chronological narrative on civil-military relations he stresses the Lavon Affair as evidence that even in times of intense interelite strain and tension, civilian conflict-resolution mechanisms (in this case the dominant party, Mapai) are operative. Lavon's ambitiousness while Minister of Defence, and his desire to re-organize Ministry-High Command spheres of competence and coordination, isolated him from his source of power, drove a wedge between the Ministry and Zahal and resulted in his downfall. Elements in the military combined with Lavon's own subordinates to topple him. Forgery and perjury was involved. And though the military did eventually purge itself of these elements, the outcome of the Affair was indicative of the lengths to which the government would go to shield Zahal from possible tarnishing circumstances. As Perlmutter summarizes it (p. 134), "in periods when the military and political elites were separate and diffuse, either due to the personalist ambitions of the defence minister (Lavon) or his non-expertise (Eshkol), the Army's effectiveness as a political pressure group was enhanced." Ideal civil-military relations in Israel are achieved under a strong Defence Minister, respected by the High Command and fully backed by his colleagues in the Cabinet.

Perlmutter's study has a number of shortcomings arising mostly out of its brevity. Miniscule chapters result in somewhat superficial treatment of important topics ("Zahal's Role Expansion" covered in ten pages?) and complete neglect of others. The essentially historical narrative approach leaves too many questions unanswered. Is there total unanimity within the Army regarding the ministry-military division of labor? What evidence is there of the cohesion of the military that the author asserts: are there no "hawks," "doves" or empire-builders? To what extent, if any, is militarism gaining ground in Israel? Moreover, despite the excellent analysis of the Lavon Affair as a case study or civil-military tensions, one is still left with only a hazy notion of the precise role of the military in policy-making.

Though some significant tables are presented throughout the book, the study does not utilize much hard data to support various of the author's contentions. The defence budget figures themselves are at total variance with another set provided by the author in his recent article in *World Politics* (XX:4:1968, p. 642)—significant portions of which are incorporated verbatim without appropriate acknowledgment. The original three hypotheses challenged are not dealt with; indeed, the challenge was quite unnecessary as Israel does not satisfy their stipulated conditions. Finally, inadequate proofreading has resulted in a significant number of printing errors.

In sum, the work promises us much, delivers considerably less and has certain shortcomings. Still, little research has been done in English on this difficult topic and there are significant security restrictions and obstacles to such endeavors. The book can be of use to the reader who will be content with a very general descriptive background picture of civil-military relations in Israel, rather than a detailed analysis. The latter kind is still forthcoming.—Samuel Decalo, *University of Rhode Island.*

Politics in the Altiplano: The Dynamics of Change in Rural Peru. By Edward Dew. (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1969. Pp. 216. $6.00.)

Social scientists are aware of the problems of gathering reliable data on the developing nations. In addition, there is increased concern for the style of analysis; that is, whether the methodology focuses on issues relevant to comprehending political phenomena in an area rather than agreeing with what is fashionable within a particular discipline. Political scientists interested in Latin American politics should consider the contribution of historian Edward Dew's *Politics in the Altiplano* which represents a prudent and effective use of data and a useful theoretical framework for interpretation.

Dew's micro-study of the politics of the Department of Puno in the Southern Peruvian Andes utilizes a group model of political activity. "Politics in any social system," he says, "involves the moderated conflict of system members over different resources in which they have an interest." Any change in the "relative allocation of resources among members of the social system" achieved through conflict constitutes political change. With this definition of politics and political change, Dew examines the "equilibrium" and "conflict" models of political change in culturally plural societies. The former conceives of the social system as composed of different geographic, social, ethnic and occupational groupings with overlapping memberships and loyalties contending for political power. Political brokers serve as moderators and generally succeed in achieving objectives through negotiation procedures rather than violence. The conflict model also conceives of a plural social system, but one in which overlapping membership in group activity is limited or virtually non-existent. If and when the moderation of conflict occurs among contending groups, it is achieved by leaders in a dominant cultural minority. Aware of the contributions and limitations of each model in the analysis of social systems, Dew examines the politics of Peru's Andean region by using the conflict model and by paying particular attention to the emergence and decline of political brokers within the culturally dominant group *and* within those subordinate groups which challenge the existing system of resource allocation.

From a variety of primary and secondary sources, statistical studies, newspaper accounts and interviews, Dew marshals supportive evidence for his contention that the politics of the *altiplano* closely resembles the conflict model. Stagnant pluralism has been induced by the existence of extremes in land tenure and the use of land among large and small proprietors, resulting in the polarization of economic positions. When these conditions are combined with geographic isolation, climatic castrophes and dense population, the resulting society produces a local political system where scarce resource allocation is controlled by a dominant minority within or outside the region.

The *altiplano* political system is further intensified by cleavages resulting from the interaction among racial and functional groups. A *mestizo* elite dominates and exploits different Indian groups but is challenged for control of the political system by newly emergent groups. Commercially orientated *cholos* (Westernized Indians) and *forasteros* (outsiders), unable to enjoy social and political assimilation commensurate with their newly acquired wealth and economic mobility, seek the prestige and power of public office by creating competing organizational structures, such as peasant syndicates and personalistic political parties. Political competition between two urban centers, Puno and Juliaca, reinforces conflict between *mestizos* and *choloforasteros,* as they compete to control the allocation of public works, an airport, roads, welfare funds, industrial projects and public offices. The lessening of polarized conflict within the region occurs when the *altiplano* brokers, principally congressmen, for reason of a natural disaster (drought, flood), achieve a united front to demand greater resources from the national government. Moderated conflict may occur under such circumstances, but the *altiplano* leaders themselves must contend with national political parties seeking power in the region. Dew asserts that common interests, which had served to unify regional leadership during emergencies, no longer provide a method of conflict moderation because the creation of a regional development agency *(Corpuno)* has increased the conflict over *who* will generate resource allocation. Further divisiveness is created when *cholo* political leaders build syndicates as means to mobilize political support and thus increase expectations among peasant farmers. Local political brokers often find themselves in precarious positions and, forced to take sides in a conflict, are unable to maintain themselves in positions of influence for any great length of time.

As Dew points out, this study should not be regarded as a definitive statement on conflict and cleavage in the *altiplano*. However, the conflict model as used here has some validity. It sheds considerable light on the *altiplano's* tentative political system where economic and social conditions often polarize contending groups and induces aspiring politicians to use a variety of means—some violent, others non-violent—to mobilize political power and to control resource allocation.

Some political scientists will find weaknesses in Dew's treatment of political attitudes and elections. Evidently, he relied on unsystematic personal interviews with political activists, informants and American research personnel as well as secondary works to draw some inferences on Indian and *Mestizo* attitudes. Drew details the power struggle among local politicians during the congressional elections of 1962 and 1963, but the results of the elections could have been made more meaningful if he had considered the intricacies of proportional representation and apportionment on the outcome of the two elections.

Aside from these minor criticisms, Professor Dew has provided students of Latin American politics with an effectively researched and theoretically significant case study of the politics of one of the more remote regions of Latin America. A bibliography and an excellent index are included in this volume.—ORVILLE G. COPE, *University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.*

Institutionalizing the Grass Roots in Brazil: A Study in Comparative Local Government. By FRANK P. SHERWOOD. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967. Pp. 173. $2.95.)

This compact little volume underscores the paucity of analytical studies on the Brazilian political system. Taken as a relatively modest effort to discuss basic features of local government in Brazil, it could be welcomed as a useful, albeit rather limited contribution to the growing comparative literature in this field. Yet the absence of any full-scale analysis of the Brazilian political-governmental system since Karl Lowenstein's *Brazil Under Vargas* appeared more than a quarter century ago places a burden upon authors of this type of monograph, since only in the rarest cases will readers be familiar with even the basic features of the polity involved. Some such as Richard Graham in his recent *Civil Service Reform in Brazil* (University of Texas Press, 1968), are relatively successful in dealing with this problem by sketching a meaningful if very basic model of the national political system. Unfortunately Professor Sherwood has failed to respond to this challenge. The scant two pages devoted to "Brazil Sociopolitical Development" are not only too grossly oversimplified to effectively distinguish it in very fundamental terms from other countries, but make no effort to alert the reader to the existence of relatively adequate English language sources covering the crucial factors of environment, history and political culture the author caricatures more than characterizes. In other respects as well Professor Sherwood promises the serious student of politics a good deal more than he delivers.

Dr. Sherwood's book, in spite of efforts to mask the fact by using fashionable disciplinary terms for often commonplace observations, reflects a carryover of the once prevalent distinction between politics and administration. For when we move from his language to the level of his ability to handle the subject matter, the author does precious little with the substance of political life. Although an effort to deal with politics in a modern manner is clearly present, complete with a rather mechanical adaptation of the system-functional approach, the analysis is disjointed and rarely escapes superficiality. Description of selected institutional arrangements is often quite good, but the real nature of the Brazilian political system remains hidden from the reader.

It is where his strengths as a specialist in municipal administration bear most closely on the subject under discussion that Professor Sherwood is most adequate. Thus he demonstrates considerable facility in dealing with the legal, structural, and service aspects of local government and enjoys some success in applying Selznick's concept of institutionalization to the Brazilian *município*. Greater difficulty is encountered in utilizing a systems approach to explain the limited role and effectiveness of the "community municipal system" and its national aggregate in Brazil. Here part of the trouble comes from Sherwood's failure to consult the most relevant of Almond's works available at the time he was writing (*Comparative Politics, A Developmental Approach*). Emphasis upon capabilities analysis as introduced by Almond into his scheme in this 1966 work, might well have served Sherwood better than his partial application of conversion functions. As it is, he has grasped more of the terminology than the substance of this influential approach.

Where Sherwood does treat of politics rather than government, chiefly at the formal level of elections, he is prone to significant factual errors as well as superficial interpretations based upon a very limited familiarity with appropriate sources. Thus he states on page 15 that in the 1962 São Paulo governorship race the winner received 37.8 percent of the vote to the runner-up's 24.1 percent. Since the margin was roughly 125,000 votes in a turnout of better than 3.3 million, his figures —for which he cites no source—were very far off the mark indeed and obscure the important point that Adhemar de Barros won as the result of a last moment stop-Quadros movement which saw ex-President Kubitschek almost on the eve of the balloting divert the support of his party from the third candidate to de Barros as a less dangerous potential rival in the 1965 presidential campaign than a rehabilitated Quadros would be. Instead of tapping the relatively rich body of community power studies, Sherwood offers a largely pointless reportage on a single municipal council meeting in a provincial town, admitting at the same time that he could not follow what was going on and did not bother to stay around for more than the first hour. (pp. 107–112)

The book's weakness in the field of systematic political analysis is accentuated by the absence of any awareness of the relevant work by Brazilian political scientists. While drawing heavily rather than widely upon the appropriate Brazilian public administration studies, Sherwood has apparently neglected to consult political science literature which treats many of the problems he skirts more than he faces. Thus, for example, the only use the author makes of the work of such a prolific and internationally known Brazilian scholar as Hélio Jaguaribe is to overuse an analytical tidbit discovered second-hand in an article by an economic historian on Pernambuco elections. (Indeed, he passes up far more rigorous work on electoral politics in favor of over reliance upon this volume of very uneven quality and doubtful analytical value.) To add injury to the insult of ignoring Jaguaribe's really relevant work, particularly the fecund concepts of the clientelistic system and "cartorial" state, Sherwood badly mangles his citation (putting the name of the journal as the title of the article and stating that the publisher is unknown.). Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how the author could use very inadequate sources for his section on "The Political Consequences of Industrialization and Urbanization" while ignoring the work of Glaucio Dillon Soares who, although a Brazilian, has long been associated with such U.S. institutions as Washington University (St. Louis) and the University of California (Berkeley). First available in English as far back as 1964, Soares' revised paper on "The Politics of Uneven Development: The Case of Brazil" appeared in 1967 in Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan's well-known volume on *Party Systems and Voter Alignments.* Similarly, Sherwood's complete neglect of populism as the most important single concept in the complex politics of the great metropolitan center of Sáo Paulo combined with over-reliance upon the misleading label of conservative for Adhemar de Barros tends to obscure the really interesting and significant aspects of the one area he selects to focus upon most closely. Whatever benefit of a doubt might be extended to Dr. Sherwood regarding neglect of Brazilian scholarship, even that available in English, the same charity is strained by his failure even to mention the solid study of Brazilian local government by Dr. Carr L. Donald (a 1959 University of Texas doctoral dissertation from which two articles were subsequently published in such widely available journals as the *Western Political Quarterly* and *Inter-American Economic Affairs*).

In sum, Sherwood's study clearly adds to what is available in English on the narrow topic of Brazilian local government in a manner particularly meaningful to students of municipal administration in this country. It is equally apparent that this book does not contribute more than marginally to a deepened understanding of the political system of this discontinuously modernizing subcontinent which is on the verge of joining the exclusive club of countries with more than 100 million inhabitants. In this regard, the piece of the Elephant perceived by the author is not a vital part of the beast, while the developmentally critical aspects of political institutionalization do not include the narrow facet fastened upon in this work. Indeed, the very limited local authority described by Sherwood has been further restricted and eroded since the cut-off date of his book.—RONALD M. SCHNEIDER, *Queens College of the City University of New York.*

How The Conservatives Rule Japan. By NATHANIEL B. THAYER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, Pp. 349. $10.00).

Postwar Japan has been ruled continuously by the conservatives, except for a brief ten-month period in 1947-48. Yet few attempts have ever been made to study in depth the organizational and psychological determinants of their behavior. The book under review is the first major work focusing directly on the intricate mechanisms of conservative rule. As a pioneering work it admirably fulfils its mission. For the first time the organization and behavior of the Liberal Democratic party are subjected to a seasoned political scientist's systematic and critical observation and analysis.

Nathaniel Thayer starts the book with a detailed discussion of the dozen or so factions in the Liberal-Democratic party, which he regards as the focal points of Japanese political processes. "The Liberal Democratic party," he contends, "is an amalgam of personal power lodged in the factions and institutional power lodged in the party organs." (p. 14) In the eight substantive chapters which follow, the author proceeds to describe and explain in terms of this delicate balance between personality and institution the roles and influences of the business community and the official party organs, the logic and psychology of the electoral politics, and the processes of intra-party personnel administration and policy making. His descriptions have a quality of extraordinary intimacy and drama, while his analysis is both disciplined and precise.

This of course does not mean however, that I agree with all of the author's observations, arguments and conclusions. On the contrary, I happen to disagree with his views in more than a few cases. In fact, I find some of his statements either outright erroneous or highly misleading, as when it is suggested that every standing and special committee of the Diet is chaired by a conservative, or that the Diet policy committee of the Liberal Democratic party consists of only about seven members. (p. 286) The fact is that the chairmanships of a few upper house standing committees and half or more of the special committees in both houses are customarily allotted to the opposition parties, while the party Diet policy committee regularly consists of over twenty-five members in addition to a chairman and several vice-chairmen. In an effort to prove the relatively high turnover rate of conservative members of the Diet, the author points to the high percentages of the quondam and new faces elected in each of the last four lower house elections. (p. 145) From this he concludes that the "new blood" thus imparted revitalizes the old organs. He should have noted, however, that more than half of these men were quondam, rather than new, faces and should more properly be regarded as part of the "old blood." In the discussion of the ratios of bills sponsored by individual members to those spondored by cabinets the author also fails to mention that the bulk of the former category of bills are introduced by opposition members. As a result, the reader may be left with the wrong impression that individual members of the conservative party are responsible for the introduction of a substantial proportion of the bills.

In some cases I find Thayer's arguments ambiguous and confusing because he does not explicitly define the key terms and contexts. At one point he contends, for example, that "factions are built on the struggle for power and the seat of power is the lower house" (p. 49), and that "the factions didn't produce the leaders" but "the leaders produced the factions." (p. 56) The validity of these statements depends on what is meant by "power" and "leaders." Elsewhere he argues that the close association which the business community maintains with the politicians is not censured but rather approved by most *responsible* critics. (p. 75) Considering the criticisms against such association frequently voiced in the press by various critics, the reader would be interested to know which critics are the responsible ones and which are not and why. Likewise, the author blandly states that as a rule prime ministers, assisted by the faction leaders, pick talented and capable men for cabinet posts and, as a result, "the Japanese people get as good a crop of ministers as they can expect." (p. 206) But by what standards are they deemed more or less talented or capable than others? There are also a few sweeping and unsubstantiated generalizations which may well cause some readers uneasiness. For example, the author simply declares that the Japanese have "always placed greater stress on personality in government than they have on institutions," (p. 4) or that the Japanese newspapers have consistently been "vicious in their attacks on the parties, particularly the conservative party." (p. 109) To me neither seems to be self-evident.

Much more serious from a methodological point of view, however, is the author's tendency to treat with almost unreserved confidence the opinions of his informants—many politicians and newspaper reporters and a few scholars. The extensive utilization of the information gathered by the author through conversations with these informants no doubt accounts for the extraordinarily vivid and absorbing narrative which distinguishes this book. On the other hand, his excessive and uncritical dependence on these sources seems to have seriously interfered with the author's own sound reasoning and judgment. For example, a conservative politician is quoted as saying, "In the old days, the young Dietmen used to spend all their time getting prepared for speeches in the Diet." (p. 40) Yet the author himself mentions elsewhere that many followers of the prewar factions, such as those led by Hatoyama Ichirō, used to meet regularly outside the Diet. (pp. 18–19) Another politician is quoted as saying, "Most councillors can anticipate . . . appointment to a cabinet post after their second election." (p. 52) The substance of this statement is patently wrong. A journalist's view quoted at some length to the effect that the leaders of the nation's business community have been unanimously urging the government to liberalize the flow of foreign capital into the country (p. 69) sounds only more incredible. Some of the uncritical quotations from written sources are no less damaging, as where Kōno Ichirō is quoted as stating that the powerful prewar Diet members "would not permit the existence of pressure groups" (p. 221), as if the *zaibatsu* had either been non-existent or completely devoid of political influence. I believe that such uncritical acceptance of the informants' judgments resulted in the one major flaw of this otherwise superbly written book.

These shortcomings are, however, far outweighed by the book's many obvious strengths. Most, if not all, of the broad generalizations put forward by the author are penetrating and incisive. For example, it is difficult to find fault with his judgment that "the role of the Diet as a forum for making of policy is limited," that the policy affairs research council of the conservative party plays a role far more critical than has been credited to it. (p. 236), or that as an institution occupying "a central position in Japanese politics," the support organizations (*kōenkai*) of individual politicians deserve a much more serious attention than they have hitherto received. (p. 88) In connection with this latter point the author provides a most informative description of one specific example of a conservative politician's support organization. (pp. 89ff) I would hope that this will inspire others to look more closely and systematically into the anatomy of these evasive but critically important structures. The book will hopefully encourage interest also in areas of the conservatives' rule which Thayer has, for very good reasons, left virtually untouched. One such area is the relationships between the conservative politicians on one hand and, on the other, the opposition parties, and the national and local government bureaucracies.—Haruhiro Fukui, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

Haile-Selassie's Government. By Christopher Clapham. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969, Pp. 218. $7.50.)

The government of Ethiopia is Haile-Selassie's government. Its major personnel, with certain qualifications, have been chosen by him, promoted, demoted and transferred by him. "Their" decisions, until recently, were made by him. This view of the government has been traditionally held by students of Ethiopia's politics, and it is sustained in Clapham's new book. It is the strength of this work, however, that it attempts both to document and to qualify these assumptions.

In a culture notorious for secretiveness and hostility towards foreigners, Clapham, an Englishman, was able to acquire a great deal of rather candid information from "innumerable conversations with Ethiopians in the government." From these conversations, he has put together a far more complex picture than we have previously had of the highest ranking personnel of the government, their relationships with each other, and to the Emperor, and the ways in which they have shaped, and been shaped by their institutional positions.

Clapham analyses not only individual careers and clique behavior but differences among individuals of different traditional status (noble and non-noble) and of different educational generations (no education, pre-war or post-war education). Central to this analysis of the relationships between the Emperor and those around him is its developmental emphasis. Immediately after liberation from the Italians, the government consisted almost exclusively of the non-educated, largely noble but with some infusion of those whose only claim to office was the Emperor's favor. Conflict and co-operation among these men was designed to win the Emperor's favor and the rewards of that favor: positions, wealth, and "power." Since this government had little impact on life in Ethiopia, the power to be attained was relatively slight.

Since that time the non-educated have been replaced by the educated, with those educated prior to and immediately after the war now holding the highest positions, and subsequent students manning their bureaucracies. Government activity and personnel have enormously expanded, reducing the ability of any individual to know of, or to control its activities. One consequence has been a limited decentralization of power from the Emperor to Prime Minister, Council of Ministers, the various ministries, and Parliament.

These changes are described in some detail, with occasional illustrative case studies. While such description adds much to our understanding of Ethiopian politics, and is extremely necessary, Clapham never transcends description. Thus, while he shows an obvious concern for questions of relative power, he does not attempt to spell out a concept of power. Nor does he explicitly assess or measure the distribution of power among the various participants, despite periodic references to the amount of power held by an individual or institution. "But in practice, these great powers (those of the Emperor) have constantly had to be made good by effective leadership, and enforced through military strength." "But the Emperor's effective powers have often been far less than his formal supremacy would lead one to suppose." "The strength of groups is reflected both in policies and appointments. As the nobility has declined in power, so has the number of noblemen in the government; and as the influence of modernising groups has increased, their numbers have been brought into the government, and some reforms have been granted in order to retain their support or acquiesence."

Another major weakness is the failure to assess adequately the relationship between Haile Selassie's government and the society it "rules." Clapham says, ". . . it is by no means obvious whether the undoubted changes since 1941 have gone to the foundations of the government, or whether they should be regarded, rather, as peripheral modifications, to a political system which remains basically unaltered." What he does not say, or ask, is to what extent changes in the society and economy (in particular the fairly rapid extension of elementary and secondary education) shape the answer to that question.

Finally, his methodology, "conversations with government officials," provides us with no independent check on his findings. We don't know to whom he spoke, what he asked them, or how much agreement there was among his informants. My criticisms—the lack of conceptual clarity, the failure to treat seriously government-society relationships, and a journalistic methodology—reflect my disappointment that the first major work on Ethiopian politics in twenty years is as traditional as if it had been written twenty years ago. It shows no signs that Clapham is aware of or interested in the intellectual ferment characteristic of the study of comparative politics in general and the study of African politics in particular.—ROBERT D. GREY, *Grinnell College.*

Politics and Government in Turkey. BY C. H. DODD. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1969. Pp. 320. $7.95.)

Within the compass of a modestly sized book, the author succeeds in presenting a useful interpretation of Turkish politics, particularly since 1961. The book is concerned primarily with the analysis of governmental institutions and seeks to "lay emphasis on what actually happens, in and through the political and administrative institutions that seems significant for the making and agreeing of policy and for deciding who should exercise political power." (p. vii) In order to do this, the author provides an introductory section, which is, at best, an overview. His discussion of the Ottoman legacy offers nothing very original. However, the emphasis on Ottoman efforts at political reform serves as a backdrop to later developments which are examined in much greater detail.

Particularly thin is the coverage of the impact of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the efforts at modernization and westenization in the early years of the Republic after 1923. Additional detail in this area would have greatly benefited the ensuing study of the rise of the anti-Republican movement in the 1950's and 1960's.

The lengthy section on political organization offers a thoughtful and critical analysis of the structure and functioning of the Turkish political system with very useful sketches of the parties and their positions in the overall system. The same ability is displayed in providing an excellent, though brief, indication of the role of important pressure groups. Most useful, perhaps, is part IV entitled "Administration." A valuable examination of the Turkish Civil Service is presented on pp. 223–305. This is based in part on original survey research into the socio-economic, educational, and employment backgrounds of civil servants. The results of the rigorous field approach are clearly suitable for comparative analysis which attempts to measure and explain the behavior of civil servants in more than one country. The discussion of the administrative system is somewhat weakened by the limited attention given village and rural administration in so far as these have to do with the total political scene in Turkey. Since villagers account for over 70 percent of the population and since there is currently great emphasis in Ankara's policies and plans on rural development (e.g. the Ministry of Village Affairs established in 1964), there would be a lot to gain from a more penetrating examination of the villagers as a political force and of the village as a unit of the political-administrative hierarchy. As it stands, the greater emphasis is clearly on the provincial administrative structures and their links with the central government.

Despite the wealth of information presented by the author, he does not seem to have had access to private and public documents other than those available to everyone. This could be explained by the political climate in Turkey which complicates research into political matters. Most of the documents referred to are Turkish language materials, mostly official and party publications. The author admits (p. vii) that he has relied heavily on materials available outside Turkey, mostly newspapers, though why this should have been so is not clear since he apparently spent some time in the country and, presumably, has a familiarity with the language.—ABBAS AMIRIE, *Kent State University.*

Elements of Nordic Public Law. By Nils Herlitz. (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1969, Pp. 287. Sw.ker 52.)

The first two volumes of Professor Herlitz' *Nordisk Offentlig Rätt* were noted in the March, 1959, issue of the *Review* (p. 242). They trace the history of public administration and explain the workings of the national legislatures in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The third volume of this series was described in the March, 1964, issue of the *Review* (pp. 157–158). It presents the constitutional law of the five countries. Both earlier reviews ended with the comment that "[m]uch more of Scandinavian letters and science should be made readily available to English speaking audiences, and not least Professor Herlitz' *Scandinavian Public Law.*"

While there is no evidence that this plea was directly heeded, it is gratifying to see that Professor Herlitz has used the earlier volumes as the basis for the book presently under review, particularly for the chapters on constitutions, parliaments, governments, courts, and public administration. Some new materials are added on individual rights and on Nordic integration. Out of 54 works sponsored by the Institute for Legal Research, this is the second to be published in English.

Dr. Herlitz is Professor emeritus in the law faculty at the University of Stockholm. He writes clearly, and is extremely well-grounded in his subject. His approach is historical and analytic, justaposing the salient political institutions of the four larger Nordic countries. *Elements of Nordic Public Law* provides a sound introduction to Scandinavian government. Its usefulness as a reference work is enhanced by the inclusion of a systematic survey of the literature, an index, and a glossary.

Scandinavian legal and political history is a third current in the Western stream; it cannot be classified as common law or continental, although it shares much with each. Swedish constitutional law, in particular, has a strong indigenous quality. The unique institution of Ombudsman and the principle of public assess to official documents illustrate this originality and indicate that there is much of value to be learned from the quiet northern corner of Europe.—STANELY V. ANDERSON, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION

Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems. EDITED BY JAMES N. ROSENAU. (New York: The Free Press, 1969. Pp. 352. $8.50.)

There is a widely admitted need to unite the conceptual frameworks of comparative and international politics. This collection of twelve papers attempts not to satisfy but to whet our appetites for such a union.

Rosenau's keynote essays correctly reprove the lack of communication between comparative and international studies. He underlines the importance of studying the impacts of external variables on internal politics, of internal variables on foreign policy. As a means to the amalgamation of the separated fields he then develops a major typology, his "linkage framework." The typology contains 9×6×24 cells: it distinguishes nine types of linkage between six aspects of the international environment and twenty-four features of national polities. Four of the national-polity features were selected for examination in this volume, and the authors of the empirical studies were invited to fill 9×6×4 cells with polity data. None of the cells could be filled with a simple quantitative coding of readily available data; all required a qualitative analysis, sometimes of not yet collected data.

To fill a three-dimensional block of 216 such cells on one case would have been something of an ordeal. With stoical courage, the authors agreed to attempt comparison as well: each would examine not one polity, but two, three, four, and entire region, or "underdeveloped nations" *en bloc*. These sets were selected for comparison because their members have one major resemblance, usually one extraneous to the linkage framework. Except where sets of polities belonged to one region, the authors were not usually specialist students of all their polities. These enterprising decisions multiplied at a stroke the number of data cells the authors were in principle doomed to fill. Under this burden not the authors but the cells collapsed. Instead of the nine linkages, authors took a few main ones; the six international environments were sometimes reduced to one; the four polity features were often maintained, but sometimes replaced by others. Where the number of states for comparison was few, they were studied as faithfully as the data allowed; but "Latin America" and "the underdeveloped nations" could not be treated individually, and consequently were treated as wholes or as abstract prototypes. By these expedients the authors survived, but the unity of effort did not. The authors drew back from the full magnitude of their assigned task, not in disorder, but by different roads. The tactical retreat was clearly necessary, as Rosenau points out frankly in his introduction to the volume. But as a result, achievements, rather than intentions, must be reviewed here; and, according to the authors' expressed wishes, their efforts must be treated as preliminary.

One of the essays, by William G. Fleming, begins a quantitative scrutiny of Ghanaian and Ugandan elite attitudes and transactions with foreign states. Two more, one by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner on island nations, the other by Richard L. Merritt on states whose territories are divided (by water or by intervening states), attempt to reintroduce geographic factors into the generalizations of comparative politics: they present a number of hypotheses worthy of investigation; but their factors of "insularity" and "noncontinuity" seems less salient, hence less in need of investigation, than mere location (i.e., proximity to superpowers, enemies, economically advanced or politically dynamic states, *etc.*).

Three more articles weigh external against internal impacts on foreign policy, and the other three examine external impacts on internal politics. Both attempts fulfil the main real aim of the editor, which is to persuade students of comparative politics to introduce "external" or "environmental" explanatory variables into their discussions of domestic politics, and students of foreign relations to accept "internal" variables as necessary instruments of their explanatory work.

Lloyd Jensen summarizes internal and external impacts on the defense policies of the three great states defeated in World War II, and concludes modestly and sensibly that the external environment has been critical in influencing policy, with the internal "environment" of increasing importance over time except in periods of internal political instability. Michael O'Leary offers a commentary on Morton A. Kaplan's system theory, and tries to extend that theory by further differentiating types of state-actors. O'Leary hypothesizes that, while in an unintegrated system strong and stable states will find the lack of integration of the system useful to them and will hence act to preserve it, weak and unstable states will find their weakness intensified in an unintegrated system. The latter will consequently violate customary (and system-maintaining) norms, and seek to change the system. In breaking a limited amount of new theoretical ground, O'Leary also presents some unconventional insights into the foreign policies of contemporary "less developed" states.

Ole R. Holsti and John D. Sullivan compare quantitative data on the "positive" and "negative" externally-oriented behavior, physical and verbal, of two "nonconforming alliance members," France and China. They find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that nonconforming behavior in a monolithic bloc, if successful, tends more to spill over into many issue areas than similar behavior in a pluralistic bloc. The hypothesis needs to be examined in other cases: one thinks today of Rumania and Hungary, if not also Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea, as limited non-conformists, and Cuba after 1959 as a thorough nonconformist in a pluralistic bloc.

In one of the studies of outside impacts on domestic politics, Bernard C. Cohen achieves a collection of brief and suggestive impressions of the particular impacts of the international environment on the origins, socialization, methods of struggling for power, and support groups of American politicians. In a second, R. V. Burks compares East European Communist states in 1952 and in 1968, with respect to Soviet influence in appointing leaders, making policies and setting ideologies. Since the conventional wisdom of East European specialists is here presented in more abstract terms, the essay is generally convincing; but it retains several conjectures palpably overthrown by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Finally, Douglas A. Chalmers presents a brief survey of widely admitted and long-standing external influences in Latin American society, political culture, political groups, political issues, and power structures. Chalmers experiments somewhat with his conceptual framework; his alternative typology will be more immediately helpful in persuading "traditionalist" students of comparative internal politics to give external impacts explicit attention in their explanations than will the original linkage framework. Cohen's paper, although the least finished of the three, makes the boldest departure from conventional subject matter, since external impacts on East European and Latin American politics have been more widely noted than present-day external impacts on American domestic affairs.

All nine substantive essays are clearly unfinished, and are not otherwise advertised. Cohen's essay for its subject matter, Chalmers' for its conceptual scaffolding, and O'Leary's for its theoretical interest, definitely demand and deserve further research. All the rest could be carried to their conclusion with some profit; the likely novelty, relevance, salience, and rapidity of results seem much higher for some (especially Holsti and Sullivan) than for others.

As for the broader framework, it deserves to survive and to be used, and even, as a supplementary theoretical essay by J. David Singer suggests, to be enlarged. But practice should lead to amendment. Useful ideas are given distracting labels: "output" means stimulus and "input" means response; "direct" and "indirect" are substituted for "intentional" and "unintentional;" and "fused" means "reciprocal." This terminology should be overhauled. The linkage framework itself needs to be haggled over and revised in light of some of the difficulties expressed in this volume by the authors who employed it.

Collaborative work of this sort should and will increase in future, at least in international and comparative politics. But a warning whispers from the pages of this book: the architects of elaborate conceptual frameworks must give their "masons" manageable jobs. Had the substantive authors in this book been confined to one country apiece (and that one-well-known to them), and had they been kept to the one-way impact of the external environment on one feature of (for instance) internal political leadership in that country, they would have had only 4×6 data cells each to fill. If the authors had then engaged, individually or jointly, to do explicit theoretical work (as Chalmers did) to cut down the cloth of the framework to fit the body of the case, this effort would have been less ambitious, but its results less preliminary.—DAVID WILKINSON, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Vietnam: Issues and Alternatives. EDITED BY WALTER ISARD. (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 213. $5.95.)

Unquestionably, a collection of essays on Vietnam by social scientists is of timely interest and importance. And this volume has much to recommend it by way of suggesting original and potentially workable procedures for the resolution of the Vietnam War. However, adequate treatments of certain outstanding issues inextricably associated with this conflict simply are not to be found in this volume, and this perhaps is its major failing.

This book is an edited volume of twelve papers delivered at the June 1968 Conference of the Peace Research Society (International). Essays in this volume range from studies of the South Vietnamese village to one involving conflict between the great powers. The book is enlivened at the outset by something of a debate on village authority structures in the form of two papers, one by Ithiel de Sola Pool, and the other by Samuel L. Popkin. Attitudes of the South Vietnamese are treated by Ralph K. White, and those of the American public are analyzed by John P. Robinson and Solomon G. Jacobson. A methodologically sophisticated analysis of the views of American social scientists on Vietnam is presented by Philip Brickman, Phillip Shaver, and Peter Archibald. The cold war is introduced in an essay by Robert Strausz-Hupé which suggests that a solution to Vietnam is dependent largely upon agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. A paper by David C. Schwartz takes Pool to task for not employing explanatory models of conflict behavior, now readily available to social scientists. More on this later.

The last section of the book on analytic models is by far the best. Nigel Howard applies his metagame theory in an analysis of the Vietnam War. Rather than using a classic game with its limitation of discrete moves in a single confrontation Howard develops a prisoner's dilemma metagame in which each protagonist is allowed to react to the other's choices. This approach has the virtue of allowing an overall analysis of policy interaction. However, as Thomas C. Schelling points out in his perceptive critique of Howard, the distinction between a game and metagame is of limited utility, for the game itself, if properly constructed, will include the policy options found in Howard's metagame. Further, Howard's analysis depends on the exclusion of certain alternatives at the outset which, according to Schelling, may constitute an oversimplification of the real-world situation. Despite these criticisms, and the additional lack of a strict isomorphism between Howard's treatment of Vietnam and his own theory, his analysis has a logical and intuitive appeal. By determining the sanctions and equilibrium conditions associated with various policy options, one may use the metagame to indicate the probable outcome of the conflict.

Walter Isard supplements the Howard approach by suggesting a step-wise disengagement of the contending forces, with each protagonist at each stage of the process having the power to veto a move to the next stage. Isard's procedure has the advantage of specifying quantitatively (assuming appropriate units of analysis at the outset) the maximum amount of disengagement that can occur at each move. Allan E. Goodman's identification of three alternative diplomatic-strategic options for ending the war is a useful addition to the Howard-Isard analyss.

This section and the book close with a quantitative analysis of the Vietnam War by Jeffrey S. Milstein and William C. Mitchell. Using a variety of measures pertaining to the war, the authors calculate multiple regression equations and simulation models of the conflict. When the simulations are used to forecast aspects of the conflict for later periods from earlier data, approximately 50% of the variance is "explained," which is a notable achievement. And the finding of an increase in North Vietnamese infiltration when the U.S. bombings of the North were escalated, is a contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of the conflict.

The Milstein and Mitchell analysis demonstrates an impressive power of the social scientist to predict the future course of a conflict. Yet a thorough understanding of the dynamics of this conflict relies, at least in part, on those explanatory variables which pertain to the onset of the conflict. One can ask further whether prediction without causal forms of explanation maximizes the process of scientific discovery. Astronomers as early as Ptolemy were quite successful at predicting the motion of the planets, but it was not until the explanatory models of Copernicus and Galileo that stronomy could be said to have rapidly emerged into its scientific stage.

There are other questions which this book addresses only tangentially, or not at all. First, there is a lack of articulation of normative preferences in the form of ethical or political desiderata. The ethical problems associated with the American involvement in Vietnam are not dealt with sufficiently. Nor do we find an analysis of a justification for the American presence in Vietnam either from the perspectives of international law, a presumed domino effect, or the expectation of fighting a much larger and bloodier war in the future, if not for the American presence. Pool is somewhat exceptional in that he does indicate a preference for the present South Vietnamese government, the pacification of the countryside, and the viability of both. White deserves credit for attempting to handle the tacky problem of what constitutes aggression, and using survey evidence to suggest that the pro-Vietcong South Vietnamese outnumber those who oppose the Vietcong.

A final problem of omission concerns the absence of a treatment of a possible deterioration of the American power position as a result of Vietnam. At the risk of using the review as a vehicle for the presentation of one's own research, it must be noted that the general posture of the United States with its multifarious alliance commitments and Vietnam War involvement may constitute a net power loss to this country. The exercise of power can be defined as the process of reducing uncertainty. Yet the aggregation of a large number of alliance commitments by a major power to smaller ones may constitute an increase in uncertainty. Neither events within the smaller country nor many of its interactional interactions are subject to regulation by the major power. Certain of these events or interactions may involve the smaller country in war which then, via a formal or informal alliance obligation, may include the major power as well. One can also understand a power loss to the United States from the more traditional perspectives of a weakening of internal cohesion and a possible diminution in international prestige.

This book then, contains interesting and sophisticated methods of data analysis, and more important, certain innovative procedures for conflict resolution. A significant contribution to this volume is the excellent "Introduction and Overview" by Isard. But for treatments of critical issues such as explanatory models of the conflict, normative criteria for evaluation of the American presence in Vietnam, and the effect of the War on the United States both domestically and in international affairs, the reader will have to look elsewhere.—Manus Midlarsky, *University of Colorado.*

Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970's. By Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. Pp. 421. $8.95.)

Should the United States adopt a new strategy towards conflicts that do not involve direct confrontation between the superpowers? Yes, say the authors of this book and proceed to suggest, on the basis of their analysis of past conflicts, what such a strategy might look like. Briefly, the new strategy would replace military intervention with conflict control; the objective of repelling aggression at any cost should give way to "avoiding or minimizing violence" (p. xiii); and the means used to deal with conflict would be multilateral, long-range, political and economic, rather than unilateral, short-range, and predominantly military, In view of the less than complete success of U.S. policy toward local conflicts, it is hardly surprising that a new strategy is required and the one suggested by Bloomfield and Leiss echoes, in a systematic, comprehensive and well-articulated way, many of the suggestions made by scholars and policy makers in recent years.

However, if this book were no more than an exhortation to our national security establishment to expand its horizons, it would be relatively uninteresting to political scientists. What merits our attention is the authors' theoretically ambitious effort to understand all "small wars" and to develop specific measures to prevent, control, and terminate them.

They begin by defining "conflict" as that part of any "substantive dispute" which is "regarded in military terms by one or both parties" (p. 13). The dispute is then divided into a sequence of five phases: I. Non-military, II. Pre-hostilities, III. Hostilities, V. Post-hostilities, V. Non-military, plus a final stage, settlement of the dispute. The three middle phases constitute the conflict. In each phase, the authors claim, some identifiable factors work to push the dispute into the next phase and other factors tend to retard the transition. Consequently, they assert, conflicts can be mitigated by policy measures that counteract the first set of factors and reinforce the second.

The authors identified fifty four post-World War II conflicts in the developing world. Of those they selected fourteen for intensive study and, of these, five appear in the book: the Soviet-Iranian Conflict, 1941-1947; the Bay of Pigs, 1960-1961; the Greek Insurgency, 1944-1949; the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945–1949; Conflict in the Middle East 1956–1967. Thus while some aggregate data are presented on all fourteen of the studied conflicts (chapter 3), the application and utility of the conflict model have to be judged on the basis of the five detailed case studies. Each case begins with a chronological narrative divided into the phases (and sub-phases) of the model. Next, the factors bearing on the transitions from phase to phase are listed and opposite them (literally) the possible control measures—at least one measure per factor. Then comes a section on the weapons available to each side; and finally, the control measures are summarized and those that were actually taken are indicated.

Clearly, if the book succeeds, it would contain not only an enormously useful technique for policy makers, but also a major contribution to the analysis and understanding of conflict. But how successful is the book in either of these capacities? Unfortunately, the success is at best highly speculative since the technique used seems to be based entirely on speculation.

Few will deny that one of the best ways to prepare for the future is to study the past—the only problem is how to do it. The authors call their approach "historic-analytic," but what they actually do is isolate certain historical events in time and space, impose a chronological structure on them, and then, by what can be called the "might-have-been" method, suggest measures that would have changed the course of these specific events. Such measures, they hope, will serve to alter similar events in the future. This is, of course, a well-known historiographic approach, but to make it the basis for a broad-gauged strategic policy study raises many serious methodological and substantive problems, only some of which can be briefly stated here.

First, there is the matter of selecting the events to examine. In this project the following criteria were used: (1) local conflicts, (2) outside Europe (with one exception), (3) since World War II, (4) in which armed forces of the Soviet Union and of the United States were not *both* directly involved and (5) which involved a serious threat or violence or actual violence. (p. 44) The fifty-four conflicts that form this class are then further reduced to fourteen on the basis of such additional criteria as conventional and unconventional warfare; internal, interstate and colonial conflicts; superpower involvement; degree of controllability; and geographic distribution. It is not made clear what further criteria were used to select the five cases actually presented. The point is that once so many characterstics are introduced it becomes impossible to say what the cases in the book exemplify, and whether the analyses, findings and especially recommended control measures can be applied to any other conflict or set of conflicts.

Next, the process of isolating the conflicts in time, i.e., self-consciously choosing rather arbitrary beginning and end points, leads to several unfortunate consequences. The most important of these is the focusing of almost all the attention on the hostilities phase of the authors' model. Even the narratives of the events emphasize the military aspects of the conflicts, as does, of course, the section on weapons. There would perhaps be no harm in this if the authors' purpose were to offer a strategy for *winning* small wars, but their avowed goal is to suggest ways of preventing or controlling such conflicts. Consequently there exists a conceptual gap between the narrative and the list of relevant factors and control measures in each case, since the factors, and especially the measures, refer most often to non-military, long-range problems and solutions which could not possibly be handled within the time period of the conflict.

Perhaps the major methodological difficulty one has with this book, for it goes to the heart of the approach, concerns the definition and identification of "factors" and "measures." A factor is defined as a condition, perception or event that generates pressure either toward or away from violence. (p. 13) Control measures are actions that offset the first type of factor and reinforce the second (p. 30). With definitions as loose as these it becomes very hard to classify the factors or the measures and so, even though the authors have set up some rudimentary categories of factors (e.g. degree of commitment, autonomy of action, internal cohesion, etc., pp. 25–28) and of measures (e.g. international organization, external-political, military and strategic, etc., p. 36), they do not make any serious attempt to apply these to the individual cases. The result is that factors vary so greatly and seem so arbitrarily classified that it is at times difficult to tell whether a particular factor tends to increase or decrease hostilities—the author's primary concern. When measures are then selected, their number "limited only by the imagination of the authors" (p. 30), to correspond to each factor, the confusion is simply compounded. Space will not permit an extensive sampling of specific factors and measures but the following might convey the kind of difficulties encountered:

Among the factors tending to promote the outbreak of hostilities in the Soviet-Iranian Conflict the authors list the tribal divisions in Iran, notably in the Soviet-occupied area. The relevant control measure suggested is strengthening Iran internally both politically and militarily. Another factor is the proximity and overwhelming power of the USSR vis-à-vis Iran. The relevant measure: renunciation of the concept of spheres of influence (pp. 76–79). In the case of the Greek Insurgency a hostilities promoting factor is the unchallenged control by ELAS (the insurgent army) of almost all of Greece after the German withdrawal. As appropriate control measure the authors suggest the immediate introduction of a massive counter-force of Greek government, friendly ally, or neutral troops (pp. 150–151). In the Indonesian War of Independence a factor is the hostility of Dutch internees and prisoners of war toward the Indonesian Republic, and the control measure is isolating them and denying them access to arms.

While an attempt is made to summarize and gneralize the proposed control measures for each case, it remains evident that the variations in level of generality, the prevalence of contradictory and self-defeating measures, and the disconnected nature of the analysis make this a most problematic technique. No wonder then that according to the authors' calculations only 18% of the measures they propose were actually applied.

Finally it should be noted that the book is based on certain ideological assumptions that deserve to be examined. One is the notion that all conflicts in the non-European world involving violence, regardless of whether they are internal or interstate, are undesirable, and should be avoided or at least controlled and halted as soon as possible. Another is the idea that the superpowers, especially the United States, have a major role in this process. The first assumption is certainly not shared by important elements in the developing countries and the second is no longer universally held, even in the American national security community. I therefore doubt very much that a successful strategy for the 1970's can be forged by following the recommendations of Bloomfield and Leiss. At best they might have served as useful tactics in the 1960's.—P. G. BOCK, *City University of New York, Brooklyn College.*

The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose. BY GABRIEL KOLKO. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969. Pp. 166. $5.95/$1.95.)

With the publication of this concise volume and the more narrowly focused *Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945* (New York: Random House, 1969), Professor Kolko joins David Horowitz, Harry Magdoff, J. P. Morray, Robert F. Smith and W. A. Williams as authors of first rate empirically-oriented radical scholarship on U.S. Foregin Policy.

In *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* Kolko evidences little concern for the pluralistic interaction which influences foreign policy decision-making. Thus, the author ignores conflicts over the efficacy or priority of alternative instrumentalities (e.g. allocating limited funds to either leader grants or MAP training). He is similarly disinterested in what I would term non-systemic goals such as whether we should lower tariffs on French automobiles in exchange for a reciprocal reduction for American computers. For political scientists who regard decisions on these or analogous issues to be the "important" ones, Kolko's work has little to contribute.

He is preoccupied with one *assumed* post-World War II foreign relations pattern: U.S. opposition to economic nationalism and socialism in the "Third World." Since his primary objective is a causal explanation of this pattern, it may be gratuitous to criticize him for failing to demonstrate that such a pattern of response exists. Impressionistically the reviewer believes that this can be done and has been in a limited way by David Horowitz in his *The Free World Colossus* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1965). But there is no reference to this or similar works in the index or copious notes to each chapter. And the volume under review also lacks even a selected bibliography.

Kolko endeavors to explain America's counterrevolutionary imperative by elaborating upon an unoriginal Marxian thesis: that capitalists in this country desire investment opportunities in underdeveloped areas both for direct profits and in order to secure vital raw materials upon "reasonable" terms (i.e. at the lowest possible price). His exposition is extremely well written and appropriate statements by government and corporate officials are cited along with relevant statistical data. When considered in conjunction with the systematic quantitative analysis by Harry Magdoff in his recent *Age of Imperialism: The Economics* of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), a fairly convincing case can be made for this view. Kolko may be faulted, however, for failing to *adequately* distinguish the forementioned investor goals from other economic objectives which would *not necessitate* counterrevolutionary intervention. Unlike Magdoff, he also fails to demonstrate the dependence of the American economic system upon the appropriation of surplus from underdeveloped areas.

How are these investment goals translated into an unquestioned policy consensus? Following the fashion of the past decade, the author assumes that because most policy initiatives have originated in the Executive that preponderant governmental power is also vested in that branch. He then infers a linkage between the career patterns of those who initiate policy and the foreign investment objectives which incur the hostility of nationalists and socialists in Vietnam and throughout the "Third World." After summarizing several studies indicating disproportionate upper class representation among high Executive policy makers, Kolko provides us with the results of his own research on top officials "in the State, Defense, or War, Treasury and Commerce Departments, plus certain relevant executive level agencies." Included were:

> 234 individuals with all their positions in government during 1944–60, comprising the lesser posts if an individual attained the highest executive level. As a total, these key leaders held 678 posts and nearly all of them were high level and policy-making.
>
> In the aggregate, men who came from big business, investment, and law held 59.6 percent of the posts, with only forty-five of them filling 32.4 percent of all posts.

According to the author, this pattern of elite recruitment has remained stable since the New Deal era. As for officials from more humble origins, Kolko suggests that cooptation and exclusion operate to maintain consensus.

> Should high status, rich men ever seek to make decisions dysfunctional to the more permanent interests of dominant power interests, even more powerful leaders would immediately purge them from decision-making roles. The point is that while such men are unlikely to make socially dysfunctional decisions so is anyone else who rises to the top of a structure with predetermined rules and functions.
>
> Even if not initially connected with the corporate sector, career government officials relate in some tangible manner with the private worlds predominantly of big law, big finance, and big business.

In concentrating almost exclusively upon the Executive, the author ignores the veto power of Congress. His analysis would have been strengthened had he examined the dependency of many Congressmen upon the corporate-owning upper class. And this would have reinforced his conclusion that there is no "military industrial complex." Criticizing C. Wright Mills' view that "the military" are a co-equal constituent of "the power elite, Professor Kolko convincingly documents the civilian origins of "our vital strategic assumptions."

For a variety of reasons including the almost universal dissemination of capitalist and anti-Communist values by the mass media and educational institutions, "public opinion" fails to exert any oppositional influence upon the implementation of major foreign policy imperatives. This consensus, in turn, is ultimately secured through "enforced conformity, as expressed often in this century in the . . . suppression of civil liberties."

The determined pursuit of these investment and expansionist economic goals and an uncritical acceptance of "the domino theory" are held to explain our commitment to stability and our inability to "lose face" in Vietnam for "(f)rom a purely economic viewpoint, the United States cannot maintain its existing vital dominating relationship to much of the Third World unless it can keep poor nations from moving too far toward the Left and the Cuban or Vietnamese path." Vietnam is primarily a "holding the line" buffer or protective zone.

Despite the shortcomings mentioned earlier, the book is well-written, relies upon official sources for much of its documentation, avoids redundance and is marked by very few over-simplifications. A thought-provoking introductory work for students of American Foreign Policy that would make an excellent companion for such works as John Spanier's *American Foreign Policy Since World War II.*—MILES D. WOLPIN, *Marlboro College.*

Betrayal from Within: Joseph Avenol, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, 1933–1940. BY JAMES BARROS. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969. Pp. 285. $10.00.)

In this volume written under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, James Barros seeks to trace the political machinations of Joseph Avenol, second Secretary-General of the League of Nations. Seven chapters of detailed and copiously documented historical study are followed by a brief essay in which the author reflects upon the political role of the international secretariat.

Barros commences with a review of the subjective forces which carried Avenol to the office of Secretary-General despite the contrary counsel of his predecessor. The succession of Harold B. Butler to the directorship of the International Labor Organization upon the death of Albert Thomas required that a French national succeed Sir Eric Drummond as the League's Secretary-General. Political accommodations among Britain, France, Germany and Italy resulted in the promotion of M. Avenol from the post of Deputy Secretary-General. But to his position Avenol brought a markedly conservative political orientation, intense anti-communism and a continental outlook, all of which prompted him increasingly to subserve the League to Italian and German policies, and to foresee a post-war Europe dominated by Germany. All of these impeded his capacity to serve the organization and its members objectively. In contrast, he used the power of his office to intrigue with the Italian Government, both directly and through Italian nationals within the Secretariat, on averting and/or reversing League action with respect to the Ethiopian conflict. On occasion he knowingly participated in Italian strategy-formulation, and exhausted procedural devices for reducing Haile Selassie's recourse to the League. He used his personal diplomacy to depoliticize the organization, and to turn its attention wholly to technical matters in order that the German Government might find it an acceptable agent of post-war European functionalism. He willingly acquiesced in the wish of the Vichy Government that he resign his post as a symbol of the diminished importance of the League in the policy of France's pro-fascist regime. He bowed to Japanese pressures to remove from China Dr. Ludwig Rajchman, Director of the Secretariat's Health Section, and generally displayed an anti-Chinese outlook. He attempted to thwart Spanish attempts to demonstrate through the League that Franco's forces were supported by Germany, Italy and Portugal.

Throughout this exposition Barros portrays Avenol as "something of a chameleon," as a man who "lacked political awareness," and who was capable of using his high office for purposes of "eroding the Ethiopian position" in order to serve the interests of Italy. Avenol is presented as a public servant whose personal theorizing and political learnings impelled him to deal in half-truths with vitally interested parties. Toward the end of his service he showed "neurasthenic" signs, frequently losing control of his emotions, fearing kidnap, suffering episodes of ill temper, and concealing his intentions, even from those closest to him, for reason of distrust.

Professor Barros' book is of high, if somewhat inconsistent, quality. Its greatest strength appears to reside in the extensive use of archival sources which, in many instances, permit the author to substantiate his conclusions by multiple evidence. Yet some segments of his treatment stand out in terms of both clarity and depth. This is especially true of the author's examination of Avenol's handling of the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, owing perhaps to his continuing interest in Mussolini's relations with the League. (*The Corfu Incident of 1923: Mussolini and the League of Nations,* Princeton, 1965. Reviewed in this *Review,* vol. 60, pp. 455–456) The two chapters devoted to this issue, and the frequent reference to it elsewhere, are characterized by exhaustive research, meticulous documentation, and cautious wedding of conclusions to evidence. On no other issue is Avenol's chicanery portrayed so persuasively.

There appear, however, two major defects in the book. In the author's careful exposure of Avenol's ideological motives, other causal factors in his behavior are often insufficiently revealed. Barros notes, for example, that the Secretary-General's actions were occasionally contrived to prevent the alienation of the Axis powers from the League and, later to avoid eradicating the possibility of enticing those states to resume participation. So, too, does he note that Avenol's diplomacy with the Duce prior to 1939 was founded in part upon the hope of maintaining the Stresa front. Whatever may have been the role of these thoughts in Avenol's over-all behavior is not examined with the scholarly thoroughness given to the study of the Secretary-General's political dispositions. Thus the reader's hope is not entirely fulfilled that Barros might have separated popular perceptions of Avenol's behavior from historically demonstrable fact.

While the book offers no main conclusions, the author spends the final pages examining the "Implications for the Office of Secretary-General." His observations, while continuously relevant to an organizing world, and while realistic with respect to the political restraints upon the international secretariat, are neither profound nor original. It is the reviewer's assessment that this closing essay lends little service to a study which is distinguished in other aspects. It does not, however, diminish the considerable value of Professor Barros's book as historical evidence of the dangers implicit in the presumed political immunity of the international secretariat. Nor does it minimize the author's success in his declared intention of presenting a segmental biography of one of the most controversial actors of the interwar years.—WALTER S. JONES, JR., *Northeastern University*

Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. BY DEAN ACHESON. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969. Pp. 798. $12.50.)

In a statesman's memoirs we look for new light on old subjects and new insights into the behavior of the man himself. In these regards former Secretary of State Dean Acheson's latest memoir, *Present at the Creation,* does not disappoint us.

It represents a meticulous reconstruction of the forces which beat down upon the decision-makers as they sought to find solutions not only to the problems of American security but to the Chinese civil war, the Palestine question, Europe, the Cold War, the atomic bomb, Germany, and Asia. As such it constitutes the most powerful explanation of the "cold war" so far presented by one of those who had to wage it on the American side. It emphasizes the force of events and the limitations of choice dictating American strategy and diplomacy.

No review can do justice to the detail with which Acheson documents the motives of American foreign policy makers, but the thesis which emerges is straightforward and compelling. The world which America confronted at the war's end and for some time afterward was one of appalling dislocation and despair. Most of the assumptions upon which even the realists in the American government had based their thinking quickly proved illusory. Whether the United Nations and other elements of Rooseveltian diplomacy ever had any basis in reality, the inability of Russia and America to get along quickly dispelled any immediate hope in that direction. Under the circumstances the U.S. had to forge a new role in world affairs. Given the choice between doing nothing or risking bad relations with the Russians, Acheson much preferred the latter. Sooner or later it would come to that anyway under circumstances disadvantageous and potentially dangerous to the United States; common sense dictated that it come about under circumstances favorable to the West. In these situations there is no substitute for power; it has both a prophylactic and, in its economic form, a therapeutic value. The other side respects it too. From this premise flowed the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, Point IV and the American response to the aggression in Korea.

Revisionists won't agree with Acheson's statement of the case but in order to demonstrate otherwise they will have to show more than economic causation; they will have to show that there were really other major alternatives than those which the statesmen adopted. In the end the worst was averted and despite the explosive potential of the Chinese civil war, the Berlin Blockade and the Korean aggression, war with Russia was carefully avoided leading on to a better day.

A great deal of the narrative is devoted to the details of persuasion and mediation to which anyone who sets out to rebuild a world must submit if the enterprise is to be successful. These details are important both to an understanding of the motives and modus operandi of Acheson's diplomacy as well as that of his opposite numbers. It does no good to citicize Acheson for over-militarizing NATO if we ignore the fact that our allies after the Korean invasion insisted upon an American military built-up in Europe.

In dealing with allies and other third powers the strength of Acheson's non-ideological and essentially strategic view of the world was a powerful asset enabling him to reassure and mobilize them in support of is objectives. The world wanted U.S. succor but it did not want war. Acheson's diplomacy of building "situations of strength" without waging an anti-Communist crusade was very appealing to Europeans who wanted to be defended not "liberated" again.

Only toward the end of the memoir where he describes his efforts to secure adoption of EDC and German rearmament do we sense that his emphasis upon military build-up is overstraining the political possibilities of the situation. It is also apparent that his preoccupation with the European situation may have led him into commitments to the French in Indochina for instance which he sensed were inherently unwise and unproductive.

Where Acheson was convinced that American power was likely to prove inefficacious or where the use of military power per se was inappropriate he was perfectly prepared to cut America's losses.

America's retreat from China was the logical culmination of a half century of fumbling, uncertainty, and half-hearted efforts to make China a great power. It was never in the cards and Acheson had the strategic sense to recognize that the revolution sweeping Chiang away was to big to be contained by the U.S.

Much has been made of Acheson's failure to include South Korea within the so-called American defense perimeter in Asia. Whether that invited the attack or not it was clearly the other side that made the decision to aggress. Where the fatal decision is ours we too often pass it off as an unintended consequence. Acheson has the candor to admit that the advance to the Yalu was a misconceived policy and near fatal error of judgment on our part.

Acheson makes clear that having made one mistake he did not intend to compound it by letting MacArthur pull the Administration into a war with Red China. Such a war was neither strategically necessary nor wise politically, and it is to Acheson's credit that he never wavered in his wisdom that such a war would be an unnecessary piece of insanity. Temporizing with the Chinese undoubtedly cost the lives of young Americans, but America at least maintained its equilibrium and the support of its allies.

At home Acheson's strategic and diplomatic policies were the center of raging controversy. The controversy was fed by a two fold psychic crisis: that of the isolationists led by Robert Taft who profoundly and sincerely opposed the course of world-wide involvement on which Truman and Acheson were leading the country. The other center of psychic crisis, the American obsession with anti-communism, was finally tapped in the spring of 1950 by Senator Joseph McCarthy.

They came together in a convulsive movement of national madness when "Taft, who had first regarded McCarthy as reckless, now decided to give him Republican backing." Acheson accepts the thesis advanced both by Earl Latham in "Communism in Washington" and William S. White, Taft's biographer, that Taft was prompted by the Republican defeat in 1948 to believe that anything "to defeat or discredit the Truman plans was acceptable" up to and including impeachment of the President.

Because of his own stoic acceptance of the vicissitudes of politics and of human nature, especially in its collective manifestations, Acheson does little more than record the more irrational forms which American behavior took during his tenure in office. But can we assume that such forces have *not* over time done more to pervert and misguide American foreign policy than Acheson lets on. International politics is not an inherently humanistic enterprise; therefore all the more reason to be sensitive to the potential for both good and evil of the American colossus. There is no guarantee that foreign policy will always be in the hands of a man as responsible as Dean Acheson.

What overall sense of American policy emerges from Acheson's voluminous and exciting narrative? The impression is that of American power, at first haltingly and then with considerable sweep and assurance, moving onto the world scene.

Under Acheson's stewardship it was less a matter of opposing the Communists, although that was an ingredient, than in giving an order to the non-Communist world shattered by two wars and the collapse of the great empires. It is the steady assertion of national power tempered by a sober awareness that a war that Russia would not do and that the U.S. must not let itself be bogged down in a hopeless war on the Asian mainland that distinguished Acheson's statecraft. Commitments were closely tailored to Amercian economic interest and to a strategic rather than either an idealistic or an anti-Communist view of the world.—DAVID S MCLELLAN, *University of California, Riverside.*

The United Nations Economic and Social Council. BY WALTER R. SHARP. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Pp. 322. $8.75.)

Peace and prosperity are the major purposes of the United Nations. Since the Charter entered into force, however, more than 100 conflicts have occurred with no end in sight. Perhaps this should not be too surprising. A reading of the recent record of the different organs of the U.N. shows a 1969 Assembly session not seized of such issues as

Vietnam, Nigeria and Czechoslovakia; a Security Council primarily concerned with the adoption of biased Middle Eastern resolutions and composed of members which includes those who sanction, if not encourage, aerial piracy; a Secretariat whose principal officer still maintains that his premature withdrawal of UNEF was the most correct decision he has ever made; and an International Court which delivers judgments and renders advisory opinions which are exercises in futility.

If the maintenance of peace had so far eluded the Organization has the promotion of the economic and social advancement of the peoples of the world fared differently? A fair response necessitates an analysis of the Economic and Social Council, one of the major bodies concerned with the latter objective, and this is the purpose of the study under review. To accomplish his goal, the author engaged in personal interviews and first-hand observations of two sessions of the Council spaced over a period of four years. The resulting ten chapters detail the past and include a number of controversial suggestions for the future.

Occasionally, the book makes tedious reading, due basically to the nature of the materials. Dr. Sharp nonetheless focuses on the issue with keen insight and, at the same time, relates a variety of revealing episodes. To be sure, the strong criticism which he directs at the members of the Council and in particular at their representatives is at first cautiously worded, but this modest approach is soon abandoned. The final chapter notes that ECOSOC is in need of "better men," a deficiency from which other U.N. organs suffer as well. The "so-called" general debate is regarded as a waste of time made worse by the fact that similar propaganda maneuvers occur in several committees, a comment then somewhat modified by describing the discussion as not without "any value"; it has a "certain educational utility"! Yet even on specifics, such as program priorities, no meaningful pattern exists and attempts at program coordination have at times resulted in such interagency rivalry that, as the Water Resources Development Center shows, they have had to be abandoned, although not all of these endeavors have met the same fate was witnessed by the Lower Mekong River Project.

Time and time again, however, Dr. Sharp returns to the thesis that the influx of Afro-Asian states in the early 60s placed the Council in the doldrums and that its enlargement in 1965 staffed it with unqualified and incompetent representatives. Not only are such organs as CPC and the Joint Inspection Unit regarded as inadequate for their tasks, but the most severe indictment is reserved for the decisions to establish UNCTAD, UNIDO and UNCDF which, together with the changing context of Assembly-Council relations, seriously undermined and eroded the functions of the Council. And while Professor Sharp concludes that the developing countries now consider the Council, which they had previously viewed as an imperialist tool and which they sought to destroy, with more kindness and operational utility for their purposes, 1968 still found ECOSOC uncertain about its revitalization.

Therefore, several substantive and procedural suggestions are set forth, proposals which cannot fail but evoke considerable fruit for thought. Two basic functions are envisaged for the future: first, long range resource allocation and expansion; second, program appraisal and evaluation. These roles call for certain prerequisites which in light of past performances are not, if Dr. Sharp's own presentation is employed as a guide, readily, if indeed at all, attainable. Appointment of a Senior Under-Secretary-General or Deputy-Secretary-General for Development Affairs is the most important procedural change which is advocated. Named by the Secretary-General after consultation with other consultation with other members of ACC and subject to confirmation by ECOSOC, he would chair the Council, especially in terms of managing its procedures in a more expeditious manner, and serve as an overseer of U.S. development policy. Other plans favor a stream-lined agenda, reduction of the volumes of documents, modification of the committee structure of the Assembly and Council, shorter and more frequent Council sessions, stronger staff support, and a more rational relationship between the Council and the Assembly, including removal from the Council of questions on Human Rights and the Status of Women. Here it might be added that for the last seven years the issue of human rights has formed a separate chapter in the Annual Report of the Secretary-General, but the suggestion overlooks instruments such as the proposed International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which assign specific functions to ECOSOC.

In sum, the book suffers from certain structural defects and several errors of commission and omission. Illustrative of these are the description of the 18th annual meeting as the voteless session of the Assembly, and failure to note that the General Assembly in 1963 approved a provisional measure to enable nine additional members to take part in the work of ECOSC until the Charter amendment enlarging the Council had come into operation. Also, that the effective participation of the nine in the three sessional committees caused Ambassador Stevenson to testify favorably on the amendment before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, even though the U.S. delegation had abstained on the Assembly resolution adopting the change. But these negative aspects are minor in comparison to the book's value. Indeed, Professor Sharp deserves congratulations for presenting such a thorough study of a highly technical subject and for submitting a challenging course of action. Surely, this volume should be read by all interested in the field and should be placed in every course syllabus on international organization. This reviewer has already done so.—GUENTER WEISSBERG, *Colby College.*

Japanese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union. BY DONALD C. HELLMANN. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 202. $5.00.)

The author uses the two-year negotiations (1954–1956) for a peace agreement with the Soviet Union as a case study to illuminate the "crucial features of the new Japanese political system" as they operated in foreign policy decision-making. The approach is avowedly "simplified" and "interpretive," based upon analysis of the role of public opinion, the political party system, and those formal governmental institutions responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. Hellmann recognizes that the Soviet negotiations were unique in some respects, but endeavors to show that fundamental features of the political process than emerging were products of "modernized-traditional" phenomena which have significant implications for Japanese and world politics.

The most important contribution of this brief study rests on its detailed analysis of the process of decision-making within the dominant Liberal-Democratic Party. Political maneuvering was characterized by the operation of four types of "modified traditional behavior," as distinctive features of Japanese politics: personality-centered factions *(habatsu)*; a "Confucian" sense of responsibility; consensual authority; and a new type of political leader—the "real power man" (*jitsuryokusha*): "comparatively young, having access to political funds, and openly maneuvering for positions of influence as a leader."

The major component of this process was the *habatsu,* within which the issues of policy were considered primarily in terms of advancing the party position of the *habatsu* leaders rather than on their own substantive merits. The conclusion is made that this factional conflict is likely to remain as the important determinant in all major foreign policies as along as the LDP remains a strong majority.

Significantly, because of the "closed aspect" of policy-making, no meaningful foreign policy debate ensued between the government, the Diet and the public. The formal institutions responsible for foreign affairs played only a subordinate role. The author makes a good case for his conclusion that the Japanese public was "poorly informed," had a "very superficial understanding of the issues," and consequently played a "rather peripheral role" in the policy-formulation process. Even more significant is his finding that the major business interests, despite their "special channels for access" and position as the "main supporting interest group," failed to have any great influence on party decision-making. Because of the peculiar relationship existing between these interests and the LDP, it is estimated that business influence "is likely to continue to be limited" on "major Japanese foreign policy decisions." The author views this closed aspect of decision-making, "largely limited to a party elite," as a potential threat to the democratic process in Japanese politics:

> Unless modification occurs through broadening the channels of communication and access, each major foreign policy decision will become a potential crisis in which not only policy but the viability of the system itself is called into question.

Those concerned with the forthcoming negotiations between Japan and the United States over Okinawa and the Security Treaty might well pay particular heed to the domestic components of Japanese foreign policy formulation. The author presents a useful reminder in the gesture of Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, during the Soviet negotiations which "ostensibly designed to strengthen Japan's position . . . became another unsettling element in already confused circumstances."

The reader is provided with only a brief account of the peace negotiations per se, plus an appendix containing the Joint Declaration signed on 19 October 1956. Most of the research was completed during an eighteen month's stay in Tokyo, where interviews with party leaders and the Japanese plenipotentiary, Matsumoto Shunichi, plus access to Japanese official documents and periodicals, provided over one-half of the sources utilized for the study. Each chapter is carefully footnoted with interpretive and comparative comment. The extensive bibliography reveals the paucity of material published in English that could be useful for sophisticated political analysis. It is to be hoped that future scholars, grounded in both the culture and language of Japan, will fill this void in American understanding of the leading democratic state in the Far East.—C. LEONARD HOAG, *Middlebury College.*

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 8–12, 1970, at the Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, California.

1970 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1970–71

The 1970 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 8–12 at the Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, California.

At the Annual Business Meeting of the Association (the particular session will be announced in *P.S.* for Summer, 1970 and in the Final Program) the Nominating Committee will propose a slate of officers for 1970–71. The Committee is composed of three members appointed by President David Easton: Frederic N. Cleaveland, University of North Carolina; Duncan MacRae, University of Chicago; and Sheldon S. Wolin, University of California, Berkeley; and three members appointed by President Karl W. Deutsch: Professor Hayward R. Alker, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Professor John C. Wahlke, University of Iowa; and Professor J. David Singer, University of Michigan, Chairman. The Nominating Committee will propose the following officers for 1970–71:

President Elect:	Heinz Eulau, Stanford University
Vice President:	Edward Banfield, Harvard University
	John A. Davis, City University of New York
	David Spitz, Hunter College
Secretary:	Thomas R. Dye, Florida State University
Treasurer:	Donald R. Matthews, Brookings Institution
Council:	Chadwick F. Alger, Northwestern University
	Philip E. Converse, University of Michigan
	Tobe Johnson, Morehouse College
	David Kettler, Purdue University
	Joyce M. Mitchell, University of Oregon
	James W. Prothro, University of North Carolina
	Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia University
	Gordon Tullock, Virginia Polytechnic Institute

FINAL REPORT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE ON ITS PROCEDURES, CRITERIA, AND RESULTING SLATE FOR 1970–71

1. Establishment of the Committee

   Three members (Cleaveland, Wolin, MacRae) were carried over from previous year, and the three new members (Wahlke, Alker, and Singer) were appointed by the President on 15 December 1969.

2. Procedures Prior to Meeting of Committee

   The first step was gathering of background information: a) constitutional constraints and precedents; b) prior decisional procedures; c) administrative and budgetary arrangements; d) list of all previous officers since 1959; e) discussion of procedures and general situation with Committee members.

With the background information in, and basic ground rules identified, we began the solicitation of suggestions from the membership of the Association. In addition to the standard announcements in the *Review* and in *P.S.*, we wrote letters asking not only for specific names of potential nominees but for suggestions regarding criteria to be applied in selecting nominees, to each of the following:

Chairmen of Political Science Departments, for dissemination
Former Presidents and Vice Presidents (past decade)
Officers of various ad hoc and caucus groups
Those who had written on matters of governance in *P.S.* since its inception

These letters went out in mid-February, and during the month that followed we received about forty separate letters of suggestion and about ten telephoned suggestions. Most of the responses merely proposed specific names, but a few also dealt with criteria and procedures.

While awaiting replies to the above inquiries, the Committee members were engaged in more personal solicitations within their several departments, regions, and circles of acquaintances. In addition, we perused back issues of the *Review,* old programs, bibliographies, etc. to compile additional lists of possible candidates.

3. Meeting of the Committee

The face to face meeting of the Committee was scheduled for the weekend of 14–15 March in Denver, and the one member who was definitely unable to attend conferred at length with the Chairman by phone on two occasions prior to the meeting. One other member fell ill just before the meeting, but he was consulted via two phone conversations during the meeting. The four remaining members convened on Saturday morning, worked through the late evening, and met until noon on Sunday.

The meeting was in two distinct parts. The first morning was devoted to a clarification of the background factors, constitutional constraints, precedents, and selection criteria. At that session, we settled on the following criteria. First, it was agreed that the dominant consideration, as in the past, would be that of intellectual excellence—a slate of scholars who would represent the best in our discipline, in terms of creativity, energy, and scientific competence. Second, we recognized the need for people who—charged with the governance of the Association—could be effective and responsible officers, and best serve the membership and the community at large.

At the same time, we realized that other factors might also be important. On matters scientific, we wanted to take cognizance of such differences as the inductive-deductive, normative-empirical, traditional-behavioral, macro-micro, basic-applied, and related issues. And on matters of public policy, we wanted to take account not only of the diverse views within the discipline but of the variety of attitudes toward the Association's role in such matters. Next, there were the emerging caucus and interest groups, and a belief that their several views should find expression in the discipline's decision making bodies. Finally, recognizing that a scholar's outlook and needs may be partially a function of the type, size, location, and mission of the institution in which he works, we thought it wise to seek some balance among such institutions.

While the need for a representative slate of officers was readily accepted, we explicitly rejected any notion of allocating seats or slots to specific groupings or viewpoints. The intention was to offer a list of nominees which would demonstrate our sensitivity to the issues of the moment, represent the best traditions of the discipline, and be able to govern wisely and effectively.

In this preliminary discussion, three issues of a procedural-constitutional issue were taken up, and while the Committee as a whole makes no formal recommendations, its chairman and individual members have communicated informally with the Constitutional Revision and Procedures Committees. These were: the multiple slate idea, the eligibility of Nominating Committee members for nomination, and the implications of a nominee's withdrawal.

Having reached tentative agreements on the above, but recognizing that they would come in for further discussion when we turned to our specific mission, we devoted the balance of the two days to the consideration of specific candidates. Eventually, we arrived—via a combination of majority vote and informal consensus—at agreed choices for all positions and for one or more alternates in the event that any potential nominee declined the invitation. But in accord with our rejection of the principle of standard seats, we developed a complex contingency plan, rather than assigning alternates to specific slots. With this tentative list of candidates and alternates drawn up, we adjourned at noon on Sunday.

4. Post-Meeting Procedures

Following the precedent of previous years, we agreed that the Chairman would contact our choice for President-elect and that the national office staff would initially contact most of the other potential nominees. At the end of one week, a large fraction of the nominees had been contacted, and had accepted our invitation to stand for office.

But given the diversity of views within the Association, the vigor with which they are held, and the consequent possibility of contending slates, not all of our nominees were able to accept immediately. Several of them requested time to consider the matter or to consult with colleagues, and while we reiterated our position that no faction or group would be permitted to designate its own candidate (or veto those selected by us) we could not object to their consulting with groups of like-minded political scientists. Needless to say the Chairman spent a good many hours in conversation with several of the potential candidates, explaining and justifying the emerging slate, and urging the importance of seeking reform within the framework of the Association. Even though several designees ultimately declined our invitation, these conversations offered an opportunity for the sorts of lively discussion and exchange of viewpoints which are essential to a responsible and democratic governance of the profession.

5. Recommendations

Having weighed all of the above considerations, taken account of the diverse views and affiliations of the membership, and consulted widely within the discipline, we propose the slate of candidates for 1970–71 listed in the boxed announcement on page 678.

NOTICE

RESOLUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AT THE ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

In accordance with the Constitution of the American Political Science Association, the attention of members of the Association is hereby directed to the provisions of the Constitution that:

"All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting." (Article VIII)

Article IX: Amendments

"1. Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed by the Council or by fifty (50) members of the Association. The Council shall transmit all proposed amendments to the next Annual Business Meeting and may make recommendations on those amendments originating outside the Council.

"2. The Council shall have any proposed amendment printed in an official publication of the Association prior to the next Annual Business Meeting. The Council shall then place the proposed amendment on the agenda of that Business Meeting. The Business Meeting may accept or reject the proposed amendment with or without further amendments to it Within thirty (30) days the Executive Director shall submit amendments supported by at least forty percent of those members present and voting at the Annual Business Meeting to the entire membership for vote by mail ballot. Ballots must be returned within thirty (30) days to be counted. A proposed amendment shall be ratified if approved by a majority of those voting. An amendment shall take effect immediately upon ratification unless the amendment itself provides otherwise."

The Council of the Association will meet during the morning and afternoon of Monday, September 7, and during the morning of Tuesday, September 8. The room will be announced in the Final Program.

The Constitution of the Association, as amended by the 1969 Annual Business Meeting, is printed in the Fall, 1969 issue of *P.S.*, pp. 672–674.

PROGRAM FOR THE 1971 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

The 67th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association will be held at the Conrad Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, September 7–11, 1971. The Program Committee is listed below. The members of the Committee and the Program Chairman welcome suggestions from members of the profession on specific papers, specific panels, or on the general structure of the program. We would be happy to have ideas for innovation; we would be happy to be reminded of traditions we have slighted. If you have suggestions or comments on the program, please communicate to one more of those listed below. It is important to have these communications early. More definite plans for the meetings will be taking shape in the fall.

Program Chairman: Sidney Verba, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago

I. Research Areas (Note: in designating the research areas, no distinction is made between American politics and comparative politics. Panels will deal with either or both):

A. Political Belief Systems and their Formation
Denis Sullivan, Department of Government, Dartmouth College
B. Technology and Politics
Todd La Porte, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley
C. New Modes of Policy Analysis
Patrick Crecine, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan
D. Law and Social Change
Herbert Jacob, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University
E. Conflicts, Groups and Party Alignments
David Kovenock, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina
F. Urban Politics
Joel Aberbach, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan
G. Art as Politics
Claire Rosenfield, Department of English, Brown University
H. International Relations and Organization
Joseph Nye, Department of Government, Harvard University
I. Political Development: New Directions
Warren Ilchman, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley
J. Public Administration: The Administration of Social Services
Paul Puryear, Department of Political Science, Fisk University

II. Philosophy, Theory and Method

K. Ethical Theory
Richard Flathman, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago
L. Formal Theory
Gordon Black, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester
M. Problems of Measurement and Method
Lester Milbrath, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Buffalo

III. Political Science and Public Policy

N. The Impact of the Social Sciences on Society: A Retrospect on Recent Major Policy Issues
Graham Allison, Department of Government, Harvard University
O. The Impact of the Social Sciences on Society: Prospects for the Major Issues of the Future
Murray Edelman, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin

IV. Political Science: A Self-Evaluation

P. Political Science as a Vocation
Merle Kling, Department of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis
Q. Teaching Political Science
G. Bingham Powell, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

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ADDRESS FOR NEW MANUSCRIPTS AFTER JUNE 1, 1970

Beginning June 1, 1970, the Review's Managing Editor Elect, Professor Nelson W. Polsby, will assume all responsibility for referring and making decisions on all newly submitted manuscripts and for deciding on manuscripts referred but not decided on prior to June 1. Accordingly, after June 1, 1970 all new manuscripts and all correspondence concerning manuscripts not then decided upon should be sent to:

Professor Nelson W. Polsby, Managing Editor Elect
American Political Science Review
Department of Political Science
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California 94720

Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of up to 200 words briefly describing the article's contents. All manuscripts and abstracts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page. Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only an a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION*

September, 1970

Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, University of Wisconsin, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Public Housing"

Gordon S. Black, University of Rochester, "Some Notes on the Process of Professionalization in Politics"

Jack Dennis, University of Wisconsin, "Support for the Institution of Elections by the Mass Public"

John P. Diggins, University of California, Irvine, "Ideology and Pragmatism: Philosophy or Passion?"

Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation"

Barbara Hinckley, University of Massachusetts, "Incumbency and the Presidential Vote in Senate Elections: Defining Parameters of Subpresidential Voting"

Raymond F. Hopkins, Swarthmore College, "The Role of the M.P. in Tanzania"

Chong Lim Kim, University of Iowa, "Political Attitudes of Defeated Candidates in American State Elections"

Edward N. Muller, University of Iowa, "Cross-National Dimensions of Political Competence"

Donald Rothchild, University of California, Davis, "Kenya's Africanization Program: Priorities of Development and Equity"

John W. Soule and James W. Clarke, Florida State University, "Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the Democratic National Convention"

Gilbert R. Winham, McMaster University, "Political Development and Lerner's Theory: Further Tests of a Causal Model"

December, 1970

Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, University of Michigan, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology"

Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., University of North Carolina, "A Causal Approach to Non-random Measurement Errors"

Giuseppe Di Palma and Herbert McClosky, University of California, Berkeley, "Personality and Conformity to Political and Social Attitudes"

Harlan Hahn, University of California, Riverside, "Correlates of Public Sentiments on War: The Vietnam Referendum"

Henry S. Kariel, University of Hawaii, "Creating Political Reality"

Robert Melson, Michigan State University, and Howard Wolpe, Western Michigan University, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective"

Edward N. Muller, University of Iowa, "The Representation of Citizens by Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support"

Eric Nordlinger, Brandeis University, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic Change in the Non-western States"

Jerrold G. Rusk, Purdue University, "The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876–1908"

Giovanni Sartori, University of Florence, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics"

Herbert F. Weisberg, University of Michigan, and Jerrold G. Rusk, Purdue University, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation"

Jerzy J. Wiatr, University of Warsaw, "Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland"

March, 1971

James W. Clarke and E. Lester Levine, Florida State University, "Marijuana Use, Social Deviance and Political Alienation: A Study of High School Youth"

James S. Coleman, Johns Hopkins University, "Political Money"

Duncan MacRae, Jr., University of Chicago, "Scientific Communication, Ethical Argument, and Public Policy"

Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Harvard University, "Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government"

Theodore R. Marmor, University of Minnesota, "Income Maintenance Alternatives: Concepts, Criteria, and Program Comparisons"

Robert Melson, Michigan State University, "Ideology and Inconsistency: The Politics of the 'Cross-Pressured' Nigerian Worker"

Donald S. Zagoria, Hunter College, " 'Rice' and 'Feudal' Communism in India"

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* Production exigencies may occasionally necessitate publication of articles in issues other than those given in this listing.

GROUP FLIGHTS TO LOS ANGELES

for 1970 APSA Annual Meeting

September 8-12

The association has arranged group flights from several cities to Los Angeles for the APSA Annual Meeting, September 8-12, 1970. The group fares are the same as excursion fares, but the regulations will permit individuals to return any day of the week and in less than seven days.

The fares for these flights are based on a minimum of 25 participants on regularly scheduled airlines:

New York-Los Angeles	September 7 (Evening)	$238.35
New York-Los Angeles	September 8 (Morning)	$238.35
Boston-Los Angeles	September 8	$248.85
Washington-Los Angeles	September 8	$226.80
Chicago-Los Angeles	September 8	$170.55
Atlanta-Los Angeles	September 8	$193.20
Seattle-Los Angeles	September 8	$109.20

Each group is required to depart together, but passengers may return individually according to their own wishes. The only requirement is that they reserve a direct flight back on the same airline. These flights are open only to members of the Association and their immediate families. For more information and application forms, write to:

Director, Group Flights to Los Angeles

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Professional Placement Service at
1970 Annual Meeting
(September 8-12, 1970)

A Professional Placement Service will be available to members of the American Political Science Association attending the Los Angeles meeting. The service will be located in the Galleria Room of the Biltmore Hotel.

Although sponsored by APSA, this Service is entirely separate from APSA's Personnel Service and therefore requires separate registration.

A file of applicants seeking employment will be available for review by employers and descriptions of position openings will be made available to applicants. Adequate facilities for personal interviews will be provided.

If you plan to attend the Conference and utilize the Placement Service, please complete and mail the form below as soon as possible *but no later than August 3, 1970.* Applicant and/or employer order forms will be forwarded to you upon receipt of your request.

Both employers and applicants can register during the meeting but those filing in advance will receive expedited service. Pre-Convention registration is strongly recommended.

- -

Name: ____

(Organization or Institution) ______________________________

____

Address: ____

____

(City) (State) (Zip)

☐ Employer ☐ Number of Position Categories

☐ Applicant

Will you be available for interviews during the annual meeting

☐ Yes ☐ No

Mail to:

Convention Placement Service
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

LOW COST GROUP INSURANCE AVAILABLE TO APSA MEMBERS

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

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

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

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